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Recent changes in social policy for delinquency has seen the
retention of the juvenile court in England and the institution of a
neu form of juvenile justice in Scotland, the Children's Hearings.
In both countries the responsibility for the making of decisions
about delinquents rests with lay members of the community, magistrates
in England and panel members in Scotland.
Given the lack of definitive statement as to 'need® or
'delinquency®, information about delinquents will be assessed in
terms of the 'frames of relevance® employed and the 'available
ideologies® from which they are derived. From this starting point
the aim of the thesis is to compare the making of decisions by panel
members and magistrates operating within different organisational
structures. The argument is presented in three main sections.
Firstly, an examination is made of conceptions of human action
and how these relate the ascription of responsibility, the infliction
of punishment or the offer of treatment. The determinist-indeterminist
debate in philosophy is discussed with reference to available theories
of delinquency causation.
Secondly, the development of juvenile justice is seen to be
one in which there has been a move towards forms of delinquency
control based upon determinist assumptions. A basic conflict,
however, remains in reconciling a 'judicial® and a 'welfare' ideology.
Thirdly, in the empirical study, an examination is made of the
extent to which panel members and magistrates, in the making of
decisions, share similar frames of relevance and the implications
this has for the practical accomplishment of juvenile justice within
different organisational structures. The findings are discussed with







The 1968 Social Work (Scotland) Act and the 1969 Children and
Young Persons Act in England have been noted (May 1971) as indicating
the acceptance of a treatment philosophy as a legitimate paradigm for
dealing with delinquents. Nevertheless, a crucial difference between
the respective systems of juvenile justice is that whereas in England
the juvenile court system has been retained (though further restrictions
were imposed on the prosecution of children and young persons), the
changes in Scottish juvenile justice were characterised by more radical
developments. A totally new form of proceedings, Children's Hearings,
was introduced.
Thus though changes in both countries may reflect increasing
acceptance of the idea of treatment rather than punishment for
children in trouble, the developments in Scotland have been more
fundamental with the abolition of the juvenile court. Moreover, the
conflict inherent in the juvenile court system, highlighted both in the
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Kilbrandon and the Ingleby Reports, between the need to adjudicate on
issues and the need to take into consideration the welfare of the
child has been resolved by the separation of the two functions. The
Children's Hearing, unlike the English Juvenile Court, is therefore no
court of law and is concerned only with making decisions as to the need
for compulsory measures of care. Although the legislation has there¬
fore implemented essentially different systems of juvenile justice,
both Acts are nevertheless the outcome of a common movement to penal
reform which, as will be seen, had its roots in the last century.
The major assumption which provides the logic of this thesis,
and which will be developed in the course of it, is that responses to
delinquency - what is actually done about it - are determined in part
by the manner in which delinquency is conceived. This holds good not
only for official policy statements, but also for the assumptions about
the causation of delinquency held by the members of agencies of social
control.
1. Report of the Committee on Children and Young Persons (Scotland).
Edinburgh, H.M.S.O. 1964 (Cmnd.2306). Hereinafter referred to as
the Kilbrandon Report.
2. Report of Committee on Children and Young Persons. London. H.M.S.O.
1960 (Cmnd.1191). Hereinafter referred to as the Ingleby Report.
The 1968 Social Work (Scotland) Act and the 1969 Children
and Young Persons Act have both been interpreted as the culmination
of a process of continual redefinition and reconceptualisation of
juvenile delinquency, which has in turn been accompanied by a trend
towards removing delinquency from the scope of the criminal law and
into the ambit of professional social work. (May 1971) Certainly,
both .the Acts espouse an approach to delinquency control based
primarily on a treatment or welfare philosophy rather than on a
punitive mode of intervention. And though the respective systems
of juvenile justice have very different administrative and organis¬
ational structures, their guiding precepts are those consonant with
an approach to dealing with delinquents in which the needs of the
offender are more important than the offence, itself taken as being
symptomatic of some underlying condition. Buvenile justice is then
'individualised' in that measures decided upon are to be determined
by the social and personal background of the offender, for which
purpose wide discretionary powers are necessary at all stages of the
process. It is because of the width of discretionary powers conferred
that the movement to measures for children based on welfare or treat¬
ment rather than punishment has also been accompanied by a debate on
the respective merits of judicial or non-judicial forms of
intervention.
A presupposition common to both Acts is that delinquency is a
behavioural condition - rather than a simple legal or judicial
category - which requires diagnosis and assessment prior to the
application of appropriate welfare measures. The semantics of
delinquency control are based upon medical analogies and metaphors
as if delinquency were an illness and were pathological. As Rock
points out, a danger associated with such usage of metaphor is that
the metaphor becomes reality and that delinquency becomes sickness,
disease, or illness. (Rock 1973, p.16) Nosological analogy becomes
nosological reality and by this very means, delinquency control has
increasingly come to be the responsibility of the 'experts'. (Bean
1976) Moreover, the true nature of the actual functioning of juvenile
justice systems may well be obscured by a process of mystification
(Matza 1964), whereby the logic of euphemism (May 1977) deflects
attention from the true nature of juvenile justice administration.
The concentration of attention upon the offender and the tendency to
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construe deeds' as if they were objective properties of individuals
serve to obscure the problematic nature of the conceptual framework
on which particular systems of juvenile justice are based. In
particular:
"
.... while the therapeutic strategy does not
theoretically preclude the recognition of a connection
between the private problems and public issues .... in
practice, it frequently fosters a world view within
which sense can be made out of phenomena .... without
the necessity of critical reflection upon the nature of
society's institutions." (Carson 1974)
The rhetoric of therapy and the quasi-medical terminology in
which the government reports and white papers leading up to both the
1968 and the 1969 Acts are phrased endow the problem of delinquency
control with an air of straightforwardness. Since, in accordance
with the principle of individualised justice, the main criterion of
intervention is considered to be 'need1, the appropriate measures of
care for dealing with delinquency are to be determined solely by
reference to individual children's needs. But the identification
of need is not such a straightforward process despite the recurrent
use of the medical analogy and the involvement of agencies such as
the social services which allegedly have the expertise necessary
for the diagnosis and treatment of children's problems.
3
The official pronouncements contained in both the Seebohm and
the Kilbrandon Reports recommended the reorganisation of social
service agencies in accordance with the redefined role of social work
in the meeting and prevention of social need. The relevance of this
for juvenile delinquency was that delinquency was reconceptualised as
being symptomatic of 'need' and therefore an appropriate area of
social work concern. But the decisions as to the necessity of
measures of care as envisaged in the two major reports were to be
the responsibility of agencies which were not part of the social
services. Thus, in England, children were still to be dealt with by
the courts though welfare was to be a prime consideration; and in
Scotland, though children could still be prosecuted and appear in
court for other reasons, decisions in the main were to be made by
the non-judicial body to be known as the Children's Panel. Though
3. Report of the Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal
Social Services. Cmnd. 3703, 1968.
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the administration of juvenile justice is officially determined in
both countries by a philosophy of welfare and need contained in the
respective government documents, this does not preclude the possi¬
bility that in practice official objectives are supplemented or
even substituted by other objectives. The existence of a formal
philosophy of delinquency control does not imply that there is
consensus as to how best to deal with delinquency as there may be
competing philosophies in evidence in society at any one time.
(Stoll 1968) Part of the purpose of this thesis is to examine the
extent to which those involved in the operation and administration
of juvenile justice share similar philosophies of delinquency control.
As such, our concern is with the criminal justice process. In
particular, we wish to argue that the selective and interpretative
activity of social control agents, in this case panel members and
juvenile magistrates, - governed as such activities will be by their
systems of belief - are important determinants in the practical
accomplishment of juvenile justice.
Social Control and Ideology
Research which attempts to relate the background character¬
istics of children with the decisions made in respect of these
children depends entirely on inference when attempting to draw
conclusions about how such decisions were reached. Thus, whereas
different authors acknowledge the importance of the interpretative
activity of control agents, they have not always adopted a method¬
ological strategy appropriate for the analysis of how individuals
within control networks assess information and make decisions. And
whereas this approach, which typifies much of traditional delinquency
and criminological research, treats the nature of the social control
process as non-problematic, more recent developments acknowledge
that
"
.... the issues of defining and enforcing the [criminal]
law are now regarded themselves as problematic and not
objectively given." (Downes and Rock 1971, p.351)
"
.... deviance is not a quality of the act the person
commits, but rather a consequence of the application by
others of rules and sanctions to an 'offence1. The
deviant is one to whom that label has been applied
successfully; deviant behaviour is behaviour that
people so label." (Becker 1963, p.9)
5.
Influenced by the development of a sociology of deviance,
emphasis in criminological research has increasingly been directed
away from the causes of delinquent and criminal behaviour. A
major focus with the more recent developments has become the nature
and mode of operation of the institutions. of social control, not
only in the maintenance but also the generation of definitions of
deviance. Deviance has come to be seen as a quality that is
ascribed rather than as a property inherent in a person and thus
subject to rigorous scientific examination. The relocation of the
focus of criminological studies on the institutions of control and
on the process whereby deviance or criminality is ascribed does not
seem to us logically to imply that aetiological studies are thereby
theoretically futile. That needs careful argument. However, the
significance of a sociology of deviance is the very fact that it
does treat the social control process as problematic.
Identifying this process of ascription as a major determinant
of deviance also relocates deviance or criminality in its complex
relationship with legal institutions (flatza 1964) whereas positivist
criminology had treated such processes as objectively given. In
particular, positivist criminology, in lacking an appropriate basis
in the sociology of law, ignored the very processes and conditions
by which particular forms of behaviour had come to be the subject of
criminal sanction. The invocation of the criminal law as a process
of social control has now become a more important focus for socio¬
logical studies of crime and the law than are criminality and
offenders.
Moreover, such a process may well be determined by factors
other than the officially stated objectives of social control. The
importance of the early chapters of this thesis in tracing the
conceptual, and historical evolution of juvenile justice in England
and Scotland is that they present a statement as to official and
formal objectives in delinquency control. And
"such an examination will benefit by heuristically
distinguishing the official goals of the court from
its functions, particularly those which sociologists
call unintended or unanticipated consequences of
purposeful action." (Lemert, 1970, p.136)
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The historical endowment of juvenile justice - for the
purpose of the present argument, a commitment to a welfare-
oriented philosophy - may well be fundamentally modified in its
implementation since there is no easy translation of policy into
practice. (flatza 1964) Comment has been made on the euphemistic
nature of the language associated with therapy and individualised
justice and their distortion of the true nature of the administration
and organisation of crime control. (Allen 1964*, Tappan 1949) IMor
has displacement of officially-stated goals or objectives (Rock
1973) passed unnoticed in the context of other welfare institutions.
Kogan, for example, reviews the traditional approach to studying
organisational structures in which they were viewed as if they
pursued objectively-defined goals and as if the organisation
operated monolithically. (Kogan 1971) He criticises the failure of
such an approach to attach significance to the subjective ideas held
by members of such organisations for the actual implementation of
formal policy statements. That is, the ideological orientations of
members of relevant organisations affect whether or not, or to what
extent, the objectives contained in the formal or official ideology
are actually realised. (See also Piatt 1975)
It is a major assumption of this thesis that the informal
working ideologies of those responsible for implementing a treatment
or welfare-oriented philosophy in the respective systems of juvenile
justice in Scotland and England will affect the way in which, or the
extent to which, the policies stated in the relevant official pro¬
nouncements have actually been put into effect. Therefore by
identifying the ideologies of delinquency and deviance maintained by
the various agents of social control, we can identify possible
sources of strain in the social control network. (Stoll 1968)
Further consideration must therefore be given to the notion cf
ideology, and its implications for the administration of juvenile
justice in Scotland and England.
Uie shall follow Smith in his definition of ideology as
"a configuration of relatively abstract ideas and
attitudes in which the elements are bound together
by a relatively high degree of inter-relatedness or
functional interdependence." (Smith, 1976, p,50)
Moreover, he adds that an ideology may be (a) formal as an
abstract system of ideas or (b) informal as an operational philosophy
which organisational members employ in determining action and
decision-making. The philosophy ('formal ideology') underlying the
two Acts in question, based on a reconceptualisation of delinquency
as symptomatic of need may well be mediated in practice by the
operational philosophies (informal ideologies) of those responsible
for implementation of the legislation. This is particularly
important for a number of reasons.
Firstly, official statistics relating to the number of
different disposals reached by panel members and by magistrates,
such as those contained in the Annual Social Work Scotland Statistics
and the Criminal Statistics for England and Wales, can tell us
relatively little about the process by which decisions in terms of
need are made about children. Official statistics are not
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accurate indicators of the level of need or the extent of
criminal behaviour in the community. Indeed, it has been argued
that such statistics may reveal more about the circumstances in which
they were produced. (Kitsuse and Cicourel 1963*, Hindess 1973)
Official statistics are construed as the outcome of successive stages
of selection and identification by different agents within the social
control network, of those children deemed to be 'in need' or
'delinquent'. With particular reference to juvenile court practices,
Tappan has indicated the influence on the administration of juvenile
justice of the different interpretations by personnel working within
an organisational structure with wide terms of reference consonant
with discretionary decision-making. Cicourel criticises traditional
sociological theories of deviance in which
"there is no attempt to show how the 'man-on-the-street'
and law-enforcement officials, through the former's
conception of 'wrong doing' and the latter's policies
and day to day decision-making are key elements in
how juveniles come to be known as delinquent."
(Cicourel 1963, p. 31)
The significance of the ideological orientations or operational
ideologies of law enforcement personnel has also been recognised in
the context of police work (Skolnick 1966; Bordua 1967) and prosec¬
ution (Blumberg 1967; Chambliss 1974) where the notion of police and
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prosecutors operating within the strict parameters of legally
prescribed procedures and relevances (Box 1971) is shown to be
a misrepresentation of policing and prosecution.
Though within the formal ideology espoused by government
reports and underlying the particular forms of delinquency control
introduced by the two Acts, the main criteria of intervention are
based on 'need' and the need for compulsory measures of care, neither
of the reports provides an adequate conceptual framework by which
need can be defined. That is, though the logic of delinquency
control is the meeting of need there is a failure to provide
definitive statements as to what actually constitutes social need
and how it can best be assessed and met. Had only 'professional'
social agencies been involved in the social control network then
such an omission would not have been quite so significant in that
the operational definitions of need would have been provided by the
ideological orientation of the profession concerned. (Though even
'professional' conceptions of need are subject to diffuse inter¬
pretations.) But the development of delinquency control in the
context of both the 1969 and the 1968 Acts allowed lay persons,
panel members in Scotland and magistrates in England, to have the
ultimate responsibility for decision-making about children in need,
at least in the first instance. The absence of a definitive state¬
ment as to 'social need',it is suggested, means that prime notions
such as 'need' and 'delinquency' obtain their very meaning only in
the process of ascription by the various personnel operating within
the social control network. Conceiving of delinquency or need as
social constructions rather than simply as properties intrinsic to
individuals necessitates a closer examination of how decisions and
compulsory measures of care are reached by agents within that network.
An equally important reason for considering the significance of
the operational ideologies of those personnel responsible for the
administration of juvenile justice is that there is an essential
difference between a nation of justice in theory and the notion of
justice as an operational concept. Blumberg (1967) for example,
suggests that the criminal justice system in the U.S.A., though
theoretically guided by a due-process ideology, is primarily
oriented to the depersonalised goals of 'production'. The modifi¬
cation of the formal ideological prescriptions are a consequence of
the fact that -
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"The rule of law is not self-executing. It is translated
into reality by men in institutions. Traditional
constitutional elements of criminal law, when placed
in the institutional setting of a modern criminal court,
are reshaped by a bureaucratic organisation to serve its
requirements and goals." (Blumberg 1966, p. 5)
In considering the status of key individuals in the admini¬
stration of juvenile justice, conceptual niceties give way to
practical difficulties. It is the very possibility of disagreement
with the rationale behind juvenile justice systems that differ¬
entiates between a notion of justice in practice and in theory. For
the purposes of this thesis, we are more concerned with how justice
is practically accomplished through decision-making than with the
question of what is the conceptual framework underpinning a
particular notion of justice.
Social policy in general and penal policy in particular
(Rock 1973) is only realised through its implementation within an
administrative framework. In the process of implementation, policy
objectives and the means of achieving these may be redefined by the
individuals operating within that framework since there is no easy
translation of policy into practice. A degree of strain (Stoll 1968)
may then appear between the objectives of the formal ideology on
which the policy is based and the objectives set by the informal
working ideologies of those responsible for its implementation.
This is particularly so in a system of justice where the lack of
definitive statement, theoretical or legislative, as to children's
needs is accompanied by wide discretionary powers. Against such a
background, desoite the promise of the legislation, concern has been
expressed about the extent of such discretionary powers available to
the members of the systems of social control with particular respons¬
ibility for children. (flatza 1964*, Fox 1976*, Grant 1976) The
movement towards an ideology of welfare or treatment has meant that
the criteria on which decisions about children are based will
necessarily be more diffuse than those established by an ideology
of punishment. Not unexpectedly, juvenile justice may then become
riddled with 'rampant discretion'. (Matza 1964) And since the
principle of individualised justice according to needs requires
examination of these diffuse social personal or environmental
characteristics, the relation between the disposition and the
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criteria of judgment is not easily ascertained. This is the danger
of examining the process of decision-making only by making inference
as to the operation of organisational or administrative structures
from official statistics without assigning significance to the role
of operational ideologies in determining and generating information
summarised in such statistics.
As an aid to reaching decisions under the principle of
individualised justice a wealth of material is collated in respect
of children. But information to be used in decision-making has to
be interpreted and in the process of interpretation, the individual
has to be able to identify what is for him information relevant to
the purpose of decision-making. The relevance ascribed to information
for this purpose will differ from individual to individual, from
agency to agency since, though all may be oriented to the same
system of juvenile justice -
"
.... the articulation of that orientation with actual
events and discussions is an empirical issue basic to
sociological interests in social organisation."
(Cicourel 1968, p.45)
The emphasis on organisational members1 operational ideologies
has hitherto mainly been concerned with 8orofessional8 ideologies.
(Strauss et al 1964,; Silverman 1971; Smith 1977; Hardiker 1977)
But what is particularly interesting about juvenile justice as
realised in the Hearing and Court system of Scotland and England
respectively is that, despite the medical and technical rhetoric
associated with a welfare ideology that pervades official
literature, responsibility for decision-making about children in
need rests finally with 8lay! persons. That is, the lay panel members
in Scotland and the lay magistrates in England are charged with the
responsibility of making decisions about children, though professional
agencies are involved in the important functions of the assessment of
need and the execution of welfare measures. Indeed the differences in
the Scottish and English legislation suggest that even decisions as to
welfare have become the responsibility of the English social services
department with a consequent loss of power for the magistracy (see
below).
There is a difference of approach to decisions about children
as between 8professionals8 and 8lay8 people. An examination of this
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difference shows how important is the fact of the lay status of the
decisionmakers. And by focusing on the issue of what constitutes
relevant information as a basis for decisions about children in
need, sources of ideological conflict can be identified in a system
where sociological and philosophical interests converge. In
particular, the move at a formal level from a punitive, judicially-
oriented philosophy of juvenile justice to a more welfare-oriented
philosophy does not preclude the possibility that the operational
ideologies of those responsible for the disposal of cases do not
completely agree with official pronouncements and intentions.
Professional Ideologies and Relevance
In an attempt to minimise the injustices that can arise from
discretionary decision-making, Davis (1969) seeks to establish a means
whereby the exercise of discretion can be brought within the
precise nature and relationship of the criteria upon which decisions
are made from a legal and a welfare perspective. (Titmuss 1971) The
dangers associated with discretionary decision-making in the context
of social policy in general have initiated a concern to establish
appropriate parameters to restrict the scope of discretion; and in
juvenile justice in particular have promoted a constitutionalist
revision of the mode of state intervention in juvenile delinquency,
especially in the United States. (Faust and Brantingham 1974, Part
IV) But even in this country, there has been concern that the
gradual move towards an approach to delinquency control based on a
welfare philosophy has been at the cost of adequate legal protection.
The status of children's rights (MacCormick 1974; Watson 1976) makes
the imposition of measures in terms of need a particularly complex
issue.
We see that in the development of juvenile justice in Britain,
the initial assumption of jurisdiction by the courts over cases of
neglect and deprivation was the beginning of a process in which
delinquency was redefined as being an appropriate area for social-
work intervention. Accordingly, both in terms of size and respons¬
ibility, the social services have expanded considerably and their
contribution to delinquency control has been emphasised by the fact
that two government reports urged the reorganisation of the social
services in an attempt to deal better with delinquency. But even
where 1 professionals' such as social workers, psychiatrists and
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psychologists are involved in a system of juvenile justice, this does
not necessarily imply that all share the same approach to the assess¬
ment and treatment of behavioural problems. Though any system of
individualised justice necessarily entails wide discretionary powers
(Campbell 1977), the diffuse nature of the characteristics that could
be taken as a basis for decision-making and the lack of definitive
objective statements as to need (Smith 1977 ) suggest that how
delinquency is conceived of in differing professional orientations
may be determined by among other things the ideological basis of the
stance adopted by particular professions. To the social worker, the
criminal may be seen as a patient requiring treatment; to the lawyer,
4
a responsible law breaker who ought to be punished. Though the
differing professions may be able to justify particular decisions in
terms of professional judgment within the ideological orientation of
the profession towards, in this case, delinquency control, this
implies a lack of shared criteria and justification between different
professions.
Perhaps we should note at this juncture the difficulty in
actually defining what is meant by *professionalism* though
Johnson (1972) comments on the attraction to particular occupational
groups of being considered 1 professional1 -
"
.... professionalism is a successful ideology and as
such has entered the political vocabulary of a wide range
of occupational groups who compete for status and income."
(Johnson 1972, p.32)
Though 'socialisation® into particular forms of knowledge and
the acquisition of specific skills and expertise, mainly through
training provides suitable qualifications, there is more to profession-
alism than that. Prestige and status are indeed important elements.
Thus what Etzioni ( 1961) and Pearson (1975, p.16) can refer to as the
semi-professions may well adopt the quasi-medical, technical
terminology of more established professions such as psychiatry or
even law, but have not yet attained an equivalent position of status.
Social work is a classic example of this.
It would be naive, however, to assert that within professional
groups it would be possible to identify a single dominant ideology
4. A particularly significant discussion of the fundamental
difference in orientation of such as social workers and lawyers
is to be found in the writing of G.H. Mead. (1918)
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expressed in the practical accomplishment of their task. Even within
groups there is the opportunity for ideological conflict, the best
example perhaps being of social work (Smith 15-77; Hardiker 1977),
though even in other contexts, particularly the medical and psychiatric
fields, there is empirical evidence for this. (Strauss et al 1964)
a more theoretical level, Schutz argues that the social scientist
also operates in a system of relevancies which he shares with others
in their common everyday lives (Schutz 1967).] Recent debate and
controversy about the methods adopted in one of the Scottish List D
schools is as much indicative of ideological conflict about how to
deal with children as it is about the relationships between the
personalities involved. However, there seem to us to be some
important distinctions that can be drawn being a member of a
'professional' group and being a 'lay' person and it is to a
development of this that we now turn.
A distinction can be made in relation to the types of checks
which may operate on discretionary decision-making by considering
administrative (Adler 1976) and 'professional' decision-making.
Under a model of administrative decision-making, decisions are made
with reference to a body of rules and regulations and the ultimate
justification of the decision is that it has been made in accordance
with those rules and regulations. Decisions made by a children's
hearing or a juvenile court can then be judged in terms of whether
they meet the statutory requirements governing procedure. But under
a model of professional decision-making the ultimate justification
for a decision is that the decision was made through the correct
exercise of professional judgment. The criteria on which a decision
is made are drawn from a stock of professional knowledge and though
the professional may exercise discretion, some check can be made on
his decision by reference to that stock of professional knowledge
which creates for him a frame of relevance. Information has to be
subjected to a process of interpretation by which only that which is
relevant is sifted out. The rela/ance of information about children's
needs depends not so much on the existence of identifiable objective
criteria as on the conceptual framework underpinning the selective or
interpretive activity of individuals which for the professional rests
on four main assumptions. (See Berger and Luckmann 1966, p.130 ff.)
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Firstly, there must be a body of knowledge that accounts for
delinquency and need. Secondly, there must be a corpus of diagnostic
concepts indicative of clearly defined symptoms. Only by appropriate
diagnosis can a condition be identified. Thirdly, there must also be
accepted measures for treating identified conditions. Finally, there
must be some statement as to the objectives sought. Interpretation of
information about children suspected of being in need will be made by
reference to that frame of relevance provided by the knowledge,
diagnostic tools, accepted measures and objectives from which the
individual derives his professional identity.
A frame of relevance provides the professional with a set of
generalisations or typifications about delinquency which allows him
to identify particular cases as coming under a more general category.
Definitions of need and assumptions about causation then relate to a
variety of factors such as broken home, deprived areas and so on,
depending on the particular professional stance. Thus, the process
of interpretation of need against a particular frame of relevance
allows the professional to make sense of a welath of potentially
ambiguous information. But he is also able thereby to construct
an explanation of delinquency in particular cases and though the
assumed causes of delinquency may have little empirical validity,
they do at least have heuristic value. That is, whether they truly
are the causes of delinquency or not has less significance than the
value they have for the individual by allowing him to make sense of
and impose explanations and order on information in his role as
professional. In this way, a degree of clarity and routine is imposed
on the decision-making process. Moreover, a frame of relevance means
that discretion is exercised in accordance with particular profes¬
sional knowledge and though there may be room for disagreement as to
professional decisions and their appropriateness, a common frame of
relevance provides the basis for shared understanding of a problem.
Decisions can then be checked by reference to the professional
standards and knowledge of the profession, though, as in the case
of social work, some professional bodies are characterised by a lack
of consensus as to knowledge base and practice.
But the very lack of objectively relevant criteria as to the
causes of delinquency and the needs of delinquent children has
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implications for the relationship between different professions
within the social control network, e.g. between the police, social
worker, psychiatrist, psychologist and so on. The lack of a
consistently defined frame of relevance means that they do not share
a common understanding of behavioural problems. Because relevance is
a quality that is ascribed to information and not an intrinsic
property of information, the operation of juvenile justice based on
welfare is circumsribed by competing frames of relevance. Because
of the existence of a number of different professions within the
organisational network for administering juvenile justice, and
because of the lack of a consistent conceptual framework underlying
the legislation, each profession operates in terms of its own back¬
ground knowledge, diagnostic concepts and objectives. An important
medium through which members of occupational groups groups are
introduced to the ideological orientation of their profession is
through the training and recruitment programme. The new recruit or
novitiate (Bankowski, 1977, Chp.4) is 'socialised1 and it is this
process of professional socialisation which lends solidarity to
occupational structure since -
"with .... a generally homogeneous group there tend
to be fewer divergent points of view which would clash
over the meaning of facts and thus give rise to inter¬
pretations on a more theoretical level." (Mills 1963,
p.527)
Matza has also referred to the importance of training and professional
background of these personnel operating within a system of juvenile
justice characterised by 'rampant discretion'. (Matza 1964)
However, the interpretation of children's behaviour and the
decision as to the appropriate measures for dealing with behavioural
problems made by the police, social workers, psychiatrists and so on
may differ more fundamentally in their acceptance of different frames
of relevance.
But more germane to our purposes is the point that discretion is
a contextually defined concept by which I mean that it cannot be
exercised in vacuo, but must always be in reference to a particular
frame of relevance. In this way, limits can be placed on the
exercise of discretionary judgment by reference to the body of
professional knowledge from which different agencies derive their
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professional identity. Thus, although the policeman and the social
worker both have considerable discretionary power, it is exercised
within different professional contexts and checks on decision¬
making can be made in terms of the principles of police and social
work respectively.
However, since no frame of relevance, whether it be that of
the social worker, psychiatrist, policeman, or psychologist, has
necessarily any prior claim to validity:
"
.... contradictions in the ideologies of deviance
held by various agents will create strains in the social
control network." (Schur 1971, p.166)
The difficulty confronting the panel member and the magistrate
is that not only are they not professionals, claiming allegiance to a
particular frame of relevance (though as we shall see, the distinction
between 'professional' and 'lay' status is not an easy one to sustain),
they are nevertheless required to make decisions on the basis of
information provided by the various professions. How then does the
'lay' panel member ascribe relevance to information provided by the
main agencies in the social control network and what implications
does this have for the practical accomplishment of juvenile justice?
Relevance and 'Lay' Ideologies
A professional frame of relevance not only provides a means of
interpreting and explaining behavioural characteristics of children
but also provides a means whereby professional expertise can be
acquired through a process of learning and training. The social
worker and psychiatrist are both seen as professionals in their own
right in as much as they have sufficiently acquainted themselves with
the body of knowledge, diagnostic concepts and accepted treatment
measures of their respective professions. In other words, a frame
of relevance determines not only who is to be treated but also who
is to be responsible for deciding on and administering treatment.
However, despite the rhetoric of therapy that pervades delinquency
control, those responsible for decision-making, panel members and
magistrates, are in fact 'lay' persons. For the purpose of this
thesis, the use of 'lay' is slightly different from that commonly
employed in the literature. 'Lay' is here taken to refer to the
status of organisational members of the respective systems of
juvenile justice who are not 'professional' members of the social-
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control network. In this respect such usage differs from that in
which the term ®lay® is used to refer to the operational ideologies
of those in the social-control network, be they professional or not.
Thus Cicourel can refer to the lay theories of delinquency sustained
by the police, social workers etc. (Cicourel 1968) For expediency,
'lay® ideologies here refers to the operational philosophies of those
involved in the system of juvenile justice for whom professional
status is not claimed.
As we shall argue, the lay status of panel members and
magistrates is of particular importance for a number of reasons.
Firstly, panel members and magistrates are responsible for making
the decision as to whether or not a child is in need of compulsory
measures of care. Secondly, though panel members and magistrates
are not themselves professionals, they nevertheless have to assess
information presented by different professional agencies and
individuals, none of whom may necessarily share the same orient¬
ation to the assessment of children, particularly children who commit
offences. Thirdly, and related to the last point, panel members and
magistrates have the opportunity of assessing information contained
in the different reports and of supplementing this with information
gleaned from discussions with the child and his parents or with
certain of the professionals in the course of hearing a case. For
these tasks, panel members® and magistrates® ®lay® ideologies of
delinquency control are significant in their impact on discretionary
decision-making. But unlike the professional, the lay person has no
professional stock of knowledge which provides a frame of relevance
and for the purpose of examing the nature of lay ideologies and frames
of relevance, we shall employ the notion of available ideologies.
Available Ideologies
As a 'lay® person, the panel member and magistrate has access
to what has been referred to as
"a socially approved system of typifications and
relevances." (Schutz 1970, p.121)
on which depends everyday social interaction. That is, for the
purpose of ordinary social intercourse, he shares in a stock of public
knowledge which allows the individual to select those elements in a
social situation which are relevant for adopting particular courses
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of action. Much in the same way as a body of knowledge provides for
the 'professional' a frame of relevance, so does this stock of public
knowledge provide a means of interpreting and explaining events in
the world. Indeed, through typifications certain events in the
world can be anticipated, allowing responses to such events or
patterns of events to be constructed. Similarly, it provides a
means of shared communication and understanding. But whereas the
professional frames of relevance can be acquired through learning
and training, the frame of relevance providing an interpretative
scheme for the 'lay person in everyday life originates in the bio¬
graphical situation of the individual'. (Schutz 1970) The
formation and use of commonsense concepts also allows for a variety
of 'lay' frames of relevance as a consequence of the varieties of
individual experience.
This is particularly important since a number of studies have
revealed the social class bias of membership of the Children's
Hearings and Ouvenile Court. (Smith & May 1971*, Hood 1962) The
implication of this is that the administration of juvenile justice
is mediated by assumptions of a group broadly similar in their values
about delinquency control. However, though for the purposes of
communication and understanding in the wider social context, 'lay'
frames of relevance are fundamentally similar because of their
origin in the stock of publicly-available knowledge, the
individual's own experiences create for him a frame of relevance
which is not totally public.
But in relation to his role as panel member or magistrate,
through his own private frame of relevance, the individual brings
to the hearing situation public and lay conceptions of delinquency,
its causation, and how to deal with it. The suggestion that delinquency
uontock operates in practice in terms of a treatment philosophy is fallacious
since this ignores the social context of the decision-making process.
The actual implementation of a treatment philosophy in the form of a
court or hearing system is in particular mediated by values and
assumptions about delinquency employed in the broader social context.
Such values and assumptions though not the same as more
'scientific' or 'professionally' respectable statements may never¬
theless be the source of lay theories which are -
"reflections and refractions of professional theories
past and present, which have been transmitted like
rumours from the writing of 'experts® (Box, 1971,
p.180)
In this way, 'scientific® or professionally respectable theories of
criminality or delinquency, its identification and its treatment
provide what may be referred to as 'available ideologies® from
which lay versions may be derived.
UJe have already discussed (p. 6 ff.) the notion of ideology
that is employed in this thesis. An 'available® ideology is one
that individuals can draw upon or that can provide the source for
frames of relevance pertinent to different social practices. In
relation to panel members and magistrates the available ideologies
with which we are concerned are those that contain assumptions about
delinquents, delinquency and its causation. In this respect, quite
apart from the commonsense notions of delinquency that are publicly
available for absorption into ordinary consciousness, panel members
and magistrates may well be introduced to others in acquiring
the skills and expertise necessary in fulfilling their roles in
the respective systems of juvenile justice.
Panel members, for example, are not expected to be expert
social workers yet they are required to undertake training which
in the early days of the Hearings system heavily involved social
workers from local authorities and others from the field of child
care in general. Of particular significance is the fact that many
of those who contributed to the training of panel members also con¬
tributed to a volume that was to have as one of its objectives the
provision of a training manual for panel members. (Martin and
Murray 1976.) Thus in terms of the content of the training programme
the ideologies available to panel members in the course of acquis¬
ition of their skills were heavily imbued with social work
(specifically case work) principles and reflected assumptions about
delinquency that were causal in nature. (See chapter on Theories of
Delinquency by R. Forrest in Martin and Murray eds.)
For magistrates, however, though the training programme did
obviously include contributions from social workers, psychiatrists
and allied professions, a much greater emphasis than in Scotland
was placed on legal or judical considerations. (See Sanders, 1973.)
The concern with responsibility for an offence and questions of
guilt or innocence means that a great part of the training afforded
to magistrates focuses on the nature of the offence and the nature
of the child's involvement in it. Magistrates are indeed specific¬
ally encouraged (Sanders 1973) to associate the nature of the offence
with the level of deliberateness or intent that can be ascribed to
the child.The- htmoosn-ess of can, for example, be used to rebut
the presumption that the child cannot be held responsible since it
is indicative of intent. In terms of the ideologies available to
magistrates in the course of training a greater emphasis is evident
on explanations of delinquency couched in terms in which responsibility
is ascribed. The extent to which the different ideologies available
are reflected in decision-making by panel members and magistrates is,
of course, an empirical question to which we shall return later.
'Available ideologies'
mediated and reinterpreted by agents of social control then, either
implicitly or explicitly, provide the basis of the ideological
orientation for such persons and a means for the identification of
those deemed to be delinquent or criminal. The epistemological
respectability commonly associated with scientific or professional
theoretical statements about human behaviour is diminished when the
actor is himself considered as a social theorist. (See Giddens
1976; Schutz 1970; Cicourel 1968) For
"
.... the relation between technical vocabularies of
social science and lay concepts, however, is a shifting
one; just as social scientists adopt everyday terms -
'meaning', 'motive', 'power', etc. - and use them in
specialised senses, so lay actors tend to take over
the concepts and theories of the social sciences and
embody them as constitutive elements in the rationalis¬
ation of their own conduct." (Giddens 1976, p.159)
Giddens then goes on to suggest that though causal generalisations in
the social sciences are similar to natural scientific laws, a crucial
difference is that they 'depend upon reproduced alignments of
unintended consequences'. (0£. cit., p.159) This has several
implications for a system of juvenile justice in which the main
criterion for intervention is the need for compulsory measures of care.
Decisions about the need for compulsory measures of care are
made within the context of moral discourse. Pearson (1975, p.15)
has pointed out that the 'medicalisation' of delinquency was assumed
to have placed the problem of delinquency control outwith the realms
of moral and political discourse, since decisions as to treatment
measures were seen to be the responsibility of the technically
competent. A similar comment has been made in relation to 'mental
illness' where the conceptual problems posed by a logic of treatment
are not unlike those raised by the notion of treating 'delinquents'.
Questions are asked as to whether -
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"
.... the only relevant criterion for evaluating the
success of therapy is in terms of its efficiency in
achieving this 'objectively defined' goal, and therefore
that moral considerations do not play any part." (Sayers
1973, p.2)
Such a position ignores two things. Firstly, a decision always has
to be made at some point as to which behaviour is to be treated. No
amount of research evidence can itself sustain an argument that
particular forms of behaviour are indicative of a need for treatment
since, in relation to delinquency at least, some decision has to be
made first of all about which forms of behaviour are to be called
'delinquent'. (See, for example, Bean 1976) The decision is
essentially a moral one and conflicting arguments are essentially
indicative of conflicting moral viewpoints, the outcome of which may
be a social policy with a strong moral basis. (See Duster 1970)
Secondly, and more importantly for my purposes, at the level of
implementation, actual decisions about particular cases may reflect
different moral stances.
bJe suggested that because decisions about 'need' are not made
in vacuo, the meaning attributed to delinquent behaviour is influenced
by the lay and commonsense notions'of justice and theories of
delinquency employed by the panel members. But though there may be
agreement that 'need' is the main criterion of intervention, the
relativity of the notion of need means that there may be disagree¬
ment as to what actually constitutes 'need'. This may be reflected
in the fundamental disagreement between the different agencies within
the control network as between individuals whether they be 'lay' or
'professional'. Because professionals are themselves members of a
community, the adoption of a professional frame of relevance does not
preclude the possibility that this too is also influenced by 'lay'
conceptions of delinquency. But though delinquency control has
apparently become the realm of the 'expert' (Gillis 1974; Bean 1976),
both panel members and magistrates were nevertheless still to be 'lay'
persons.
As we shall later see more fully, a problem for juvenile justice
has always been that of attempting to deal with children who offend by
means of a process ultimately derived from criminal justice in its
application to adults. It would be subject therefore to the rules
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of evidence and criminal procedure. In reference to Western criminal
policy, Duster (1970) identifies the conflict in a criminal justice
system where the individual is treated as a rational, responsible
being up until the point of conviction. But from the point of
sentencing onwards, he is subject to measures and professions whose
conceptual base reflects a philosophy of pathology, or more broadly,
determinism. There is then an ideological clash between the more
judicially or legally oriented ideology of the initial stages of
proceedings and the welfare ideology underpinning the later ones.
The separation of adjudication and disposal in the Scottish system
where the need for compulsory measures of care is decided upon by
panel members was an attempt to resolve this. Similarly, the intro¬
duction of care and criminal proceedings in the 1969 Children and
Young Persons Act, though not so radical as the Scottish developments,
was also made in recognition of this ideological clash. But
rather than complete separation, in England
"the model was, in crude terms, one of social
pathology for the younger child, but more classical
assumptions about the choice of evil for the older
child .... " (Bottoms 1974, p.324)
The criminal law, even in its application to children where youth
was recognised as a mitigating factor, assumed a high degree of
personal responsibility, a fact which had received considerable
criticism in the 1960s. (Kilbrandon Report, esp. paras. 60, 71, 72.)
But also in the course of everyday social interaction, for the
purpose of ascribing praise, blame or punishment, it makes a
difference whether an act had to occur or not and the designation
of responsibility, conformity and deviance depends on this common-
sense assumption. (McHugh 1970) Some concept of agency is necessary
for the judgment of behaviour and it is in this respect that questions
about the justice or otherwise of the way in which we deal with those
who do wrong is inextricably linked to particular notions of human
action.
Though the rhetoric of therapy theoretically removes the issue
of delinquency control from the realms of moral discourse, lay
theories of justice and delinquency derived from that stock of know¬
ledge about delinquency causation may introduce an element of moral
judgment to the juvenile justice process. In the two chapters which
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follow we will consider different conceptions of human action and the
way in which these are accommodated within different philsophies of
delinquency or crime control. This is for a number of reasons.
Firstly, it seems to us that a number of authors operate on
the assumption that treatment or welfare and punishment are dia¬
metrically opposed. UJe wish to argue that this is not the case and
that the relationship between treatment and punishment is conceptually
complex.
Secondly, the history of the development of juvenile justice
has not been one of a simple trend away from punishment to
treatment.
Finally, and importantly for the present thesis, the different
notions of action, punishment and treatment provide what we have
referred to as 'available ideologies' from which lay notions of
delinquency control are derived. Whereas the juvenile justice
systems in this country have developed in accordance with a more
welfare oriented philosophy, paralled by the expansion of the role
played by 'experts' or professionals, 'lay' persons occupy crucial
positions. It will be an objective of this thesis to examine
empirically the extent to which lay persons operating within two
organisationally and structurally different contexts employ notions
of delinquency control derived from similar available ideologies.
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CHAPTER II
ACTION. PUNISHMENT AND TREATMENT
Indeterminism, Determinism, Punishment and Treatment
Children have always posed conceptual problems for the law and
no more so than in the context of the criminal law. Perhaps one of
the clearest examples of this has been the history of attempts to
present a definitive statement as to the age at which children can
be held as being criminally responsible. The difficulty of stipul¬
ating the age at and beyond which children can be held criminally
responsible and liable to punishment crystallises the more general
problem of deciding when someone can be held morally responsible. It
is with the judgment of action and behaviour and the ascription of
moral responsibility that we shall be concerned with here.
In our ordinary employment of language, moral discourse
focuses on actions and more especially on actions that in some way
have deviated from accepted norms and standards. Questions of moral
responsibility arise when we feel that an action has been performed
which ought not to have been, or that an action has not been performed
which ought to have been. As Austin (1961, p.128) says -
"the situation is one where someone is accused of having
done something, or (if that will keep it any clearer) where
someone is said to have done something which is bad, wrong,
inept, unwelcome, or in some other way untoward."
Somebody against whom such an accusaticn is made may defend
himself in three ways: 'X is wrong, but I didn't do it' - denial;
'although X is normally wrong, there were special circumstances
which made it the right thing to do in this case1 - justification;
'although X is wrong, I am not to blame for doing it, because of these
special circumstances .... ' - an excuse. An understanding of the
last category, excuses, Austin held to be of special importance for
understanding the idea of responsibility: excusing conditions
exclude responsibility.
Though Arendt (1958) accepts, with Austin, that excuses lessen
the costs in human relationships for those whose behaviour is un¬
toward, she suggests that men have devised prospective as well as
retrospective strategies. Prospectively, by commitment and by
promising, we reduce the risk of uncertainty by imposing duties and
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obligations on ourselves and on others. Excuses and justific¬
ations are retrospective in that they serve to negate responsibility
for action after the event. However, where we disagree with Arendt
is in holding that excuses and justifications have to be known and
be acceptable beforehand since:
"a further implication of taking 'excuses' as central
to moral discourse is that morality emerges as both
conventionally traditional and pragmatically mundane,
and consequently as having very definite limitations."
(Pitkin 1972, p.150)
Both the formal and the material nature of excusing conditions
are topics for moral discourse. It is obvious that ordinary every¬
day language does not display consensus over the material nature of
excuses, that is, what counts as a good excuse (though we may all
agree as to their logic or form). Similarly, moral philosophers
themselves display no little disagreement about the relevance of the
factors which they are prepared to accept as absolving an individual
from responsibility for his actions. The lack of consensus does not
merely reflect different moral positions as such. It is more basic
than that. A fundamental problem for discussions about judgments of
people's behaviour is that of understanding exactly what is meant by
'action'. In this respect, as we shall see below, the so-called
Free-will/Determinism debate finds its parallel in the sociological
literature where epistemological questions about the relevance of
natural science as a model for the social sciences presuppose onto-
logical confusion over the similarity, or otherwise, of human
phenomena to natural phenomena. In moral discourse, the issues are
similar. How we identify 'action' for which an individual is or is
not responsible depends on the conception of human nature to which we
adhere. And depending on our conception of human action, the moral
justifications we offer for punishment or blame will vary. In the
course of this and the succeeding chapter we shall therefore consider
two perspectives on human action, which we shall broadly call
'determinism' and 'indeterminism' or 'libertarianism'.
Further, we shall also consider the extent to which adherence
to the determinist thesis is compatible with any use of the concept
of responsibility and with the possibility of engaging in any form
of moral discourse.
It is not our intention to present a philosophical account of
the concept of action or of the morality of different means of
dealing with those who perform untoward actions. Rather, our
account will be a descriptive one, aimed at dovetailing with our
argument that 'available ideologies' provide the origins of the
working frames of relevance adopted or employed by those who are
in the position of having to make decisions about children who
commit offences. By identifying perspectives on the explanation
of action and their association with different methods espoused
for dealing with untoward action, we merely wish to present what
appear to be logically tenable positions. This involves an approach
to conceptual analysis not unlike that of contemporary philosophy,
but with a different objective. (See Timms and Watson 1976.)
Methodologically, we are committed in this thesis to
recognising the relativity of what have been termed 'frames of
relevance' (Asquith 1977), a notion similar to 'multiple realities'
(Schutz 1970), and 'language regions' (Winch 1958; Oakeshott 1962;
Polanyi 1958). The origins of frames of relevance or language
regions rest in the available ideologies though they may not be
easily identifiable to the observer nor easily articulated by the
actor. (Giddene 1976, p.30) Though in theory, language regions may
not be reducible one to the other, in everyday language, conceptions
of delinquency and its control may well reflect confused associations
of ideas and concepts drawn from such origins.
We would argue that the general lack of consensus over
delinquency causation and delinquency control is reflected in the
frames of relevance employed by lay members of the community such as
magistrates and panel members.
It is our task now to identify perspectives on action,
responsibility and ultimately punishment that are logically tenable
and have the status of available ideologies. In particular, the
discussion will focus on the different theses of determinism,
indeterminsim and the extent to which they can be reconciled. The
free-will/determinist debate in moral philosophy and the extent to
which morality is compatible with a determinist thesis again finds
its sociological analogue in recent attempts to locate a voluntaristic
model of man within macro-sociological theory. (See Giddens 1976;
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Wrong 1969; and Parsons 1951, 1949, in which he attempts to reconcile
functionalism and voluntarism.)
Indeterminism, Determinism and Responsibility
What the libertarian or indeterminist thesis asserts, in brief,
is that a necessary condition of moral action is that the agent or
actor acted of his own free will in the sense that he could have
done otherwise. It is on this that depends both the ascription
of responsibility and agency and the very use of the language of
moral discourse. Finding its origins in Cartesian indeterminism,
the libertarian thesis accepts no limitations on the power of choice
available to individuals. 'Agency1, in its literal sense, means
acting and doing which is very different from events happening or
being caused. The libertarian or indeterminist then insists that an
individual is responsible and free if he could have chosen to do
otherwise than he did do, the model of human action, a distinguishing
characteristic from natural phenomena, being purposive and intentional.
In contrast, by determinism, we refer to that general philo¬
sophical thesis which states that for everything that happens, and
this includes human actions, there are conditions such that, given
their existence, nothing else could have happened. All phenomena,
human and natural, are the product of preceding causes. Whereas it
could be argued that moral discourse is dependent on a libertarian
world view and that determinism negates moral discourse, this would
be wrong. It would be wrong because philosophical debate has not
centred only on the relative merits of libertarianism or determinism
but has also considered the extent to which determinism is in fact a
thesis that is compatible with the existence of moral discourse as a
meaningful and intelligible type of discourse.
Indeterminism and Responsibility
For the libertarian, it is a necessary presupposition of our
use of moral language that human beings are capable of choice and can
be responsible for what they do since they possess free—will. Never¬
theless, though human beings have this capacity to initiate actions,
and it is this capacity for action that distinguishes man from other
phenomena, human beings are also the subject of events in the world
that are beyond their control. As well as being agents in the sense
of acting in and on the world, they are also affected by what
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'happens® in it. This not only refers to external events, but may
also refer to the very constitution of human nature. Kant argued that
man is both a rational being who operates in the world and a sensory
being in his physical and physiological constitution.
Explanations for action cannot always be, though they may be
on occasion, given in causal terms since man is on occasion free to
choose how to act and therefore responsible for what he does. Arendt
would question (1958, p.157) whether 'action® which could be
explained in causal terms could in fact be called 'action® at all.
But in Kantian terms, man may be the cause of his own behaviour and
is therefore self-determining but a different type of explanation of
such behaviour is required.
"Indeed Kant's suggestion that man lives in two worlds,
and is subject to two different sorts of causation, is
a metaphysical way of bringing out the logical distinction
between those two sorts of explanation." (Benn and Peters,
1959, p.203)
Thus, the libertarian thesis has to accommodate means for
recognising when people may be held responsible for their actions and
when their actions are the result of events beyond their control
thereby negating responsibility and agency. This much is embodied in
the spirit of Kant's maxim that 'ought® implies 'can®. To assert
that a man ought to have done something or ought not to have done
something and to hold him morally responsible is to imply that he in
fact could have behaved otherwise than he did. Moral discourse does
then rest on ontological presuppositions about human behaviour since
"in describing anything as an act there must be essential
reference to the agent as the performer or author of that
act, nor merely to know whose act it is, but in order even
to know that it is an act. (Taylor 1966, p.109)
More than that, it would appear also that we are not simply talking
about what it is to be responsible but about what it is to be a
1
person. Libertarianism, adopting a purposive, intentional model
of action must allow for those events in the world which are prima
facie actions but which on closer investigation are in fact outwith
the control of the subject. It is in this dimension of moral dis¬
course that excusing conditions are crucial since it is important for
our moral concepts of responsibility and of action to know when we
withdraw our assumption that a person is responsible for what he does.
1. This is precisely the point made by Downie and Telfer. 1969.
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Several uses of the word 'responsibility' have been noted in
the literature. A person may quite simply be called 'responsible'
by possessing a particular quality of character. (Gordon 1967;
Dounie and Telfer 1969) A person may be responsible to someone else
in that he is accountable to the other for his actions or his
behaviour. (Dounie 1971) And in such a hierarchical relationship a
person may also be responsible for other people, as a mother for her
child.
Houever, as should be plain by nou, the notion of responsibility
uith uhich ue are primarily concerned is the one uhich allous us to
ascribe blame or praise, reuard or punishment to another in respect
of certain actions. When ue assert that a person is responsible in
this sense of the uord, ue do more than simply describe a sequence
of events ultimately traceable to the action of an individual. (See
Hart 1960) The essence of moral judgment, as of action, is not dis¬
cernible by observation alone. It uould appear that it uas uith this
in mind that Lucas could argue that -
"If there are persons, ue have to vieu them in part as
rational agents and not entirely as regular performing
things." (Lucas, 1970, p.171)
It is for this very reason that the method of the natural sciences uith
its emphasis on observation and experiment is seen as an inadequate
2
model for the social sciences. Responsibility like action cannot per
se be observed and described. Moral judgment and interpretation of
action depend on the conventional and mundane standards of social
context. Nor are these static since conceptions of responsibility
do and have changed in line uith development in knouledge of the
behavioural sciences. (Clarke 1975) But the deo«Aop<«4.\ts made both in
philosophy and sociology reflect the contention that adequate or
sufficient explanation of human action can never be given in causal
terms alone. (Peters 1958; Weber 1962) Indeed, a distinguishing
feature of human action is that it can be explained in terms of
2. It is surely in this context that the free-uill/determinism
debate in moral philosophy and the voluntarism/determinism
debate in sociology converge. Dust as a problem for moral
philosophy is the compatibility of moral responsibility and
determinism, in sociological theorising a related issue is
the possibility of reconciling determinist theories of
society uith the concept of agency. The philosophy of
action is crucial to both enterprises.
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reasons and not only causes. This however has not prevented some
philosophers maintaining that reasons may be causes in themselves.
(Davidson 1963)
The indeterminist then holds that a person can only be respons¬
ible for an action when he could have acted otherwise and further
that he could have chosen to have acted otherwise. Moral respons¬
ibility in the view expounded by Kant, and more recently by
Campbell is incompatible with determinism since choice is itself not
the product of antecedents. Campbell (1951) in particular in his
criticism of Schlick's attempt to reconcile determinism and moral
responsibility, considered that freedom of a contra-causal kind was
amongst the conditions necessary for the ascription of responsibility.
What defences then would the indeterminist allow that would serve to
excuse someone from responsibility? There are two broad categories
of excusing conditions - those in which it can be shown that the
agent was in some sense compelled to act as he did and those in which
he did not really know what he did. Both point to purposeness or
intentionality as the condition of responsibility.
The Kantian maxim 'ought implies can' entails that moral
judgment logically presupposes that the agent could have, in some
absolute sense, done other than he did. The freedom of action under¬
lying Kantian ethics and other versions of libertarianism is categorical
rather than hypothetical since it is a freedom to do or not to do an
action under similar sets of conditions. But where the will of the
agent was influenced in its operation through ignorance or compulsion,
then in no sense is it true to say that he could have done otherwise.
Excusing conditions are no less important in the law than they
are for morality. They may be more important, indeed as Hart argues
excusing conditions
"maximise within a framework of coercive criminal law the
efficacy of the individual's informed and considered choice
in determining the future and also his power to predict that
future." (1968, p.46)
Ignorance
Where there are features of a situation unknown to or mis¬
takenly believed by a person accused of having done something wrong,
and these factors are relevant to the ascription of responsibility,
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then he may not be held responsible. It is obvious however that
though ignorance may on occasion be used as a defence, it is not
applied without qualification as the phrase 'ignorance of the law is
no excuse' testifies. But what we are concerned with are these states
of affairs which we maintain as accepted impediments to purposive or
intentional action. Important requisites for moral responsibility are
therefore awareness of circumstances, awareness of the wrongfulness
and awareness of the possible consequences.
There are of course exceptions in criminal law, especially
Anglo-American, where the requirement of mens rea is not absolute.
Offences of strict liability, vicarious liability and negligence are
examples where ignorance of certain states of affairs is no excuse.
This in itself is testimony to the fact that though there are major
interstices between the criminal law and morality, the two are not
completely co-extensive (Hart 1962; Devlin 1965; McNeilly 1966)
But in moral discourse, it is in some cases an accepted defence
to claim ignorance of some features of the situation which if known
would have been another set of variables in the choice of action.
Compulsion
Whereas ignorance or lack of knowledge may be sufficient to
absolve a person from responsibility in particular situations,
compulsion, on the other hand, though it does refer to particular
instances of action, may also inhibit the capacity for intentional
and voluntary behaviour generally. This does of course depend on
what definition of 'compulsion' is accepted and the debate about the
compatibility of a determinist thesis with moral discourse rests on
subtle distinctions. Compulsion may take a variety of forms and may be
either internal or external. (Downie 1971) Examples of external
compulsion are where
(i) the action was the result of an accident;
(ii) an individual is forced to behave or act in
a certain way under duress or threat.
Since one of the objectives in ascribing responsibility for behaviour
is to place limits on the causal nexus leading up to the committal of
an act, then where a person accidentally commits an act or commits
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it under duress, he is not the last link in the chain as it were.
His behaviour was not 'purposive', 'intentional', 'voluntarily done'
or done through choice.
But it is when ue consider the nature of internal compulsion
that the very application of the concepts of free will and moral
responsibility are challenged particularly by arguments from a
determinist perspective. There are three positions which may be
identified as logically tenable and which provide the structure for
this discussion.
Firstly, as the libertarians or indeterminists believe, people
are generally responsible for their actions and may be held to be so
in the absence of suitable excuses. Excusing conditions are associ¬
ated with ignorance and compulsion. Compulsion may be external as
we have seen but it may also take the form of 'internal' compulsion.
(See Downie 1971) Within this position where such instances of
'determined' action take place, individuals cannot be held morally
responsible. Human beings are conceived of as having the capacity
to act according to their choices and to will their choices. Where
choices are seen as being the result of causal antecedents then they
cannot be considered, from this viewpoint, as being freely willed.
The second position held by 'compatibility theorists' is that
determinism is not incompatible with morality since, though choices
may be determined by desires, motives, background and so on, we are
free to act according to our choices. Freedom from compulsion means
the absence of constraint and therefore the freedom to act according
to our desires. Though more recent writers such as Schlick (1939)
have advocated this doctrine, it has a tradition that can be traced
back through British empiricists such as Hume, Hobbes and Locke.
The third position in a sense reflects the libertarian in that
it believes that determinism and morality are incompatible. Because
human action is in fact the result of antecedent causes, then the
concepts of free-will and responsibility are utterly irrelevant.
It is to a discussion of the last two positions that we now turn.
Determinism and Responsibility
A number of principles underlie the indeterminist or libert¬
arian thesis. These are that human action is essentially different
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from other phenomena in the world; that human action is the result
of 'acts of will'; that human beings are responsible, both morally
and legally, for some, if not all, of their actions. Human beings
then, from an indeterminist viewpoint, are truly 'agents'. But even
in these principles an individual may in some circumstances be
excused, either through ignorance or compulsion, from responsibility
for some or (in special cases, e.g. children, the insane) all of his
actions and may not therefore be rightly blamed or punished.
Questions of the ontological status of human action are inextricably
linked to questions about the morality of blame or punishment.
(Pitkin 1972) Though the development and advances in the behavioural
sciences have furnished us with more information about human action,
with implications for the concept of responsibility (Clarke 1975), the
logic of excuse remains the same. As Hospers says, in distinguishing
the 'layman's' from the 'expert's' acceptance of excusing conditions -
"The number of acts which result from inner compulsion,
then far exceeds the uninformed layman's guess; he
recognises only the superficial or obvious cases and
assumes that in all the other cases no inner compulsion
exists. Still, his failure to recognise inner compulsion
does not change the formula; if the act arises through
compulsion, the agent is morally excusable for it."
(Hospers 1961, p.488)
What the determinist thesis does, in a sense, is to expand the appli¬
cability of the causal framework in analysing human action to the
point of claiming that all behaviour is in fact the product of ante¬
cedent conditions. This ontological shift, with its ramifications for
the epistemological basis of social science, implies that the language
of moral discourse is in fact invalid ard irrelevant to human action.
Since on this perspective, there is essentially no difference between
human and other phenomena, 'responsibility is an illusion and a
linguistic convenience'. (Downie 1971) As we indicated above there
is however an important tradition in philosophy traceable through the
work of the British empiricists in which determinism is seen as com¬
patible with the constituent elements of moral discourse. This
section however refers to what we shall call the incompatible thesis
for the sake of brevity.
For those who adopt a purposive and intentional model of human
action, there is a necessary distinction between action and other
phenomena such as bodily movement, flelden (1961, Chp. XIV) is unable,
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for example, to bridge what he considers to be 'the irreducible gap
between bodily movements and actions'. Peters is also sceptical of
the implications of a deterministic analysis of action since -
"to claim we are confronted with an action is ipso facto
to rule out such mechanical explanations as being
sufficient." (1958, p.8)
And Melden again, in agreement with Peters, suggests that a causal
explanation depicts how an event is brought to pass whereas an
explanation by purpose tells us what the person was doing. (1961,
Chp.XIV) What then are the basic premises of determinism which make
us question the status of concepts such as 'action', 'person' and
'responsibility', concepts that are employed in and crucial to the
language of moral discourse.
The general philosophical thesis of determinism maintains that
for everything that ever happens, there are conditions such that
given them, it would be impossible for anything else to have
happened. The modern theses of determinism have their origins
(Ruska 1974) in the developments made in the natural sciences in the
17th and 18th Centuries, particularly with the shift to observation,
experiment and the search for descriptive laws. The ontological and
epistemological implications of this empiricist conception of
scientific endeavour is not without significance for contemporary
debate on the inadequacy of positivism as a model for the social
sciences. (Ryan 1970; Philipson 1971; Schutz 1970) But the real
significance of the trend was that explanations of events in the
world were grounded in scientific and rational accounts in opposition
to the metaphysical and theological tenets of earlier philosophies.
(Ruska 1974) Only the facts empirically verified by methods akin to
those employed in the natural sciences could attain the status of
knowledge. Such thinking underlies verificationist and referential
theories of truth. (Blum and PIcHugh 1971)
The importance of observation and experiment as method is that
metaphysical speculation was replaced by empirical investigation.
Human action, and mental processes such as thinking, as categories
of events in the world were considered susceptible to the same
explanatory framework.
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In terms of relevance for moral discourse, 'determinism may
without logical fault be the thesis that physical events and states
cause such things as decisions and actions'. (Honderich 1969, p.115)
The irreducible gap conceived by Melden can theoretically be bridged,
and this is no less significant for moral discourse than for our
conceptions of human action. If action is caused, what are we to make
of the concept of freedom? Can the freedom available to individuals
ever be categorical in Kant's use of the term? If we are not free,
then how can we be held responsible for actions that in fact we could
not help doing. Moreover, the concept of responsibility is problematic
not only in that it is difficult to establish when people are respon¬
sible for their actions but also because the language of determinism
is prima facie incompatible with the language of morals. (Wootton
1959) If actions are made to happen, then the purposive and intentional
types of explanation are without application. The logic of excuse is
without application since all events and actions are the outcome of
events which could not be otherwise. (Downie 1971)
But what libertarian theories have in common is that they all
assert the relevance of the distinction between human action and other
phenomena. For each of them a esquence of events or action can be
traced back to an agent with free choice, thereby breaking the link
in the causal nexus. They each posit what Broad (1952) refers to as
a progenitor.
"If determinism be true, every event has causal ancestors,
and therefore there are no causal progenitors." (p.98)
There can in effect be no agency, only events in the world causally
linked. Concepts such as 'will' and 'self' are mere heuristic
devices employed to account for events in the world that can be
explained in terms of causal antecedents. (Ryle 1968; Wann 1964;
Skinner 1973; Eysenck 1965) Since 'wills' and 'selves' are not
observable, they are not readily accommodated within empiricist
conceptions of science. (Wilier and Wilier 1973)
The idea that all events are the consequence of causal ante¬
cedents means that what we have referred to as the incompatibility
thesis allows for neither 'progenitors' nor 'self-determinism' since
human choices, decisions and actions are themselves caused. All are
necessary consequences of some antecedent circumstances. Human actions
as a subcategory of natural events are necessary effects of such
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antecedent states of affairs. The implication for morality is then
that if we are not free to act other than we did, if we could not
act other than we did, we are therefore not free to act in such a
way as to be responsible agents.
It should however be pointed out that not all philosophers
readily accept that actions or events in the world are necessary con¬
sequences of antecedent circumstances. As Hume argues, events
are not necessarily the result of particular causes but are merely
associated by contingency or what he refers to as 'constant
conjunction'. Whether or not we accept the Humean distinction
between 'necessity' and 'constant conjunction' there are two
important implications arising from the claim that events in the
world are caused by antecedent states of affairs. Given similar
states of affairs similar events ought to occur. The determinist
can therefore argue that his thesis implies that events are pre¬
dictable and that accordingly events are particular instances of the
effect of universal invariable laws governing the universe.
(Wilier and Wilier 1973; Ryan 1970; Glover1970)
Human action then, in terms of the incompatibility thesis,
is not only predictable but also subject to the causal laws that
govern all phenomena in the universe. (Ryan 1970; Hospers 1950)
If an event is conceived of as the necessary effect of antecedent
conditions then given sufficient knowledge of the states of affairs
we ought to be able to predict particular instances. Moreover, if
universal and invariable laws govern the universe, they can provide
us with ready-made sources for explanation. Particular instances of
events whether they be human action or other phenomena are mani¬
festations of general laws and may be explained in terms of the
theoretical elements embodied by such laws. Human action does display
regularity but it is a matter of debate whether the conception of
science appropriate to natural phenomena is apposite to human
behaviour. The danger is that explanations of human action and,
more importantly of social life, given in such empiricist terms are
reductionist. (Taylor, Walton and Young 1973, Chp.2)
-fhus ontological commitment to the
existence of typical patterns of causal sequences both in natural
and human phenomena — there is no real distinction - requires a
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causal account of human behaviour, action and motivation. Thus far,
we have been speaking about the logic of determinism but what
different theoretical accounts of human action have to be able to
do is to fill in the details of the sequences between cause and
effect. (Ryan 1970)
Formally, determinist accounts of action rely on concepts such
as cause, predictability and the existence of invariable laws and
are committed to an empiricist epistemology. Materially, however,
there exists considerable divergence over what are the mechanisms
through which causal sequences operate. Later we shall in fact
discuss different theoretical accounts of delinquency which assume
delinquency in some form, but which postulate different mechanisms.
This
"brings out a certain flexibility in the determinist
position as outlined here. The determinist is not
committed to the view that the causal laws governing
human behaviour must be psychological, must be physio¬
logical, must be chemical or must be physical. All he
claims is that there is some set of causal laws, at
whatever level or levels of explanation, that entail
tight-fitting predictions of human behaviour, and that
there is no human behaviour that is in principle un¬
predictable on the basis of a knowledge of these laws
and of the initial conditions in which th^nperate."
(Glover 1970, p.45)
Whether we accept Hobbesian physical determinism or the
principles of the early biological positivists (see Taylor, Walton
and Young 1973, Chp.3) the logic of determinism, as Glover's quotation
shows, is essentially the same. The quotation also provides us with a
neat summary of what we have called the imcompatibilitv thesis, i.e.
the incompatibility of determinism with the central concepts of moral
discourse. If a correct prediction of how a person would act was
entailed by a set of true causal laws, together with statements of
the initial conditions relevant, he could not have acted otherwise.
Incapacity, to borrow Kant's phrase, would be categorical. The in¬
compatibility thesis rules out the ontological distinction between
action and other phenomena and assumes basically similar epistemo-
logical principles. But more importantly for our present purposes,
it also rules out the possibility of anyone ever being responsible
in the sense of the term which libertarians use. Whether there can be
a revised deterministic usage of 'responsibility' we shall in due
course consider.
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Determinism and Responsibility: Compatibility Thesis
For the libertarian, to have what was referred to as free-will
entails having a will that is categorically free and exempt from the
causal laws that the determinists posit as governing human action.
To be morally responsible requires that individuals qua agents can
act according to choice and can choose as they will, floral respons¬
ibility, in terms of the libertarian conception, is therefore
incompatible with compulsion, if by compulsion we mean 'subject to
the influence of causal laws'. It is precisely in rejecting this
notion of compulsion that Schlick (1939) is able to argue that human
action can be free and at the same time the product of antecedent
circumstances. He therefore claims that he has resolved the
apparent antimony between free-will and determinism claiming that
it was
"really one of the greatest scandals of philosophy that
again and again so much paper and printers ink is devoted
to this matter". (1939, p.143)
Schlick was concerned to provide an account of responsibility that
would allow people to be held responsible for their actions without
committing us to the view that the determinist thesis is false. Some
philosophers have also argued that it is impossible anyway to claim
that, as the indeterminists do, choices and actions are not determined
but are freely, and categorically so, willed. The indeterminist
thesis is in this respect unsound since it would make it theoretically
impossible to link the making of choices or the doing of actions with
antecedents such as background, nature, desire and so on. Hobbes and
Hume in particular both maintained that a satisfactory account could
not be given of decisions unless they were seen as necessary con¬
sequences of such antecedents as desire or disposition. To view
decisions as freely made while totally rejecting the deterministic
thesis is illogical. What we cannot here attempt is to present an
argument to the effect that there is no incompatibility between free¬
will and causation. Rather our purpose is to present some of the
basic principles underlying the acceptance of the compatibility
thesis, particularly by the empiricist philosophers.
The solution that Schlick proposes has its origins in a
tradition that can be traced back through British empiricist
philosophy particularly in the philosophy of Locke, Hobbes and Hume.
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More recently, as well as by Schlick, this version of what Dames
(1902) refers to as 'soft' determinism as opposed to the 'hard*
determinism of the incompatibility theorists, has found expression
in the philosophy of Moore (1949), Russell (1912) and Ayer (1954;
1953). It was also later developed sociologically by Matza (1964)
in his critique of positivism.
Following the formula proposed by Schlick the prima facie
antinomy between moral responsibility and determinism can be
resolved thus. Whereas decisions may be caused, we can and often
do act freely. As we shall see the conception of responsibility
maintained by the compatibility theorists, and by implication its
significance for questions about the morality of blame or punish¬
ment, is in a number of respects different from the libertarian
conception.
The solution to the problem rests on clarification of what we
mean when we refer to human action as 'free*. 'Freedom' for those
who adhere to the compatibility theory is taken to mean the lack of
constraint and the lack of compulsion. It is further claimed that
there is no incompatibility between conceiving of decisions as the
necessary consequences of preceding causes and believing that we are
not constrained or compelled to decide as we do. But compulsion, on
this perspective, does not mean the same as causation, since it is
misleading to assume that causes compel. (Downie 1971) Purposive
language, and the purposive-intentional model of human action can be
reduced to causal language since the freedom required is not, as
Campbell maintained, of a contra-causal kind. (Campbell 1951)
Hobbes conceived of the lack of constraint or freedom as the
absence of physical force thereby allowing a man to do as he pleased.
(Hobbes, Vol.4) Similarly, Schlick suggests that
"Freedom means the opposite of compulsion; a man is
free if he does not act under compulsion, and he is
compelled or unfree when he is hindered from without
in the realisation of his desires." (1939, p.150)
To say a man decided freely, means that he decided as he wanted,
unhindered by external forces. But Schlick, developing Hobbes'
position, accepts that there are also internal forces which may
possibly impede freedom of decision thereby absolving an individual
from responsibility. As examples, he cites action performed under
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the influence of drugs, and mental illness in which case not the
individual 'but his disease is responsible'. (Schlick 1939, p.151)
People who act in accordance with their desires and are not
hindered in their decision by forces referred to above therefore
act freely. In this way, the strength of the claim that respons¬
ibility demands acceptance of the determinist position rather than
its rejection can best be appreciated. Ross, for example, considered
choice to be the expression of the strongest desire at the moment of
action, and desire, in turn, is the joint product of antecedent
states of character and beliefs about the circumstances. (1939,
pp.222-51) Questions about the capacity to act in a morally respons¬
ible manner are negative in the sense that they refer to the absence
of factors whose presence would otherwise negate responsibility and
freedom of choice. Hart makes the same point -
"Yet, none the less, what is meant by the mental
element in criminal liability (mens rea) is only
to be understood by considering certain defences
or exceptions .... most of which have come to be
admitted in most crimes, and in some cases exclude
liability altogether, and in others merely reduce
it." (1960, p.152)
Hart is not here giving a full-blown argument in support of the
compatibility thesis. But elsewhere, in what appears to be the only
formal statement of his position with regard to this, he suggests
that his concern with the defeasibility of concepts such as respons¬
ibility is not incompatible with the determinist thesis. He
satisfied himself with the claim that
"the defence I make in this paper of the rationality,
morality and justice of qualifying criminal respons¬
ibility by excusing conditions will be compatible with
any form of determinism which satisfied (certain ....
requirements. (1968, p.28)
That is, for Hart at least, the concept of responsibility is
defeasible in that responsibility can be established not so much
by indication of the presence of a necessary mental or subjective
element but the absence of the generally or formally accepted
excusing conditions. Determinism is compatible with such a standpoint.
When we claim that someone acted voluntarily, in ordinary moral
discourse we usually mean that he could have acted otherwise. The
importance of the purposive-intentional model of human action adopted
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by the libertarians was that it allowed for the possibility of
alternative behaviour. But we also saw in the incompatibility theory
that the truth of determinism entailed that no one could ever act
other than he did, and could not therefore be morally responsible in
the libertarian sense. (See Glover 1970) The freedom required for
truly voluntary and therefore responsible behaviour was considered
categorical. However, the position adopted by the compatibility
theorists is that freedom of action implies freedom to act in
accordance with choice. !I could have acted otherwise1 is not
categorical for the compatibility theorists, but means rather
something like JI could have acted otherwise, if I had chosen*.
(Moore 1912) This is the only sense in which it would be true to
say that a man could have done other than he actually did do. Moore
(1912) suggests that even the determinist can and must say that an
individual can very often have done things he did not do - if he
had chosen to do so. Because 'cans' are constitutionally 'iffy'
(Austin 1956), the conditional clause provides us with the material
criteria for determining when a man could have acted otherwise and
may therefore be held responsibile.
In ascribing responsibility, the compatibility theorists are
not so much concerned with identifying remote causes - for example
when a man has inherited his behaviour from his great-grandfather
(see Schlick 1939). Rather they are only really concerned with the
question of who can effectively be rewarded or punished. Punishment
for Schlick is an educative measure. Such a line of thinking is
apparent in the psychological hedonism of utilitarians such as
Mill, who argued that the human will was governed by motives and
that the threat of punishment provided an additional motive for
refraining from criminal behaviour.
A man is only morally responsible if those motives which
brought about the act can be affected 'in respect of his future
behaviour by the educative influences of reward and pain1. The con¬
ception of human nature is one in which man is seen as conducting his
life in terms of a hedonistic and moral calculus.
The incompatibilist position espoused by the determinists
could not accommodate the logic of excuse within its explanatory
framework. The libertarian position posited excusing conditions,
or at least their absence as a prerequisite for the ascription of
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responsibility. The compatibility theorists, in reconciling
determinism with moral discourse, accept the necessity of excusing
conditions but for very different reasons from those of the
libertarians. There are those categories of individuals for whom
the prospect of reward or pain would be completely ineffective;
these are children and the mentally and physically ill. Similarly,
to hold as responsible those who acted in ignorance or through
compulsion (in the compatibilist sense of the term) would be unjust
for the same reasons. It is however by no means easy to separate the
question of efficiency and justice since
"Questions of reconciliation of determinism and
moral responsibility have stressed that determinism
does not make all blame ineffective, but have largely
ignored the question of whether or not determinism
makes all blame unjust." (Ayer 1954)
Further doubts about the compatibilist position have been
raised by Campbell and other libertarians. Though some actions
may be caused, they argue, the way in which we decide when to hold
people responsible assumes that actions are free. This is the basis
of moral discourse and moral judgment. Strawson (1962) attempts to
meet such objections in that his support for the compatibilist thesis
rests on the reconciliation of ordinary moral language with deter¬
minism. In that respect, his conclusions suggest not that determin¬
ism and moral discourse are necessarily compatible but rather that
they are not incompatible.
His first attempt to make a case out for the compatibility
thesis is concerned with reconciling physical determinism and
morality. (Strawson 1962) The conclusion he states is that human
action cannot be explained fully in terms of physical events. But
anyway, since physical determinism is concerned with physical events,
our ordinary concepts of action and responsibility are in no way
threatened. Causal and purposive action are not incompatible because
causal explanation is not 'really of action but of moving parts'.
His second argument (1962) logically related to the first rests on
the distinction between reactive and objective attitudes. Reactive
attitudes are what characterise interpersonal behaviour between
normal individuals and involve moral judgment and the ascription of
blame. If determinism, in the incompatibilist view, were true then
our reactive attitudes would logically be out of place. Our objective
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attitudes are those which are devoid of judgmental properties and
involve the suspension of reactive attitudes, being more 'dis¬
interested'. Occasions when we would suspend our reactive attitudes
and adopt the objective mode would be when we felt that someone had
acted through compulsion or ignorance. (Downie 1971) It could be
argued that the development of social policy and the expansion of
welfare measures for those formerly subject to penal control reflects
the increasing commitment to an objective stance. (Downie 1971)
What Strawson is suggesting, however, is that in ordinary social
intercourse the reactive attitude is deeply ingrained and not at
odds with determinism. Reactive attitudes are essentially different
from objective attitudes and in this way what Strawson is saying
looks very like Mead's contention that
"it is psychologically impossible to hate the sin
but love the sinner". (Mead 1918, in Coser & Rosenberg, 1969, p.583)
It is in considering what to do about those who behave in an
untoward manner that the distinctions that characterise the three
positions identified in this section are further drawn. It is also
particularly in relation to delinquency control that the decision as
to the appropriate forms of measures is by no means easy.
Punishment and Justification
As we have seen, the discussion of moral responsibility and
action has usually been in the context of the free-will/determinist
debate. The significance of this for the present thesis is that the
historical and theoretical development of criminology, underpinning
many of the modifications in the legal and penal system, reflects the
move away from a perspective on crime based on an assumption of
rationality and free-will (classicism) to one based on a determin¬
istic framework. In no'case more so that that of children has the
criminal law been more subject to continued modification (Bean 1976)
paralleled by an increasing emphasis on children as appropriate
objects of inquiry for positivist social science. As Gillis points
out (1974), though 'delinquency' and 'adolescence' were only
'discovered' or 'invented' comparatively recently, moves which were
to culminate in the reconceptualisation of delinquency as a
behavioural problem had their origins in the 'scientisation' of
youth criminality.
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In the previous section, ue examined three different pers¬
pectives on action, namely indeterminism, determinism and the
compatibility thesis, and what we must now do is to examine the
arguments for or against punishment founded on these. Once again,
the purpose is not so much to examine philosophically the internal
logic of such justifications but to identify the major perspectives
which provide 'available ideologies'. This is in keeping with my
argument that ontology, epistemology and morality are inextricably
linked. In rather simpler terms, the identification of action as
punishable or blameworthy and the justification of dealing with
untoward actions depends to a great extent on the conception of human
action employed. How we conceive of some action, of some cases of
delinquency for example, sets the terms for decisions we make about
appropriate responses to it. The changing attitudes to children are
in part attributable to the evolution of a conception of children
as being inappropriate subjects for punishment. The attempts by
people such as Blackstone and Coke (see Kean 1937) to establish
criteria for the age of discretion were paralleled in practice by
the difficulty of actually proving discretion where such consider¬
ations as the height of the child were employed? (Kean 1937)
Prior to examining, ideal typically, major views on the
justification of punishment, some consideration ought to be given
to what is meant by punishment itself. There are a number of reasons
for this. To theorise about the justifications of punishment is not
thereby to define what it is that we are attempting to justify since
justification and definition are two entirely independent processes.
(Flew 1954; Quinton 1954; Baier 1955; Armstrong 1961) Definition is
essentially a linguistic matter whereas the attempt to offer justifi¬
cation for a practice or behaviour is essentially a moral issue,
offering moral arguments why some states of affairs ought or ought
not to obtain. As we shall see, some attempts to justify punishment
may involve !a confusion of modalities' in that they have not always
sought to justify the same state of affairs. Similarly, one of the
questions prompted by a system of juvenile justice based on a con¬
ceptual framework of need is whether treatment is not after all <kPorrr,
punishment. A related issue is that whether treatment theoretically
is or is not punishment, does not preclude the possibility that it is
experienced as such by those subjected to it. The prima facie dichotomy
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between punishment and treatment is not so clear cut as to allow the
simple assumption that 'punishment' and 'treatment' are mutually
exclusive concepts.
A number of philosophers (Benn 1973; Watson 1976) have
followed Flew (1954) in suggesting that certain conditions have to be
satisfied by a standard case before the word 'punishment' may
appropriately be applied. The conditions laid down by Flew include
what are generally accepted as essential characteristics of punishment.
Flew proposes that: punishment must be an intended
unpleasantness to the subject; punishment must be for an offence;
punishment must be of an offender; punishment must, in a standard
case, be imposed by virtue of some some 'special authority'.
Though these conditions identify what is "-.n«ce&» <*.<«< for procv-u^e. be,
coUad punishment, they do not apply only to legal and/or moral
offences, as indeed Flew himself asserts; they can also apply to the
use of the word in connection with any system of rules. Nor do they
in themselves specify in what circumstances punishment is justified,
how severe punishment ought to be, or even what form punishment
should take. The existence of excusing conditions and categories of
offences such as those of strict and vicarious liability do not allow
for straightforward application. It is when we begin to ask
questions about the justification of punishment that defining
characteristics have to be supplemented by arguments that are
essentially moral in nature.
Rawls (1955) draws an important distinction between the justifi¬
cation of a rule and a practice on the one hand, and the justification
of a particular action on the other. This applies directly to
justifications of punishment where a distinction can be drawn between
(a) justifying punishment as an institution; and
(b) justifying the application of punishment in
particular cases. (See also Benn 1973)
Both concern the moral justification of punishment but (a) refers to
the morality of the institution or the practice as a whole, whereas
(b) refers to the moral appropriateness of a particular instance of
the application of punishment within the practice. It could also be
argued that (b) could refer to the form that punishment ought or
ought not to take. It was suggested above that the defining
characteristics of punishment as a concept give no indication of the
form that punishment should take as a practice. Similarly, whereas
punishment in concept may be morally justifiable, there may be
particular forms of punishment, such as garotting, flogging,
birching, which pose deep moral dilemmas. Whereas the development
of a welfare ethic has eroded the extent of application of punish¬
ment, particular forms of punishment have also been recognised as
morally unjustifiable. Rawls' distinction between the justification
of a practice and the justification of particular actions falling
within it has been extended by Hart who argues (1968) that it is
mistaken to attempt to evolve a comprehensive theory of punishment
which would bestow moral validity on the institution of punishment
as a whole. Though there may be a General Justifying Aim there must
also be some means for distributing punishment in a morally acceptable
way. Questions about the justification of punishment as a practice
cannot and ought not to be confused with questions about who ought
to be punished, how severely and so on.
Questions of justification then arise at two important levels
(though as Hart says they are not necessarily mutually exclusive).
These are in reference to the very idea of punishment and the moral
validity of particular acts of punishment. Such concerns are paral¬
leled by the two main traditions in the justification of punishment
since retributivists mainly answers questions about the justification
of punishment in particular instances; utilitarianism on the other
hand considers mainly questions pertinent to the morality of punish¬
ment as an institution. Since we are arguing in this thesis that the
main justifications of punishment (as are the main scientific theories
about delinquency) provide 'available ideologies' from which ordinary
commonsense approaches to delinquency control are derived, it is
important that at least the main salient features of retributivism
and utilitarianism respectively be identified. As our concern is not
philosophical, there is no scope in this thesis to attempt to resolve
the philosophical antinomy between retributivism and utilitarianism,
merely to catalogue essential features.
The history of the juvenile court has been one in which retri¬
butive justifications for punishment of children have been gradually
eroded and replaced with more utilitarian concerns, though juvenile
justice philosophy was, and is, still riddled with conflation of the
two perspectives. And -
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"in any case it should at least be clear that part of
the juvenile court system dealing with offenders was
an amalgam of features reflecting and justified by two
distinct moral points of view." (klatson 1976, p.198)
Following the three perspectives ideintified earlier, I nou
intend to consider the justifications for punishment in reference to
(i) indeterminism and punishment
(ii) the compatibility thesis and punishment
(iii) determinism and punishment
In broad terms, my discussion of (i) will relate mainly to
retributivist accounts of punishment and its justification, whereas
(ii) and (iii) will be more concerned with (broadly speaking)
arguments derived from utilitarianism (again broadly defined). This
is not to be taken however as signifying a belief in the mutual
exclusiveness of retributivist) and utilitarianism respectively, but
rather is an attempt to identify the salient chacteristics of
differing perspectives.
(i) Indeterminism and punishment
A problem with punishment is that prima facie, those behaviours
or actions which we call punishment are in many respects similar to
the rule breaking behaviour, whether it be in a legal or other
context, which provoked its infliction. As punishment involves the
deliberate, intentional infliction of some formof unpleasantness, the
legitimacy of such a practice is prima facie doubtful and calls for
moral arguments.
In moral philosophy, there is disagreement between those who
consider that the moral worth of an action is determined by reference
to the motive of the agent and those who consider that the moral
worth of an action is determined by reference to the consequences of
that action. Retributive theories of punishment offer as justifi¬
cation a past act, the offence, which is considered a wrong requiring
punishment. Perhaps the essential differences between retributivism
and utilitarianism are most concisely summed up by Kant:
"Punishment can never be administered merely as a
means for promoting another good, either with regard
to the Criminal himself or to Civil society, but must
in all cases be imposed only because the individual
has committed a crime ...." (Hastie 1887)
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and later
"For one man ought never to be dealt with merely as
a means subservient to the purpose of another
(Hastie 1887)
The obligation or imperative to punish is categorical in as much as
it would be morally wrong to allow an offence to go unpunished. In
this respect, the retributive justification of punishment has been
seen as self-validating (Quintan 1954) requiring no further moral
validation outwith itself. To follow Kant in asserting that punish¬
ment of offenders for offences is good in itself is to reject the
need for further justification. Other retributivists however have
seen punishment as restoring an imbalance in social order. Hegel
for example asserts that -
"Punishment is necessary to annul the wrong done by the
criminal .... not restitution or compensation but the
criminal has upset the balance of the moral order which
can be restored only by his being made to suffer. Or
in terms of the dialectic, crime is a negation of right
and as such a nullity; punishment negates the negation
thus reaffirming the right." (1942, p.59)
But to assert that a man be punished because he has committed an
offence is to assume a relationship between offence and sanction.
It is in this respect that retributive justifications of punish¬
ment rest on the indeterminist thesis and consequently seek to
promote non-treatment punishment. For the retributivist, a man
is punishment because he deserves punishment, or he may even be said
to have a right to be punished.
The justification for punishment then rests on what the offender
has done and not in any consequences that may accrue from punishing
him. To seek justification in the consequences of his punishment is
on this view to use individuals as mere means to ends and not in
Kantian terms as ends in themselves. Furthermore, to assert that
only those who have committed an offence can justly be punished is
supplemented in retributivism by the contention that only those who
are 'responsible' for their offences can be punished. (Watson 1976;
Honderich 1969) The offender is punished justly if, and only if, he
behaved culpably. The indeterminist thesis therefore supports a
conception of man as having the capacity for rationality, choice and
intention, that is free-will; it also supports a justification for
punishment in which punishment is deserved and just where the offender
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behaved culpably or responsibly. Punishment is not and ought not to
be associated with any attempt to promote other ends such as the
reformation or rehabilitation of the offender.
However, the indeterminist thesis also accommodates excusing
conditions which serve to absolve individuals from responsibility and
the possibility of punishment. Similarly, it is recognised that there
are categories of offenders who are not and cannot be morally respons¬
ible, such as children or the mentally ill and who cannot therefore
be justly punished. Because of their incapacity to form choice or
intent such persons are not responsible. Rather than be the subjects
of non-treatment punishment they ought to be offered non-punishment
treatment. But these are residual categories, and though conceptions
of responsibility have been increasingly subjected to modification as
the result of advances in the behavioural sciences, resulting in the
expansion of such categories (Clarke 1975) the indeterminist thesis
is central to retributivist justifications of punishment.
A number of consequences follow from the postulated relationship
between culpability, desert and punishment. Since there are varying
degrees of culpability, punishment deserved by the offender must be
proportional to his wrongdoing or 'the depravity of the act'. (Rawls
1955) Or as Honderich (1969) claims, 'the penalty will give
satisfactions equivalent to the grievance caused by his actions'. A
corollary of this for retributive philosophy is that like offences
ought to be treated in a like manner so that the principle of
proportionality is supplemented by the principle of consistency. That
is, not only must a punishment be proportional to the culpability of
the offender or to the nature of his act, but in like cases the same
punishments will be inflicted. The similarity between retributivist
arguments and the formal requirements of justice such as 'treat like
cases alike' which underpins considerations of due process and
natural justice is apparent. (See NcCloskey 1965) But as with
justice, the formal criteria have to be supplemented by material or
substantive criteria (Lloyd 1964; Perelman 1963) by which the logic
of likeness can be given context. For the retributivist, 'likeness'
is determined in terms of desert or merit. What is commonly referred
to as the tariff system (see Thomas 1970) embodies the principles of
proportionality and consistency in the form of a penal calculus.
Thus, a prime element in the retributivist position is that the
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severity of the sanction should in some way be related to the
culpability of the offender and the amount of harm done by the
offence. Some retributivists however would say that 'the amount
of blame and therefore the severity of the penalty should be
governed by the offender's intentions and not by the actual result'.
(Walker 1969) What this does is to introduce the particularly
difficult task of establishing the state of mind of the offender at
the time of the offence. This is conveyed in the legal maxim 'actus
non facit reum nisi mens sit reat.
It is because of concern with the subjective element of mens
rea that a criminal trial
"may involve investigations into the sanity of the
accused; into what he knew, believed or foresaw ....
These matters come up under heads known to lawyers




.... for children and persons of unsound mind,
the question of technical conviction for crime
has lost much of its importance because they can
frequently be treated in much the same way whether
they are found guilty or not." (Hart 1968, p.184)
Though Watson (1976) argues that the development of juvenile justice
reflects the attempt to reconcile two moral points of view, it is
undoubtedly true that the history of the punishment of children has
been one in which the retributivist position has increasingly been
eroded by more utilitarian concerns.
Whereas for the retributivist a person is punished because he
had done something to deserve punishment, a distinction has to be
drawn between 'desert' as justification and 'desert' in Hart's
terms, as a limiting factor. Thus punishment ought not to be
decided upon simply with atonement in mind since a limit, a
retributively appropriate limit, should be imposed on the severity
of the sanction. In terms of 'retribution in distribution' the
importance of the moral culpability of the offender is further signi¬
fied by Walker (1969, p.31) in the principle that 'society has no
right to apply an unpleasant measure to someone against his will unless
he has intentionally done something prohibited'. Those who behaved
responsibly can justly be punished and the justice of the sanction
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can be further enhanced by its correspondence with the desert of the
offender. It is because retributivism emphasises the questions of
who can justly be punished and what form punishment can take that
retributivist!! has been seen as being not a moral but a logical
doctrine, (bundle 1954) But in general where retributivists in
the main agree is that punishment must in some senses fit the crime,
that the punishment must be deserved and that offenders in fact have
a right to punishment by virtue of their moral agency. (Quinton
1954; NacCormick 1974) Penal sanctions moreover take the form of
non-treatment punishment except in the case of certain categories
whose capacity for moral responsibility is in doubt. Whereas the
indeterminist thesis supports retributivists' justifications of
punishment, both the determinist and compatibility thesis espouse
different approaches to responsibility and therefore also different
perspectives on how to deal with offenders.
(ii) Compatibility Thesis and Punishment
In terms of retributivist justifications of punishment, only
those who are morally responsible can justifiably be punished for
criminal behaviour. The conception of the offender as deserving
his punishment and as having a right to punishment (MacCorrnick 1974)
ultimately derived from the libertarian thesis that to have free¬
will entailed having a will that is categorically free. Retribut-
ivism is by these criteria essentially backward-looking in that it
focuses on the offence and the offender's capacity at the time of
the offence for rational action.
But as we have seen, there are those who argue that the truth
of determinism does not ipso facto preclude the possibility that
individuals may still be held responsible for their actions. The
justifications for punishment then which derive from this philosophy
are radically different from the retributivist position though,
again, this is not to imply that they are mutually exclusive either
theoretically or practically. What may be broadly termed utilitarian
justifications of punishment differ from the retributivist ones by
being mainly goal or end-oriented. That is, in opposition to the
backward-looking character of retributivist!, utilitarianism promotes
a justificatory framework for punishment which is essentially
forward-looking. The types of justification offered are mainly those
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of deterrence or reformation. And as we shall see, the utilitarian
argument for bringing about some change in the offender through
punishment was also developed into an argument that offenders could not
be justifiably punished but were in need of help or treatment.
Utilitarian justifications cf punishment can therefore be said
to be forward-looking in that punishment can only be justified in
terms of its beneficent consequences. The justification for punish¬
ment therefore rests in the value of its consequences, and the only
valid reason for punishing is to prevent crime, not to seek to avenge
it. As did the retributivists, the utilitarians noted that punish¬
ment, prima facie, is a wrong in itself, and merely represents the
imposition of a new wrong for an old, a principle epitomised in
Bentham's assertion that -
"all punishment is a mischief .... If it at all
ought to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted
in as far as it promises to exclude some greater
evil." (Benn 1973, p.22)
What the retributivists show concern with, following Kantian
orthodoxy, is that utilitarian philosophy could be construed so as
to allow the punishment of the innocent since this could be justified
in terms of any beneficent consequences that may be seen to accrue.
Thus since punishment ought to be inflicted because the offender
deserves it, utilitarian philosophy permits 'crying injustice'.
(Benn 1973) In terms of utilitarianism, the purpose of punishment
is not to annul a wrong nor to restore a right, nor is it to be
determined by the 'malignity of the wrongdoer'. (Beccaria 1^bij
Rather it is the prevention of crime. Whereas the retributivist
approach, founded in indeterminism, supported non-treatment punishment,
the utilitarian perspective promotes treatment-punishment since
punishment is end-oriented and forward rather than backward-looking.
And though prevention may be the overall objective, the attainment of
such an end can be achieved in a number of ways. Bentham (1948)
argued that there were three major means of preventing crime;
incapacitation, deterrence and reformation.
Earlier we saw that, according to Schlick and others, a man can
be held resgonsible if his motives can be influenced favourably by
reward or punishment. Schlick further argued that the question of
a man's responsibility is the question of whether punishing him will
have good effects. With reference to deterrence theory in particular,
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there does not appear to be the same controversy about free-will and
responsibility as with retributivist justifications. (Honderich 1969
pp.127-131) Far from its being the case that deterrence is incom¬
patible with causal accounts of human action, a number of philosophies
have associated deterrence with some form of determinism. Since
punishment in utilitarian terms is wholly a matter of preventing
crime and attaining certain stated ends, it is quite reconcilable
with the compatibility thesis on human action. Mill, for example,
(1962) argued that the human will was governed by motives and that
the threat of punishment provided an additional motive for abstention
from criminal behaviour. Both actual offenders and potential
offenders could then be deterred by the prospect of certain punish¬
ment. A conception of human nature as operating in terms of some
moral or hedonistic calculus whereby individuals could rationally
anticipate the outcomes and consequences of behaviour, whether un¬
toward or otherwise, fits in well with utilitarian justifications of
punishment. Classical criminology with its conception of rational
man was committed, notably by Beccaria ( lAO ) to the belief that it
was not severity of punishment but the prospect of certain punishment
that would be more effective in reducing the escalating crime rates
of the time. More recently, the relationship between punishment and
responsibility, echoing the arguments of advocates of the compatibility
thesis has been stated thus -
"
.... a man is not punishable because he is guilty;
he is guilty because he is punishable." (Nowell-Smith
1954, p.51)
It is by such an argument that utilitarianism has been defended
against the commonplace retributivist claim that it allows for the
punishment of the innocent, theoretically justifiable because of the
beneficent consequences that may accrue. The possible consequences,
claim the retributivists, could be used to nullify any injustices
perpetrated in particular instances. But utilitarian justifications
do impose limits on the scope and the extent of punishment in
accordance with a principle of economy of threats. (See also Sprigge
1965) Honderich, with specific reference to deterrence theory,
characterises economy thus. Punishment
"
.... does indeed deter and in so doing (1) causes
less distress than would occur if it were not imposed.
Also (2) there is no other punishment that would deter
as effectively at a cost of less distress." (Honderich
1969, p.49)
Punishment, if it does not and cannot serve to deter an
offender cannot be justified, and it is in this respect that, for
utilitarians, the question of how severely to punish is determined
by the same criterion as the question of whether to punish at all.
(Moberley 1968) And since it is not the severity of but the
certainty of punishment that has a deterrent effect, only as much
punishment is necessary or justified as will be sufficient to deter
either actual or potential offenders. (Beccaria \<Wi-) Severity as
a preventive of crime by itself may actually defeat its own ends,
an argument which applies as much to punishment as an institution,
as it does for specific acts of punishment.
It was with such considerations in mind that Beccaria argued
that punishment should have the greatest impression on others with
the least torment to the criminal. (Beccaria 1963) The effect of
these principles as was intended by their authors of the classical
school of criminology was to lessen the severity of the law at the
turn of the 18th Century. But the point for the purpose at hand is
that punishment should not be greater than what is needed to deter.
But there are also categories of offenders who cannot justly
be the subject of punishment at all and who are not guilty because
they 'are not punishable'. This is because in these instances,
punishment can only be ineffective. Children, the mentally ill and
the physically ill cannot be punished on utilitarian principles since
they and their like are generally not susceptible to deterrence by
threat. However, where children are considered punishable, such as
those about the age of criminal responsibility, it could be argued
that in certain cases, punishment is appropriate, though this may be
as much for reasons of reformation as of deterrence. Likewise, the
significance of excusing conditions is that, in this perspective, it
would be meaningless and ineffective to punish anyone who acted under
duress, mistake or who could claim any of the generally acceptable
means of defence. The threat of penalties or sanctions could not
deter anyone who found himself in such circumstances. (Benn 1973)
But in general such arguments serve to differentiate between those
who could and those who could not be justly punished, not so much in
terms of responsibility, though this is one factor, (Watson 19'fes^)
in terms of the susceptibility of threats of punishment.
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An important feature in utilitarian justifications of punish¬
ment and especially of deterrence theory is that, a fact that seems
rather obvious, punishment must serve as a warning and must therefore
be as public as possible. (See Moberley 1968) It would appear to
follow logically that if a justification of punishment entails
consideration of beneficent consequences such as deterring potential
offenders, then punishment ought to be publicly displayed to have the
maximum effect. The public denunciation of offences and offenders
has been advocated by a number of authors (Beccaria 1963; Fitzjames
Stephen 1883) and has undoubtedly influenced the development of most
western systems of criminal law. In sociological terms, Mead (1918)
had discussed the potential for cohesion in the social order as a
result of the punishment of offenders. And the potential for conflict
between punitive and other utilitarian considerations is neatly
summed up in Mead's by now apocryphal maxim that it is psychologically
impossible to hate the sin but love the sinner. As we shall later
see, the development of therapeutic or treatment philosophies for
dealing with offenders has been paralleled by increasing attempts
to deprive social control of its symbolic dimension. This is no¬
where more so than in the case of children, and provides an approp¬
riate area of contrast between systems of juvenile justice that are
court based and more recent developments in favour of administrative
tribunals.
Moreover, it need not necessarily be the case that deterrence
theory is irreconcilable with other utilitarian justifications such
as reformation, especially where the reformative influence can be
said to apply to those other than the offender as well as the offender
himself. Punishment may in fact reform through deterrence though this
argument is aided by the difficulty of establishing what reform
actually is.
In their concentration on the past act, retributive justifi¬
cations for punishment tell us very little about the nature of
punishment, about what punishment should actually look like. And as
we discussed earlier, the constituent elements of retribution echo
the main principles of justice in their emphasis on proportionality
and consistency. (See Hart 1968) The maxim 'treat like cases alike'
resembles retributive prescriptions as much as it does the basic
tenets of the concept of justice. But because reformation seeks 'to
induce repentance', create awareness of moral guilt (Hart); to
improve or socialise offenders, inculcate moral principles or make
law-abiding (Honderich 1969); to individualise punishment to suit
the needs of the offender; seeks to reduce the tendency to commit
crime (Armstrong 1969) Hart argues that it runs counter to the
customary morality of punishment. Theoretically, the principles
of consistency, proportionality and equality of treatment give way
to the application of measures related to the personal characteristics
of the offender with some end in mind. (See Watson 197fc^for a
concise statement of the areas of conflict between retributivism
and utilitarianism.) The recognition by the neo-classicists that
punishment is experienced differentially and that it can have a
reformative effect -
"created an entree for the non-legal expert -
particularly the psychiatrists, and later, the
social workers - into the courts." (Taylor, Walton
and Young 1973, p.8)
The increasing emphasis on the reformation and welfare of the
juvenile offender (see Bean 1976) since the Gladstone Report in
which reformation was formally accepted as an appropriate objective
has culminated in systems of juvenile justice more akin to social
than to criminal justice.
But to return to our earlier argument, deterrence can be con¬
strued as having a reformative effect. Ewing, (1929) for example,
suggests that whereas punishment as deterrence does not in itself
'reform', it does provide a means by which the criminal law will
eventually be obeyed from moral motives and not just through habit.
This applies both to actual and potential offenders, though in the
case of the latter, Ewing's argument sounds more akin to psychological
speculation than to philosophical theorising. (The opposing stance
is taken by Benn (1958) who maintains that the reform of offenders
cannot be attained through deterrence.) Conversely, reformation
could be attained by means other than punishment such as education,
vocational guidance or social work, none of which necessarily entail,
though they may, the experience of distress or suffering which Flew
considered one of the prime characteristics of the institution of
punishment. (Flew 1954; Honderich 1969)
Nor could a justification for punishment be based purely in
reformative arguments since the logical conclusion that could be
drawn (Honderich 1969) is that it would only apply to those who had
already committed offences. It would be difficult therefore to
develop an argument for the prevention of offences in general and
not simply of those committed by individuals convicted at least
once. The contemporary elision of the concepts of delinquency and
non-delinquency (in cases of need, deprivation etc.) and the develop¬
ment of recent programmes for dealing with delinquency espouse
prevention as an appropriate aim.
The difficulty of adequately establishing a justification of
punishment either in terms of retributivist! ov_ utilitarianism has
meant that there have in fact been a number of attempts to reconcile
the two. Acknowledging the problems identified above Armstrong
argues that
"pain is inflicted for the sake of a number of
different ends. Amongst these are the protection
of society, the reform of the criminal and the
deterrence of others."
and in view of the traditional retributivist attack he further states
"All these ends are in themselves both morally and
socially desirable; where the infliction of pain is
justified by desert, pain may be a morally permissible
means to achieving them." (Armstrong 1969, p.156)
The insistence that punishment, where utilitarian in objective, be
limited in application to only those legally responsible is also
taken up by Ewing (1929), Bradley (1958), Ross (1925) and Mabbot
(1939).
Ue have seen that retributive justifications, ideal typically,
were essentially backward-looking, concentrating on the offence and
the state of mind of the offender at the time of the offence. In
contrast, utilitarian justifications, though they do not ignore the
offence and rationality of the offender, were essentially forward-
looking in that the consequences of punishment were employed in its
justification. Thus, the protection of society, deterrence and the
reformation of the offender are amongst the objectives propounded.
However, inasmuch as even in retributivist philosophy some benefit
does accrue, such as the annulment of wrong and the restoration of
right, it could be, and has been, argued that retribution is merely
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disguised utilitarianism. Hart's argument that at different points
in a legal system, different types of justification may be required,
finds its parallel in a compromise theory of punishment. Gordon also
argues that though the law is mainly utilitarian, because of its
concern with the ordering of society, nevertheless because 'it is
closely bound up with ordinary morality .... it contains many
deontological features ...." (Gordon 1967)
The historical significance of utilitarianism for both penal
philosophy and criminological thought is that it laid the foundations,
through the classical and neo-classical school, for the more thera¬
peutic and treatment oriented developments that were to follow.
"The move toward a therapeutic response to crime can
be seen as, at least in theory, an outgrowth of the
utilitarian outlook. If one is going to evaluate
punishment solely in terms of its social consequences -
e.g. its capacity to reduce crime - one might reasonably
reach the conclusion that therapy would do a better job
of bringing those consequences about." (Murphy 1973, p.8)
Some utilitarian justifications as we have seen rest on a conception
of the offender as a rational being whose reformation can be
achieve through punishment. The justification for such punishment-
treatment is seen to be in the attainment of stated ends. But other
utilitarian approaches, conceiving of criminality or deliquency as
illness or disease reject even punishment-treatment favouring instead
an approach based on non-punishment treatment and a conception of the
offender as soneone whose behaviour is beyond his control. It is to
a consideration of this perspective that we now turn.
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CHAPTER III
DETERMINISM. RESPONSIBILITY AND TREATMENT
Determinism and Punishment
In the previous chapter, ue considered the relationship between
conceptions of human action and moral responsibility noting that, in
general, the principle that no man can be held responsible for what
he could not have helped doing holds good. But as we saw, it is a
matter of some disagreement how to interpret such a principle. The
importance of the qualifications that it imposes on human action
however is that, as in the case of retributivism and utilitarianism,
they allow us to determine who may justly be punished. But the
question prompted by the determinist thesis on action is not that of
who may be held morally responsible and punishable but whether anyone
can ever be deemed so. Modifications in the criminal law and in penal
sanctions have paralleled, and in part been attributable to, the
increasing recognition that there are categories of offenders who
may not be justly punished. Rather, treatment and help are
considered more appropriate forms of intervention. Where the com¬
patibility theorists advocated treatment-punishment in that
punishment sought to attain certain ends such as the reformation
of the offender, the determinists argue that such ends can be
achieved through treatment or welfare measures alone. The treatment
approach though essentially different in its constituent requirements
nevertheless derives from the less extreme forms of utilitarianism,
as we saw from the quotation by Murphy. (Ojc. cit. , p. 57)
In this section, we shall consider the argument that crimin¬
ality is in fact illness or disease requiring help or treatment, and
the implications that this has for the concept of responsibility. It
should be obvious also that what were seen to be central requirements
for any practice to be called punishment are not easily accommodated
within a treatment approach to social control. The conceptual
framework supporting treatment and punishment in fact conflict on a
number of points.
The notion of 'treatment' can have a wide or a narrow appli¬
cation. (Watson 1976) In its wider application treatment also
includes punishment, as we have seen in the previous section, since
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certain theories of punishment seek to attain ends or objectives such
as the reformation of the offender. The vagueness of the concept of
treatment has, in this wider use of the term, been compounded by the
fact that many authors and government reports use treatment or
training, reformation or rehabilitation interchangeably. (Bean 1975;
Watson 1975) But again, it is interesting to note that early moves
to incorporate more welfare-oriented measures within criminal
justice systems were made in relation to punishment of juvenile
offenders, epitomised in Section 44 of the 1933 Children and Young
Persons Act. Likewise, though the arguments that offenders should
be treated and not punished have been with us for some time now,
it has been in delinquency control that the more radical changes
have been introduced, especially towards questioning the validity
of the concept of responsibility. But utilitarians employing
treatment in its wider application have, until fairly recently,
taken seriously the notion of responsibility. (Hart 1968) An
important criterion for both retributivists and utilitarians has
been that, in some senses, the offender must be held to be
responsible. However, advocates of treatment in its narrower
sense, such as bJootton, have challenged this. In its narrow
application, treatment is non-punitive and excludes punishment as a
suitable means for preventing or reducing crime, referring mainly
to the application of non-punitive measures. Similarly, the
offender, rather than being conceived as a responsible individual,
is seen as being non-responsible in that his behaviour is the result
of predisposing factors. (Wootton 1959; Flew 1973) Thus the
utilitarian position is advanced to the point where crime, or more
correctly, criminality, is conceived of as disease. (Flew 1973)
As Rock (1973) points out, the medicalisation of delinquency, or
the application of the medical analogy to criminality culminated
in the dissolution of the metaphor of 'as if'. That is, where
formerly criminality may have been conceived of as if it were
disease, it came to be construed _as_ disease. The 'as if' drops
out and criminality is disease.
From such a viewpoint, there is little reason to seek to
establish the moral responsibility of the offender whose behaviour
is seen as pathological, or symptomatic of need. (See Kilbrandon
Report) There are two arguments here. Firstly, because the treatment
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or medical approach to crime is built upon a deterministic frame¬
work, it is theoretically futile to attempt to establish moral
responsibility. This argument associates the treatment model with
positivist criminology. (Radzinowicz 1965) However, it is also
seen to be practically difficult for courts to inquire into the
question of whether or not a person could have done other than
what he did do. (Wootton 1959) Since Wootton argues that this
is impossible, she is logically committed to the position that the
very question of responsibility should be bypassed. Thus, her
position rests on a blend of theoretical and practical implications.
In the literal sense of the word, criminals are patients in that
they suffer from or experience conditions such that their criminal
behaviour is a necessary outcome. From this viewpoint then, crime
is disease and should be dealt with in a manner similar to that
employed in the prevention or curing of medical ailments. What
such a perspective ignores, however, is the social and cultural
context not only of criminality and also of the definitions of the
behaviours which constitute 'crimes', (Phillipson 1971) but also
of the paradigm of medicine (Flew 1973). Nevertheless, a number
of others adopt a treatment or social hygiene approach to
criminality, rejecting the need to establish and ascribe respons¬
ibility. Eysenck, for example, argues
"We would regard behaviour from a completely
deterministic point of view .... Therefore
to attribute to individuals greater or lesser
degrees of responsibility seems, from this
point of view, a rather meaningless procedure."
(1970, p.183)
Glueck, quoted by Wootton states
"The question of responsibility would not have
to be raised, if the concept of the management
of the anti-social individual were changed from
that of punishment as the main instrument of
control, to a concept of the anti-social
individual as a sick person, in need of
treatment rather than of punishment." (Wootton 1959, p.248)
And in favour of the abandonment of the concept of responsibility,
Wootton herself recommended
"
.... a shift in emphasis on the treatment of
offenders away from considerations of guilt towards
choice of whatever course of action appeared most
likely to be effective as a cure in any particular
case." (1959, p.251)
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The semantics of crime control as Tappan appreciated some time ago
has thus undergone considerable change with the differing theoretical
frameworks. The language of crime, responsibility and punishment with
the advent of the medical model has given way to the technical jargon
of pathology, diagnosis and treatment.
One argument advanced in favour of an approach based on
curative or preventive measures and seeking to promote social hygiene
is that it would be a scientific and rational mode of crime control
rather than a system of punishment. (See Haksar 1963, 1965) The
reasoning is that less value-judgments would be made since the
decisions to treat and deal with offenders in particular ways would
be purely technical questions based on the diagnosis and prognosis
of the professionally competent. (See Pearson 1975) But this would
be to ignore that even a system of prevention whether it be punitive
or treatment-oriented is required to stipulate which behaviours
ought to be treated or dealt with and that is a matter for moral
judgment. (Bean 1976; Haksar 1963, 1965) The medicalisation of
delinquency does not thereby remove it from the context of moral
discourse. (Pearson 1975)
But the argument for the elimination of responsibility in
favour of an approach akin to social hygiene can also be countered
for other reasons. MacCormick (1974), Hart (1968) and Fox (1974)
express concern that though the medicalisation of delinquency
reflects a humanitarian approach to dealing with offenders, to
eliminate responsibility altogether would be to deprive individuals
of fundamental human rights. Offenders in fact have a right to be
held responsible or a right to punishment. (See Kittrie 1971)
Under the treatment approach, offenders are however seen as
being in need of treatment which is dictated by the lnaturel of
the condition and its supposed causes, not by reference to the
offence. The conception of human nature employed is essentially
deterministic with important implications for the means accepted
as appropriate for dealing with offenders. The treatment model, for
example, is often associated with the evolution of individualisation
where measures are designed to meet the needs of the offender; it is
also associated with the growth of discretionary powers available to
those responsible for sentencing. Consequently, the treatment model
in practice requires considerable information on the offender for
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the purpose of diagnosis and treatment and in this respect the link
between such a philosophy and positivist criminology is obvious for
a number of reasons. (Hart 1968; Bean 1976) Firstly, the positivist
conception of the unity of scientific method has meant that offenders
became the object of inquiry in an attempt to locate the 'causes' of
criminality. Only by discovering such causes can crime ever be
dealt with in a scientific and rational manner. What has been
referred to as the deterministic position on crime (Radzinowicz
1965) and 'scientific ideology' has fostered the idea that the
control and prevention of crime is better suited to a form of
intervention based on scientific principles. The elimination of
responsibility is therefore a logical consequence of a treatment
philosophy in which criminality is considered to be the necessary
outcome of predisposing conditions. That these conditions are
subject to scientific inquiry at least according to positivist
criminology, further enhances the theoretical framework of
positivism as a basis for crime control.
Moreover, positivist criminology sought to| establish general
laws or generalities about the causes of criminal behaviour,
thereby laying the basis for an argument that preventive action
rather than simply curative action could be taken. Given that
general statements could be made about what causes crime, then
crime, as could illness or disease, could be predicted and anti¬
cipated. Wootton's work, as does that of others, conceives of
criminality as a treatable condition not only similar to, but in
actuality being, mental abnormality. But as we shall see later,
the theoretical prescriptions about criminality or delinquency and
their causes are not restricted to purely pathological formulations.
Whereas positivist criminology showed remarkable homogeneity in
terms of the logic of determinism and its application to the
research and correction of criminality, there was considerable
disagreement as to what were the supposed causes. The inability
to locate objectively determined factors to account for delinquency
has meant that formal systems of delinquency control have taken
various forms and are continually under review. Because the diffi¬
culty in identifying' the causes of delinquency is more theoretical
than practical, changes in the administrative and institutional
structure of juvenile justice are usually dependent on emerging
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theoretical prescriptions on the causes of, and houi best to deal uith
delinquency. UJithin a utilitarian framework, as in the neo-classical
penology, (Taylor, Walton and Young 1973) which has dominated court¬
room and penal practice, the introduction of experts such as
psychiatrists and social workers reflected the acceptance of
information which could be used in mitigation without challenging
the concept of responsibility fundamentally. But whereas penal
practice has been dominated by such an approach, criminological
and sociological research has been conducted within a more rigorous
positivistic framework with all the assumptions about determinism
and the rejection of responsibility implied therein. As Taylor,
Walton and Young state (1973, p.10)
"Periodically, the two models clash, and indeed,
the debates about responsibility in penal philosophy
bear testimony to the attempt of the classicists
(Hart 1962) to resist the positivist incursions
(Wootton 1959; Eysenck 1970)
One of the implications of the treatment approach is that
there exist those who know how to identify and how to treat the
conditions or causes of criminality and delinquency. As in
medicine, there must be a diagnostic framework and conceptual
apparatus which determines not only who is to be treated but also,
just as importantly, who is to treat. (Berger and Luckman 1971)
Thus, the medicalisation of delinquency implies that treatment can
only be legitimately carried out by people qualified and familiar with
particular bodies of knowledge and techniques. Thus, the ideological
clash referred to by Taylor, Walton and Young finds expression in the
lack of consensus about delinquency control displayed by the
different agencies that compose and participate in social control
networks. (Asquith 1977) It is in relation to juvenile justice
where the increasing role of the experts (Bean 1976), the extension
of the treatment and preventive functions of juvenile courts
(Tappan 1949) and the almost exclusive abandonment of principles of
due process (Rosenheim 1962; Fox 1974; Grant 1976; Faust and
Brantingham 1974) that the ideology of positivism has found its
greatest expression. It has also produced conflict with the
principles of justice.
Whereas utilitarian theories of punishment could accommodate
treatment as an acceptable objective of punishment, the more rigorous
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positivist conception of criminality rejects punishment as an
appropriate form of penal practice. Since offenders are not
responsible they are not punishable but are appropriate subjects
for treatment. Treatment and meeting the needs of offenders are
explicitly accepted within a theoretical framework which derives
from a deterministic formulation of criminality. The conflict
between justice and therapy is thus epitomised in the develop¬
ments which have given responsibility for decision-making to
experts who are more concerned with, assessing, diagnosing and
classifying deviants than about considerations of justice. (Bean
1976) The paradox is that in many systems of justice resting on
the treatment philosophy such responsibility is not given to experts
but ultimately to lay people. For the purpose of the present
thesis this is a most significant factor in any attempt to analyse
the exercise of discretionary powers in respect of children who
commit offences.
Crime and Determinism
In challenging the relevance of the concept of responsibility
Uootton and others have tended to discuss criminality in associ¬
ation with the concept of abnormality in general and mental
abnormality in particular. Haksar (1965) even discusses criminality
in the context of psychopathy though he does attack Wootton's
attempt to develop a scientifically respectable theory and a
morally neutral approach to crime control. This is perhaps not
surprising in light of the fact that differentiation between offenders
and non-offenders is an important principle in the positivist
tradition of criminology and one which is logically requisite to
studies which involve the use of control groups and experimental
groups. (Void 1958) The danger of such an approach is that it
presents an overdetermined picture of man (see Wrong 1961) or, as
Matza (1964) puts it, it accounts for too much delinquency. And
indeed as we shall argue in this thesis, accounts of behaviour which
are couched in a deterministic conception of human nature are not
readily accommodated in the language of everyday life.
In classical criminology, and even within the revisionism of
neo-classical philosophy, the offender was seen as a rational,
responsible individual whose criminality, in the absence of mitig¬
ating circumstances, merited punishment. However, within what has
65.
come to be known as the positivist revolution, (Taylor, Walton and
Young 1973) a fully deterministic account of criminality was
espoused. The implications of positivism, deriving from the basic
premise of the unity of scientific method were twofold.
Firstly, the changing conception of criminality as essentially
determined meant that it could be studied in much the same way as
could other allegedly similar phenomena. Thus, the search became
that of the causes of criminality. As a corollary of this, we
would argue that positivism does not easily reconcile the conflict
between a rationalistic conception of normal law-abiding behaviour
and a deterministic conception of abnormal or law-breaking people.
Radzinowicz likewise asserts
"
.... the positivists may not all have been absolute
determinists .... but they were all too firmly
convinced of the deep influence that the constitutional
make-up of offender and his immediate environment had
upon criminal conduct to admit that he could be
responsible." (1965, p.1056)
Secondly, as well as presenting prescriptions about human nature
and more specifically about criminality, positivist criminology was
committed methodologically to a particular kind of research. Thus,
'the essential point in positivism (was) the application of a
deterministic and scientific method to the study of crime1. (Void
1958, p.42) And because positivist criminology rested on what we
shall call the logic of difference (that is, that there are basic
differences between offenders and non-offenders) the overriding
purpose became that of establishing significant differences between
individuals.
Though our discussion of treatment referred specifically to
the treatment of individuals by 'psycho-social' experts, (Bean 1976)
theories of delinquency do not always account for the phenomenon in
terms of characteristics or properties intrinsic to the individual.
It could be argued for instance that more recent developments in the
sociology of crime and deviance, which are less concerned with
factors in an individual's background, are for this very reason
difficult to reconcile with a correctionalist approach to delinquency
or crime control. What we seek to do in the following section is to
present brief statements of what seem to us to be important
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Once again our concern is to identify possible available
ideologies from which the working frames of relevance of lay members
of the community may be derived. May (1971), Box (1971 ) and Giddens
(1976) have all suggested the importance of formal theoretical
prescriptions in informing the lay man and in providing him with
stereotypes of delinquency, as well as assumptions about causation.
The significance of the five perspectives which will be discussed in
rather crude simplistic terms is that they are all couched in the
language of determinism (though they differ in substantive focus)
in which conceptions of responsibility and considerations of
punishment may not be easily accommodated. Again we are not
suggesting that each logically tenable position is in fact held
exclusively by individuals nor that the different orientations can be
articulated by people such as panel members or magistrates. Rather,
we wish to suggest that lay ideologies of delinquency causation and
control will be informed to some extent by more formal theoretical
considerations. In ordinary commonsense moral discourse, it may
in fact be possible to identify elements of a number of the
orientations offered since logically tenable positions are not
always maintained in practice.
(i) Biological determinism
Biological or physiological explanations of crime, associated
with the development of positivist criminology, particularly the
early work of Lombroso, have their roots in the wider implications
of biologism for social theory. (1876) It is in this respect that
the Darwinian influence on the early biological determinists are
apparent. (Void 1958; Taylor, UJalton and Young 1973) In reference
to behaviour in general
"
.... all biological explanations rest on the basic
logic that structure determines function. Individuals
behave differently owing to the fundamental fact that
they are structurally different." (Void 1958, p.43)
The basic 'constancies' (Pearson 1975) can be identified in biological
determinism.
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Biological inferiority: a recurrent theme in biological determinism
was the notion of biological inferiority or difference, notions which
had both substantive and methodological implications. Thus in the
work of Lombroso (1913) and Garofalo (1915), biological inferiority
is an important principle. Lombroso, for example, attributes
criminality to the 'atavistic1 characteristics of offenders. That
is, criminals were evolutionary throwbacks and criminality could be
identified by the presence of physical 'stigmata1 as supernumerary
nipples or unusual skull size. The nature of the biological
differences were as varied as the theories, but they all had in common
the assumption, theoretically rooted in the times, that the criminal
was biologically different, abnormal or inferior to the law-abiding
citizen.
Even when the environment was seen to be a factor in the
production of criminality, the effect was qualified as its influence
was primarily on what was no more than a 'low grade organism'.
(Hootton 1931)
With the emphasis on constitutional inferiority, it is not
surprising to find that criminals were also conceived of as in some
ways mentally as well as physically inferior. There has been a
long tradition in criminology in which criminality has been associ¬
ated with low intelligence or mental f^.e.W.eness. (Void 1958) The
implications of defects of reason or the will for the capacity of
individuals to realise the nature and quality of their behaviour is
obvious. It is no coincidence that Uootton's discussion of the
problematic nature of responsibility is related to a discussion of
mental abnormality. The vej?y history of the concept of mens rea
and the McNaghten rules is paralleled by the increasing attack on
the concept of responsibility in the wake of 'scientific knowledge'
about human behaviour. Biological positivism has been a particularly
potent source of change in this respect, as klootton's own work
testifies.
Heredity: Derived as their theories were from Darwinism, the bio¬
logical determinists placed great importance on heredity as a crucial
factor in criminal aetiology. (See Void 1958) Later theories were
also logically committed to the heredity factor, perhaps the most
notorious being that employed to explain the activities of the Dukes
family. (Dugdale 1877) More contemporary theories are even more
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specific, as in the case of the XYY theory in which criminality is
attributed to abnormal chromosomal composition. (See Sarbin and
Miller 1970) Whereas Lombroso had sought evidence in the atavistic
features of man, others were committed more to studying physiological
make-up and genetic constitution and possible combinations of
such factora (Healey 1915; Burt 1944; Hootton 1931)
Studies of twins provided an important strategy for biological
determinism where the effects of heredity could be controlled for
(Lange 1930) other than by simple statistical manipulation.
(Hootton 1931; Goring 1913)
Though the theories differ sustantively in the factors adduced
as contributing to criminality, the importance of heredity is reflected
in common-sense assumptions about crime causations. As Void suggests
"Explanations .... in terms of heredity go back to
common-sense observations that children tend to resemble
their parents in appearance, mannerisms and disposition.
The popular adage 'as father, so son' is a much older
description of everyday folk knowledge than any
scientific study of family influence ...." (1958, p.90)
Criminal types: A criticism made by contemporary, new criminologists
of biological determinism is that the search for characteristic
differences between criminals and non-criminals rests upon what they
consider to be a false assumption. Poveda (1970, p.59) suggests that
"This false dichotomy has usually taken the expression
in the characterisation of criminals as belonging to some
criminal type. Where earlier criminal type myths
attempted to link the criminal to certain physical
characteristics or mental characteristics, the
modern myth of the criminal type in identifying the
criminal with a particular s.ocial type - poor, lower
class, slum dweller."
The 'earlier criminal type myths' categorised criminals in terms of
their membership of different categories usually derived from the
assumptions of the different theoretical frameworks employed. The
very notion of a criminal type itself is derived from the logic of
difference and depends as much on the notions of biological
inferiority as on heredity. Perhaps the best example of 'typing'
is in the relationship drawn by Kretschmer (1921 and later Sheldon
(1940) between criminality and body shape.
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The development of biological determinism, associated as it
was with the emergence of positivistic criminology had a number of
implications. With the emphasis on difference or abnormality,
heredity and types, the biological approach further emphasised the
need to study the offender. Whereas the 'classical school had
exhorted man to study justice, the positivist school had exhorted
justice to study man1. Thus as well as providing theoretical
accounts of the causes of crime, the biological determinists at
the same time challenged the validity of legal concepts such as
responsibility (see Ferri 1895) and as Bean points out (1976),
provided the entree for a body of experts into the criminal justice
system. The need to understand the offender became a constitutent
stage in the process of deciding to deal with him. Radzinowicz
also argues that one of the merits of the positivist concentration
on the individual was that paradoxically, it prompted a renewed
interest in the significance of social factors in crime causation.
(1965) In the next section we shall see that although the work
of Eysenck and Trasler was derived from biological determinism, it
nevertheless, in different degrees, sought to accommodate consider¬
ation of wider social and sociological forces.
(ii) Behaviourism and Criminality
The most important advance made by Eysenck (1970) and one which
makes his theories more sophisticated than those of the early bio¬
logical positivists is that he does not only set out to explain why
people offend. Rather, he also seeks to establish how it is that
people do not offend. His theory of human behaviour tells us as much
about the process of socialisation as it does about the disposition
to commit offences.
The early criminologists, but Lombroso less than others
(Radzinowicz 1965), had largely ignored the influence of environ¬
mental factors. (Morris 1957) But as we shall see, Eysenck's
theory of criminality presupposes an interplay between genetic or
biological constitution and more social or sociological factors.
His conception of human nature is in that respect additive, the
cumulative product of the influence of certain social forces such
as the family on biological givens. It was on this element of
Eysenck's work that Trasler (1962) was to construct his analysis of
the apparent class bias in the distribution of criminality.
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Behaviourist explanations of criminality or delinquency owe
much of their importance and validity to the early experimental work
of Pavlov (1927) and Watson (1920) as to the philosophy of behaviour¬
ism in general. Unlike psychoanalytic theories, behaviourist
psychology assumes that aberrations in behaviour, such as neurosis
or criminality, are not merely indications of some endopsychic
conflict but are maladaptive responses acquired by a process of
faulty learning. Criminal behaviour is but one maladaptive response.
There are essentially three ways in which behaviourist psychol¬
ogists can account for criminality.
Conditionability: Eysenck suggests that behaviour can be acquired by
learning or by conditioning, susceptibility to which is related to
the degree of extraversion displayed by an individual. It is by
conditioning, or as Trasler (1962) calls it 'social learning' that
values and attitudes of the social mores are acquired and which
serve to check asocial or hedonic impulses. Criminality can then
be explained as a phenomenon which occurs when there is a lack of
social conditioning as a result of which the individual has no means
of restraining himself from the pursuit of primary atavistic
impulses. Central to Eysenck's explanation of criminality is that
this lack of conditioning can be attributed to the inability of some
sections of the population to be affected by conditioning techniques
or the ordinary processes of socialisation.
Following Pavlov, (1927) Eysenck attributes susceptibility to
conditioning to physiological processes underlying behaviour
(especially the mechanism of excitement and inhibition) and conceives
of personality as linked to this biological endowment. Criminals or
delinquents are characterised by high levels of neurosis and extra-
version, which makes them biologically poor subjects for conditioning.
The significance of the high neurotic score lies in the assertion
that conditioned anxiety responses to antisocial behaviour have not
been instilled in the individual. More generally, it means that the
criminal does not readily acquire the necessarily strong conscience
against hedonic or antisocial impulses.
However, we would expect a random distribution of criminality
amongst the population if conditionability were truly associated
with■endowment. As Trasler himself noticed, this does not appear to
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be the case and it is in his attempt to account for the apparent class
bias in the distribution of criminality that he develops Eysenck!s
earlier position.
Techniques of socialisation: Socialisation, if it is adequate, should
provide the child with the accepted behavioural repertoire and basic
values of his social milieu. In behaviourist psychology, it is the
conscience, instilled through the child's contact with the symbolic
environment, which inhibits antisocial behaviour.
If environmental and social pressures were to exist in an
objectively equal manner for all, we would expect to find extraverts
to be undersocialised because of their inability to be readily
conditioned. But since the distribution of those with high extra-
version scores is fairly even over the population as a whole, there
are other equally important factors to be taken into account in
explaining criminality.
Trasler (1962) comments that a significant number of convicted
offenders come from families of unskilled workers but that this is
not to be taken to suggest that the values of this group are at
variance with the rest of society. Techniques employed during
socialisation must follow certain stipulations if it is to be adequate,
and since this does not appear to be the case amongst those in lower
socio-economic positions, their children will be more disposed to
criminal and delinquent behaviour.
Trasler's argument is based on the notion that there is a
marked difference between the child training techniques employed by
the middle classes and the lower classes. Because the distribution
of extraversion is assumed to be fairly even, the higher incidence
of criminality in certain sections of the community can be explained
by reference to the way in which they rear their children. In
particular, child-rearing techniques as practised by middle-class
parents inculcate moral principles; working-class children are not
however offered the same opportunity for acquiring general principles
but are brought up in such a way as to relate punishment and reward
to particular actions. The social avoidance responses which should
occur on the contemplation of an idea or an intention to perform
asocial actions can only be activated by a degree of autonomic response
which the working-class child has not necessarily been induced to
associate with such behaviour.
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Since there is a higher incidence of broken homes in working-
class areas, the child from such a background is more likely to be
subjected to a very inconsistent programme of socialisation. On
this argument it is not so much that coming from a broken home or
a home in which there is considerable problems ipso facto determines
that an individual will become delinquent or criminal. Rather, it is
by living in circumstances in which there is an absence of proper
parental care or in which such care is inconsistently administered
that determines susceptibility to delinquency or criminality.
Antisocial values: Although conditioning may be technically effective,
the values to which a person is conditioned may in fact be antisocial
in their nature. They may not be what Eysenck calls 'in the right
direction'. The behaviour advocated by such values may be contrary
to those upheld by society at large. It is not probable, the argu¬
ment goes, that the mother who is a prostitute or the father who is
a thief will accept the validity of social values which proscribe
theft and sexual immorality. The very..social values which they
offer to their children could conceivably be antisocial in nature.
'Socialisation8 into deviant values would be more easily
achieved with the introverted person because of his susceptibility to
conditioning. We then have the paradoxial position in which those
more likely to become criminal are in fact those who are more
susceptible to conditioning.
Neither Eysenck nor Trasler suggest that the child whose father
is a thief will not receive at least some social training since the
child will also have contact with those who have been socialised
into acceptance of dominant values and morality. He meets children
at school which is itself a potent source for the transmission of the
accepted social and moral code. What their argument does suggest is
that in such circumstances such a child would experience such an in¬
consistent socialisation experience as to prepare him poorly to meet
the demands and sacrifices required by social life.
Derived as it is from Humean empiricism, behaviourism regards
behaviour from a completely deterministic stance. 'The individual's
behaviour is determined completely by his heredity and by the
environmental influences which have been brought to bear upon him'
(Eysenck 1970) In this respect, his theory can be associated with
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behaviourist philosophy in general. (see Skinner 1973; Beech 1969)
Since the efficacy of conditioning depends upon the individual's
capacity to form conditioned anxiety responses to inhibit antisocial
conduct, or the environmental influences which affect the conditioning
process, what one regards as the appropriate measures of control is
dependent upon diagnosis of the causes of failure in socialisation.
Therapeutic nihilism is not entailed because of the biological or
sociological determinants of behaviour. Indeed, the behaviourist
argument is that only by taking such factors into consideration can
we do anything to promote the welfare of the individual.
(iii) Psychoanalytic explanations of crime and delinquency
Despite their many differences, there are a number of points
of fundamental similarity between psychoanalytic and behaviourist
theories of crime or more correctly criminality. The psycho¬
analytic frameowrk for example suggests the means by which the
accomplishment of normal social behaviour is achieved and does not
simply concentrate on delinquency or criminality. There is little
analytical difference between ,no^^^■^^al., and 'abnormal2 or deviant
behaviour since psychoanalytic explanations of aberrant behaviour
rest on the assumption that the very antisocial impulses which
motivate a person to criminal behaviour are not absent in the law-
abiding citizen. (Void 1958; Friedlander 1947; Glover 1960) As with
behaviourism, explanations given of deviant or delinquent behaviour
are derived from more general statements central to psychoanalytic
theory about the process of socialisation. Delinquent behaviour can
therefore be explained by the same rationale employed to account for
apparent abnormal features or 'parapraxes2 (Horney 1947) such as
slips of the tongue. As we shall see, one importance of psycho¬
analytic theory has been that it helped underpin, especially through
the work of people like Bowlby (1969), the notion of the family as a
significant force in the growth and development of children. The
growth of social work as a profession and the role it has played in
attempts to control or meet the problems of delinquency can in part be
attributed to its origins in a knowledge base which itself prompted
ideologically attractive explanations of criminality. (Bean 1976;
Pearson 1975)
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Although psychoanalysis appears to lack the scientific respect¬
ability and systematic rigour (Void 1958) associated with behaviour¬
ism, it is nevertheless also rooted in biological constitutionalism.
Freud's own training in medicine is apparent in his theory of
psychoanalysis and
"
.... psychoanalysis, for all that it is a break
with simple medical thought, remains impregnated
with biological and physiological assumptions."
(Taylor, Walton and Young 1973, p.36)
The different personality structures and psychic forces posited
by Freud in his earlier and later works and which were influential
in the search for the causes of crime are then also dependent upon
a conception of biological determinism. Actions, feelings and
psychic processes are all strictly determined. (Horney 1947)
Despite the many varieties of psychoanalytic explanations of
crime, what they have in common is the assumption that crime is the
result of psychic conflict. (Void 1958; Rickman 1951^ Friedlander
1947; Glover 1960) In his early work Freud had argued that such
conflict was the result of the tension between the libido (the
basic primitive urges of the individual) and the demands for con¬
formity. His later and more famous formulation distinguished three
basic personality elements - the id, the ego and the superego.
The id, the unconscious part of the mind contains all that is innate
and in particular, the instincts whose drive is for immediate satis¬
faction of essentially hedonic pursuits. It is through a strong ego
and superego, inculcated by healthy processes of socialisation that
these instinctual urges are repressed. Without them
"there is no doubt that greed, demandingness, possess!ve-
ness, jealousy and competitiveness (i.e. all the normal
elements of infantile instinctual life) become nuclei
for later dissociality." (A. Freud, 196^ p.170)
Most psychoanalytic theories of delinquency refer to the potential
for conflict between the innate instinctual drives of the individual
and the demands of a truly social life. Glover (1960) for example,
attributes delinquency to the failure of 'domestication® of a
naturally wild animal. Friedlander (1947) posits the imbalance of the
three psychic elements as the condition of which delinquency is but
a manifestation. More prosaically, Aichorn (1925; 1936) sees anti-
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social behaviour as representing the 'coefficient of friction'
between parental influences and the instincts of the child. An
added factor in Aichorn's work is that his 'wayward' concepts refers
to all children who display behavioural problems, not just
delinquents.
The varieties of Freudianism and the difficulty of objectively
documenting individual cases and the reasons for delinquency have
been attributed to the lack of scientific rigour associated with
psychoanalysis. (Void 1958) This may well give the reason why
many of the writings in this genre take the form of detailed case
studies. (See Alexander and Healey 1935) Nevertheless, some
generalisations can be made about the way in which psychoanalytic
theories characterise crime and account for the different mechanisms
of failure in the socialisation process.
Rickman (1932) suggests that the instinctual drives can erupt
and express themselves either directly or indirectly. Indirect
expression involves a turning in of hostile attitudes on oneself with
subsequent feelings of guilt and shame. Such feelings, he argues,
can only be dissipated by infliction of some form of punishment,
hence the drive towards asocial behaviour in general and delinquency
in particular. (See Void 1958; Doestoevsky 1970) More direct
expression is associated with the inability of the indivudal to
control his instinctual urges and prevent their expression in overt
behaviour. Thus as well as the guilt-ridden and neurotic delinquent,
Friedlander (1947) is also able to identify the unsocialised
delinquent whose basic urges are allowed to run wild through faulty
socialisation.
"Psychologically, their behaviour is due to the fact
that they are still dominated by the pleasure
principle instead of the reality principle." (p.110)
Criminals then ought not to be viewed with respect to their
position in society but as individuals with a particular way of
dealing with their instinctual urges. (Rickman 1932) Certainly, the
picture that is often drawn in the literature of the delinquent is
that of a person who is selfish, aggressive, hedonistic and
emotionally infantile. (See Glover 1960; Aichorn 1925; Friedlander
1947; Rickman 1932; Bowlby 1969)
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The Bowlby revolution
We pointed out that the dialectic between organism and environ¬
ment was not simple but that the endopsychic arrangement of in¬
dividuals at particular stages in development was an important
consideration. What is important for psychoanalytic thought is
that explanations of delinquency are historically and biographically
rooted. The significance of this position is best epitomised by one
of the more famous writers in this tradition - Dohn Bowlby.
Bowlby's general thesis rests on the importance of the
family and especially of the mother in the laying of foundations
in the first years of life. Thus in 1951 he stated -
"It is submitted that the evidence is now such that
it leaves no room for doubt regarding the general
proposition - that the prolonged deprivation of the
young child of maternal care may have grave and far
reaching effects on his character and so on the
whole of his future life." (1951, p.46)
It was on this basis that he posited the notion of 'maternal
deprivation1 as the crucial factor in the disposition to delinquency
and to other forms of psychological disturbance. (See Bowlby 1969)
Children who do not experience the bond of normal relationships
with a mother or mother substitute are therefore more likely to
develop a delinquent or disturbed personality. In particular,
Bowlby (1946) and others (Bender 1947) had noted the fact that
delinquents who were affectionless and could not sustain stable
relationships with others, especially adults, had experienced trau¬
matic separations from their mothers. They may also have experienced
institutional care. It is perhaps at this point that the similarities
between behaviourist and psychoanalytic theories of delinquency,
particularly in reference to parental care and guidance, are most
pronounced. Certainly, Bowlby and others (Glueck and Glueck 1950;
Wootton 1959) had noticed the relationship between delinquency and
the broken home. Friedlander (1947) had also perceptively argued that
the significance of such factors as coming ffcom a broken home were not
so important in delinquent aetiology as the effect they had on
character formation. (See West 1969; Glueck 1962)
Bowlby's work had highlighted the importance of the family,
and especially the mother, in its effect on the growth and develop¬
ment of children. This had a number of implications. Since the
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mother-child relationship was considered important in delinquency
causation, his theories not only presented an explanation of why
people became delinquent but at the same time were employed to
criticise the existing institutional arrangements for children
in care. It is no surprise to find alternative suggestions in his
work, especially in the direction of breaking children's homes up
into smaller units, and the greater use of foster care. This was
even though he recognised the danger of frequent changes of
foster home. (1969 ) Concern with the degree and quality of
discipline afforded to children meant that the family increasingly
became the focus for social work intervention. This was obvious in
both the Kilbrandon and Seebohm reports alluded to earlier.
Dust as important, however, was the fact that the psycho¬
analytic framework was used to promote preventive measures in an
attempt to forestall delinquency. Again, this was a recurrent theme
in the debates relating to the development of juvenile justice in
this country. The organisational restructuring of social work both
north and south of the border was not simply in the interest of
greater efficiency - it was also based on changing conceptions of
social work and welfare provision and the role that could be played
by early social work intervention in preventing delinquency and other
behavioural problems. The recent history of juvenile justice, as we
shall see, reflects increasing acceptance of a conception of
delinquency as symptomatic of some underlying disturbance and of the
expansion of the role played by a profession whose ideological roots
(Bean 1976) lay in psychoanalysis.
(iv) Sociological Determinism
There has been a long history of association between the causes
of delinquency and such factors as broken homes and deprived areas
which are commonplace in the public imagery of delinquent causation.
(l*lay 1971) Earlier in this chapter we pointed out that at a time
when biological positivism was emerging as the theoretical foundation
far criminology, more sociologically-oritent approaches were, if not
ignored, treated as less important. (Morris 1957) However, this is
not to suggest that there were no attempts to develop a sociology of
crime and a number of authors have in fact indicated that the first
real theoretical advances in constructing a 'scientific8 criminology
were made, not by the biological positivists but by early socio¬
logists such as Mayhew. (Taylor, Walton and Young 1973; Uoss and
Peterson 1971; Carson and Wiles 1971) In this section, we intend
to discuss the core assumptions of the early sociologists of crime,
especially the ecological perspective and briefly to trace some of
the later sociological developments which were either derived from
or emerged in opposition to the main tenets of human ecology.
There are a number of reasons for tackling this section in this
way. Firstly, it is by analysing the influence of positivism on the
ecological perspective that we can more readily appreciate the con¬
ception of human nature as determined by environment. Secondly,
the attempts of later sociologies to escape such environmental
determinism can be seen as a response to the theoretical bankruptcy
of ecology. Lastly, there have been more recent attempts to
revive ecology, particularly for the purposes of urban sociology,
under various guises, the most recent British effort being 'areal
epidemiology5. (Baldwin and Bottoms 197k)
Whereas the biological positivists had argued that the
personality, and more specifically criminality, could only be
studied in relation to genetic or constitutional make-up, the
ecologists argued in turn that the social structure or cultural
tradition of an area could only be analysed in reference to the local
environment. (Morris 1951; Uoss and Petersen 1971; Taylor, Walton
and Young 1973; Baldwin and Bottoms 1973) The cultural or social
structure is imposed upon or epiphenomenal to the biotic substructure.
(Park 1936)
But by employing concepts drawn from plant ecology, the early
Chicagoans (Park 1936) sought to articulate the
relationship between the social organisation and distinctive physical
characteristics of what they termed 'natural areas5, by which they
usually meant urban neighbourhoods. The healthy community was one
characterised by homogeneity and social organisation with little
disruption of social life; the pathological community was character¬
ised by social disorganisation, evidenced by such factors as high
rates of poverty, high rates of delinquency, and physical and moral
deterioration. For Burgess, social disorganisation was the 'basic
general fact5.
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Though these pathological areas were seen as being isolated from
the integrative values of the larger organism, the city, they were
nevertheless themselves conceived of as communities in their own
right with both structure and character.
"
.... it is assumed that people living in natural
areas of the same general type and subject to the
same social conditions will display on the whole,
the same characteristics." (Park 1929, p.36)
It was the irreconcilability of 'pathology' and 'cultural diversity'
uithin the ecological tradition that provided much of the impetus
for later developments. Likewise, the explanation of social
problems such as poverty and delinquency employed a conception of
man as determined by environment, (Alihan 1938;
Morris 1957) a deterministic assumption which later sociology
sought to dispel. (Wrong 1971)
The more spaific links between delinquency and criminality,
and environment were made by Shaw and McKay. (1931; 1942) Though
the ecologists placed great emphasis on physical deterioration of
areas and neighbourhoods, and though such areas were characterised
by constant delinquency rates despite frequent changes of population,
Shaw and McKay argued that it was not their belief that delinquency
is caused simply by the external fact of location. (Shaw and McKay
1942) A significant feature of their work is that their discussion
of differences between communities related as much to attitudes, values
and traditions as it did to physical attributes of natural areas.
(Voss and Petersen 1971) Similarly, their concern with the situ¬
ational contingencies of life in these areas improved on the cruder
determinism of Park. Morris (1957) was later to argue also that the
early Chicagoans had emphasised variables such as poverty and deteri¬
oration too much as causal factors in the ecological distribution of
delinquency. The emphasis of Shaw and McKay was on the social dis¬
organisation of areas which displayed features such as continually
changing population and physical deterioration. It was through
social disorganisation and the cultural transmission of values at
odds with other communities which accounted for the ecological
distribution of delinquency.
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"The common element (among social factors highly
correlated with juvenile delinquency) is social
disorganisation or the lack of community effort to
deal with these conditions .... Buvenile delinquency,
as shown in this study, follows the pattern of the
physical and social structure of the city being
concentrated in areas of physical deterioration
and neighbourhood disorganisation." (Shaw and
McKay 1942, p.xxvi)
Shaw and McKay then do not only attribute delinquency to
physical environment but see it along with other factors as
providing the context in which boys residing in high rate delinquency
areas are exposed to delinquency values. (Moss and Petersen 1971)
In areas of low delinquency rates, children are thereby exposed to
conventional and anti-delinquent values; in high rate areas,
children are presented with a variety of contradicting standards
and forms of behaviour (1942, p.172) and 'powerful competing
values'. (1942, p.317) It has been argued that in this respect
Shaw and McKay recognising the cultural diversity of areas were
admitting not social disorganisation but differential social
organisation. (Voss and Petersen 1971) The inherent conflict
between the concepts of 'pathology' and 'diversity' were never
really resolved by them, a source of criticism of internal incon¬
sistency made by Clowerd and Ohlin later (i960). But the theoretical
implication of this tension provided a baseline for later develop¬
ments which recognised the inappropriateness of a consensus of
values. Even Shaw and McKay cite Sutherland (1949) because of the
similarity of their work with his theory of differential association.
(Carson and Wiles 1971; Voss and Petersen 1971)
What Sutherland had argued was that the cause of crime or
deviance was an excess of definitions favourable to the violation
of law over those definitions unfavourable to it. The notion of
crime or deviance as learned bdnaviour recognised the theoretical
bankruptcy of crime as individually (biological determinists) or
socially (ecologists) pathological. At the same time, the emphasis
attached to learning meant that differential association and differ¬
ential organisation were to be readily accommodated within what
Taylor, Walton and Young refer to as the behaviourist revisionism
of Burgess and Akers. (1966)
Carson and Wiles also argue that the ecologists had prepared
the way for Merton's theory of anomie, or at least had anticipated
it because they
"
..... speculated about the possible association
of unconventional conduct with a discrepancy,
particularly economic between idealised status and
practical prospects of its attainment." (1971, p. 51)
Thus what had originally been a source of internal inconsistency in
the work of the ecological school did in fact result in a number of
developments which concentrated on the transmission of culture in a
framework of 'ecological pluralism'. The works of Sutherland (1949),
Cloward and Ohlin (i960) are all seen as being
related to the ecological school either through direct heritage or
in reaction to some of the major principles contained in their
theories. (Voss and Petersen 1971; Carson and Wiles 1971; Morris
1957; Taylor, Walton and Young 1973)
Equally importantly, the growth of interest in the cultural
transmission of deviant values gave rise to the important tradition
in delinquency theory which concentrated on the origin of delinquent
subcultures. Particularly prominent in this is Cohen (1955; 1966).
Whether children came to learn delinquent values which competed and
conflicted with more conventional values was the source of debate to
be found not only in Cohen's work but also in that of Matza, Sykes
and Matza (1957), Miller (1958), Cloward and Ohlin (i960) and
Downes (1966) amongst many others.
What writers such as Shaw and McKay had appreciated, and what
was taken up in these other developments in sociology, was that the
emergence of crime and delinquency required some theoretical con¬
ception of the cultural transmission of a criminal tradition.
(Taylor 1971, p.128)
"The ecologists were not just painting elaborate
backgrounds against which deviants could strut.
They were trying to provide links between dilapidated
houses and gang life, between population density and
delinquency, between physical deterioration and moral
deterioration."
Biological and personality theories of crime had in the main
posited internal forces as the determinants of delinquency and
criminality and as the means by which delinquents could be
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differentiated from non-delinquents. Though more sociologically
oriented theories do attempt to relate the individual to his
environment, whether symbolic or physical, they are themselves
generally no less deterministic or positivist but have merely
relocated the search for causes. One of the more significant
contemporary problems in sociological theory is the attempt to
evolve a theory of society and man which reconciles the competing
concepts of voluntarism and determinism. (Giddens 1976) It was
just this failure of the ecological school and of later sociologies
to articulate the relationship between man and his environment that
makes them subject to the criticism of determinism. (Alihan 1938;
Taylor, Walton and Young 1973; Matza 1964) Even in subcultural
theory, the nature of constraint is only different in content, not
in form, from biological or personality theories. Matza states:
"It is ironic that the sociological view which began
as a protest against the conviction that the delinquent
was something apart has managed again to thrust the
delinquent outside the pale of normal life. Such is
the force of the positivist determination to find and
accentuate differences." (1964, p.18)
(v) Processual Determinism
In this section we shall consider what has variously been
called labelling theory, interactionism, social reactions theory and
social control theory. Though there are subtle differences between
the statements presented by the main theorists it is what is common
to their work that is our concern here; the relativity of the
concept of deviance and the importance of the notion of process.
Dust as importantly, it is argued that attempts to confront the
problem of delinquency or deviance, far from alleviating it may well
aggravate or perpetuate the phenomenon since social control either
leads to or creates deviance. Any adequate analysis of deviance
must then focus on the nature of social control in the processing
of deviance which is conceived of as 'some sort of transaction
between the rule breaker and the rest of society'. (Cohen 1966)
The labelling theorists (I shall use this term hereafter to
refer collectively to the different positions) rejected earlier
attempts to explain deviance for a number of reasons. Becker, for
example, criticised the medical analogy since it located the source
of deviance within the individual and ignored the significance of
the very process of judgment itself as part of the phenomenon. (1963)
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Deviance is not objectively but subjectively problematic since as we
shall see, a major area of concern for labelling theory was the
influence of societal reaction or social control in the commitment
to deviance. The important of such a position is concisely stated
by Kitsuse.
"I intend to shift the focus of theory and research
from the forms of deviant behaviour to the processes by
which persons come to be defined as deviant by others."
(1969, p.247)
Lemert likewise argues
"The task of sociology is to study not the theoretical
'stuff' of delinquency but the process by which a
variety of behaviours in context are given the un-
fficial and offical meaning that is the basis for
assigning a special status in society." (1967, p.24)
The focus of the labelling theorists, and the orienting bias
of the sociology of deviance is to the forms of social reaction and
the processing of deviance. Becker again argues that
"Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose
infraction constitutes deviance .... From this point
of view, deviance is not a quality of the act the person
commits but rather a consequence of the application by
others of rules or sanctions to an offender." (1963, p.9)
For that reason alone Becker and others are less concerned with
the social or personal characteristics of offenders than with the
process by which they came to be labelled outsiders. The logic of
differentiation which was employed in early theories is seen as
theoretically sterile since it depends on assumptions about deviance
which ignore the very essence of the phenomenon itself - its
essentially processual nature.
Thus the very notion of deviance itself is based on the pre¬
supposition of norms or social rules whose infraction evokes reactions
which are in themselves influential in the development of a deviant
character. Nor is this in theory a one-sided determinism (Gibbs 1966;
Taylor, Walton and Young 1973) since the relationship between the
rule violator and the agents of social control whether they be
teachers, policemen or social workers is one of inter-action. It is
the dialectic of social control and self that provide the basis
for commitment to deviance since the concept of self maintained by
the individual and his long-term behaviour may be modified as a
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result of contact with the agents of social controla (Schur 1969;
1973) Whereas more traditional criminologists had conceived of
delinquency or criminality as something that could be described and
observed, in true empiricist fashion, the labelling theorists
identified deviance as an ascribed status. Mead (1934) had argued
for the importance of the symbolic environment in the construction
and emergence of the self. Through the contact with significant
others a particular construction of self emerged which was the
product of the interaction and influential in the very socialisation
of the individual. How we come to act and how we come to conceive
of ourselves is then in part a function of how others act towards us
and conceive of us.
The relevance of this for the study of deviance is that since
the self is socially located, contact with systems of social control
can in fact have a negative effect on the rule-breaker's self image.
The alleged deviant may come to conceive of himself, and thereby
alter his behaviour accordingly, in terms of the very reactions
presented to him by the agents of social control. Harrington (1977)
provides empirical evidence to the effect that the labelling process
can itself lead to the likelihood of further delinquency.
Even where the alleged delinquent has not committed the acts which
have evoked a hostile reaction, such is the potency of social re¬
definition that it may still be powerful in promoting a negative self
image. (Becker 1963; Taylor, Walton and Young 1973) The transform¬
ation of self or the renegotiating of identity is more readily
accommodated within a framework which espouses a model of deviance as
sequential or processual. The analysis of deviance in this respect
has benefited from concepts employed in other sociological fields,
especially those of career, career contingencies, and master and
auxiliary traits. (See Goffman 1968; Hughes 1944; Lemert 1967)
Above we suggested that labelling theory does not focus
exclusively on the societal reation or definition. This was for the
following reason. The labelling approach emphasises the importance
of the social reaction in the development of a self image.
(Erikson 1962) However, it does not entirely ignore the precipit¬
ating factors (Schur 1973), those factors which contributed to the
committal of a deviant act in the first place. In this way rather
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paradoxically, Schur (1969; 1973) and others (Lemert 1967) do not
therefore deny the relevance of the types of factors postulated by
the earlier criminologists but suggest that their importance has
been rather overstated. We then have the anomalous position whereby
deviant commitment can be, and theoretically has to be, explained in
terms of the social reactions approach. The committal of initial
acts of deviance, however, on which the social reaction is based
are to be explained in a different way. This parallels Lemert's
distinction between (i) primary deviation, the original causes of
the deviant attributes which he suggests are polygenetic, i.e. they
arise out of a variety of social, cultural, psychological and
physiological factors. These have little influence on the trans¬
formation of self; and (ii) secondary deviation, by which he means
'a special class of socially defined responses which people make to
problems created by the societal reaction to their deviance'. (1969)
Importantly, secondary deviance refers to the person and his commit¬
ment to further deviance whereas primary deviance refers only to his
acts and not to the reorganising of psychic structure. The influence
of the social psychological assumptions of Mead is obvious.
Critical as were others of what he termed the 'crude socio¬
logists determinism of Becker and Eriksorf, the distinction made by
Lemert was devised to confront two different research problems: how
deviant behaviour originates and how deviant acts are symbolically
attached to persons and the consequences that these have for future
acts of deviance. The polygenetic factors, the subject of a very
different methodological strategy are less important than adverse
social reaction which as secondary deviance evokes deviance commit¬
ment. The potential that such an analysis has for research into
deviance, or more correctly deviation, is in fact that deviance is
a consequence of social control. (Schur 1973) Social control
becomes the independent variable and though primary deviation cannot
be explained in this way, secondary deviation can. And, in referring
to the psychic structure of the deviant, Lemert is thereby explaining
the nature of deviant commitment, a process attained by the realign¬




.... we assume that deviation qualitatively changes in
relation to the processing and to the impacts of the court
and other agencies who take control over the child. Devi¬
ation becomes secondary in nature and in a real sense
deviation begets deviation." (1970, p.59)
One of the implications of all this is that attempts to control
deviance by extending the scope of social control may well have
quite the opposite effect, either on individuals or on areas. In
consequence, a more appropriate policy would be to restrict the
sphere of social control in an attempt to reduce the potential for
secondary deviation. It is such a proposal that Schur makes in
suggesting radical non-intervention (1973) and Lemert in advocating
judicious non-intervention (1970). The theoretical significance
of the perspective as a whole, despite the misgivings that have been
voiced (Gibbs 1966) was its relocation of the focus of criminology
on the very nature of social control itself. As a result
"The issues of defining and enforcing the criminal law
are now regarded as in themselves problematic, and not
objectively given. There has been a resultant loss
of clarity about the kinds of questions we can
legitimately ask about crime and delinquency."
(Downes and Rock 1971, p.351)
Nevertheless, social reaction theorists, and we include Lemert
in this criticism, treat the question of the aetiology of initial
deviance as subordinate to the processes of social reaction. Yet,
though often referred to as 'transactionalism' or 'interactionist
perspective' most of the discussions focus on social control and
social reaction as determinants of deviance. Akers graphically
epitomises the one-sidedness of the approach -
"One sometimes gets the impression from reading this
literature that people go about minding their own business
and then 'wham' - bad society comes along and slaps them
with a stigmatised label. Forced into the role of deviant,
the delinquent has little choice but to be deviant."
(Akers 1967, p.46, quoted in Taylor, Walton and Young 1973,
Po149)
This is a direct argument of a perspective in which not only
is there little evidence empirically to support this contention that
social control begets deviance, that deviation begets deviation, but
one in which theoretical assumptions have not been clearly drawn.
(Box 1971) These are criticisms that could also be made of more
traditional approaches and which serve to identify the inability
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of the social reaction approach to transcend the simplistic
mechanistic explanations we have already discussed above. (See
Mankoff 1971.) The social reaction theorists failed to achieve
the dictates of what Matza termed the naturalist perspective in that
despite statements to the contrary, they fail theoretically to offer
deviants a choice in a framework which can be characterised as
processual determinism.
To summarise the argument thus far, we suggest that the
'frames of relevance' employed by magistrates and panel members in
the making of decisions about children who commit offences will be
derived from the different 'available' ideologies of delinquency
and delinquency control. We also hypothsise that there may possibly
be a strain between the formal ideology upon which policy is based and
the lay ideologies employed in its implementation. In the next
section we shall trace in part the conceptual development of forms
of juvenile justice. Our argument will be (i) that modifications in
systems of delinquency control reflect a trend away from conceptions
of delinquents as rational responsible beings who are liable to
punishment; and (ii) that the debate as to whether children be best
dealt with in a court or an administrative tribunal rests on the
significance attached to considerations of fault or liability. In
this way, our discussions above on responability and determinism
become pertinent in so far as developments in delinquency control
in particular and juvenile justice in general derive from a series
of compromises between competing explanatory frameworks.
SECTION II
CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT




CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
In earlier chapters of this thesis we have examined the
nature of different, logically tenable perspectives that can be
employed in the explanation of and the control of delinquency.
Indeed we argued that there must in theory be a link between the
explanatory framework and the favoured means of control. This
holds true, as we argued, for both formal and informal modes of
intervention. Prior to examining the results of the empirical
study in which we sought to analyse the differences in the frames
of relevance between magistrates and panel members, it is imperative
that we consider the recent development of juvenile justice. In
so doing the implications for formal policy of the different
theoretical formulations thus far discussed can best be appreciated.
What we argued earlier is that the comparatively recent trend
in the explanation of crime and delinquency was to reject the free
will, classical conception of man in favour of more deterministic
explanations. The intellectual revolution in social science
(see Rusca 1973) had meant the reconceptualisation of man's behaviour
as the product of causal antecedents. The significance of this
for a discussion on social policy and delinquency is that in the
context of juvenile justice the influence of positivistic
conceptions of human nature is obvious in a number of important ways.
Perhaps one of the more important modifications to juvenile
justice systems has been the gradual elimination of or erosion of the
importance of personal responsibility. Wootton, in challenging the
adequacy of criminal responsibility had argued that responsibility as a
concept was a vague theological and metaphysical anachronism and
that in practical terms it was difficult to establish responsibility on
intent. What we find in relation to children is that the issue of
responsibility has always been problematic since children by virtue
of their age were not considered responsible to the extent that adults
were. Early histories also reveal the fact that were was no agreement
as to when a child or a person reached the age at which he could be
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responsible. (See also Kean 1937.) With a lack of definitive
criteria it is no surprise then to find that factors other than
the age of the child were taken into consideration as
"age throughout played a small part for in these
proceedings it was essentially physique that was
regarded. ( Dames 1962, p.131)
In England it was only in the seventeenth century that the
'age of discretion' became established at 14 by Hale, (see Kean 1937)
following Coke, who emphasised the absolute disability of children
who were seven and under. Between seven and fourteen, again the
established guidelines, proof of malice resting with the prosecution,
could render the child liable to harsh penalties • Though at common
law the 'age of discretion' or of criminal responsibility was 7
with those from 7-14 presumed incapable of crime, the situation
in Scotland was less precise. Morris and Mclsaac (1978 p.160)
for example suggest that
"according to Hume, the Scots had not attained the
same degree of maturity and precision as England and he
seems uncertain of the position of 7 - 14 year olds.
MacDonald is quite clear hpwever that the child over 7
had full .responsibility. "
Walker also advises us that in England, but not in Scotland,
childiEn between the age of criminal responsibility and their fourteenth
birthday sometimes received protection from the rebuttable
presumption that they are incapable of guilt. In Scotland, this
was not the case. (196H p.175. See also Sanders 1973 on this).
Despite the numerous changes and modifications in criminal law
and procedure, as it applied to children, in later years, the
guidelines of seven for absolute disability and fourteen for
qualified disability remained unchanged until the Children and
Young Persons Act of 1932.. But even then, the only change was that
the age of criminal responsibility was raised from seven to eight
years of age, as it still is in Scotland despite the recent change.
In the 1970s juvenile magistrates were still being advised about
•malice' and its implications for criminal behaviour by children.
(Sanders 1973).
1. The authors referred to in this quotation are Hume (The Baron),
Commentaries on the Law of Scotland respecting Crimes. Edinburgh,
Bell and Bradfute 1847; and Macdonald (D.H.A.), Walker (3) and
Stevenson (D) eds., A practical treatise on the criminal law
of Scotland, Edinburgh, Green 1948.
But as juvenile justice developed through time, the concept of
responsibility had also been challenged with the expansion of the
welfare and social services and the development of a philosophy of
prevention. In this respect, what is important about the develop¬
ment of juvenile justice is that as considerations of welfare became
paramount, the social services were seen to be an appropriate source
of knowledge to inform the very measures of delinquency control.
Once the positivistic logic had been accepted the debates about
delinquency control and prevention began to focus on which causal
analysis was appropriate. Formally, the logic of positivism, which
underlay what is commonly referred to as the 'medical model' of
delinquency provided the accepted paradigm of explanation and
control; materially, however, there was no agreement as to which
explanatory framework or 'available ideology' was the right one.
Morris and Mclsaac (1978, pp.50-51) commenting on a 'social welfare'
approach in general state:
"
... the medical analogy in fact breaks doen, for while
there still may be doubts in medicine about the causes of
certain illnesses and uncertainty about their treatment,
there is a far greater body of established knowledge than
exists in criminological literature. There, little agree¬
ment exists at any precise level about the underlying
reasons for delinquent behaviour and there is little
evidence that known 'treatments' ... have any
rehabilitative effect."
They then go on to argue that children may in fact need protection
from a system based on welfare principles derived from shaky
positivistic assumptions and that the most appropriate form of
protection is afforded by the law. And with specific reference to
the juvenile court it has been argued that the crucial issue was the
correct balance of law and welfare in practice in the pursuit of
individualised justice. (Yablonsky, 1962) What is obvious also in
Yablonsky's work is that the problems of child offenders can not be
resolved simply by a judicial, legalistic mode of intervention in
which criminal responsibility is all important. Of equal importance
is the necessity of ensuring that children get the help they need from
individuals, in some cases before acts of delinquency have occurred,
where competence is derived from familiarity with social science
research.
"Ideally, usable social science theories and findings
based upon hard research find their way into the
operation of the juvenile court machinery, enabling
the judge and his auxiliary services to implement
recently developed therapeutic and diagnostic
approaches." (Harmo, 1951, p.427)
What is particularly interesting about the developments in
Scotland following the 1968 Act and in England following the 1969
Act is that though they are premised upon a belief in a welfare or
treatment philosophy and were accomplished in the context of social
work re-organisation and rethinking, in both countries responsibility
for decisions about children's welfare was allowed to rest with lay
individuals. (That is, no professional body was granted ultimate
responsibility for decisions about children's needs and welfare.)
Thus, with specific reference to the institution of the system of
Children's Hearings in Scotland, concern has been expressed both
about the adequacy of the theoretical foundations of the system and
the apparent paradox that despite the rather technical and morally
neutral language of treatment preceding the 1968 Act, those responsible
for deciding upon the welfare of children should be lay persons
operating within few statutory restrictions. (Fox 1976, Asquith 1977.)
What now follows is an analysis of events heading up
to the changes in juvenile justice that occurred in the late
1960s. Our argument is that the recent developments reflect a
move away from what we characterised as a punishment non-treatment
perspective (retributivism). Though some, such as Wootton (1959)
sought to foster a non—punishment treatment approach to crime control,
the solutions reached in the context of juvenile justice in both
Scotland and England though influenced by treatment or welfare
considerations were not exclusively so. Moreover, given that it
is by no means a matter of universal agreement what the most appropriate
form of explanatory framework is, it is important to note that
changes in juvenile justice in the sixties, in both countries, were
made in the context of widescale reorganisation and reconceptualisation
of social work.
The Juvenile Court: 1908 onwards
There were two main movements in the development of juvenile
justice since the turn of the century. The first was the gradual
elimination of the distinction drawn between children who appeared
in juvenile courts for having committed an offence and those who
were in court for other reasons; offenders were increasingly
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viewed as children who needed help, care or protection,
and the measures for children who appeared in court for whatever
reason became increasingly similar. The second movement was the
continual modification of the juvenile court in recognition of the
fact that the appearance of children in a court derived from a
court of criminal law was less than desirable. Much of this
chapter will be concerned to trace the early modifications
this century in juvenile court procedure culminating in the
radical difference that was to ensue between the Scottish and
English systems.
Although much of the work of the juvenile court was with
children who commit offences, the court also had jurisidction over
cases in which children were considered to be in need of some form
of care or protection. (See Boss 1967; Midgley 1975; Cavenagh 1959).
This civil function of the juvenile court has been influential
not only in the development of measures to ensure that such
children receive satisfactory standards of care, but also in that
the measures available to the court in its criminal jurisdiction
have been modified to ensure the welfare of the delinquent child
may also be advanced. Under common law, the approach to child
offenders was more clear cut. If the child were considered to be
criminally liable he could be dealt with by any of the existing
penal measures; if he were not considered so, the court had no
authority to undertake any other form of action.
Later modifications meant that the measures applied to children
who were the subject of civil proceedings could also be applied
to delinquents. But this meant that such similar treatment of
the two categories of children was also undertaken after they had
been dealt with by the court. Later we shall see that more recent
changes in court procedure have extended civil proceedings to cover
many cases that would formerly have been dealt with in criminal
proceedings.
It is therefore relevant to consider the extension of the
measures available to courts in their civil capacity and welfare
policy in general in any attempt to examine the development of the
juvenile court. With the continual redefinition of delinquency in
more 'social' rather than simple 'legalistic' terms, such an enterprise
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also has implications for the concept of criminal responsibility
as it applies to the young, since the criteria for intervention
under civil proceedings are the needs or interests of the child,
not his criminal involvement per se. More fundamentally, the
convergence of approaches for dealing with the delinquent and the
deprived also raised important questions as to the appropriateness
of the juvenile court as the agency for dealing with delinquency.
What is particularly important about the lOOS^Children Act
is that the jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters was
assumed by the juvenile court. In the years that were to
follow, the civil jurisdiction of the courts and the volume of
work associated with it was to continue to increase. But the
provisions of the act, despite the progress they made, were seen
to be inadequate to offer children protection when it was most
urgently needed. (Cavenagh 1967). On the recommendation of the
2 3
Molony Committee, the 1933 Children and Young Persons Act extended
the provisions made in the 1908 Act to include, in the concept of care
and protection which had been officially stated for the first time, two
other categories of children. The first was of those children and
young persons who had no parents or guardians, or parents or guardians
who were unfit to take care of them or who did not exercise proper
guardianship. Where the court was satisfied that the children or
young persons are falling into bad associations, or are exposed to
moral danger or are beyond control, action could be taken.
The second was of those children or young persons under
seventeen in respect.of whom specified offences, such as cruelty
or sexual offences, had been committed; or who were living in homes
where such offences have been committed in respect of other children
or young persons and the court was satisfied that they required special
provision.
1. The 1908 Children Act applied to England and Wales, and Scotland.
2. Departmental Committee on the Treatment of Young Offenders, 1927,
Cmnd. 2831.
3. This was followed in Scotland by the 1937 Children and Young
Persons (Scotland Act).
Though the extension of the categories of children
who came within the jurisdiction of the court anticipated later
legislation, no provision had as yet been made for preventive
action to be taken.
In 1945 in England, as a result of a number of incidents
4
involving children in care, an interdepartmental committee
was set up to examine the provision of care for children. The
major focus for the criticisms contained in the committee's report
was the delegation of responsibility for the deprived child to a
number of different local authority departments.^ Similarly,
5
the Clyde Committee in Scotland examined the problems of dealing
with children in public care. Consequently the recommendation of
both committees, mainly for the reorganisation of the administrative
structure of the child care services into one local authority department,
was implemented in the 1948 Children Act.
The objectives of the new child care department were to
",cdefine and maintain standards of inspection
advice and direction."
But once again it was recognised that, though the Act broadened
the jurisdiction of the courts and the duties of the local authorities
in respect of deprived children, there were many cases of children
who could have been prevented from coming into care in the first
place. (Watson 1965).
The documents which were most influential in establishing
by legislation a preventive approach were the Ingleby and Kilbrandon
Reports. Following on the recommendations of the Ingleby Committee,
the 1963 Children and Young Persons Act granted specific powers to
local authorities to undertake preventive work. The philosophy behind
the Act was one of promoting the welfare of children by diminishing the
need to receive them into the care of the local authority, and to
prevent them as far as possible, from being brought before the
4 . This resulted in the Report of the Care of Children Committee
(Curtis Report) 1946. Cmnd. 6922.
5 . The developments in juvenile justice that were to take place in
Scotland and England and Ualas in the sixties, were also to
occur within the context of the reorganisation of local authority
services and the later reorganisation of local government.




Section (2.) of the Act also widened the definition of
8in need of care and protection8 by including children under ten
who under the 1933 Act might have been charged with an offence.
There is thus an explicit statement as to the relevance of
dealing with children who commit offences in a manner which was
only applicable to non-delinquents in the 1933 and earlier acts.
In many respects, there was little to distinguish between
what were thought to be appropriate measures for dealing with
delinquents and those in need of care and protection, some
commentators suggesting in fact that the only difference is the
intention with which particular measures were proposed for
children. (Jacobs 197l).
In the extension of the jurisdiction and measures available
for dealing with children, the treatment of child offenders certainly
developed along very different lines from that of adults. Indeed,
Cavenagh argues that it is in the methods available to juvenile
courts after the charge has been proved that most scope has
bean given for differentiating between adults and juveniles.
(1967)
But the nature and form of court procedure had also come
under attack and was progressively modified to meet what were
seen to be the particular requirements of children processed
through the courts. Two trends can be discerned. A form of
court procedure was evolved that differed considerably from that
experienced by adults. But significant differences existed between
the civil and criminal procedures of the juvenile court. (Jacobs 1971)
The Juvenile Court: Constitution and Procedure
Common law had made no special provision for the modification
of court procedure in relation to juvenile offenders who, under
the common law principle of equality before the law had to
7. As Morris and Mclsaac state, (1978 p.25/6), it would have been
possible to extend the recommendations of Ingleby to the Scottish
context or to realistically and fully implement the provisions of
the 1937 Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act which allowed
for the institution of specialised courts. The momentous
decision made by the then Secretary of State was the setting up
of the Kilbrandon Committee, an event that was to result in
radically different systems of juvenile justice in both countries.
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undergo trial at a court of quarter sessions or assizes (see Boss 1967;
Kean 1937) as did the adult offender. The system of juvenile
courts, as statutorily constituted by the 1908 Children Act,
embodies the recognition that young offenders need protection,
not only from the severity of the penal measures applicable to
adults but also from the rigidity and formality of criminal prosecution.
Special courts had been established for children in America in
Chicago in 1881 but there is considerable danger in drawing strict
parallels between the English and American system of juvenile courts.
Watson, for example (1965) advises us that the American courts were
from the outset derived from the principles of chancery whereas
the English equivalent was the product of progressive modification
of the common law courts. The English juvenile court had been
constituted as a criminal court and, like all criminal courts, its
first duty was the protection of society, based on the premise
'salus populi suprema lex.'
Though the 1908 Children Act had also applied to Scotland,
developments in that country took a more fragmented turn (see the
Kilbrandon Report, Chapter II). Four distinct types of court
evolved for dealing with juveniles. These were the Sheriff Court,
the Burgh (or Police) Courts, the Justice of the Peace Courts, and
specially constituted J.P. Juvenile Courts. The J.P. Juvenile Coudts
were instituted by the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937
but could be found in only four Scottish areas - Ayrshire, Renfrewshire,
Fife and the City of Aberdeen (Kilbrandon para. 43). After the 1937
Act the assumption was that all juvenile cases would be heard summarily.
Yet, it was by no means clear which court should hear the cases or
which cases should be heard by which courts. For example, the
especially constituted J.P. Courts were to have the same jurisdiction
as the sheriff court in reference to children. Only the Lord Advocate
however could order proceedings to be taken against children in
the Sheriff Court or the High Court. Moreover, the very fact that
not all juvenile courts dealt with offenders and those in need of
care and protection is testimony to the lack of a uniform system
in Scotland after the 1908 Children Act. As stated in the Kilbrandon
report
"In Edinburgh, however, the Burgh Juvenile Court does not
deal with truancy cases, or in Glasgow with care or protection
proceedings, (including truancy cases)." (Para.46).
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The system was characterised by the lack of uniformity.
The 1908 Children Act established summary courts which would
deal exclusively with juveniles and the importance of this particular
that
piece of legislation can be assessed by the fact/subsequent legislation
in England and Wales has taken the form of introducing incremental
modifications to the juvenile court system rather than fundamentally
restructuring the very basis of juvenile justice. In this respect,
the changes implemented in Scotland by the 1968 Social Work (Scotland)
Act differ radically from the 1969 Children and Young Persons Act
with the abolition of the juvenile court in favour of the system of
Children's Hearings.
Further to protect the child from the exigencies of court
appearance, various other amendments were made to the rules
governing procedure in what were the ordinary courts of summary
jurisdiction. Dust as it was considered that the juvenile should
not be subjected to the same procedure in court as the adult,
so the 1908 Act made it obligatory for the juvenile courts
"to sit in different buildings or a different room from
that in which the ordinary sittings of the court are held,
or on different days or at different times."®
Restrictions were also later imposed 0n the
reporting of proceedings in juvenile courts, though the Secretary
of State could allow the release of such information if it were
considered to be in the interests of justice. For similar reasons,
restrictions were imposed on the number of people as well as on
those who were actually allowed to attend. Though public, the
juvenile court was by no means an open court.
Modifications in actual legal procedure have been inextricably
linked to the expansion of the role played by the courts in relation
to the neglected and deprived children. With the increasing commitment
to having regard to the welfare of children, recognised initially
in the 1908 Act by the delegation to the juvenile court of jurisdiction
over matters civil as well as criminal, a number of changes epitomised the
8 . It has been suggested that the separation of juveniles from adults
at every stage in the criminal process is justified largely on
the ground that a punitive and moralistic framework is inappropriate
for children. (Wheeler, Bonaich, Cramer and Zola, 1968).
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move towards a better understanding of children and their needs.
These have been primarily in the very nature of court procedure
itself but also, perhaps more importantly for the direction in
which the juvenile court was to develop, in the availability of
information on the child's social, environmental and background
characteristics.
Because the juvenile court is a court of law, a child's case
may be subject to the rules of evidence which govern the adjudication
of the allegation. Obvious limitations on the capacity of the
child to assimilate and appreciate the implications of what is
going on around him have been graphically if somewhat humorously
illustrated by Watson. (1965). Consequently, in order that a
child may be offered a fair trial, which involves his understanding
g
the processes of adjudication and sentence, a number of guidelines
were prescribed whereby assistance can be given to a child to allow
him the benefit of full protection of the law.
According to the act the language of the court had to be
kept as simple as possible and not beyond the comprehension of the
child. Should the child fail to comprehend any matter, the clerk
of the court was enjoined to explain this to him. This has meant
that, at least as far as the child and his parents may have been
concerned, much of the legal jargon associated with a court of
law has been eliminated from the juvenile court.
Furthermore, a child was given the benefit of full legal
representation either to cross examine witnesses or to plead his
case. Even in ordinary cases where children were not represented
the magistrates were obliged, in the interests of justice, 'to
attempt to redress the balance, even to the extent of seeming to
be counsel for the defence.' (Watson 1965). The Ingleby report
likewise commented (para.68) on the disadvantages for the child of
a court procedure which, though less formal than that of the adult
court may nevertheless have been too formal to be understood by
children.
Similarly, the indirect consequences of an appearance in
court and the stigma associated with such and with a conviction were
recognised and by the 1933 Children and Young Persons Act the terms
9. Magistrates Court Rules 1952
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'finding of guilt' and 'order upon such finding' were substituted
for fconviction' and 'sentence.'
Thus, though the criminal law had initially discriminated
in important respects between the measures appropriate for adults
and children, such discrimination had also emerged as regards the
form of criminal procedure experienced by the adult and young offender.
Consonant with the greater emphasis on the welfare of the
child, the need for social and background information on the basis
of which appropriate welfare decisions could be made, was clearly
appreciated soon after the 1908 Act.
As early as 1925, the Third Report of the Home Office Children's
Department commented upon the dearth of satisfactory information
about delinquents actually available to the courts. Two years later
the Molony Committee had argued that it was
"....essential that the juvenile court, whose main
function it is to consider the welfare of young persons
who come before it and to prescribe appropriate treatment
for them, should have, in all except trivial cases, the
fullest information as to the young person's history, his
home surroundings and circumstances, his career at school
and his medical record." (paras. 34/35).
It is of course logical that, where decisions were to be
influenced by welfare considerations, information pertinent
to childrens' needs should be available to those responsible for
making such decisions.
But a fundamental difference between the recommendations of
the 1927 Committee and the 1933 Children and Young Persons Act in
which they found legislative expression, was that whereas the
committee argued that 'the main consideration of the court was
to consider welfare', in the Act welfare was only stated to be a
secondary consideration. Nevertheless, the 1933 Act made provision
that
"...in every case, where a child or young person is
brought before the court... it shall be the duty of
the local authority to investigate and report to the
court upon his home surroundings, school record, health
and character." (Section 35£2)).
However, at the instance of the court such inquiries could
be made by a probation officer though responsibility in such matters
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lay initially with the local authorities. The practice of
appointing probation officers in earlier yeara had not been
3D
generally adopted but at the time of the 1933 Act, the probation
service, which by that time was more organised}was charged with
the presentation of social inquiries on juveniles but also with
the supervision of juvenile offenders. The close relationship
which the probation service was to have with the juvenile courts
is summed up in the following quotation:
"The magistrates however if they wish may make a
general direction that inquiries about the home
surroundings shall be made by their probation officers,
in which case the Local Authorities shall be exempt."(Our emphasis)
The relationship of the local authorities to the court
was conceived of as one of co-operation in so far as the measures
imposed by the court were executed by the local authority departments
who also provided necessary background information. But the
probation service was unequivocally an element in the juvenile court
network.
What we find then is that between the turn of the century
and the sixties, the local authority and related services became
important for the diagnosis, assessment and prevention of juvenile
delinquency as the appropriateness of the juvenile court for dealing
with such children was increasingly questioned. The gradual elision
of the distinction between delinquents and non-delinquents
that occurred after the 1908 Act was to anticipate important changes
that were to occur later in the structural and administration
organisation of juvenile justice as in the philosophy underlying the
respective systems in England and Wales and Scotland. In short,
the retributivist elements inherent in the juvenile court were to
be challenged by arguments which derived from more utilitarian ways
of thinking.
The Duvenile Court - A basic conflict
An important feature of the 1908 Children Act, quite apart from
lO, See Departmental Committee on Training, Appointment and
Payment of Probation Officers 1922.
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the very fact of the establishment of separate courts for
juveniles, was the assumption of jurisdiction over both civil and
criminal matters. This was to have important implications for
the later development of the juvenile court, which in terms of
its two areas of jurisdiction, increasingly reflected the greater
emphasis placed on the welfare of children who appeared before
the court whether for having committed an offence or for some other
reason. Consequently, delinquent and other children could be
subjected to similar measures and committed to the same institutions.
In particular, the 1933 Children and Young Persons Act - containing
as it does the requirement to have regard to the welfare of the
child - has been the source of much controversy about the nature
and philosophy of the juvenile court. klootton states in reference
to the Act:
"Nevertheless, behind the clear and simple language of this
statute there lurks a fundamental conflict which threatens
to become the subject of acute controversy and perhaps
to crack wide open the structure that has been so
carefully built upon the foundations laid 53 years ago." (1961 p.678)
The conflict to which she refers is that contained within
a system of juvenile justice whose principles are derived from
criminal justice in its application to adults, and subject therefore
to the rules of evidence and criminal procedure, but which at the
same time is expressly required to have regard to the welfare of
the children who are the subjects of decisions within it. This
is of course the crucial dilemma of juvenile justice, and as such
has been the focus of considerable comment within the literature.
(See Elkin 1938). Cavenagh, for example, explicity and concisely
states the position of critics of the juvenile court:
"The practical difficulty in submitting child offenders
to the criminal jurisdiction was, as they saw it, that the
extent of a child's social need and the gravity of his
offence were not necessarily in proportion to each other."
(19 67, p.65).
And later, commenting on the similarity of the proceedings for
delinquent and non delinquent children she states that
"..the procedure for dealing with non-criminal cases is
in many ways similar to that for trial on a criminal charge
though no question of criminal responsibility is involved."
(1967, p.89).
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Nor had the apparent incongruity of adoping a welfare
philosophy within a framework ultimately derived from the ordinary
courts of criminal law escaped official notice. The incompatibility
of a conceptual framework underlying notions of welfare and treatment
on the one hand with the conceptual framework underlying notions
of crime and punishment on the other received explicit comment in the
Ingleby and the Kilbrandon Reports, the respective committees of
which were obliged to examine the law in its application to children
in England and Scotland, respectively.
Ingleby, in an oft quoted passage, commented thus:
"The court remains a criminal court in the sense that
it is a magistrates court, that it is principally
concerned with trying offences, that its procedure is a
modified form of ordinary criminal procedure and that,
with a few special provisions, it is governed by the law
of evidence in criminal cases. Yet the requirement to have
regard to the welfare of the child, and the various ways in
which the court may deal with an offender suggest a
jurisdiction that is not criminal. It is not easy
to see how these two principles may be reconciled...."
(ingleby report, para.60).
And in similar vein, though referring to the practical
difficulty of implementing a preventive philosophy within the
framework of the court, the Kilbrandon report argued that
"In drawing a contrast between a system resting primarily
on ideas of crime, responsibility and punishment and one
proceeding primarily on the principle of prevention, we
are not, of course, suggesting that the methods of dealing
with adult crime are entirely governed by the first concept
or that a working compromise between them is not possible.
In practice, the present arrangements represent such a
compromise, and at any given time and certainly in relation
to any individual offender, a balance has to be sought on an
empirical basis between the conflicting claims of the two
principles." (Kilbrandon Report, para.54).
The recommendations of the respective committees as to the
future development of juvenile justice were seen as providing
viable and, perhaps more importantly, acceptable solutions to the
particular problem associated with the juvenile court. The
recommendations themselves, as we shall later see, though derived
from a common concern, were fundamentally different and are indicative
of the two opposing standpoints which can be identified in the
*
relevant literature. (See Cavenagh 1966).
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One is based on the argument for the necessity of a judicial
and legalistic mode of intervention in the lives of children, even
where welfare is being considered, and hence the necessity of
retaining the juvenile court structure and form of proceedings.
The principle of welfare, it is important to note, was not itself
questioned by the advocates of the juvenile court. Rather, the
source of the controversy was the implementation of welfare
measures in particular and a welfare philosophy in general within
an institution bound by the legal, judicial concepts associated with
a criminal jurisdiction. (See Elkin 1938 ; Cavenagh & Sparks 1965;
Watson 1965 ; Pound 1946).
The other, in complete contrast, is based on the notion that
an administrative tribunal or agency, without the trappings of
the court of criminal jurisdiction, was more appropriate for dealing
with children in terms of welfare. (See Wootton 1961, 1968;
didgley 1975; Napley 1968; Harno 1951). The form of proceedings
within a court setting itself was considered an obstacle to the
provision of appropriate welfare measures for children, whether
they were offenders or not. (Wootton 1968). The form of
proceedings associated with a criminal court required the establishment
of guilt before sentence could be passed. The problem of the juvenile
court, although it is not without significance for sentencing adult
offenders, (see Duster 1970; Kilbrandon 1966 p.118) is seen to
be that there were two more or less distinct stages in the sentencing
process. The first, the adjudication of the allegation, was
dictated by judicial or legal concepts and was subject to rules of
evidence. The other was the disposition or disposal of the case
at the sentencing stage where consideration of the appropriate
welfare measures was founded theoretically at least, upon a conceptual
framework which far from assuming, in criminal cases, rationality
and personal responsibility, presupposed a conception of human
nature as essentially determined. This has been presented as the
dilemma of western penal systems. (Duster 1970).
Nor are the differences in the conceptual frameworks simply of
philosophical interest; they are of considerable sociological
significance in terms of the ideological orientations of the
different agencies which comprise particular social-control networks.
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The changes introduced by the 1969 and 1968 Acts respectively,
for example, were made in the context of the reorganisation of the
social services in the light of their expanding role in the
field of delinquency as well as the redefinition of delinquency
in terms of a different ideological orientation.
Though the procedure of trial for children had been modified
in a number of ways from the proceedings in summary court, the
juvenile court was nevertheless, and still is, a court of law.
In this respect, the juvenile court in England in the early days
of its history did not experience the conflict between a 'welfare'
and a 'court' or 'judicial' philosophy to the same extent as did
the early American courts. The modifications made to summary
court procedure never quite allowed for the same degree of
'socialisation' (see Waite 1921; Midgley 1975) as its American
counterpart. Despite the attempts to simplify procedure,
commentators, some of whom were advocates of the juvenile courts,
recognised that proceedings in the English juvenile court may
still be confusing for a child. The degree of informality in the
juvenile court moreover in its early development did not involve
the loss of protection afforded by the principles of due process
and though perhaps true of American juvenile justice before
constitutionalist revision, (Waite 1921; Tappan 1946; Allen 1973;
Van Waters 1922) it would not have been accurate to suggest of the
English juvenile court that
"Emphasis upon legal rights of the accused, protection
of the innocent, proof of guilt and sentence of punishment
commensurate with offence was supplanted with a concern
for determining the child's condition and prescribing and
implementing a course of action aimed atfelieving that
condition and preventing its recurrence." (Faust and
Brantingham 1974 p.145).
From the outset, where a child's welfare was in question,
the decision as to measures appropriate to promoting welfare were
only made after specific issues had been settled in accordance with
the rules of evidence. (Tappan 1946; Faust and Brantingham 1974;
Fox 1974).
As a court of criminal law, the English juvenile court in
hearing cases was obliged to abide by the standards of legal procedure
and only when guilt had been established, in offence cases, could the
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child be dealt with, whether by measures of treatment or
punishment. And even in its civil jurisdiction, such standards
of legal procedure were also applicable where state intervention
depended upon the establishment of matters of fact pertaining
to the child's social, personal and environmental background.
The establishment of specific allegations prior to state
intervention had been seen as basic to a philosophy of juvenile
justice implemented within a court setting:
"The soT-called 'problem' is basic to the judicial
procedure, whether civil or criminal. It is that
specific allegations must be made and proved before
a person can be subjected to complusion on account of
them, and the weight of the order is traditionally likely
to be apportioned by the court to the gravity of the
acts or situations established. (Cavenagh 1966 p.127).
The concentration on specific allegations offers a means
whereby protection can be afforded to the defendant from undue
intervention and interference with his liberty. Even where
welfare measures are being considered, this does not preclude
the need for children to be afforded protection. (Elkin ^
Cavenagh 1966 ; Midgley 1975 ). Again, it is not the principle
of welfare as much as undue interference with individual, in this
case children's, rights and liberty which underpins the argument
for the retention of the juvenile court.
Such arguments had been made as early as 1927 in the Moloney
Report^ Though it had considered the question of possible preventive
measures to further the welfare of children, the committee were
unable to recommend the abolition of the juvenile courts. One
reason for this was that, since they were courts of justice, juveniles
who appeared before them were given the opportunity to meet specific
allegations made. The more recent criticism expressed over the
nature of the American juvenile court (Tappan 1974; Faust and
Brantingham 1974) was based on similar foundations and was of no
little significance for the constitutionalist revision of juvenile
justice in the United States. This is perhaps best epitomised
by In re Gault. (See Faust and Brantingham 1974 p.360 ff).
11. Moloney Committee (1927) Report of the Committee on the
Treatment of Young Offenders (Cmnd. 2831), London: HMSO.
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The Moloney committee had further argued, in support of the
retention of the juvenile courts, that alternative forms of
proceedings, as had been created in New Zealand only two years
prior to the report, did not allow sufficient attention to be
paid to the offence which had occasioned the charge in the first
place. (See Midgley 1975). Moreover, in recognition of the
principle that welfare is not the sole consideration for courts
of law, where offences were serious this had to be brought home to
the offender; the court appearance itself was valued as having
a deterrent effect. The 'formalism' of the juvenile court
(Midgley 1975, p.29) in its application of established standards
of judicial procedure safeguarded the rights of the child and
protected him from undue intervention; the nature of the court
proceedings themselves, and not only the actual measures available
to the court, were also seen to have a salutary effect on the
offender, and to be of possible general deterrent value.
Though originally voiced in the 1920s, such arguments can also be
seen in later government reports (see Ingleby I960).
The reluctance of the 1927 committee to introduce radical
changes in juvenile justice in favour of more incremental
modifications to the proceedings and jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, has been a characteristic feature of policy statements, at
least as far as England is concerned, up to the present day.
Proposals for incremental changes had also been made by Clarke Hall
who envisaged a system of juvenile justice in which all children
would be dealt with in terms of guardianship (1926). This did
not mean that the rules of evidence would not have applied, but
rather that the process of deciding whether there were sufficient
grounds to intervene in a child's life would be made by a court
operating within its civil jurisdiction, irrespective of whether
the child was an offender or had appeared in court for other reasons.
The judgment of questions of fact, pertaining to the child's needs
and not simply to offence allegations, remained under this approach
an appropriate task for judicial investigation. Even in terms
of civil jurisdiction, the principles of due process would still
be available to the child and his parents. The attraction of
such an approach to dealing with children is indicated by the fact
that any changes actually implemented since then have been of the
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nature of raising the age of criminal responsibility and dealing
with child offenders more in terms of civil than criminal
proceedings. Watson, himself an advocate of the juvenile court,
had also taken the stance that any changes introduced in the formal
institution for dealing with children should be within the framework
of the juvenile court. (1970).
The Ingleby committee had also been unable to recommend the
abolition of the juvenile court though it did recognise the
weaknesses, thereby creating a dilemma as to the nature of any
proposals it may have made. (Boss 1967). One of the arguments
given in the report for the retention of the juvenile courts had
been that the courts 'were generally of good standing and worked
well on the whole.' (Para.70). The changes recommended were
again essentially of a procedural nature and were designed in
recognition of the unsuitability of dealing with children especially
younger children, by means of criminal jurisdiction. Though the
juvenile courts were to be retained, it was recommended that efforts
should be made to get away from the conceptions of criminal
jurisdiction, (i960 para.77) a proposal not dissimilar to that made
by Clarke Hall, and later by Wootton. (1959). Nevertheless,
the Report could not support the total abolition of the juvenile
court which had objectives and considerations other than welfare
alone to bear in mind.
"Although it may be right for the court's action to
be determined primarily by the needs of the particular
child before it, the court cannot entirely disregard
other considerations such as the need to deter potential
offenders. An element of general deterrence must enter
into many of the court's decisions and this must make the
distiction between treatment and punishment even more difficult
to draw." (i960 para.7).
The solutions proposed were again indicative of the fact that
it was not the principle of welfare per se which was objectionable
so much as the proceedings which surrounded welfare considerations
in decision-making. Decisions about children were still to be
welfare oriented but the proceedings were to be further modified
so as to allow younger children to be dealt with by the court in
its civil jurisdiction.
All children who appeared before the court and who were under
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12 were to be dealt with as in need of care, protection and
control. (Para.84). Because the court was to inquire into
all circumstances surrounding court appearance, mother and father
of the child were to be required to appear. But even before
proceedings were instituted, police and local authority personnel
were to consult as to the necessity of court appearance. (Para.84).
Ingleby had accepted the comments of those who opposed the retention
of the courts on the grounds that the child would thereby be
stigmatised. (Para.68). The notion of stigma and 'stigma theory'
were to occupy a central role in the later, post Ingleby, proposals
for juvenile justice.
Children between 12 and 17 were to continue to appear before
courts under the then existing procedure; they were to be dealt
with as offenders responsible in law for their own actions, or
as in need of protection or discipline, subject in all cases to
S.44 of the 1933 Act. (Para.105). Perhaps a development of a more
fundamental nature was the recommendation (para.94) that the doli
incapax rule should be abolished. The difficulty of establishing
guilty intention generally, but particularly in children, it was
agreed, meant that the criminal law was thereby administered
inconsistently. More importantly, the doli incapax principle
could in fact prevent children from getting help they needed
where it had been proven that they had not known what they were
doing. (Para.94). The 'knowledge of wrong' test, particularly
since the implementation of S.44 of the 1933 Act was considered
as inhibiting the application not of punitive measures, but of
welfare measures. (Williams 1954). klootton also felt that
"..in short, if the welfare, not the punishment of
the child is the governing consideration, the safeguards
of the criminal trial became irrelevant;
and
"..as I have tried to point out, these safeguards are
inextricably related to a punitive judicial process.
It is only because the approved school, the probation or
supervision order and the attendance centre are inherently
penal institutions, because they are places of punishment
the road to which lies through the courts, that a specially
elaborate procedure is necessary. Substitute an educational
for a penal role and the need for that procedure will
disappear." (1951 p.675).
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However, the Ingleby committee had not recommended the
fundamental substitution of philosophies for dealing with children,
especially those who commit offences. Rather, the changes which
it recommended concentrated on the issue of responsibility and its
implication for the suitability of different types of proceedings.
The inflexibility of the common law had meant that where doli incapax
had not been established, a child could not receive any necessary
help or treatment. What makes the principle particularly difficult
to apply is that children who are between the ages of 18 and 14
(following the 193XAct the age of criminal responsibility was
set at 8) are
"..morally responsible not as a class but as individuals
when they know their act to be wrong. Only then do they
morally deserve punishment.." (Williams 1954 p.497).
Court proceedings at the stage of adjudication in offence
cases were determined by judicial and legal notions such as doli
incapax and responsibility, whereas the sentencing stage where
welfare was considered operated in terms of a different conceptual
framework. The Ingleby solution to the dilemma was further to
alter the proceedings and not abandon the welfare ethic, so that
decisions as to welfare in cases involving younger children would
logically follow from a form of court procedure whose guiding
precepts were not antithetical to those governing welfare.
Welfare measures, it was hoped, would not then be imposed on children
in whom had been created expectations of 'just deserts' by means
of the court proceedings. What are particularly interesting are
the assumptions about delinquency causation underlying the main
recommendations of the report.
The responsibility for crime by juveniles was considered
to be shared by the child and 'those responsible for his upbringing.'
Amongst 'those responsible' were parents, family, school and the
community and the child could therefore himself only be held
partly responsible for his behaviour. (ingleby viewed the
family particularly as a potent source of delinquency.)
Nevertheless, in later years children had to accept greater
responsibility for their behaviour, presumably until they had
attained the status of normal, fully responsible, law-abiding citizens.
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The influence of such assumptions in the recommendations of the
committee has been remarked upon by Bottoms.
"In other words, the model was, in crude terms,
one of social pathology for the younger child, but
more classical assumptions about choice of evil for
the older child; and these models were to be
reflected in the differing procedures - civil proceedings
for the younger child and criminal for the older."
(Bottoms 1974 p.324).
The resolution of the dilemma of the juvenile court was
in effect
"..to inject the pathological model in to the whole
of court proceedings for younger children, and for
older children to reduce the force of the conflict
by stressing moral responsibility for crime and
thus minimise the pathological model at the sentencing
stage." (Bottoms 1974 p.342).
Despite the apparent neatness of such a proposal, the ideological
conflict between a welfare and a punitive orientation could not
be completely resolved where considerations of welfare are,
theoretically at least, to be given to all cases. Indeed,
the imposition of a rehabilitative ideal on a court based approach
to dealing with adult offenders has presented just such problems.
Though the report was considered by some to have been
ineffectual and unimaginative (Midgley 1975), the committee's
recommendations themselves did not receive complete legislative
expression. With the 1953 Children and Young Persons Act, the
age of criminal responsibility was certainly raised but only to ten;
the jurisdiction of the court over care and protection cases were
modified to care, protection and control. Other than these
changes, the only condition of major importance in the 1963 Act
was the provision for preventive powers to be exercised by local
authorities.
Whereas the Ingleby report may well have been rather conservative
in its recommendations, the more radical proposals made in England
in the 1960s aroused considerable hostile reactions, with the
result that the incremental and evolutionary, rather than revolutionary,




The rather conservative approach to change in juvenile justice
proposed in the Ingleby report did little to stem the demands
for more radical reform. Uootton, a prominent commentator
throughout this period, summed up the raction of many to the
report when she said:
"We had been hoping for a bold and imaginative
reconstruction of the whole system for dealing with
unfortunate children in this day and age. What
we got was a number of useful technical minor reforms
on a system which in the judgment of many of us is
already outmoded." (Hansard H.L. 1962 CCXL1V. 815).
The report also received criticism in a Fabian pamphlet
devoted to commentary on the Ingleby proposals. (Donnison et al.
1962). The main thrust of the criticisms was twofold. Though
Ingleby had identified the family as a major source of delinquency,
as had other reports previously, (see Kahan 1966) it was felt
that little had actually been done to provide a service which
would truly be designed to alleviate family need. (Jay 1962).
Moreover, though the report had also recognised inherent weaknesses
in the juvenile court system and the problem of the stigma associated
with court appearance, the report had in fact not taken sufficient
steps to keep children out of the court. These were issues that
12
were to be firmly taken up in the Longford Report.
Though the Longford Committee had been established to
consider the prevention of crime and the improvement and modernisation
of penal practice as a whole, a substantial part of the report
was in fact devoted to problems associated with juvenile delinquency.
In response to thinking which had expressed concern at the absence
of any effective 'family' service (see Jay 1962) and at the
stigmatisation of children who appeared before court, the committee
recommended
"..the establishment of a family service with the aim of
helping every family to provide for its children the
careful nurture and attention to individual social needs
that the fortunate majority already enjoy, and, secondly,
changes in judicial procedure which will take children of
school age out of the range of the criminal courts and the
penal system and treat their problems in a family setting.
12. Crime: A Challenge to Us All. 1964.
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Once again uje find that not only is there a shift in orientation
to the problem of dealing with children but that the implications
of changing philosophies are reflected in the recommendation for
the reorganisation of the services hitherto responsible for the
presentation of information about children to the courts and for
A A ^ •» **
the execution of court orders. Hock faecaosc.aP uv-^portance. & o. family
service, which in terms of the report would be responsible for the
very diagnosis of problems experienced by children as well as for
decisions as to appropriate measures of treatment, this meant
that both functions would be carried out mainly by social workers.
This would have necessitated a considerable expansion in the role
of such services and the Report anticipated further developments
in this direction.
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Like the Curtis Report the Longford Committee represented
the integration of fragmented local authority services as desirable
in that there would be overall planning with a more efficient use
of skilled manpower. The concept of a 'family' orientated service
itself also provided the foundation for change in dealing with
delinquents with the proposal for a non-judicial agency to determine
appropriate welfare measures. The proposal to remove all children
of compulsory school age from the ambit of the criminal law was not
new, though the Longford report gave it official backing. But
the proposals involving the creation of a family service by each
local authority did not completely do away with the court. A
'family' court, which was to be a judicial agency, was to deal with
cases where the family service could reach no agreement. It also
would have responsibility for other than simply children's cases.
Cases of 'serious1 delinquency could also be referred to the 'family'
court directly by the family service or the police and this exemplifies
the difficulty of accommodating children who commit offences
within a system based completely on a welfare ethic, with its under¬
lying assumptions of pathology. (Kilbrandon 1964, Morris 1974).
The logic behind the proposals was that of the unsuitability
of the juvenile court for daaling with children, none of whom
in early adolescence ought to be subjected to criminal proceedings.
The measures applicable to children of compulsory school age who
13. The Report of the Committee on Care of Children (Curtis)
Cmnd. 6922, 1946.
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had not been involved in offending were considered appropriate
for those who had been so involved; consequently, the form of
proceedings for such children, who were in no essential respects
different from other children, should similarly be of a non-judicial
nature. The Longford proposals were incorporated within the
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abortive white paper, The Child, The Family and the Young Offenders,
which contained the government's
"..provisional proposals for practical reforms to
support the family, to forestall and reduce delinquency
and to revise the law and practice relating to offenders
up to 21. (p.3).
An addition made within the recommendations of the white paper
was that a 'family council' should be appointed whose function
would be to hear cases and, through the family service, to be
responsible also for the execution of measures decided upon. It
was to deal with all cases of delinquency, care, protection and
control and was to work as far as possible in consultation with
and with the agreement of the parents. And though the family
council was to be a non-judicial body, as with Kilbrandon, the white
paper did not propose to dispense completely with the court since
the child's right to protest his innocence was preserved. (See Jacobs
1971; Elkin 1938; Cavenagh 1967 on this point.)
The arguments that had been mentioned in the Longford report,
pertaining to stigma and a family service, were supplemented
by others. Firstly, the task of the courts had become one mainly
of making decisions about appropriate measures, as the majority
of children who appeared before the court did not dispute the facts
of the allegation. Again, this was similar to an argument made by
Kilbrandon and it is difficult to believe that the Scottish report
was of no significance in influencing developments in England.
Secondly, and related to all this, treatment measures were to be
imposed in the form of court orders and were thereby not flexible
enough for the implementation of a welfare philosophy. The purposes
behind the white paper were to remove children from the jurisdiction
of the criminal law and to separate as far as possible arrangements
for the trial from the process of making decisions as to appropriate
measures for children.
14. Cmnd. 2742, 1965
Perhaps not unexpectedly in view of the radical nature
of the proposals, the magistracy, lawyers and probation service
were hostile to such developments. The main focus of criticism
was the fact that cases were to be heard by a non-judicial body,
composed mainly of child care and other local authority social
workers.
In reference to the argument that facts were not disputed
in the majority of cases, Cavenagh argued that both the white
paper and the Kilbrandon report were mistaken in their assessment
of judicial procedure in this respect.
"Both wrongly assume that therefore the criminal
court has no real function to perform in such cases.
But the criminal jurisdiction protects the liberties of
the offender not only by requiring proof of offence
before liability to compulsion but by limiting the
exercise of compulsory powers over a convicted offender."
(1966 p.128).
The delegation of responsibility for investigation of cases
involving young offenders to non-judicial bodies was considered
fraught with problems, and was an unwarranted shift from the
concepts of crime, responsibility and punishment to a concept of
treatment based wholly on the needs of the offender. Yet such
a shift necessarily rendered the judicial protection of children
inappropriate, given that the framework of intervention was to be
based on welfare or need. The shift in the philosophical basis
would also have involved, it was argued, an unnecessary revolution
in English juvenile justice.
"Duvenile delinquency is not a new problem. The
criminal law has been dealing with it just as long as
it has been dealing with adult crime. A system of such
antiquity is unlikely to be fundamentally unsound..."
(1966, p.133)
Again the principle of welfare itself may well have been
acceptable but what was not acceptable was the complete abolition
of the juvenile courts whose functions were not solely restricted
to dealing with considerations of welfare. The danger of too
radical a shift in philosophy was to concentrate too much on the
welfare of children at the cost of other objectives.
"Dealing with breaches of the criminal law appears to
be the proper responsibility for the judiciary. After
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all the child and his parents are not solely involved;
the public also has an interest in the administration
of the law." (1966, p.133)
Though approval had been voiced by some at the attempt to
remove children from the courts (Scott 1966), others were
doubtful as to the 'efficacy' of such proposals in dealing with
juvenile crime (Cavenagh 1966, Cavenagh and Sparks 1965)
and also as to the ability of the family councils to be any more
successful at producing a consistent policy of decision-making
than had been the magistracy. (Patchet and McLean 1965 p.699 ff).
That the family councils were to have been composed of local
authority social workers was an obvious focus of criticism by
members of the probation service. Though probation work was
based on the same ideological orientation as that of other
branches of social work, the probation service was an integral
element in the court network. Whereas social work was local
authority based, probation work was conducted within the framework
of the courts and the service was independent of the local authorities.
Probation officers, in view of the apparent success of probation
work (see Oarvis 1966) were unable to accept the merits of the
proposal that a new body of social workers given responsibility
for a field in which they had been traditionally involved and
in whose development they had been influential. Members of the
service «\£o emphasised that judicial intervention as opposed to
decision making by non-judicial bodies was necessary as a means of
protecting the defendant.
Conversely, at a time when there were increased demands for
the professionalisation and unification of social work, the
proposals contained in the Longford report and in the white paper
were not unacceptable to the members of the various local authority
and other social services. (Kahan 1966).
But the dominant criticism of the proposals was against the
removal of the child from the jurisdiction of the criminal law
and the abolition of the juvenile courts in favour of a more
administrative approach to delinquency control. What must have
undoubtedly offered support to such criticisms was the developments
at that time in America, where the trend in the 1960s was to a more
formal process of intervention. By the beginnings of the 1960s
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the problems associated with the scope of discretionary decision¬
making in the juvenile court in the United States had been
recognised with the result that there followed a number of changes
in juvenile justice which introduced a more formalistic approach
to decision-making based on the principles of due process. (See
Faust and Brantingham 1974).
The proposals in the English White Paper were then defeated
and the government were forced to think again.
Though the recommendations in The Child, The Family and
The Young Offender met with widespread disapproval, a White Paper
produced only three years later was incorporated into The 1969 Children
and Young Persons Bill with only minor modification. The
proposals in the 1968 White Paper, Children in Trouble, were
made within the context of the juvenile court framework and it is
the retention of the juvenile courts that has been seen as
giving respectability and acceptability to the recommendations.
The later proposals in this way did not pose such a threat to
"the ancient principle that no subject of the
Crown, however young or undistinguished may be
deprived of his liberty except by order of a
properly constituted court of law." (Watson 1970 , p.IX)
Whereas the two White Papers differed in their intentions
towards the juvenile courts, the less radical Children in Trouble
nevertheless made recommendations which were influenced by the
recommendations of the earlier paper. In particular, the move
to keep children out of court as far as possible was still
predominant, though the 1968 recommendations sought to achieve
this without the abolition of the juvenile courts. Similarly,
both papers recognised the need for the reorganisation of the
social services as a prerequisite to the provision of adequate
measures for children, whether offenders or not. Such a trend
was welcomed by Wootton who stated
"I submit that up to compulsory school leaving age
every child should be treated in an educational and
not a penal atmosphere and should not be liable to any
penal proceedings whatsoever." (1965 , p.29 ff.)
The nature of the 1968 proposals was to allocate to informal
consultation between the different agencves within the social control
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network, the functions that would have been carried out by
the 'family councils.' The nature of intervention was therefore
either to be through court proceedings or informal, voluntary
contact with the social services department.
The White Paper had proposed new legal procedures in relation
to juvenile offenders over the age of 10 which was to remain as
the age of criminal responsibility, below which children, as
before, would not be subject to criminal proceedings. In
relation to offenders aged 10 and under 14, however, an offence
was no longer to be a sufficient ground in itself for bringing
children before the court. Where proceedings were to be
necessary, they were to be brought under care, protection or
control procedure, and where a child had been involved in an
offence, it had to be established that he had committed the offence
and that he was 'not receiving such care, protection and guidance
as a good parent may reasonably be expected to give. ' There
was then a double-tier requirement whereby it had to be shown that
a child was in need of care and that one of the other conditions,
one of which was the commission of an offence, was satisfied. But
even before proceedings were instituted, the local authority and
the police had to consult as to the necessity of such a step.
The prosecution of children between 14 and 17 was also
restricted and except on a charge of homicide, would only be
possible on the authority of a summons or warrant issued by a
magistrate, a proposal that did not meet with universal approval.
In terms of the measures for offenders, the 1968 White Paper
was no less committed to treatment and welfare than the earlier
paper had been, and it made a number of modiciations that had
important implications for the increased role of the social services.
Firstly, the approved school order was to be abolished for it was
to be substituted by an order committing children to the care
of the local authority. Secondly, provision was to be made for
a new form of treatment, intermediate treatment, which was to be
developed as neither a community nor a residentially-based programme,
but which was to fall somewhere between the two. Thirdly all
supervision of children under 14 was to be by the local authority
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social services. This last proposal did not meet with the
approval of a departmental committee which reported in the same
year.
The 1965 White Paper, ocS we have noted, urged examination
of the local-authority social services, as the reform of the law
in relation to children highlighted the need for organisationally
improved services to offer help to the family and to prevent
delinquency. Accordingly, in the same year, the Seebohm Committee"^
was set up to 'review the organisation and responsibilities of the
local authority personal social services and to consider what
changes are desirable to ensure an effective family service.1
Whereas, perhaps not unexpectedly, the Seebohm Committee
welcomed the main recommendations of Children in Trouble, it
nevertheless differed in a number of ways from the White Paper.
The Seebohm report dealt with the shortcomings of the then
existing social services, namely the inadequacy in the level, range
and quality of provision, and (as a consequence of the fragmented
nature of the local authority social services), the lack of
co-ordination which contributed to the difficulty of access to
the appropriate services. The major recommendation of the committee
was that a new local authority department be set up which would
include the various services that had hitherto existed. These
included the children's department, welfare departments, mental
health services and educational services. What in effect was
proposed was an organisational restructuring of different local
authority services which complemented the drive towards the
unification of social work as a profession and the acceptance of
the concept of generic social work. (See Sinfield 1970)
The influence of the social work profession on the 1968 White Paper
is displayed by the shift in orientation a.u>ocj from the assumption
about social pathology, made in the Ingleby Report and the 1965
White Paper. Children in Trouble had also recognised the importance
of the family as a potential source of delinquency but it placed
greater emphasis on individual pathology.
15. Report of the Committee on Local Authority and Allied
Social Services. (Seebohm) Cmnd. 3703. 1968.
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"A child's behaviour is influenced by genetic,
emotional and intellectual factors, his maturity,
and his family, school, neighbourhood and wider social
setting." (para.6.)
Whereas factors other than those of an individual nature
were cited, the proposals for treatment measures concentrated on
the child. This was also apparent in the Seebohm report where
it was suggested that the diagnosis, assessment and treatment of
delinquency could only be imrpoved with the restructuring of the
social services. Even though the juvenile courts were to be
retained the social services were to play a central role in the
diagnosing and treatment of delinquency which was construed in
terms rather of pathology and its social ramifications than in
terms of legal definitions and implications. Indeed, the retention
of the juvenile court may have deflected the attention of the
magistracy and the legal profession from the fact that the involvement
of the social services was only minimally less than that proposed
under the 1965 White Paper. The fact that the approved school
order was abolished meant that with the care order, the decisions
as to appropriate measures were to be made by the local authority.
The decision by the magistrates, as was well appreciated later
(Bottoms 1974 p.335), was to commit children to the care of the
local authority, not to determine what the particular measures of
care would be. That was for social work judgment and
"magistrates had failed to realise how far
the traditional functions of the juvenile
court were being eroded." (Bottoms 1974,
p.335)
Whereas the 1968 White Paper had envisaged a divided
responsibility between the social services and the probation
service, Seebohm disagreed and recommended that all children and
young persons under 17 be supervised by the social services
department alone. Once again a government document was proposing
to diminish the responsibility of the probation service in the
field of delinquency.
Three principles then had been stated in the 1968 White Paper
which with minor modifications became the basis for the 1969 Children
and Young Persons Act. Firstly, children were to be offered treatment
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rather than punishment with the distinction between delinquents
and non-delinquents being further elided. Secondly, treatment
was to be flexible with the introduction of intermediate treatment
and the integration of all residential institutions into a system
of community homes, a proposal that had been made earlier. Finally,
there was to be participation of all concerned with the welfare of
children, which was also to include the parents of children involved,
and which would allow more children to be kept out of court by being
dealt with other than by formal proceedings. In this respect the
interdependence of the proposals made in the 1968 White Paper and
the Seebohm report with the necessary reorganisation of social
service provision both in practice and in concept had been anticipated
in Scotland within the Kilbrandon Report itself.
Scotland: The Kilbrandon Report"^
Prior to the 1968 Social Work (Scotland) Act, there had
in effect, as we have seen, been no uniform system of juvenile
justice in Scotland. Though the 1908 Children Act establishing
juvenile courts had applied to both England and Scotland, the
evolution of juvenile justice thereafter took a very different .
form.
The 1908 Act had made legislative provision for juvenile
courts to meet at different times and in places dissociated from
the system of criminal justice as it applied to adults. But when
17
the Norton committee, - appointed in 1925 to examine the treatment of
young offenders and young people requiring care or protection -
reported it emphasised the fact that juvenile cases were at that
time still being heard in Sheriff courts or the Burgh courts.
Only in Lanarkshire were the juvenile courts, attached to the justice
16. In contrast to the availability of literature relating to
juvenile justice in England, there has been until recently,
comparatively less written about the Scottish context.
The Kilbrandon report itself contains only a brief history
of the juvenile courts in Scotland.
17. Report of the Departmental Committee on Protection and
Training (Scotland). London H.N.S.O. 1928.
49 - 192.
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of the peace courts, operating as intended. The committee also
referred critically to the lack of personnel qualified in dealing
with children as neither lay magistrates nor legally qualified
sheriffs were considered appropriate for the task. Consequently,
the report had recommended that cases involving children and young
offenders should be referred to specially constituted Justice of
the Peace courts. The members of such courts u/ere to be drawn from
a panel of justices selected by virtue of their knowledge and
experience in dealing with juveniles. The committee further
recommended that the age of criminal responsibility be raised
from seven to eight.
The recommendations of the Morton committee were embodied
in the 1932 Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act, later
consolidated by the 1937 Children and Young Persons (Scotland)
Act, and as with the 1933 Act in England, the magistracy were
enjoined to have regard to the welfare of the child.
Nevertheless when the Kilbrandon committee was appointed
in 1961 to
"consider the provisions of the law of Scotland
relating to the treatment of juvenile delinquents and
juveniles in need of care and protection or beyond
parental control, and, in particular, the constitution,
powers and procedure of the courts dealing with such
juveniles.."
only in four areas were the specially constituted justice of the
peace juvenile courts established. (These were Ayrshire, Fife,
Renfrewshire and the City of Aberdeen.) Before the 1968
Act there were then four different types of courts dealing with
juvenile offenders. These were the Sheriff court, the Burgh or
Police court,the Justice of the Peace courts and the specially
constituted courts. (See the Kilbrandon Report paras. 43 - 46).
Whereas the Sheriff court was presided over by a single,
legally qualified judge, the Burgh or Police courts were presided
over by a single baillie who held the office as an elected town
councillor and was appointed by election by his colleagues.
Lay justices sat in the J.P. courts; in the specially constituted
courts, the panel of justices were appointed from their own number.
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Moreover, the three different Police courts in Glasgow which sat
as courts of summary jurisdiction for adult cases also sat as
juvenile courts. Of these, the Central court was presided
over by a legally qualified stipendiary magistrate with a full
time appointment whereas the other two, the Marine and Govan
Police courts were presided over by baillies.
The object in presenting such a catalogue is not simply to
give a description of the provisions for children in Scotland
but to highlight the lack of uniformity in the courts which
had jurisdiction over juvenile cases in different parts of
Scotland. In addition, as Kilbrandon points out, the choice of
court for the hearing of a case could be affected by various
considerations. (See paras. 43 - 46).
What had evolved in Scotland was a system of juvenile
justice which unlike that of England and Wales, lacked any
coherence or uniformity, a factor which must surely have
contributed to the acceptance of the radical recommendations made
by the Kilbrandon Committee (See Bottoms 1974; Morris 1974).
It was against such a background that the Committee reported and
recommended that the existing means of dealing with children were
unsuitable and be replaced by a new system of Children's Hearings.
However, it was not simply the organisational and administrative
incoherence in Scottish juvenile justice which prompted such proposals -
rather, the Kilbrandon Committee too had criticised an approach
to dealing with children in terms of welfare within a framework of
criminal jurisdiction.
Increasing delinquency rates, though treated with caution
by the Kilbrandon Committee, were attributed in part to the
inadequacy of the available means of dealing with delinquents.
The particular form of social control in Scotland was treated
as an independent variable in delinquency causation.
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The solution to the problem of juvenile delinquency was
not simply to modify the existing court arrangements which had
fostered such general dissatisfaction, but to make wholesale
changes in the very organisational and administrative structure
of juvenile justice. Fundamental, not incremental change was
proposed.
What was to follow in the report was a more concise
appreciation of issues essentially similar to those tackled in
the Ingleby Report, the disjunction between the two stages of
adjudication and sentencing being given particular examination and
analysis. It is also possible in the report to recognise issues
and arguments that were to appear later in the major reports and
White Papers in England. Kilbrandon, in particular, had argued
that the ineffectiveness of the existing arrangements for combating
delinquency could be attributed in part to the lack of co-ordination
amongst the welfare services as well as to the inappropriateness
of the attempt to implement a welfare philosophy within a court
based agency. Neither was equipped realistically to implement
welfare principles. It was the proposed solution to the 'dilemma
of the juvenile court' that was to lead to a fundamentally different
model of juvenile justice in Scotland from that in England. This
was despite the fact that the underlying philosophies were
essentially the same. (day 1971).
In reference to criminal procedure, though modifications
had been made for children, the report stated that
"Criminal procedure....is clearly well adapted to
determination of questions of fact, from which
the accused's guilt or innocence may be inferred...
In relation to juvenile offenders, however, statute
law introduces a further set of considerations.
A court in dealing with a juvenile is required to have
regard to the welfare of the person before it.
'Welfare' is of course, irrelevant to the question
of determination of innocence or guilt and relates to
the second stage of the proceedings, namely, the form
of treatment appropriate to the case once the facts
have been established." (Para. 50).
These two functions rested on a framework of concepts that
were fundamentally different from each other. Whereas the adjudication
of the allegation issue assumes a high degree of personal
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responsibility and focus on a specific act, an offence;
welfare considerations were not based on an assumption of
responsibility and welfare measures are determined by rather
broader factors. Where the measures available to a court had
been determined by a retributive or deterrent philosophy, then
such punitive measures as would follow upon adjudication could
well be influenced by the questions relating to the degree of
responsibility. The conceptual frameworks underlying adjudication
and punishment are essentially similar.
The committee were not solely concerned at the incompatibility
of a crime - and - responsibility - and - punishment philosophy
with a treatment philosophy that was 'curative' in nature. Rather,
the crime - responsibility - punishment approach militated against
the principle of prevention (paras. 52 - 3), by the necessity of
establishing a specific offence or act, a point considered by
Cavenagh to be crucial to justice. The report identified
four ways in which it felt the two approaches to be incompatible.
Firstly, where no proof of involvement in an offence could
be established, or where the offender was not criminally liable,
no action could be taken even where preventive measures appeared
necessary. (Para. 54 (l)). An important difference between
Scotland and England in this respect, as we have seen, is that
children in Scotland were not offered the protection of the
rebuttable presumption of doli incapax which was available to
children in England until their fourteenth birthday.
Secondly, punishment was too restrictive in its application
to the offender whereas others could be included in a programme
designed on preventive or welfare principles. (Para.54 (2)).
Thirdly, alteration to the needs of the child could be
inhibited by the crime - and - responsibility approach where
punishments would mainly be related to the nature of the child's
involvement or the nature of the offence. (Para. 54 (3)). Indeed,
the intention of the report, which was not accepted fully, had been
that the concept of criminal responsibility be completely abandoned.
(See Kilbrandon 1966).
Lastly, punishment is once and for all whereas treatment or
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welfare measures may require to be altered in the light of changing
needs. (Para. 54 (4)). Flexibility of approach was therefore
necessary in dealing with children in terms of need and simply in
relation to specific offences. With the emphasis in the report
also on parental involvement, some of the proposals and the principles
underlying them do seem to have been influential in determining the
character of later English proposals.
However, in view of the difficulty in reconciling the principles
underlying crime and its punishment on the one hand and those
underlying welfare, or as Kilbrandon referred to it, educative
ones on the other hand, the Committee did not accept that further
modification to the existing system of juvenile justice would have
made any real impact on the problem. (See para. 57). Whereas
both Ingleby and Children in Trouble attempted to resolve the dilemma
of the juvenile court by making a number of procedural modifications,
Kilbrandon argued that the two functions, adjudication and disposal,
should be separated. The argument was given extra strength by the
further claim that the skills required for adjudication of questions
of fact were mainly legal or judicial and the question of sentencing
was
"...an entirely separate one and calls for quite
different skills and qualities from these to be applied
in deciding on the action to be taken in relation to
delinquent children once the fact is established."
(Para. 70).
Though the 1968 White Paper in England had proposed alterations
to procedure, the retention of the juvenile courts meant that
magistrates could still be involved in questions of fact and
questions of welfare, though welfare decisions were also
to be made by the social services. The Kilbrandon solution was
"to devise a procedure whereby juvenile offenders would
in all cases be brought before a specialised agency whose
sole concern would be the measures to be applied on
what amounts to an agreed referral." (Para. 73).
Such a specialised agency would also benefit parents in
allowing them a more realistic opportunity of becoming involved in
the process of making decisions about their own children, thereby
fostering parental responsibility. (Para. 76). The courts had
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not been able to give sufficient attention to the role that might
be played by parents in formal proceedings. (Para. 36).
By analogy with the office of public prosecutor, the committee
recommended that the initial referring agencies (police or social
services) should not have the responsibility of forwarding cases
to the juvenile panels. This was to be the function of a new
type of official, to be known as the Reporter, who would make
initial assessment of cases and decide as to the necessity for referral
to the panels. And though he would be required to make preliminary
assessment of cases in terms of need for treatment (para. 97) he
would also be required to be competent at handling both the legal
issues and wider questions of public interest. (Para. 98). Though
he was obviously to be involved as a 'filter' through which only
appropriate cases would be referred to the panels, the lack of
definitive statement as to his qualifications (see para. 102)
has meant that with the wide discretion involved different policies
have evolved in different geographical and administrative areas.
His role is a crucial determinant of the numbers of children dealt
with by formal means of intervention as well as of those alternative
measures available which he can utilise himself.
Even where the sole function of the 'specialised' agency was
to be the consideration and application of appropriate measures,
offence behaviour was not completely without significance. For
"The offence, while the essential basis of judicial
action, has significance only as a pointer to the need for
intervention. Its true significance will not necessarily
be found on the basis of any preconceived standard
i.e. by viewing the offence simply as an act in isolation
and judging its potential seriousness simply by the
ready-made standards offered by the range of sanctions
which the law (and thus society at large) attaches to
the particular class of offence which it exemplifies."
(Para. 71).
Definitions of delinquency in legalistic and judicial terms
were considered inappropriate in their inability to express the
nature of children's needs of which delinquency was merely
symptomatic. Delinquency was no longer to be conceived of
simply as a legal label or category but was a behavioural condition
requiring diagnosis, assessment and treatment. Accordingly, it was not
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appropriate to deal with it through the medium of the criminal law
as it was essentially similar to other forms of behavioural conditions
or circumstances, such as truancy. Delinquency in concept was
theoretically removed from the jurisdiction of criminal law and in
practice was to be the responsibility of the new 'public agency',
which was in itself an extension of the social services concerned
with children's needs. (Para. 234). It is perhaps worth noting
that not all commentators on the English and Scottish systems have
been convinced of the theoretical and pragmatic merits of such a
'treatment' approach. (Morris and Mclsaac 1978; Fox 1974).
So far the arguments against the juvenile courts were that
the procedure was inhibitive of the implementation of a treatment
philosophy; that parents could not be wholly involved in the
decisions about and application of measures in respect of their
children; and that children's needs were in general being met
only inadequately. Delinquency was not really a problem for the
courts and was not simply a legal or judicial status conferred on
children but was symptomatic of some underlying condition or
circumstances which fell within the domain of a welfare institution
whose primary objective would be that of meeting need.
Lord Kilbrandon himself was later to assert more explicitly
that the treatment of children was no longer to be a small part of
the system of criminal jurisdiction but was instead to become a small
though important part of the system of the social services. (1966).
It was the very fragmented nature of the social services
themselves which was also the focus of examination by the committee
who considered that any attempt to deal with delinquency necessarily
required the supporting framework of a single agency charged with
the responsibility for the prevention and reduction of juvenile
delinquency (para. 39). And though the terms of reference of the
committee were restricted to provisions for children, the committee
anticipated that their proposals would have benefits for young and
old alike, consonant with the conceptualisation of delinquency as one
form of social need. Consequently, Kilbrandon proposed a new
department, the social education department, which would have overall
responsibility for dealing with children and would represent a merging
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of all the existing services whose primary concern was with
the problems of children in need. Such a department would not
only provide diagnostic and assessment functions but would also
be responsible for executing the decisions of the new panels.
In view of the fact that decisions about need and measures of care
were to be made both by the new panels and by the new social work
departments, it was not clear who was the correct assessor of need
was to be.
An interesting feature of the report was that whereas the
committee had espoused a treatment or welfare philosophy, and had
recommended the extension of supervisory provisions, there was still
a role to be played by the courts. Children could still be required
to appear in court for a number of reasons. Despite the promise
of the legislation, there remains an intricate network of
relationships between the courts and the Hearing system in Scotland.
At a time when England retained the court structure, it is perhaps
not surprising that in Scotland the Children's Hearings were not given
the monopoly for dealing with children who may be 'in need of
compulsory measures of care.'
Despite the creation of a specialised tribunal to make
decisions in terms of the need for compulsory measures of care,
and the rejection of the judiciary as being ill-equipped for making
decisions about the welfare of children, there is nevertheless
considerable contact between the courts and the Hearing system.
With the retention by the Lord Advocate of the right to prosecute,
children in Scotland may still be dealt with in court for a number
of reasons. Conceptions of the Children's Hearing system as a radical
form of juvenile justice have to be qualified by the reminder that
children in Scotland over the age of criminal responsibility may
still be prosecuted.
What has to be remembered is that though the conceptual
framework underlying the system of Children's Hearings is based on a
philosophy of welfare and determinism, the age of criminal responsibility
in Scotland remains at eight. A sharp reminder of this was presented
in the unfortunate case of nary Cairns, (see Bruce and Spencer 1973)
the young Glasgow child involved in a stabbing incident with one of
her friends. Thus, though the Scottish system accepts the philosophy
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of welfare for dealing with certain children it does not for those
others who may be prosecuted. It could be argued that whereas the
conceptual ambiguity of care and control was resolved in England by
the distinction of 'care' and 'criminal' proceedings within the juvenile
court structure, the Scottish solution was to separate the two realms
of operation. There was, however, no exclusive commitment to welfare.
This is also reflected in the fact that of those children who are
indeed prosecuted, some may well be sent to exactly the same
residential institutions as those who were dealt with by the
Children's Hearing.
Further, where a child or his parents do not admit the ground
of referral at a Hearing, the case, as is by now well known, must be
referred to the Sheriff who must decide whether the facts of the case
have been proven or not. Where they are, the child will again appear
before a Hearing for appropriate disposal. What appears as an
apparently cumbersome procedure is derived from Kilbrandon's
recommendation to separate the adjudication process from the decision
as to the appropriate measures of care.
These areas of contact in fact recognise the different spheres
of operation of the courts and the Hearings in that adjudication and
prosecution are legitimate judicial enterprises, whereas the function
of the Hearings is to reach the most appropriate decision.
The solution of the committee to the problems associated with
delinquency then involved taking children under the age of sixteen
outwith the scope of the criminal law, with notable exceptions;
to replace the juvenile courts by a system of juvenile panels; to
appoint an intermediate official who alone would refer cases to the
panels and to establish a matching fieldwork support which would be
charged with the assessment and diagnosis of children's needs as
well as the execution of the necessary measures of care.
Social Work and the Community
The White Paper which followed the report, Social Work and the
Community accepted the main proposal of the committee in respect of the
abolition of the juvenile courts in favour of a system of juvenile or
children's panels. There had however been criticism as to the
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applicability of a 'social education department' as the main
supporting agency fieldwork and the government in fact suggested
that a social work department would be more appropriate.
Morris (1974) sees the change from social education to social work
department as one of 'status gains' and 'moral victory' with no
fundamental difference in the functions of the two proposed agencies.
What had been conceived of by Kilbrandon as the functions of a social
education department were indistinguishable from what is usually
considered to be family casework. The appointment of a joint working
party to advise the government had also been composed of three prominent
individuals closely associated with social work, a fact that may well
have contributed to the changes included in the White Paper. Moreover,
the Child Care Association, which had welcomed the welfare orientation
of the report, expressed doubts about the responsibilities of the new
agencies being given to a social education department. (The Scotsman
1964). The Association argued that, as the McBoyle Committee"^had
proposed an extension of the responsibilities of local authority
child welfare services, it would be more appropriate that the new
fieldwork agency be composed of the members of such departments.
The civil service had in fact been criticised for having established
two separate committees with terms of reference to examine issues and
questions which had broadly similar underlying circumstances. (See
Morris 1974).
The bulk of the criticism of the White Paper was to come not
from the maigstracy, even with the proposed abolition of the juvenile
courts, but from the probation service. The general criticism of any
proposal which would establish an administrative agency for dealing
with problems of delinquency had been that there would be insufficient
safeguards. In fact, though the Kilbrandon Report had urged the abolition
of the juvenile courts, children could still have resort to the courts.
Where a child denied the facts on which a referral was based, his
case could be heard by the Sheriff, as the committee had only separated
the functions of adjudication and disposal and had not done away
completely with the court. Moreover, the right of appeal was to rest
with the Sheriff in the first instance, a proposal that was to create
18. Committee of the Prevention of Neglect of Children.
Cmnd. 1466, H.M.S.O. 1963.
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difficulty in its implementation. (See Grant 1976 ; Asquith 1979).
But children could also, under the Kilbrandon proposals be prosecuted
as the Lord Advocate was to retain the right of prosecution but was to
exercise his power
"only exceptionally and on the gravest crimes, in
which major issues of public interest must necessarily
arise, and in which, equally as a safeguard for the
interests of the accused, trial under criminal procedure
is essential." (Para. 127).
Such a proposal may then have satisfied the judiciary, some of
whom later commented favourably on the recommendations, (Aikman Smith,
1974), in that they were theoretically still charged with safeguarding
the liberty of children, though not of all children who were caught
up in the formal means of intervention.
However, the probation service had made similar representations to
those 1 their colleagues were later to make in reference to the
1965 White Paper in England. The Scottish Branch of the National
Association of Probation Officers maintained that the requirements of a
judicial system would not be met satisfactorily under the new
proposals. (1965) But as Morris argues (1974) even the criticism
by the probation service of the proposals for the abolition or
of the courts' representatives diminished by the time of the 1968
Social Work (Scotland) Bill. By that time, the Scottish probation
service, which lacked the co-ordination of the English service, was
devoting its energies to fighting inclusion in the new generic social
work department, a battle which, in Scotland they were to lose.
(Morris 1974).
In the late sixties then in both Scotland and England and Wales,
a welfare philosophy was accepted as the legitimate paradigm for dealing
with children who commit offences; the distinction between children in
need and children who commit offences was further elided; and the
respective systems of juvenile justice were further modified, a
development that took place in both countries in the context of the
reorganisation of social work. The basic and crucial difference between
the respective systems was the retention of the juvenile court in
England and the creation of a new specialised tribunal in Scotland. It is
to the significance of this that we will return in the preliminary





AIMS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY AND REVIELJ OF RESEARCH
So far we have examined potentially 'available ideologies'
and the extent to which they find expression in formal systems of
social control. Our purpose now is to consider the significance
of the apparent ambiguity between welfare and more legalistic
approaches to delinquency control for the making of decisions about
children who commit offences. In particular, we set out to examine
the frames of relevance employed by panel members (in Scotland) and
juvenile magistrates (in England) in the process of interpreting
information and the making of decisions. The intention in adopting
a comparative approach in the research was to analyse important
differences in the two systems of juvenile justice, particularly in
terms of what actually happens in the hearing of a case. In the
early research literature on the operation of the Children's Hearings
system in Scotland (May 1971; Smith and May 1971; Mapstone 1972)
much was made of the fact that juvenile justice in that country would
be subject to the stereotypes and typifications of lay people, i.e.
the panel members. Yet, in many respects, though there are of course
important differences between juvenile magistrates and panel members
they share a number of similarities. Not least is the fact that
juvenile magistrates are themselves 'lay persons' though the process
of selection and training may differ from that experience^ by panel
members.
Panel Members
The Kilbrandon Committee in its rejection of the juvenile court
based in part on the inappropriateness of the skills of the judiciary
for making decisions about the welfare of children was thereby
committed to making alternatives. The committee had recommended
that the Sheriff in each area should be charged with the duty of
appointing a sufficient number of persons who were in his opinion
"specially qualified either by knowledge or experience
to consider children's problems." ( Para.92(a))
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What makes the choice of the Sheriff as the person given such
responsibility as particularly surprising is that all along the
report had claimed that the judiciary did not have the skills
necessary for dealing with children. Yet, the proposal meant
that reliance was being placed on the ability of the judiciary to
select people who did have the appropriate skills. In view of
the fact that delinquency was conceived of as a behavioural
condition and not a legal status :is even more surprising.
This was altered in the white paper, Social Work and the Community
(Cmnd 3065), which also emphasised the desirability of the
involvement of the community in meeting the problems that arose
within it. Panels were to be composed of people
"drawn from a wide variety of occupation,
neighbourhood, age group and income group" (para 76)
and who were acquainted with the neighbourhood from which the child
came. Moreover, panel members were to be
"suitable people whose occupations or circumstances
have hitherto prevented them from taking a formal
part in helping and advising young people (para 76).
The difficulty in selecting panel members who were both
'representative' of the community and were 'suitable' (which was
never clearly defined) was an issue that was given considerable
attention later. (See Spencer 19 73; Smith and May 1971; Asquith
1977). Analyses of the applications and membership were later all
to reveal that neither initial applicants nor successful applicants
were representative of the community, (See Mapstone 1972; Moody
1976; Smith and May 1971).
What is particularly interesting is that though the language
of therapy, pathology and the medical analogy pervade the
Kilbrandon Report, the ultimate responsibility for decision making
was not to rest with 'experts' or 'professionals'.
The recommendation made in the Kilbrandon Report was
specifically for 'lay' membership of the proposed panels and seems
to have been made more in terms of the negative aspects of the
judicial framework for dealing with children. What the arguments
were for 'lay' membership are not particularly clear and this is
reflected in a telling statement produced later:
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"It is unnecessary for members of panels to be expert
social workers. The expertise necessary in their
work will be supplied by the local authority's social
work department. Members will, however, need a good
knowledge of treatment methods and of facilities
available for applying them ... Many people will
lack some of this knowledge and experience. Panel
members will therefore require a certain amount of
training, and it is proposed that at the outset this
training will be arranged for them by the local
authority." (Social Work and the Community 1966,para 80)
There are two comments that can be made here. Firstly,
though the panels are to make decisions about the children's needs,
it is the duty of the social work department to provide the
appropriate measures of care. There does then seem to be an
element of conflict in that if appropriate measures of care is a
professional task, the identification of need and the decision
about what measures are to be applied would also seem to call for
professional social work expertise. Indicative of the lack of a
consistently stated conceptual framework is the fact that whereas
the Kilbrandon Report envisaged that a Social Education Department
was the appropriate agency to deal with delinquent children, it was
only in the White Paper of 1966 that the Social Work Department was
proposed as being appropriate."'" Secondly, the distinction between
'lay' and 'professional' becomes somewhat blurred. We suggested
earlier (Chapter I,) that in the social control network no
particular frame of relevance necessarily had any prior claim to
validity. But this does not preclude the possibility of one agency
within that network having an overriding influence on the
development of and maintenance of the processes of social control.
Comment has already been made (Smith and May 1971) on the
difficulty of selecting not only those who would be 'suitable' panel
members but also those who would be 'representative' of the
community since dealing with delinquency was conceived of as a
process involving community participation. Though 'representativeness'
has certainly not been achieved, (Spencer 1973) the criterion of
'suitability' is not without its problems. Not being a
professional agency, there is theoretically no professional frame
1. Though as Morris (1974) rightly points out the notion of
social education contained in the Kilbrandon Report may not
differ fundamentally from what is usually implied by
'social work'.
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of relevance by which the selection of panel members can be
determined. Nevertheless, they are expected to have some
knowledge and experience of children's problems and with no
definitive statement as to 'suitability' the influence of the
social work profession in the process of selection makes it not
unlikely that successful candidates are those most amenable to
social work principles. Though not sharing completely the
professional frame of relevance of the social worker, the panel
members' susceptibility to social work principles allows for a
degree of shared understanding of children's problems.
Each panel area in Scotland contains an appointed advisory
body, the Children's Panel Advisory Group (C.P.A.G.) who are
responsible for the selection and later training of panel members.
There are a number of ways in which an individual can seek
membership of the children's panels. The most common way, as
testified by the panel members in this study, is for would be
panel members to put their own name forward either at the
instigation of or at least through contact with certain
organisations or individuals (some of whom are themselves panel
members). Since panel members 'require a certain amount of
training' (see above p.134), successful applicants will then go
through a programme of instruction, visits to institutions, lectures
from interested individuals who have either experience in
behavioural problems of children or general social work experience
or who have conducted research on the system, and workshop or
seminar type discussions on the role of the panel member. (See
Martin and Murray 1976 ) What is obvious is that in the training
of panel members, there are a number of professional bodies
involved and not just the social work profession.
What we have suggested earlier (Asquith 1977) is that the
distinction between 'lay' and 'professional' status is perhaps best
represented by points on a continuum and|^ not mutually exclusive
categories. The significance of this for the present thesis is
that though not a professional, the panel member has to assess and
interpret information and material from a number of professional
organisations. Moreover, the only measures for dealing with
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children who commit offences, supervision at home or residential
supervision, will involve such organisations, particularly social
work. The move away from a punishment non-treatment approach
to a more treatment non-punishment oriented approach has then in
Scotland resulted in a system of juvenile justice in which an
2
administrative form of tribunal manned by lay persons is serviced
and,provided with information from a number of ancillary services.
3
Juvenile Magistrates
Cavenagh points out that the development of the juvenile
court, as we have seen, has been continual in the light of growing
experience and of increased knowledge about children (1966). The
advances in knowledge and understanding of child development and
the social and emotional factors involved in child delinquency has
meant a greatly increased role for the child care and social
services. It was precisely because of the inappropriateness of
decisions about the welfare of children being made by the judiciary
that the Kilbrandon Report had recommended the creation of a new
body of individuals who by virtue of their expertise or personal
qualities were to be successful in their application for panel
membership In England however with the retention of the juvenile
court it would have been difficult to construct an argument
relieving magistrates of their duties in the juvenile court. Yet
since the 1969 Children and Young Persons Act one of the concerns
voiced by magistrates is that they are losing the power to make
decisions about the welfare of children. The social services
department has in fact been granted the right in a number of cases
to determine the nature of the measures to be adopted for particular
children. In relation to Care Orders for example the
magistrates can only decide whether to commit a child to the care of
the local authority or not; their decision is not about the nature
of the care considered appropriate The relationship between the
social services, the magistracy and the juvenile justice system in
2. The Children's Hearings are in fact subject to the same
statutory requirements and rules as are other forms of tribunals,
e.g. Supplementary Benefits Tribunal, Rents Tribunal etc.
3. See 'Justices of the Peace : How they are appointed; what
they do ' Central Office of Information 1972.
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general in England then is a very different one from that between
the social work department, the panel members and the Scottish
system.
One of the areas in which the respective systems differ is
that whereas in Scotland the Hearings are held in buildings
completed unassociated with and divorced from the courts and the
police, in England the police may in fact conduct the prosecution
in a case and play a considerable role in conducting the affairs
of the court. The police in England and Wales are then more
involved in the actual operation and administration of juvenile
justice as conceived within the framework of the 1969 Children and
Young Persons Act. The broader implication of this for the
present study is that the organisational network in the respective
systems is characterised by a number of potentially competing
ideologies to which different agencies (panel members and
magistrates, the police, social work profession etc.) might adhere
in varying degrees.
We saw that panelnembers are meant to be, as far as possible,
both 'suitable' and 'representative'. Though this has obviously
caused some concern north of the border (Spencer 1973; Smith and
May 1971), precisely the same issue has been important in the
selection of persons to the magistracy in England.
Magistrates are to be suitable in point of tharacter, integrity
4
and understanding'. Moreover, the Advisory Committee, responsible
for selection and training in the different areas,
"... must not only recommend suitable people but they
must also make sure that each Bench is broadly
representative of all sections of the community it has
to serve." (5)
What is implicit in this quotation is more than the suggestion that
the Bench should be representative; it also brings into relief the
way in which the selection process itself can influence the profile
of the Bench in a particular area. For example, the Royal
4. 'Appointment and Composition of the Magistrates Bench'.
Magistrates Association. Revised 1975, para 2.
5. op.cit., para 10.
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Commission on the Justices of the Peace^ commented on the
political nature of the selection made and recommended that
each committee should see to it that there be no political bias
in the composition of the bench.
Similarly, the Royal Commission had also pointed out
(para 32) that 71% of all magistrates were either non-employed,
professional men or employers and only a small proportion were
wage earners. (See Hood 1962)
Magistrates may not be appointed to the bench for the first
time if they are over 60 and indeed the Magistrates Association
(1975) urge the recruitment of younger magistrates. Lord Hewart,
Lord Chief Justice, as long ago as 1935 commented, with specific
reference to the juvenile court
"Is it not desirable that magistrates in these juvenile
courts should be of parental age, varying from 40-60
rather than of the grandfatherly period which runs from
60 to a happily distant future." (1935)
What has to be remembered in this respect is that only those who
are magistrates in the adult court can be magistrates in the
juvenile court. Magistrates are thus required to deal with diverse
issues and are not, in the case of the juvenile court, exclusively
concerned with the deeds or needs of children.
As in the Scottish system, anyone can nominate himself but a
nomination from a recognised organisation is considered to carry
more weight. Most of the magistrates in the present study, for
example, had been nominated or at least supported by an organisation
of some kind.
Given that the development of the juvenile court has been in
association with increased knowledge about the problems of children,
training of successful nominees would appear to be of extreme
importance. Indeed since January 1966 it has been obligatory for
all magistrates to take basic training. Panel members as we have
seen are also offered training but because of the different
objectives related to their task, the training in general differs.
Magistrates, whether in the adult or in the juvenile court, not only
6. Cmnd.7463, July 1948.
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sentence but, rather obviously, also decide on what we have
referred to as the allegation issue. That is, they must also
determine responsibility or liability in offence cases. The
significance of this for our study is that basic training is
related to a wider range of responsibilities than is the case
for panel training. Basic training
"... is designed to enable them to understand the
nature of their duties, to obtain sufficient
knowledge of the law to follow normal cases, to
acquire a working knowledge of the rules of evidence ^
and to understand the nature and purposes of sentences."
Magistrates are required to familiarise themselves with the basics
of legal and judicial procedure, as well as the issues relating to
sentencing, though in the 1948 Royal Commission Report it was
recognised that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to give
the lay magistrate considerable knowledge of extensive and complex
law. It is for that very reason that Hood (1962) highlights
the importance of the Clerk of the Court.
One important difference between the role of panel members
and that of juvenile magistrates is that, as well as working within
a more legal and judicial form of proceedings, magistrates can in
fact do a lot more than commit juvenile delinquents to the care of
the local authority. They can in fact adopt more punitive
measures. Magistrates have amongst their options
(i) An order for the parent or guardian to enter
into recognisance to take proper care of the
juvenile;
(ii) A Hospital or guardianship order;
(iii) A fine;
(iv) An attendance centre order;
(v) A detention centre order;
(vi) Committal of young person of not less than
fifteen years old to the Crown Court with a
view to Borstal training being imposed;
(vii) Absolute Discharge;
(viii) Conditional Discharge subject to the condition
that he commits no offence during a period not
exceeding 3 years;
(ix) Supervision Order placing the juvenile under the
supervision of the local authority; and
(x) Care Order placing the child or young person in
the care of the local authority.
7. Magistrates Association 1975.
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Unlike the Residential Supervision requirement in Scotland,
the Care Order is not an order for residential care though that
may indeed be the outcome. As with the Supervision Order, the
decision as to what form supervision or care may take, that is
the responsibility of the social services department.
The general point to be made however is that the conceptual
ambiguity inherent in the control or the care of delinquent
children is reflected in the availability to magistrates of
different forms of proceedings (care or criminal) and different
types of measures. Whether in practice there were any real
differences between juvenile justice in Scotland and England was one
of the questions we sought to examine empirically. Before turning
to a consideration of the major hypotheses of the .study we wish to
state our scepticism at a recent statement which suggests
"... the type of tribunal (juvenile court or welfare
tribunal) is largely unimportant. What is crucial
is the philosophy underlying that tribunal and the
ideology of its practitioners." (Morris and Mclsaac 1978, p 111).
Our belief is that any examination of the 'ideology of
practitioners' must of necessity be theoretically related to the
construction or accomplishment of social institutions such as
juvenile court or welfare tribunal. In this respect the major
hypotheses of this study are related theoretically to the
discussion of the relationship between formal and informal
ideologies. In the same way, our brief review of relevant research
at the end of this chapter is influenced by the desire to assess the
extent to which such research has been conducted within a
methodological framework appropriate to our concerns.
Major Hypotheses in the Study
For the purpose of this study we refer to those factors which
relate to children's 'needs' or 'interests' as welfare factors;
thus information about the personal, social or environmental
background of the child is considered to be 'welfare' factors.
Statements which allude more to the offence and the nature of
the child's involvement in it are referred to as judicial factors.
We recognise of course that these are rather vague and at the
same time rather restrictive concepts. Indeed what we have
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argued from the start of this thesis is that the potential for
conceptual ambiguity underpinning systems of juvenile justice
makes it difficult to separate welfare or judicial orientations,
punishment or treatment, and care and control. Later in this
thesis we shall present our own findings which we shall use to
argue that such neat distinctions are not easily maintained by
those responsible for the implementation of social policy for
delinquents. However, the utility of the difference between
'welfare' and 'judicial' considerations at this stage of the
thesis is that we can then examine the practical accomplishment
of juvenile justice within systems one of which, in organisational
and structural terms, is more judicially oriented than the other.
Hypothesis I: for the purpose of decision making, panel
members will treat welfare considerations as
more important than will juvenile magistrates
Since panel nembers, in theory at least, only decide upon the
need for compulsory measures of care and on the form that these
measures shall take, it was felt that they would be less inclined
to consider what we have referred to as legal or judicial factors,
i.e. the questions related to personal responsibility, protection
of the public and the nature of the offence. The frames of
relevance of panel members will, we suggest, be derived more from
available welfare ideologies and therefore more attention will be
paid to the assumed causes of juvenile delinquency. Legal and
judicial questions will be less important.
Hypothesis la: of the different theories of delinquency, mnro
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The history of juvenile justice has been one in which an ever
expanding role has been played by professional bodies and services.
In particular, the social services perform a number of important
functions in the Scottish and English system by way of providing
information about and care for children who find themselves in
trouble. The development of juvenile justice in both countries, as
we have seen, in recent times in fact occurred within the context of
reorganisation of the social services. And in Scotland, the local
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authority social work department was considered to have an
important role to play in the training and selection of panel
members Given the psychoanalytic base to much social
casework, we treated as an empirical question the degree to
which this perspective was seen as providing a more acceptable
explanatory framework over other available ideologies.
Hypotheses Ila; for the purpose of decision making, magistrates
will place greater importance on the need to
protect society
lib; for the purpose of decision making, magistrates
will place more importance on the harm or
seriousness of the offence
lie: for the purpose of decision making, magistrates
will place greater emphasis on personal
responsibility
These hypotheses are in a sense corollaries of Hypothesis I
in that they refer to a conceptual framework derived more from a
legal or judicial ideology than a welfare one. In part, they are
also located within a theoretical framework which can be used to
justify the infliction of punishment. However, as we have seen in
the historical and conceptual sections of this thesis, there is no
easy opposition of punishment and welfare. A methodological
difficulty for this research was in fact to devise a strategy which
would in some way allow us to appreciate how particular individuals
conceived of offence behaviour. Our purpose was not simply to
examine whether magistrates were more or less punitive than panel
members Rather we sought to examine how magistrates and panel
members would resolve the potential for conceptual ambiguity of
dealing with offences within a welfare ideology given the different
organisational structures of the respective systems of juvenile
justice.
Hypothesis III: there will be more open discussion in the
Children's Hearings involving the parents and
children than in the juvenile court
Both Kilbrandon and Ingleby questioned the validity and
efficacy of court proceedings in the hearing of offence cases.
Given the very different structural arrangements we set out to
examine, as far as possible, whether any significant differences
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could be identified and what implications, if any, these had
for the accomplishment of juvenile justice.
Our concern here was to treat as an empirical question
the significance of the different structures for the making of
decisions about children who commit offences and not to make any
a priori assumptions to the effect that the nature of the hearing
had little bearing on the outcome. (See Morris and Mclsaac 1978).
We have argued earlier in this thesis that we wish to examine
'frames of relevance' and working ideologies of key individuals
within two different systems of juvenile justice. The basic
methodological problem was that of gaining access to individuals'
own assumptions about delinquency causation and control without
imposing too much of the researcher's own beliefs and values in the
process of the research. Put another way our difficulty was that
of eliciting the frames of relevance without imposing our own.
The difficulty was compounded since, as we wished to examine the
nature and process of the different types of hearing, we would be
confronted by the fact that three (always in Scotland and generally
in England) people would be involved in the decision making process.
That is, though our concern was with informal ideologies as
espoused by individuals, it was apparent that we would have to
recognise that the attempt to reach a decision was a collective and
not simply an individual affair. This had important methodological
implications for our research.
In anticipation of a fuller discussion of these methodological
issues pertinent to this research, we now turn to a review of the
literature in this field, to examine some of the conclusions and
also the methodological approaches on which such conclusions were
based.
Juvenile Justice and Sentencing Research
Given that this research was designed to examine the decision
making process in a new institutional framework for dealing with
children (the Children's Hearing System) there is clearly little
previous research literature specifically on this topic to report.
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But since the research was also concerned with juvenile
justice in general and with the juvenile court in particular,
this meant that an appropriate source of information was the
literature on sentencing. Moreover, because of the
similarities in sentencing problems in the context of the adult
criminal justice system and the juvenile court, it was decided
to refer to research relating to both. This is not of course to
deny that there are differences between the processes involved in
the sentencing of adults and of children, particularly in relation
to the types of alternatives available. Where they are similar
however is in the conflict between the potentially competing
ideologies of welfare and the more legalistic approach. The
issue of welfare or control however, though it does have
implication for the sentencing of adults (see our discussion on
Wootton's work, Chapter III), is no more ambiguous than in the
context of juvenile justice. It is in relation to delinquency
control that the ideals and principles of individualised justice
or the rehabilitative ideal have found their greatest expression.
The development of the process of juvenile justice and the
availability of alternatives to the punishment of children have
been underpinned by a positivistic conception of delinquency and
its control. (Bean 1976; Deffery 1974). Grunhut, in developing
the theme of the association between the juvenile and the adult
courts suggests
"Even the treatment of adult criminals has, in the
principal approach rather than in legal forms and
statutory provisions, been influenced by the
experience gained in juvenile courts." (1956, p l)
Sentencing Research
The predominant concern of much sentencing research has been to
account for the apparent disparity in sentencing decisions. (Hogarth
1971). The implication has generally been that 'disparity' is not
desirable in as much as it is taken to indicate that, in some senses,
'justice' has not been achieved. However, this suggests that
'justice' means something along the lines of 'treating like cases
alike', and the existence of disparity therefire is indicative of the
fact that like cases have not been treated in like fashion.
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But such a principle as 'treat like cases alike' would
have been comparatively easier to maintain within a classical
framework for sentencing, and as has been pointed out
"... the problem of sentencing disparity is closely
related to the post-classical emphasis on
individualised justice, which has regards to the needs
of the individual offender, in contrast to the
mechanical juridical emphasis on the nature of the
offence." (Bottomley 1973, p 132)
'Treating like cases alike' actually tells us very little as
to the criteria which are to be adopted in deciding the 'likeness'
of cases as it is merely a formal, logical imperative for the
attainment of justice; it offers no account of 'likeness' which
must be explained by reference to the material or substantial
element in the notion of justice. (Lloyd 1964; Perelman 19 ;.;..).
Under classical doctrine, with its emphasis on free will and
responsibility, the 'likeness' of cases could be decided by
reference to such criteria as the nature of the offence. In that
respect, the task of deciding on like sentences for like cases was
comparatively straightforward since the criteria for 'likeness'
were fairly well circumscribed.
With'the development and acceptance of individualised justice,
the criteria by which cases can be said to be alike (the material
element of justice) become 'need' criteria. That is, important
factors as a basis for sentencing decisions are factors relating to
the needs of individual offenders and not simply to what Green
referred to as legal factors such as the type of offence, seriousness
of offence or culpability of the offender. (Green 1961). But there
are two problems here which have significance for much sentencing
research.
Firstly, the development of individualised justice, of taking
the offender's needs into consideration for the purposes of
sentencing, has not wholly been at the expense of more traditional
objectives in sentencing. Rather, the criminal justice system has
become something of a hybrid in that sentencing decisions may well
reflect punitive considerations as much as rehabilitative. The
history of the development of juvenile justice in terms of the merits
of court or tribunal, punishment or treatment has been in this respect
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a history of compromise. (Morris and Mclsaac 1978).
Difficulties in stating the objectives of the criminal
justice system which would be generally accepted are then
compounded by the development of rehabilitative considerations.
As suggested by one commentator, the sentencer(s) may in fact
have to make two types of decisions; a 'primary' and a
'secondary' decision. (Thomas 1967). A 'primary' decision is
the decision made as to what framework is the more appropriate
for a sentencing decision, tariff or individualised justice.
Once that decision has been made, a secondary decision has to be
made as to what is the appropriate decision within the framework
chosen. This, as we shall later see, has important implications
for the way in which information about children is interpreted
within different frames of relevance.
Secondly, that offenders' needs are to be taken into
consideration is by no means a straightforward principle because
of the difficulty of establishing just what offenders' needs are
generally, but also what a particular offender's needs are. As
we have seen, research into the 'causes' of crime or delinquency
has been singularly unfruitful in providing objective criteria
establishing the causes of delinquency or criminality.
Consequently, there are no clear or agreed upon guidelines as to
the 'needs' of offenders. Moreover, and certainly related to what
has just been said, research into the 'effectiveness' of different
types of rehabilitative measures has likewise been somewhat
disappointing, adding to the very complexity of the sentencing task,
(indeed the very lack of objective criteria about the 'causes' of
delinquency has meant that formal systems of delinquency control are
continually under review. (Asquith 1978)).
Thus, there is by no means consensus as to what the objectives
or goals of the criminal system are, how to achieve these goals and
what the needs of offenders are. Consequently, this makes any
attempt to compare sentencing decisions and sentencing patterns a
rather crude affair. (Hogarth 1971; Bottomley 1973; Hood 1962).
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As has been noted, much of sentencing research, with
notable exceptions, has largely focussed on identifying factors
which might explain the apparent disparity that appears in
sentencing. But because of the difficulty in establishing just
what the objectives of the criminal justice system are the notion
of disparity then becomes problematic. With the development of
individualised justice, and the expansion of the welfare or
rehabilitative ethic within the system of criminal justice, the
task of sentencing has become more complex. It has thereby also
become more difficult to appreciate what the actual bases of
sentences are. Consequently, it has become more than problematic
simply to assert that sentencers lack uniformity or consistency, or
that sentencing patterns reveal inequalities, because it is more
difficult to appreciate the factors the sentencer takes into
consideration, the goals he hopes to achieve, and the reasons for
his decision. Sentences which may, prima facie, indicate a degree
of disparity may in fact be attributed to the unique circumstances
associated with the case; on the other hand uniformity and
consistency of sentencing may well be due to the ignoring of the
unique features of different cases. The logical implication of the
principle of 'treat like cases alike' is that cases that are unlike
in important respects should be treated differently. Prima facie
disparity or inconsistency may well reflect the acceptance of the
premises on which individualised justice is based. Once again the
relevance of information for making decisions about children who
commit offences is to be treated as an empirical question.
The relevance for this research of treating the notion of
'disparity' as problematic, is that the studies into sentencing
research, some of which are considered below, employ different
conceptions of the notion. One of the consequences of this is that
the particular methodologies adopted by different researchers are
determined by the search for factors to account for 'disparity'.
Since our concern was to identify the significance of frames of
relevance for the decision making process, the appropriateness or
adequacy of methodological strategies employed in earlier research
was for us as important as the conclusions reached.
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In his study of juvenile court sentencing practice in each
of the 134 police authorities in England and Wales, Grunhut (1956)
found that there were wide variations between juvenile courts,
particularly in the use made of fines and probation orders. The
mean national figures, he suggested, also however covered a
considerable amount of conformity as well as a number of local
variations in the treatment practice of magistrates. A number of
areas such as Liverpool and the West Riding of Yorkshire, showed a
high rate of fining with a low rate of probation orders. (1956, p 74).
After showing that there was a coincidence between 'high delinquency'
g
areas and 'low rates of probation', he concluded that where there
were smaller and more manageable numbers of delinquents, there was
greater opportunity for consideration of individual cases, resulting
in a more frequent use of probation. But where there were largely
populated areas, with a greater incidence of juvenile delinquency,
the volume of work magistrates were required to deal with meant that
they had less opportunity for adequate consideration of cases,
resulting in a greater use of fining. Grunhut suggested that
evidence for the 'complementary character of fines and probation' (1956,
p 83) comes in two forms. The first is that a preference for 'fining
is associated with a sparing use of probation; conversely, a
preference for probation is associated with the less frequent use of
fining.
Patchett and McLean (1965) used as a basis for their study into
sentencing practice in juvenile courts in the Sheffield area, Grunhut's
discovery of
"... belt of districts with high rates of fines stretching
throughout the north Midlands."
The region around the Sheffield area for example had made use of fines
around 6% above the national average. However, such a figure in
8. He had in fact argued that "any investigation of the treatment
practice of magistrates' courts ... must take into account the
amount and structure of delinquency in different localities." (1956,
P 13).
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itself, suggested Patchett and McLean, hid wide variations in
sentencing within the region. Commenting on the differences
between urban and rural areas, the authors felt that it would
have been expected that these differences would have been more
significant than those between similar urban areas (such as
Barnsley and Doncaster). In attempting to account for such
variations within the region, the authors examined the relationship
between such factors as the caseload size of the probation officers
in the areas as possible contributory variables to the decision as
to whether or not to make a probation order. But there was no
significant relationship. On the broader level, the authors asked
why it should be that two different courts, only separated in some
instances by a matter of miles, with changing composition and
combinations of magistrates should follow widely different patterns
of sentencing. Their conclusion was that the relevant factors
that could account for this were largely internal; that is, it was
due to the approaches adopted by the magistrates. Wide variation
in the use of the various alternatives suggested
"... basic differences in the selection of sentences,
underlying which may be found major differences of
outlook concerning the policy to be implemented." (1965, p.710)
Indeed, Patchett and McLean had themselves questioned whether lack of
uniformity or the display of disparity was the real problem. Their
position was that 'strict uniformity may in fact reflect a failure by
magistrates to take into account all relevant factors' (1965, p 699).
It is interesting that such a statement could be made a/en though
the researchers had neither collected information on the types of
offences or offenders appearing before the courts nor on the
magistrates themselves, since the research was primarily concerned
with sentencing practice in juvenile courts. However, one of the
inadequacies of this type of research has been, depending as it does
on official statistics and records, that it tells us more about
'decisions' made than it does about 'decision making'. Yet the
conclusion often drawn from such studies is that in the absence of
any identifiable factors, disparity or variation can be attributed
to some indefinable element such as 'the personality of the judge',
even though the methodologies adopted only allow conclusions about
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how certain individuals make decisions to be made at the level
of inference. Few studies - with notable exceptions - have
been designed specifically to examine 'decision making' as such.
One of the studies which indicated the influence of 'the
human element' on the sentencing process was that conducted by
Mannheim, Spencer and Lynch (1957) whose main aim was to examine
the extent to which uniformity could be observed in a random
sample of cases in one particular area. The area which was the
focus of their study was London and the hypothesis which they set
out to examine was that
"there was consistency in the adjudications of the London
Court."
Taking a sample of 400 cases, divided into sub-samples of 50 cases
for each of the eight courts in the area, information was
collected on (i) Legal and Administrative; (ii) Sociological; and
(iii) Psychological factors. The source for such information was
mainly the court records, though this was also supplemented by
information from significant personnel such as social workers.
Mannheim et al. concluded that such factors as the sex of the
Chairman of the magistrates, court identity and characteristics of
the area in which the court was located contributed little to
explaining the similarities or otherwise in the use made of different
orders. Moreover they concluded that they could not claim support
for their hypothesis from the data of their study but that this may
in part be attributable to the inadequacy of their information.
This was a particularly telling conclusion in as much as the authors
had suggested that the methodology adopted in their study had the
advantage that the researcher, who did not actually attend the hearing
of cases, was 'detached' from the courts, and their operation, which
he knew only as numbers. But, perhaps, more importantly, they
suggested that
"it is the intuitive assessment of individual cases which
in the main prevails. The next step ... might usefully
be a study of magistrates attitudes ..." (1957, p.138)
Hood (1962) also studied sentencing practice in different areas,
an intention which he firmly stated;
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"The main difference between our study and most of
those undertaken in the United States and Europe is
that it is not concerned with differences between
individual judges or with change of policy over a
period of time but with differences between areas,
that is, groups of judges." (1962, p 9)
It was also suggested that Hood improved on work such as that of
Mannheim et al.in that he did not simply make use of court records
and official statistics; rather he attempted to appreciate the
policy of particular courts by supplementing information from
records by actually visiting the courts in question and by
interviewing some of the key personnel therein. The research had
its origins in the fact that the use of prison sentences by
magistrates' courts in England showed considerable variation. For
example, from 1951-1954 inclusive, the proportion of adult males
sentenced to imprisonment for indictable offences varied from 3$ to 55$
of all sentences for indictable offences.
By taking the average for each police district in each of the
four years the respective figures are S$ and 47$. Of all the courts,
60$ had an imprisonment rate of between 14 and 28$ Hood's main
purpose was to show the extent and nature of the variations in the
practice of a number of magistrates' courts, for which twelve were
chosen in terms of whether they sent a high, low or average number
of men to prison in the years in question and whether they were
representative of urban areas both large and small, industrial and
residential, old and new. (1962, p 21)
To test 'whether the local variations in imprisonment rates
can be explained in terms of the circumstances of the offenders
appearing before the courts or by the seriousness of the offences
which they commit', (1962, p 28) information on the offences committed
and on the background of offenders was collected for each court.
Though he was able to show that there were a number of differences in
the distribution of offence and offender characteristics between the
different courts, these had no significant relationship to the
imprisonment rates. Amongst the more important conclusions Hood
made was his suggestion that such differences as existed in
sentencing practice, might be the product of the adoption of different
'policies' of the magistrates and that 'imprisonment policies of
magistrates appear to be related to the social characteristics of the
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areas, the social constitution of the bench, and its particular
view of the crime problem' (p 78). Though Hood did attempt to
supplement the kind of information that Mannheim et al. gathered by
actually visiting the courts in the study, the information on the
characteristics of the area and of the attitudes of the judges was
nevertheless of an impressionistic nature and had not been
collected consistently for each of the courts. As has been noted
elsewhere (Hogarth 1971), such impressionistic information/data has
reduced the significance of otherwise important findings that
judicial attitudes and court policies may not completely be divorced
from the nature of the 'social structures' of the court areas
themselves.
Whereas the studies above described draw their conclusions
mainly from official records and statistics relating to sentencing
patterns and variations between courts or areas, other studies had
focussed on the differences in practice between different judges.
Gaudet (1949) for example had analysed a sample of 7442 cases of
certain offences dealt with by 6 judges over a ten year period.
His major conclusion was that
"... one is forced to conclude that the differences
among these judges in their sentencing behaviour can
best be accounted for by the use of the general term
'personality'". (1949, p 452)
and that
"... the criteria for sentencing are unevenly and
capriciously applied; that the primary influence upon
sentence is the personality of the judge." (Hogarth 1971, p 8)
Thus though Gaudet's work had adopted a different notion of disparity,
in that his objective was to examine the difference in sentencing
between judges, his conclusion was basically the same as that
advanced later by such as Mannheim et al. But Gaudet's work suffered
from the problem that though he attributed the disparity in
sentencing to the 'personality of the judge', the concept of
personality was defined rather vaguely in terms of social background,
education, religion, experience on the bench and social attitudes.
Yet he found no consistent relationships between such characteristics
and sentencing behaviour. (Bottomley 1971, p 152).
153.
Not only is it therefore difficult to appreciate what Gaudet
meant by personality; he also produced no evidence in his
study as to the significance or otherwise of such variables as
social background, education and attitudes. (Hogarth 1971).
With particular reference to Gaudet's work, Green (1961)
criticised much of sentencing research on the grounds that it had
previously stressed the non-rationality of the sentencing process,
and that no work had included a systematic analysis of legal
criteria in sentencing. In his own study of 1437 cases dealt
with by 18 judges in a non-jury court, Green set out to investigate
more extensively than other researchers the factors which underlay
the variation in the gravity of penalties meted out, particularly
for cases of near equivalent seriousness. By considering (i)
Legal factors, (ii) Legally irrelevant factors and (iii) factors
related to the criminal prosecution process, Green concluded that
the results of his study contradicted claims that there are no
standards by which judges sentence convicted offenders. Wore
positively, he argued that by taking legal factors into account,
sentencing practice could be shown to operate in terms of 'orderly
processes which flow reasonably from the penal philosophy implicit
in the law.' Thus the legal make-up of the case, which includes
such factors as the nature and severity of the offence, the number
of the charges and the offender's past record, do in fact impose
constraints on sentencing. Legally irrelevant factors, which Green
referred to as the biosocial traits of the offender (sex, age, race,
birth) and factors in the criminal prosecution, by which he meant
differences in the court personnel and the type of plea, did not
significantly affect the variation in the sentences.
Amongst the more important factors which he claimed did
influence the sentencing decision were the seriousness of the offence
and the previous convictions of the offender. But even here, though
the severity of the penalties decided upon by the judges generally
reflected statutorily prescribed guidelines, offences which had
involved the infliction of bodily harm tended to be dealt with more
severely than other types of cases.
To test the significance of the role which he concluded
legal factors played in sentencing, Green attempted to construct
a predictive measure derived from permutations of different
'legal' factors, by which the likelihood of committal to prison
or some community based measure could be determined actuarially.
However, there was not complete uniformity in the sentencing
behaviour of the judges in his study in as much as there was less
inconsistency amongst judges in the types of sentences imposed for
the most serious and the least serious types of cases; the
greatest disparity occurred in relation to those types of cases
which fell between the two extremes. As Green states
"As cases move from the extreme of gravity or mildness
towards intermediacy, judicial standards tend to become
less stable and sentencing increasingly reflects the
individuality of the judge." (1961, p 69)
The Legal or Black Box Model of Sentencing Research
A common feature of research into sentencing, and certainly
characteristic of those studies described above, is that they may
be said to be typical of what Hogarth (1971) refers to as 'black
box' or 'Legal' models of sentencing research. By this is meant
that type of research which is characterised by the collection of
information, the 'facts' of the case, from official sources; the
information provided from the official records and statistics about
the offender or the offence such as the type of offence, seriousness
of the offence, past record of offender and so on, are then
correlated with the sentencing decisions actually reached in respect
of the cases in question. The sentencing decision is considered in
this way to be the dependent variable and the information about the
offender or the offence are the independent variables which either
singly or in a number of combinations can be said to account for the
decision or pattern of decisions. Such a model of sentencing
research may be referred to as the 'black box' model in as much as
relatively little is known about the magistrates themselves since it
assumes
"that the only significant variables affecting sentencing
decisions are those externally visible 'facts' available
from judicial records." (Hogarth 1971, p 341)
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Such a model may also be referred to as the 'legal' model in
that the conception of the 'facts' of the case as being
directly associated with the decision is consonant with a
notion of
"law being a constant and the personality of the judge
being legally irrelevant." (Hogarth 1971, p 341)
In many respects such an approach to sentencing research treats
the implementation of penal policy and the law, as the imposition
of sanctions for particular forms of proscribed behaviour as the
mechanical application of legal principles in which the role of
the judge is conceived merely as being the medium through which
the law finds expression.
The notion of the 'facts' of the case being objectively
given also ignores what Hogarth refers to as the 'selective
perception' of judges. That is, by adopting a methodological
strategy which is grounded in the assumption that sentencing
decisions can be accounted for by simply analysing the information
about the offence and/or offender, much sentencing research is
insensitive to the way in which judges interpret such information.
As has been noted elsewhere (Asquith 1977) such strategies treat
the idea of what constitutes 'relevant' information as non-
problematic. But a difficulty is that what the researcher chooses
as his relevant independent variables may not be the same variables
as chosen for the purpose of sentencing. What we have suggested
in Chapter I of this thesis is that information has to be assessed
and interpreted in order to sift out what is relevant for the task
at hand. However, since the 'system of relevancies', to use the
Schutzian notion (Schutz 1970), or the 'frames of relevance' of the
researcher and subject will be different, it is unwise to assume
that what is relevant for the researcher is relevant for the subject.
The danger is that explanations of how sentencing decisions are made
are premised more upon what the researcher rather than the sentencer
determines to be relevant. The two purposes, that of sentencing and
that of doing research into sentencing, are different.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that the only information
employed for the purpose of sentencing is contained in the records
or official sources. By designing methodologies to analyse what
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'facts' are associated with decisions, previous researchers
have omitted from their studies any consideration of information
provided but not recorded, such as information gleaned in the
course of discussion in court. In the empirical part of this
thesis it was our intention to examine the use of information in
the different types of hearing since it seemed appropriate to our
concerns about the significance of the differences, if any existed,
between the court and panel hearings. Similarly, by trying to
locate what facts are associated with decisions, and which may then
help to account for the apparent disparity in sentencing, little
consideration has been given to the question of how information is
used. Most researches have been designed to examine 'what'
questions and not 'how' questions, and in that sense it could be
argued that much sentencing research has been primarily concerned
with 'decisions' and not 'decision making'. Studies referred to
earlier in this chapter for example were more concerned with the
disparity in sentencing patterns between areas and courts but lacked
an adequate methodological framework for examining sentencing as a
decision making process■
Despite this lack of adequate methodology for commenting on
decision making, it is also characteristic of such research that
where the attempt to locate independent variables in the offender's
background that would account for the apparent disparity in sentencing,
has actually failed, inferences have commonly been made as to the role
played in sentencing by the 'human element'. Thus, again in the
studies referred to above, reference has been made to the influence of
the 'human element' in a number of ways. Sentencing disparity has
been variously accounted for in terms of 'the intuitive assessment of
the individual cases' (Mannheim et alj; the 'policies' of magistrates
(Hood 1962); 'the personality of the judge' (Gaudet 1949);
'judicial attitudes' (Green 1961). Green's own study is particularly
interesting in that having criticised other research into sentencing
because of the imputation of 'attitudes' from inconsistent sentencing
behaviour, his own study nevertheless drew conclusions about the
relationship between judicial attitudes and consistent sentencing.
That is, without providing independent evidence as to the operation of
attitudes in the sentencing task, his own study was subject to similar
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criticisms as he had made of others. And with specific reference
to the Children's Hearing system in Scotland, Plorris and Mclsaac
(1978) were concerned to identify the working ideologies of panel
members on the basis of data about the children who were the
subject of the decisions. (See Asquith 1979).
By focussing on the factual, and in Green's case 'legal',
make-up of cases, and relating this to sentencing decisions, such
research allows conclusions to be drawn about the influence of the
'human element' only at the level of inference. And by
concentrating on decisions or sentencing patterns, and not decision
making, the processual character of sentencing, in which the influence
of individuals might best be examined, has generally been precluded
from such studies. 'Attitudes' or 'policies' have then to be inferred
from sentencing behaviour as manifested in sentencing decisions, from
the statistical association of decisions with informat on about the
case. The variables which prove to be significantly related to
decisions are then used to account for disparity but in the absence of
the location of significant variables, disparity is accounted for in
terms of this vague notion of the 'human element'. But as Hogarth
rightly suggests
"The establishment of a statistical relationship between
factors such as the severity of the crime and criminal
record to the pattern of sentencing decisions made does
not mean that these factors were consciously or even
subconsciously in the minds of the judges at the time of
sentence." (1971, p 8)
Two important studies which attempted to examine sentencing in
such a way as to correct some of the methodological inadequacies of
much of the available literature were conducted by Hood (1972) and
Hogarth (1971) respectively. Both researchers were in agreement that
disparity is a problem in sentencing; that previous sentencing
research had been grounded in inadequate methodologies; and that,
consequently, a new methodological alternative was required to study
the theoretical basis of sentencing. Moreover, both investigations
rest on the assumption that there are five important factors which
affect sentencing decisions. These are
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(i) the social, personal and judicial
characteristics of the judges;
(ii) the attitudes of judges towards 'disposal';
(iii) the judges perception of the nature of the offence
and characteristics of the offenders;
(iv) the type of information considered relevant; and
(v) the controls or constraints exercised either by
law, or by courts, or informally through local
sentencing norms.
However, despite the similarity in their theoretical assumptions,
the methodological alternatives offered by the respective authors are
very different.
In reference to his own research into the sentencing of
motoring offenders, Hood suggested that it was
"...part of a recent development in criminology away
from a sole interest in the offender towards a concern
to understand the behaviour and assumptions of those whom
sociologists like to call agents of social control" (1972, p 5)
and
"it is the views of these agents which may reflect or be
reflected in the way offenders of different sorts are
perceived, categorised or labelled both in court or the
community " (1972, p 5)
Thus, the move in relation to sentencing research which Hood suggests
his study reflects is one which recent developments in criminological
theory have taken- That is, as criminological theory has moved away
from simply attempting to associate variables in offenders' backgrounds
with criminal behaviour, so also Hood argues that sentencing research
should not simply treat sentencing decisions as the variable dependent
on factors associated with the offender or his offence. The
independent variable, or variables, cannot be located in the 'factual'
make-up of the case per se. Rather implicit in his suggestion is the
assumption that cognition or perception becomes the independent
variable; that is, it is the perception of information and facts
assessed for the purpose of sentencing that directly bears on the
sentencing decision. There are then no 'facts' which are relevant
apart from their identification as such by those deciding on a
sentence. Consequently, any methodological strategy for studying
sentencing must be grounded in a theoretical basis which acknowledges
that the influence of information on sentencing decisions cannot be
gauged independently of the way in which such information is perceived,
organised, assessed and used.
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Hood's later study had as its main objective to show
whether the personal or social background as well as the driving
experience of magistrates were related to different attitudes and
sentencing practice, or whether the basic penalty approach was an
overriding factor. Having decided that his inquiry should
concentrate on 'serious' motoring offences in addition to two
offences regarded as less serious a possible sample of 860
magistrates was drawn from 32 courts in 16 counties in England.
The actual sample was finally composed of 538 magistrates. He
then used a variety of methods to collect information not only on
the attitudes and opinions of magistrates as individuals but also
on their group behaviour. Because of the problems previous research
had encountered in trying to match cases or in assuming the random
distribution of cases in large samples, he decided to control
variability by sending to each magistrate exactly the same cases.
In this way he hoped to remove all variability due to factors other
than those associated with the magistrates themselves. After the
magistrates involved had studied the eight printed cases received,
one for each of the offences included in the study, they were
interviewed as to the decision they would make for each case, their
reasons for the decision, the seriousness of the offence and about
various other factors which may have influenced the decision making
process.
But since the use of simulated material in itself suffered from
certain defects, the primary one of which was the very fact it was a
simulated or 'game' exercise, this was supplemented by other methods,
some of which would allow for comparison with information gathered
about sentencing in the actual court setting. Thus, Hood also used
self-completion questionnaires, the Eysenck Personality Inventory,
held conferences for studying group decisions, and also spent as
much time in court as possible noting the details of procedure. The
last tactic is interesting if only for the fact that earlier
researchers had argued that by not knowing the details about the
courts included in a study, the researcher had the advantage of
detachment. (Mannheim et al 1957)
In his analysis Hood distinguished between three sets of
variables which could potentially account for disparity in sentencing
of motoring offenders. These were
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(i) Personal and social attributes
(ii) Perceptions and attitudes
(iii) Factors associated with Bench membership
In relation to the influence of personal and social attributes,
Hood noted that one of his most important findings, a negative
one, was that there were very feu associations over a variety of
offences uith any of the personal attributes of the magistrates.
Overall, he concluded that 'disparity could not be accounted for
in terms of their personal backgrounds.' Similarly, though he
uas able to conclude that variation in the perception of the
seriousness of the case is of importance, it uas nevertheless
impossible to generalise about the nature of its influence. But
uith respect to the last of the groups of variables employed in
the analysis, he concluded that membership of a particular bench
had a highly significant effect on the amount of the fine imposed
for all eight kinds of offence included in the study. It is
perhaps uorth noting that despite his intention to offer a
methodological frameuork adequate to account for the theoretical
basis of sentencing, Hood's study nevertheless displays elements
of the 'black box' model of sentencing research, though obviously
to a lesser degree. He does gather independent information about
the attitudes and perceptions of magistrates but nevertheless
isolates factors, or groups of factors such as bench membership
uhich are then used to explain or account for sentencing practice
through statistical association uith actual sentencing decisions.
Houever, he concluded that the research provided ample evidence
"... that a method based on decision making in simulated
cases can provide a realistic assessment of hou
magistrates actually behave in court." (1972, p.153)
The other study uhich sought to provide an alternative
methodological frameuork, Hogarth's 'Sentencing as a Human Process',
concentrated more on actual sentencing decisions than did Hood's
study. The main objective in Hogarth's study uas to explain the
apparent inconsistency in sentencing practice amongst magistrates
in Ontario. Variations in the use of particular measures
"appeared too large to be explained solely in terms
of the differences in the types of cases appearing
before the courts in different areas." ( 1971, p.12)
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He also makes clear his rejection of the 'black box' model of
sentencing research when he asserts that
"this is a study of the sentencing behaviour of
magistrates. It is concerned with what decisions
different magistrates make, how they make them, and
why." (1971, p 15)
His research was designed therefore to explore the 'meaning' of
sentencing as magistrates themselves experienced it and was
logically committed to being based on explicit assumptions about
how sentencing could be analysed. Whereas research such as that
of Green and Gaudet i^erocd the existence of certain attitudes from
sentencing behaviour, Hogarth assumed that prior to appointment
magistrates already have certain opinions and beliefs which provide
broad predispositions for specific attitudes the magistrate will
later form in reference to his judicial role. As a result of
their relationship to the demands of this judicial role and because
of the dialectic between self conception and these demands,
magistrates develop a relatively stable and enduring set of judicial
attitudes. Hogarth then defines judicial attitudes as
"a set of evaluative categories relevant to the judicial
role which the individual magistrate has adopted (or
learned) during his past experience, problems or ideas
in his social world." (1971, p 100)
Wheeler (1968) in a similar study had also argued that prima
facie inconsistent sentencing or sentencing disparity could be seen
to be rational given an examination of judicial penal philosophies.
Whereas the other studies had imputed the existence of
attitudes from behaviour, specifically sentencing behaviour, the
conception of attitudes as evaluative categories necessarily entails
a consideration of how information is processed by different
magistrates with different attitudes. This in turn also demands a
framework for studying attitudes and Hogarth distinguishes between
'attitude scales' which are logically (theoretically) derived and
those which are empirically (phenomenologically) derived. In the
former, the researcher, by making a priori assumptions about the
existence of certain attitudes, thereby imposes his own evaluative
categories on the categories of those subjects in his research. The
researcher is in danger of substituting what has been referred to
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elsewhere as stcoorder constructs fbr Pir\st order constructs
(see Cicourel 1968) since the conceptual framework on which
understanding or explanation is based is provided not by the
subjects of the research but by the researcher himself.
Empirically or phenomenologically derived scales, on the
other hand, are claimed to have the merit of not imposing the
researcher's own theoretical assumptions on to the subjects since
the scales are 'derived naturally'; that is, they assist the
researcher to place himself within the 'framework of meaning' of
his subjects (p 105). Hogarth's scales for measuring jocUciaA
since he was committed to a phenomenological method of
scale construction, were therefore developed by being based on
statements which satisfied several clearly stated criteria (p 107)
but which more specifically should be
"... selected from the evaluative statements actually
used by the individuals involved, or from those that
have been made by well known persons in their
environment." (1971, p 106)
Since he was concerned with judicial attitudes, the appropriate
evaluative statements were therefore drawn from cases in which the
Ontario magistrates had themselves been involved or from literature
relating to the judicial role and with which the magistrates would
be familiar. In this respect at least, there is considerable
difference in the methodology adopted in this study and that of
earlier researches into sentencing. Even Hood's study, contemporary
with Hogarth's and based on the same assumptions, had employed a
means of measuring attitudes, the Eysenck Personality Inventory,
which Hogarth would be obliged to reject on the grounds of its being
theoretically and not phenomenologically derived.
By adopting a phenomenological stance Hogarth argued further
that the three main classes of variables to be considered in the
study, the legal and social environments in which sentencing took
place, and the personalities and backgrounds of the magistrates,
could be reduced to one form. The manipulation and organisation of
information 'as it occurred in the minds of the magistrates' could
then be revealed by a method of analysis based on a phenomenological
approach.
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As well as information collected about the cases which
appeared before the magistrates involved, two instruments were
specifically designed in accordance with Hogarth's
phenomenological commitment. These were a self-administered
questionnaire mainly exploring the attitudes that magistrates
held towards crime and how to deal with it; and a decision
making guide or sentencing study sheet completed by each of the
71 magistrates for those cases involving offences selected for
the purpose of the study. The sentencing study was designed to
'reveal the mental processes involved in reaching sentencing
decisions.'
Hogarth's major conclusion, in relation to the penal
philosophies of magistrates, was that whereas there may have been
wide variations in penal philosophies amongst magistrates,
individual magistrates nevertheless had a fairly consistent set
of beliefs influencing their penal philosophies. Thus, whereas
magistrates were inconsistent with each other, they were consistent
within themselves; and once the purpose which magistrates
subscribed to in sentencing - the internal consistency of their
thinking in respect of their judicial role - was known, the whole
of their penal philosophy could also be predicted. Moreover, he
demonstrated that actual sentencing behaviour was also
significantly related to attitudes and
"... the fact that variation in sentencing behaviour
was found to be associated with variations in the
attitudes of magistrates concerned indicates that the
judicial process is not as uniform and impartial as
many people hope it would be. Indeed, it would appear
that justice is a very personal thing." (1971, p 365)
As for the legal and social constraints on sentencing behaviour, he
suggested that the law offered little guidance to or control over
sentencing but that whilst social constraints as perceived by the
magistrate are closely related to his attitudes, they nevertheless do
have an independent influence on sentencing behaviour. Generally,
the interpretation, organisation and assessment of information on
which sentences are based was seen to be consistent with personal
attitudes held by magistrates. Whereas earlier studies had tended
to view sentencing as a static entity or as irrational, Hogarth views
sentencing as
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"... a dynamic process in which the facts of the
cases, the constraints arising out of the law and the
social system and other features of the external world
are interpreted, assimilated and made sense of in ways
compatible with the attitudes of the magistrates
concerned. Sentencing was shown to be a very human
process." (19 71, p 382)
The attention devoted to discussing Hogarth's work in this study
reflects the importance his work has had in adding a truly new
dimension to the study of sentencing and sentencing disparity.
Prima facie disparity between magistrates may be indicative of a
high degree of internal consistency maintained by individual
magistrates in their interpretation, assessment and organisation of
information.
The attitude scales devised by Hogarth, with minor
modifications were employed by Lemon (1974). Lemon argued that no
previous study had been concerned with newly-trained magistrates and
that none had studied the impact of the first year training
programme which by that time had become compulsory for magistrates.
Whereas he used Hogarth's attitude scales to measure magistrates'
attitudes to measure the influence of personality on sentencing
practice Lemon used instruments developed for psychological purposes
and which were designed to assess the 'concreteness' or 'abstractness'
of the cognitive processes employed by individuals. Concreteness
was defined in a variety of ways such as 'high dictatorialness',
'high need for structure', 'tendency to categorise into black and
white', etc. 'abstractness' on the other hand
Because of the difficulties he claimed were associated with actually
being in court, Lemon used simulated cases presented on tape to the
magistrates.
He concluded that his study did in fact indicate that one
consequence of undergoing a training programme was that newly
appointed magistrates became more punitive in their sentencing
practice. The first year training did in fact succeed in instilling
in magistrates a 'necessary judicial attitude'. Thirty five of the
magistrates were classified as 'concrete' thinkers, with the remaining
19 being categorised as 'abstract'. But whereas this personality
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factor did appear to be determinant of sentencing practice,
its influence seemed to depend on the nature of the case.
Though he was able to show that, not unexpectedly, there was a
strong relationship between concreteness and having punitive
attitudes, he was not able
"to reveal any significant differences in the attitude
scores of magistrates awarding sentences of different
types".
That is, though he established that the first year training
programme did appear to inculcate punitive attitudes, there was no
evidence to suggest that in practice magistrates with such
attitudes were in fact more punitive.
Of the empirical research on the Children's Hearing system,
which is becoming available, though not employing a phenomenologically
derived framework, Higgins (1974) sought to examine the personality
attributes of panel members. Her study focussed on the first panel
in Glasgow early in the history of the Children's Hearing system
shortly after its inception in 1971. In an early stage of the study
using the Eysenck Personality Inventory, she found that a high
proportion of panel members described themselves in a 'socially
desirable way'. Pursuing this she asked panel members to complete
the Marlowe-Crowne Desirability Scale and concluded that a
considerable proportion of panel members were 'approval seeking'.
Though Higgins undoubtedly presents interesting material of an
explicitly psychological nature, what is disappointing is that the
significance of such material for the actual task of making decisions
about children is not really developed.
The significance of 'working ideologies' or the attitudes and
beliefs of key personnel for the accomplishment of juvenile justice
was a central concern of two recent works, one relating to the
juvenile court and the other to the Children's Hearings system.
Interestingly, the conclusions reached in the respective studies,
though arising from shared criticisms of the philosophy of welfare,
were quite different.
Priestly et al-(l977) presented the results of a research project
which looked at all the children who were dealt with under the
provisions of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 in Bristol and
Wiltshire during the first three months of 1972. Though concerned
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with the children in court, the authors argued that
"... we saw the system to be studied as embracing
those processes associated with decisions made about
any child coming before the court." (1977, p 112)
(Our emphasis)
Thus the focus of their study became the attitudes and beliefs
of the key people who man the child care system and in particular,
the police and the magistracy. One of their major conclusions is
that it would be wrong to suggest that there exists a strong
ideological consensus within members of the agencies involved in
juvenile justice (1972, p 32). Further, they later argue (p 101)
that at the court stage magistrates divide the children appearing
into two roughly equal-sized groups; one of which they help, and
the other they penalise. The general implication which they derive
from this is that the principles of welfare and justice are not
compatible and they recommend
"that the attempt to fuse justice with welfare be
abandoned and that the juvenile court as such should
disappear." (p 102)
Though Priestly et al. were interested in the beliefs and attitudes
of key personnel, the research relied primarily on records for source
material. And though they did interview a number of individuals
from different agencies as well as the magistrates and also observed
at a number of court hearings, their material on the actual process
of decision making in the court room situation reveals little of what
we later refer to as the form and content of the hearing.
In the study on the Children's Hearings by Morris and Mclsaac
(1973), the authors set for themselves as their objective an
examination of
"... the ideology and practice of social welfare within
that juvenile justice system; how does it work? does
it work? is it different from a juvenile court? does
the stated dominance of one goal prevent inter-
organisational conflict? do the various groups involved
in the operation of the new system change their working
ideologies to fit the dominant conception'1." (1978, p x-xi)
Their starting point is the apparent ambiguity between the conceptual
frameworks underlying what they call 'social control' and 'social
welfare'. This conceptual ambiguity is significant in that it has,
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and has had, important implications for the way juvenile justice
is organised and practically accomplished. Like Priestly et ai,
the researchers conclude that there is no shared ideology of
delinquency control amongst the different agencies within the
organisational network but that there is considerable tension.
And since panel members and even the reporter are unable to
separate conceptually 'needs' and 'deeds', children who commit
offences are in fact controlled or punished under the guise of
'treatment' or 'care'. Thus they argue that despite the formal
commitment to a welfare philosophy, panel members, and others in
the system, make decisions on the basis of more classical and
punitive considerations. Panel members may in fact operate with
a disguised form of tariff decision making where considerations of
the offence, the child's involvement in it and so on become relevant
criteria on which to base a decision.
Again in common with Priestly et al, they conclude that the
conflict between competing ideologies of control and welfare cannot
be reconciled within a system such as the Children's Hearings.
Unlike Priestly et al, however, they recommend the return to a
system based on punishment in which the nature of the offence should
be the criterion for decision making in a system of fixed penalties.
What we find interesting about Morris and Mclsaac's work is
that it seeks to analyse the conceptual ambiguity of control and
welfare in its implication for the practical accomplishment of
juvenile justice. However, we have two concerns with their approach.
Firstly, as we suggested above, Morris and Mclsaac do not
consider the actual form of a hearing to be significant in the
practical accomplishment of juvenile justice. We treat that as an
empirical question worthy of investigation.
Secondly, whereas they acknowledge the importance of the
interpretive activity of decision makers in the processing of
delinquency, most of their evidence about how decisions are made
actually relates to what are the personal characteristics of children
in the system. Methodologically, we make the same criticisms of
their approach as had been applied to those sentencing studies which
attributed disparity to an 'indefinable human €.Lei«ve.r\t ( t^-vooo^v -S<*cW a.v\
infer«..u€. "ould not be valid given the nature of the
available data.
In short, our concern with the work of Morris and Mclsaac
in ignoring situated aspects of decision making and in adopting
an inappropriate methodological strategy is that they seek to





Whereas sentencing research had in the main generally ignored
the processual nature of decision-making, it was a prime consider¬
ation of this research that an attempt should be made to examine
decision-making in respect of child offenders, in the context of
both the Children's Hearing system and the Juvenile Court as a
process. Consequently there were several requirements that dictated
the nature of the methodological strategies evolved finally for this
research.
Firstly, some means had to be devised so as to allow for
genuine and valid comparisons to be made between panel members and
juvenile magistrates in relation to decision-making. Given the very
different organisational structures and the philosophies of the
Children's Hearing system and the Juvenile Court, it was considered
necessary to have a baseline for comparison between the two groups
of subjects.
Secondly, one objective of the research was to examine the
extent to which theoretical perspectives on criminality and delinquency
provided 'available ideologies' from which the lay theories of
delinquency and need were derived and employed by the subjects in the
course of practical decision-making about children. The danger of a
researcher simply identifying the existence of such ideologies, after
they had undergone the metamorphosis of absorption into lay theories
or ideologies, without involving the subjects themselves, is that he
does in fact impose structure and organisation on the cognitive
frameworks of his subjects. He thereby lays himself open to criti¬
cisms similar to those used against the integrating quality of
statistical analysis.
Thirdly, as a direct consequence of the defects identified with
'black box' sentencing research, it was decided that the research
should be actor oriented, and in this respect is related to the
argument of the previous paragraph. By an 'actor-orientation' is
meant that as far as possible in a study of practical decision—making
an attempt should be made to assess how the decision—maker reaches a
170.
decision. The importance of cognition in relation to the selection,
identification and organisation of information deemed relevant for
the purpose of decision-making necessitates a methodology which does
more than simply identify what factors were prima facie determinants
of decisions of a particular kind. Whereas in much sentencing
research the factors identified in the background of the offender
were treated as independent variables, it could be argued that by
adopting an actor orientation the independent variable becomes the
cognitive framework of the subject, though the dependent variable,
the decision, remains the same. Similarly, an actor orientation is
necessary in a research project committed to assessing the extent
to which theoretical perspectives on criminality find their
expression in the lay theories of delinquency and criminality
espoused by those responsible for the identification of deviance
or need.
»
Fourthly, most sentencing research had focused primarily on
individual judges or magistrates but there had been few attempts to
analyse the nature of collective decision-making. Since there must
by law be three panel members present at a Children's Hearing and
never less than two juvenile magistrates presiding in Buvenile Court,
it is argued that any consideration of decision-making in these
contexts must acknowledge the fact that decisions are ostensibly the
outcome of a collective process. Whereas research into sentencing by
magistrates in juvenile court had on occasion recognised the signifi¬
cance of the 'indefinable human element' the importance of inter¬
action and discussion between magistrates had not been examined though
this must undoubtedly have implications for the decision-making
process. But an added factor was that since one of the objectives
behind the introduction of the Children's Hearing system in Scotland
and the further modification of the procedure of juvenile court in
England was the promotion of informality, it was also important to
evolve a strategy which would allow for some analysis to be made
of the interaction and communication in the hearings as a whole. In
Scotland especially, as recommended by the Kilbrandon Report, the
intention was that the informal proceeding of the Children's Hearing
would allow parents and child to be more involved in the decision¬
making process. Consequently, to have tried to compare differences
in decision-making between the respective systems without adopting
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a strategy which would accommodate a consideration of the relative
contribution to the decision process of parents and children would
have been to have ignored the very context in which decisions were
made.
Finally, children's hearings and juvenile courts do not
operate in vacuo but are part of a network of agencies providing
specialist skills and facilities which not only serve to inform the
decisions made by panel members and magistrates but which may also be
involved in the actual implementation of that decision. Thus, the
availability and nature of the facilities provided by such agencies
as social work or social services departments, education departments,
psychiatric and psychological services are not without significance
for the making of decisions in respect of children. Because of the
potential influence of the services available in different areas, it
was decided to conduct the research in complete administrative areas
in an attempt as far as possible to control for national variablility
in services and facilities provided. This would also have the added
advantage for the purpose of examining collective decision-making.
By concentrating on complete administrative areas, this meant that
the samples of subjects would only be drawn from one juvenile panel
and one juvenile bench. In this way, the different permutations of
subjects who presided at Children's Hearings and Court Hearings would
only be composed of individuals who were members of the respective
panel or bench. Since a prime objective in the research was to
examine collective decision-making, a sample of subjects drawn from
a mother population in terms of a particular sampling frame, perhaps
in an attempt to introduce an element of 'representativeness', would
have meant that the samples were composed of subjects from different
administrative areas. Drawn from different areas, some of the
subjects could not therefore have possibly presided at the same
Children's or Court hearing as their colleagues since this would have
been ruled out by the administrative arrangements peculiar to
particular areas.
In view of these constraints, the research could not have been
conducted employing a single methodological strategy but demanded a
number of strategies. Though the researcher had been initially
attracted by the merits of phenomenological sociology and ethno-
methodology, as revealed in Cicourel's work, this proved to have
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limitations for this research. As will be explained, though the
original intention had been to employ a phenomenological framework
as the basis for the design of the methodology, the methodology
actually employed cannot be said to be truly phenomenological. But
this does not mean that phenomenological sociology played no part
in the design of the research; its influence was twofold. Firstly,
it did have an influence in the design of appropriate strategies for
a project committed to an actor-orientation; and secondly, it high¬
lighted the relationship between theory and data, methodology and
results by revealing how comments on or accounts of the world were
inextricably linked to the constitutive rules employed by actors,
whether subject or researcher, which made such comments or accounts
possible.
Theoretical Foundations
A characteristic feature of sentencing research was that in
the main it had been theoretically barren, perhaps with the exception
of Hogarth's and Hood's later research both of which acknowledged the
relevance of psychological literature as a source for appropriate
theoretical statements and formulations. At the planning stage of
this research, it was decided that a sound theoretical framework was
necessary in which to ground an examination of decision-making
especially because of the commitment to an actor-orientation'. An
advantage of the type of research into sentencing which sought to
relate factors in an offender's background with the decisions made
was that there was little necessity for theoretical assumptions to
be made clear prior to the undertaking of the research. But a con¬
sequence of this was that statements and conclusions were made about
sentencing which were not supported by the different methodologies
adopted. This was particularly obvious in relation to research which
explained disparities in terms of some indefinable human element when
they could not be accounted for in terms of the different
characteristics in offenders' backgrounds. (See preceding chapter.)
Though examination of disparity as such is not an aim of this
research, a prime factor in the eventual nature of the strategies evolved
for the present project was the intention of being able to make state¬
ments about and comparisons of 'how' decisions were made, statements
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on the basis of and comparisons based in a methodological framework
adequate for that purpose. The methodology was thereby determined
by the desire not simply to analyse 'what' questions, about which
factors influenced or were related to which decisions, but also
•how® questions, relating to the process by which decisions were
made. In other words, this project was designed to examine differ¬
ences in decision-making and not just to consider the different
characteristics or factors associated with decisions made in the
respective systems.
Originally, the researcher had planned to adopt a framework
derived from the phenomenological or interpretive sociology pers¬
pective but in view of the constraints imposed on the research by
what were argued to be the requirements of this project, this
proved unsuitable for a number of reasons.
Whereas a phenomenological or ethnomethodological approach
would certainly allow for the 'tacit assumptions® or ®background
expectancies® of different personnel involved in the decision¬
making process to be revealed, and consequently what implications
these had for the processing of delinquents, it would not have
allowed for easy comparison of two different systems of juvenile
justice. This was especially so because of the intention to
examine the nature of interaction and communication between a
number of individuals involved in making a decision and to
acknowledge how diverse factors influenced such a decision.
Though interpretive sociology criticises the positivistic bias of
much sociological reasoning and rejects the methodologies
associated therewith as being inappropriate for the study of social
phenomena, it is singularly lacking in the development of an
alternative and more appropriate methodology. The ethnomethod¬
ological enterprise as its literal derivation signifies, seeks to
make 'rationally visible' the processes and basic rules which makes
the accomplishment of social interaction or behaviour possible. It
seeks to do so in such a way as to make the account of that
behaviour compatible with the terms which actors or members would
themselves use to characterise that behaviour. An analogy that is
appealing in its contribution to the understanding of the ethno¬
methodological enterprise is that of the ethnomethodologist as an
anthropologist at home. That is, the ethnomethodologist seeks to
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understand social behaviour, usually taken for granted in his cun
culture, in the same way as the anthropologist seeks to understand
and explain the behaviour of those in alien cultures. Following the
Schutzian postulate of adequacy then, any account of social behaviour
must be made in such a way as to be compatible with the account of it
given by those whose behaviour was the object of analysis. One of
the failings, as we have seen, of positivistic sociology was that
sociological concepts were second order constructs; that is, they
are constructs of the constructs used in commonsense and lay
reasoning. The irony of the development of ethnomethodology is
however that, despite its commitment to rendering accounts of the
world in language compatible with that of lay actors and members,
the language used is not only highly technical on occasion but is
also sometimes remarkable for its opaque quality.
But for present purposes, an important disadvantage of
interpretive sociology was that there was no definitive statement
as to how best one might render the processes which make inter¬
action possible, rationally visible. There are then two problems.
Firstly, the postulate of adequacy associated with inter¬
pretive sociology comes close to suggesting that the only accurate
accounts of social interaction can be given by the actors involved
in the interaction. The accuracy of any account given by a
researcher is then theoretically dictated by its compatibility with
actors2 accounts. But in some social situations, and perhaps in
more cases than not in which more than one actor is involved, there
may well be disagreement between the participants as to the accuracy
of any account given of that social process. Moreover, it may not
always be the case that actors themselves are aware of the tacit
assumptions or background expectancies which allow them to accom¬
plish the behaviour. Bearing in mind that this research set out to
subject to analysis decision-making in hearings involving as many as
six or seven people, and involving information gleaned from a variety
of reports and other sources, the possibility of disagreement over
the accuracy of any account as to how a decision was accomplished
is far from remote.
The second difficulty relates more to the lack of methodo¬
logical statement. Perhaps the greatest contribution made by the
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interpretive perspective is that it has directed attention to the
basis of professional theorisation as well as lay theorisation.
(See Schutz 1967; Giddens 1976) That is, not only does it focus
on how lay actors account for or make sense of the world in lay
terms but also how professionals such as sociologists account for
the world in sociological terms. In accordance with the notion of
®reflexivity®, interpretive sociology is commited to revealing the
constitutive rules which make both lay and professional accounts
of the world possible, thereby eroding the distinction between the
lay or professional sociologist. Any account of the world whether
lay or professional is then the product of the very processes which
make the account possible. That is, the truth of such accounts
lies not in their correspondence to some feature of an external
or preconstituted world but rather is inextricably linked to the
way in which (the method) the account was accomplished. Truth is
then 'methodic® in character and no longer referential. Hereby,
the ontological and epistemological gap between theory and data
is bridged, since there are then no data in the world that are
independent of the theoretical assumptions or prescriptions guiding
the researcher. But though this approach does warn of the dangers
of dissociating accounts or conclusions from the way in which they
were made, in other words ignoring the methodic character of
accounts, interpretive sociology fails to postulate a methodology
adequate to meet the strict demands of its maxims. The continual
need to make visible the auspices under which research is made
possible or accomplished in itself gives no indication of the
methodology adequate for this purpose, and ethnomethodological
studies are themselves not exempt from this examination made in
terms of the ethnomethodological critique. What may then be referred
to as an 'ethnomethodological spiral® is established. That is,
once an ethnomethodological study of ethnomethodological studies is
undertaken, this theoretically demands an ethnomethodological
examination of an ethnomethodological examination of an ethno¬
methodological study which in turn theoretically demands .... But
for the purpose of this research, though interpretive sociology was
not without significance for the project as a whole, the fact that
no positive or constructive attempts had been made to devise an




Whereas interpretive sociology provided no methodological
prescriptions, Kelly's (1955) theory of personal constructs is
actually supported by
"
.... a number of techniques of investigation and
measurement, which are closely tied to many of the
assumptions in the main body of the theory."
(Bannister and Mair 1968, p.32)
From the description of the essential features of personal construct
theory it will be seen that it reveals many similarities with
phenomenological or interpretive sociology. This is not totally
unexpected as the traditions in which both Schutz and Kelly worked
were ultimately derived from Husserl's attempt by the phenomeno¬
logical method to provide a presuppositionless philosophy. The
advantage of construct theory however was seen by the researcher to
lie in the availability of an associated body of investigative and
measurement techniques.
In developing personal construct theory, as Schutz had sought .
to do in relation to a social phenomenology, Kelly avoided the ground¬
lessness and transcendentalism associated with pure phenomenology in
its Husserlian form. Yet, he also avoided the extremes of behaviourism
which, as discussed above, were displayed in the psychological
tradition whose roots were to be found in Humean empiricism. For
Kelly, man was to be seen as an agent in the real sense of that word
in that human nature was not merely determined by environment nor
subject to physical or biochemical forces. This is indicated in the
fundamental postulate of construct theory that
"
.... a person's processes are psychologically channelised
by the ways in which he anticipates events." (Bannister
and Mair 1968, p.12)
The theory embodies a conception of a person as essentially
anticipatory and predicting and not just responding to forces outwith
his conscious control. A person can only anticipate events through
his system of personal constructs and it is in notion of a 'construct'
that the key to the theory as a whole is to be found. Though Kelly
did not deny the existence of a real or absolute world, of more
importance was his claim that to operate in the world man has to
make representations of it which he can then test in the course of
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his experiences in it. By 'representing' or 'construing1 the world
is meant the attempt to relate the pre-analytical diversity of
phenomena into conceptual categories. It is through these
representations or constructs that man gains knowledge of and acts
in the world and since they are conceptual categories which do not
simply refer to an external absolute reality they are subject to
change in accordance to the experience of the individual. This is
necessitated by the heuristic and pragmatic character of constructs.
In another context, a similar point has been made by Vaihinger who
suggested that
"
.... it must be remembered that the object of the
world of ideas as a whole is not the portrayal of reality -
this would be an utterly impossible task - but to provide
us with an instrument for finding our way about more
easily in the world." (1924, P«15)
"The world of ideas is an edifice well calculated to
fulfil this purpose; but to regard it as a copy is to
indulge in a hasty and unjustifiable comparison." (1924, p.16)
Similarly, in personal construct theory, the events which man
experiences cannot be absolutely apprehended but can only be
conceptualised or appreciated by the constructions placed on them.
Since events are not intrinsically meaningful, they are made
meaningful or have meaning imposed on them by the individual only
by reference to the system of constructs within which he subsumes
them. Interpretations of events in the world are then subject to
the differing construct systems employed by men to make sense of a
world in which a degree of prediction and anticipation is a distinct
advantage.
A construct is then a means by which similar and related
phenomena can be conceptually linked and by which, on the other hand,
dissimilar phenomena can be conceptually segregated. The attributes
of 'likeness' and 'difference' logically associated with the notion
of a construct, at the same time reveal the bi-polar nature of a
construct as employed in Kelly's theory, and also identifies how it
differs from the use of 'construct' in interpretive sociology. Though
in the latter context a construct certainly implies differentiation
of dissimilar and association of similar phenomena, it is not con¬
sidered to be bi-polar in the way that it is in personal construct
theory. Bi-polarity in constructs, as exemplified by the construct
black-white, does not imply that a construct simply has affirmative
and negative poles. As has been remarked elsewhere -
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.... Kelly insisted that constructs could be used in
a scalar mode, while being bi-polar in origin. Thus, the
famous 'shades of grey' stem from the construct black
versus white." (Bannister and Fransella 1971)
Similarly, the two poles of a construct are not always consciously
employed since many constructs may have only one visible pole, the
other being 'submerged®. As will be discussed later, this was to
have important implications for the design of one of the elements
of the methodology of the present research.
But where personal construct theory does resemble interpretive
sociology is in its presentation of a theoretical framework whose
explanatory potential is directed not only at the psychological
processes of man qua man but also man qua scientist or psychologist.
Indeed the very reflexivity required by the theory means that
personal construct theory is itself a form of construing which can
be accounted for by personal construct theory. The basis of
theorising of subject and psychologist is examined under the precepts
of the theory. Thus, again, as in the sociological form of phenomen¬
ology, the onus is on the researcher to be aware that the constructs
he employs in making sense of an individual's behaviour, though
different from those available to the subject, are not necessarily
any more authoritative. An assumption that Kelly makes is that
"
.... whatever nature may be, or howsoever the quest
for truth will turn out in the end, the events we face
today are subject to as great a variety of constructions
as our wits will enable us to contrive." (1970, p.1)
This he then refers to as constructive alternativism whereby events
may be construed in a number of ways by being subsumed under
different construct systems amongst which may be included those of
individual psychologists or different psychological perspectives.
A merit of the theory which has direct relevance for this project
is that though it was established in opposition to psychological
determinism, the heuristic value of determinist accounts of behaviour
is not rejected outright. In accord with the precept of 'constructive
alternativism' personal construct theory is but one way of construing
a world which may be construed in terms of other psychological
theories and also the theories of lay men. Personal construct
theory does not deny the 'truths' provided by other construct
systems and reflects an acceptance of the 'methodic® character of
truth associated with interpretive sociology. (See Blum and McHugh
1971. )
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Moreover, there are clear implications for a project which
seeks to examine the extent to which decision-makers in two systems
of juvenile justice ascribe responsibility for delinquent behaviour.
Personal construct theory makes, and is not required to do so, no
definitive commitment to a view of human nature as being either
'free' or 'determined' since 'free' and 'determined' are themselves
the opposite poles of a construct. The free-determined construct
is then a means of interpreting behaviour, whether in scientific or
lay terms, and subjects are then free or determined only with respect
to the standpoint or construct system employed by the observer.
Thus, the theory avoids both an overdetermined view of man and also
the doctrine of unlimited free will be postulating that man's
contact with the world is mediated by the construct system he has
evolved, whether he be experimenter or subject. Though the 'frame
of relevance' (Asquith 1977) of the experimenter and subject may be
different, the basis of theorisation is essentially similar in the
employment of a system of constructs.
Kelly originally devised the Role Construct Repertory Test to
elicit construct systems, and this provided the model for later
variations and developments, especially the Repertory Grid. In its
original form, the subject was asked to supply the names of a number
of people and who occupied specified roles, e.g. mother, father,
daughter. These were then grouped in permutations of three and for
each grouping, the subject was asked to indicate in what way two of
the named individuals were alike and different from the third. The
resulting 'grid' is then analysed to estaUish the number and nature
of the constructs employed by an individual in making judgments
about others. The Repertory Grid differs from the original in that
it allows investigation not only of the nature and numbers of constructs
but also examines the relationship between constructs and their hier¬
archical status. (Bannister and Mair 1968) A basic consideration
for this research was that the Repertory Grid and its original
model, the Role Construct Repertory Test, was that they 'allow for
the use of many different types of elements, constructs and scoring
systems'. (See Bannister and Mair 1971) Ulhereas the elements
employed in the more traditional form of the Repertory Grid Test were
the names of people known to the subjects, others have employed sets
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of pictured situations (Ravenette 1970); and though in its original
form the test was used to elicit constructs, the provision of
constructs, or their word labels, by the researcher is also
documented. (Bannister and Fransella 1971)
Development of instruments and pilot study
Because it was intended to adopt an actor-orientation, we
considered it important to involve personnel from the respective
systems in the design of the instruments, and to gain further first¬
hand experience of the operation of juvenile justice. This was neces¬
sary in order to define instruments that required to be 'subjective®
rather than 'objective® and which also, in Kelly's terms were to be
'life representative®. Consequently, the development of appropriate
instruments has to be discussed in the context of the small pilot
study conducted in England and Scotland. This involvement of
personnel from the two systems in the design of the instruments was
also continued after the field-work was completed when the researcher
attended day conferences in both the study areas. This allowed for
the presentation and discussion of some of his preliminary findings
with both panel members and magistrates, a process which not only
acknowledged the co-operation afforded by both groups but at the
same time which had significant influence on the analysis of the data.
It had soon become obvious that what were seen to be the
methodological requirements of the research could not be met
adequately by adopting one particular technique. A number of
techniques were then devised in a strategy which involved a consider¬
able degree of what has been referred to as 'methodological
triangulation®. (Denzin 1978)






The first stage of the research was designed primarily to
compare the extent to which different theoretical perspectives on
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criminality and delinquency provided available ideologies which were
manifested in the working frames of relevance of panel members and
juvenile magistrates. The main objective was to compare the
extent to which a treatment philosophy or a judicial philosophy
provided a conceptual framework for decision-making by panel
members and magistrates respectively. But an added purpose was to
compare the relative influence of each of the identified
theoretical perspectives on delinquency whose premises rested on
deterministic assumptions. A dual requirement of this element of
the research then was that it be methodologically adequate to
examine the ideological roots of the lay theories of delinquency
employed by the decision-makers but also provide a baseline for
comparison between panel members and juvenile magistrates. For
these purposes, it was decided to use a number of case studies,
containing basic information about an offenders background and the
offence in which he was involved.
The technique associated with personal construct theory,
especially the Repertory Grid, have been subjected to many variations
and modifications and by using case studies, it was possible to
utilise construct principles in designing the cases themselves. In
trying to examine the differences in decision-making between personnel
in two different systems of juvenile justice, the use of case studies,
for the purposes of this stage of the research, eliminated the
influence of technical rules and regulations which would apply to
actual cases. At the same time, as Hood has commented, (1972) the
use of case studies introduces a further degree of control over the
variability in information relating to specific cases. One argument,
however, against the case study method is of course that it is a
technique which is artificial in the sense that it removes the
subjects from their normal decision-making context, thereby ignoring
the 'situated aspects' of decision-making. (Hood 1972;recognised this.)
Acknowledging this caveat, the researcher also intended to examine
decision-making at actual hearings and accordingly later describes
the methods by which this was achieved.
But in terms of 'life representativeness', the case studies could
themselves devised in such a way as realistically to resemble documents
such as social enquiry reports. Towards this end, the researcher, who
had had practical experience of writing social enquiry reports on
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children, spent some time reading a considerable number of reports
made available to him by the Reporter to the Children's Hearings in
the study area. Though each case study was to embody basic premises
of the different theoretical perspectives identified earlier in this
thesis, (see Chapters II and III) they were to be administered in a
way that would not be too removed from the presentation of reports to
the subjects in the making of decisions in actual cases.
In the case studies, the basic assumptions of each of the
different types of causal explanations (the psychoanalytic, bio¬
logical, environmental, processual and behaviourist) were embodied
in information relating to the child's background; in addition, this
was balanced with information about the offence in which the child
had been involved. (Thus, what we have referred to as a more judicial
or legal ideology was also presented.) Five offences were depicted
<Xnd Oece vtcnecX \T\ ttorns oh Ihfc oh ohhe.nc£. lr\ C-HUd tovjoldtd tXod
ser-ioosntsi. To control further for differences in cases, as in
the research as a whole, only boys were referred to in the case
studies. Copies of the case studies employed are included at the
end of this thesis. However, in anticipation of our later discussion
we now present a brief description of what each case study contains.
Each of the case studies then were based on (a) a 'judicial'
philosophy by which we mean a perspective on delinquency control in
which such considerations as the personal responsibility of the offender
and the consequences of the act are important; and (b) a 'welfare' philo¬
sophy in which the social, personal and environmental characteristics of
the delinquent are more important considerations. These two models are
obviously not mutually exclusive as the history of juvenile justice has
indicated. And as we shall argue later in this thesis in terms of the
frames of relevance adopted by an individual they are not easy to
separate conceptually. For the purpose of the thesis, each study con¬
tained a description of an offence and a statement of the social,
personal and environmental characteristics of the child. Each case
study was followed by a list of statements relating to 'welfare' factors
derived from the respective causal theories we discussed and also
statements relating to the child's personal involvement in the offence,
the nature of the resultant harm, his awareness of right and wrong,
his awareness of the consequences of his action and on a broader level,
the need for social protection. Copies of the Cases Studies are
contained in the Appendices.
»See V
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A decision had then to be made about how the case studies could
be best administered, and there were a number of options available.
As suggested earlier, whereas Kelly's original test has in fact sought
to elicit constructs, a number of later versions allowed the researcher
to provide the constructs or the word lables by which the constructs
were signified. (See Bannister and Mair 1968; Bannister and Fransella
1971 ) Similarly, because both poles of a construct are not always
readily identifiable, some versions of the test have been admini¬
stered in which only one pole of the construct was actually
presented. For the purposes of this project, the following method
was employed in this stage. After each of the five case studies which
were presented to the subjects, ten statements were listed, all of
which were derived from the case study itself. Of the ten statements,
reflecting the balance of information in the case, five referred to
the theoretical assumptions of the perspective embodied in it; the
other five referred to the factors surrounding the offence and the
child's involvement in it. That is, each case study was followed by
a list of statements divided equally between 'welfare/determinist'
factors and 'judicial/responsibility' factors. As the intention was
to assess the extent to which judicial or welfare factors would be
important for the purpose of decision-making, the subjects were then
asked to indicate how important different factors were. They were
asked to indicate the three most important factors, in order, and the
three least important factors, again in order. Over the five case
studies the subjects were therefore required to rate in terms of
importance, 50 statements, half of which were 'welfare' statements
and half 'judicial' statements.
That statements were presented after the cases had been
considered renders the method liable to the criticism that constructs
are thereby not elicited but are rather imposed by the theoretical
assumptions underlying the researcher's objectives. Nevertheless,
basic considerations influenced the choice of this method. There had
of course been the option of using the Role Construct Test or its
later version, the Repertory Grid. However, this would have meant
that juvenile magistrates and panel members would have been required
to make judgments about cases by assessing the differences or simil¬
arities of cases in groups of three, thereby adding to the
artificiality of the task.
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There were three main sources of justification for the adoption
of the preferred method. The first basic consideration that influenced
the use of the method characterised above was that by presenting
statements after the case study, only those factors would be judged
important which were directly relevant to the major hypotheses of
the study. Secondly, it also meant that the study could be com¬
parative by asking the subjects to consider similar factors in
respect of their relevance for decision-making. Free choice would
have made comparison difficult, making the analysis of the resulting
responses extremely complex by introducing extraneous factors which
were controlled for by this more economical and focused method.
Thirdly, and logically related to the second consideration, the
researcher was interested in decision-making by individuals who
occupied specific roles within the respective systems of juvenile
justice.
However, an alternative was adopted in the pilot study, which
we shall describe later, in which, briefly, a number of the subjects
were presented with the same case studies as their colleagues but
without an accompanying list of statements.
(ii) Case Reports
Nevertheless, it could not be denied that one drawback of the
case study method was the fact of its being abstracted from the real
situation of decision-making as it occurred in Court and Children's
Hearings. Moreover, what were seen to be the requirements of this
research demanded that an attempt be made to supplement the case
studies with some means of examining actual decisions and decision¬
making. The development of the Case Reports and the Interaction
Schedules was an attempt to do so.
Ue have already argued that previous research into sentencing
generally tended to ignore how information was selected as being
relevant for the purpose of decision-making. 'Black box' sentencing
research had especially failed to acknowledge the role played by the
interpretive capacities of sentencers though in many instances
conclusions were drawn about the influence of the human element on
sentencing decisions. But sentencing research had also failed to
consider the influence of sentencers on each other's behaviour when
the decision, theoretically at least, was the outcome of discussion
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between a number of magistrates. The Case Report Form was devised
so as to allow conclusions to be made about how panel members and
juvenile magistrates respectively judged information, and as far as
possible to allow the researcher to make some comment on the
collective nature of decisions, an objective which also involved an
'Interaction Schedule'.
Though we obviously cannot deny that known information about
an offender is influential in making a decision as to how to deal
with him, information is not intrinsically meaningful or relevant
per se. It is only meaningful and relevant when it is treated as
such by those responsible for making the decision. The search for
those factors, either relating to the offence or background information,
which can be said to be determinants of the resulting decision has
then to be conducted in such a way as to allow the researcher to
examine how the information was interpreted and for what purpose.
Thus, the important questions relate not simply to what information
was used but also how and why it was sued. In this respect, to
appreciate decision-making, and not merely analyse decisions, it is
important that the subject has the opportunity of indicating what
influenced him in making a decision, and what was for him relevant
information. A fundamental logical 'link' between information and a
decision, as we have argued earlier, is the reason that the decision¬
maker gives for making the decision that he did. Though a number of
people may employ the same information to reach what prima facie seems
to be a similar decision, once the reasons for a decision have been
established, it can be appreciated that very different decisions have
been made. Since the underlying logic to this project was to consider
the relative influence of welfare or judicial factors on decision¬
making in respect of children who commit offences, the difficulty of
conceptually separating information relating to children's needs
and that relating to the offences committed meant that it was therefore
important to consider how panel members and magistrates interpreted
information.
But decisions are subject to a number of constraints other than
the availability and quality of information on which decisions may be
logically based, and these constraints are of two types. Firstly,
decisions may be restricted by the statutory requirements governing
the making of decisions about children who commit offences. In a
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similar vein, Green had also postulated that 'the statutory guide to
the relative gravity of thevarious offences exerts a pronounced
effect upon variations in sentences'. (1961, p.32) Though our
purpose was not to examine decision-making as such, the importance
of statutory restrictions on decisions had to be acknowledged.
Secondly, but just as importantly, decisions may be further
restricted by the availability or non-availability of suitable
resources by which appropriate treatment measures can be carried
out. The principles underlying individualised treatment require
I
that decisions be made in terms of offenders needs rather than in
terms of what he has done. Consequently, since offenders' needs are
likely to vary considerably from offender to offender, a number of
different types of facilities are necessary to allow treatment
measures to be realistically implemented. Where adequate
resources or a variety of resources are not available, decisions
cannot be implemented and the non-availability of resources if
known to the decision-maker, will necessitate that his decision
be tailored accordingly.
Bearing these considerations in mind, the following method
was devised to examine decision-making in respect of a number of
cases appearing before Children's Hearings and Duvenile Court. In its
original form, the Case Report was a single sheet on which were
listed a number of factors which may have been taken into consider¬
ation in reaching a decision about children who had committed an
offence. The subjects were to be asked to indicate, by placing
a tick in the appropriate place, how important were certain factors.
For example, where the child's relationship with his father was
considered to have been important, it would have added to the
analysis of the use of information to have been able to allow the
subject the opportunity to make some judgment of the factor. Thus,
a child's relationship may be an important factor for making a
decision and what we sought to analyse was the extent to which
different factors were treated as important by magistrates and
panel members. It was hoped that this simple approach would allow
for some methodological progress to be made in research into
decision-making unlike much sentencing research which had ignored
which factors were relevant for the subject and how he judged those
factors.
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At this time, the factors were not organised on the Case Report
into different sections as they were to be in the later version, but <
four main categories of information had been presented by the researcher.
Firstly, there were the different reports available in relation to
which it was considered important to have some overall assessment of
their importance for decision-making. Secondly, there were the
'background' or 'welfare' factors which, though less in number, were
derived from the different theoretical perspectives in the case
studies. They had to be reduced in number to keep the form in
manageable proportions, and though the overall objective of the
research was to assess the relative influence of 'welfare' or
'judicial' factors, no definitive conclusions could be drawn from
this stage of the research about the individual theoretical
perspectives. Thirdly, there were the 'judicial' factors them¬
selves as employed in the case studies but supplemented by inform¬
ation relating to the child's previous offence behaviour and
previous contact with the juvenile justice system. Lastly, there
was a residual category in which different types of information,
which could not readily be incorporated into the other categories,
were presented. Opportunity was also made available for the subjects
to include factors which had not appeared on the Case Report.
After the list of factors, there were a number of questions
which specifically focused on the reasons given by the panel member
or juvenile magistrate for his decision, whether he agreed with it,
and if not, why not and what would his decision have been.
In this way, we could examine the factors which were important
and in what way they were important to the subject and also elicit
his reasons for his decision. Though this could not be called
phenomenological methodology, the design was nevertheless influenced
by the phenomenological notion of intentionality. The primary
methodological objective had again been to evolve a means whereby
the frame of relevance of the subject would not be completely
dominated by that of the researcher.
(iii) Interaction Schedules
A major disadvantage of research into sentencing is that there
has been little attempt to provide information about what happened in
court during the course of a hearing. The dangers associated with
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explanations of sentencing behaviour based on information extracted
from official records alone have already been commented on,
(Hogarth 1971; Hood 1972) but feu researchers have examined the process
of decision-making in the hearing of a case. Though Hood (1972), for
example, recognises the limitation of his games theory approach,
uhich he argues needs to be supplemented by information collected
at court hearings, this actually occupies a minor part of the
research. Others, as ue have noted, even suggested that by having
no knouledge of the courts and the hearings the researcher could in
fact benefit by being 'detached'. (Mannheim et al.1957) Even
Hogarth, uhose uork uas theoretically based on a phenomenological
framework, derives his data from interviews, questionnaires and
sentencing study sheets, and ignores altogether the nature of the
discussion and interaction which provides the context for the hearing
of a case.
The Kilbrandon Report, on which the changes introduced in
Scotland by the 1968 Act had been based, had recommended that
Children's Hearings be a more informal affair than the system which
had previously existed in order that parents and children might them¬
selves play a greater part in the decision-making process.
Similarly, though the 1969 Act in England had retained the juvenile
court structure, there were recommendations made that the formal
court hearing in respect of children should also become a more informal
affair. And again to return to the underlying logic of this research,
which has as its overall aim an examination of the relative influence
of 'welfare' and 'judicial' factors, an analysis of the discussion of
information and the sources of information in the hearing itself
would bring an added dimension to a study of the process of decision¬
making. Thus, a method had to be devised by which both the content
and form of decision-making could be studied. By content is meant
the nature of the discussion in relation to a case in a hearing; by
form is meant the flow of discussion and communication between the
different individuals involved in the decision-making process.
To obtain this kind of information in the hearings, the
original intention had been to tape record the hearing of specific
cases and then analyse the verbatim transcripts. But as permission
could not be given by the Reporter of the area in Scotland where the
main study was to be conducted, an alternative means of analysing
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the hearing transactions had to be found. As it turned out, however,
the main study area in England was one of the few courts where the
hearings from each courtroom were taped as a matter of course. But
for comparability, the fact that in one of the study areas a tape
recorder could not be used meant that it was not appropriate for it
to be used in the other. A simple alternative was that the
researcher could attempt to write down as much of the discussion as
he could. But the experience of the researcher at hearings led him
to believe that this was not feasible due to the wealth of information
discussed and the quick interchanges between the participants. After
some deliberation, it was decided to use some form of interaction
schedule on which to base the analysis of both content and form of
the interaction in hearings. The Bales Interaction * T\ flAysxsGASOjMSi \ was
considered but it suffered from a number of limittions which made it
unsuitable for this research.
Firstly, the Bales method of interaction analysis was rather
limited in the scope and kind of information it could deal with.
Secondly, it was not particularly suited to examine the major hypo¬
theses of the study. Consequently, without rejecting the concept of
an interaction schedule, one was designed which was particularly
suited to examining the major hypotheses that have been already
stated. The main criteria governing its design were that it should
be relatively simple to administer but at the same time be capable of
dealing with as much information from a discussion as possible.
Moreover, in a research study of this type, with its limited resources,
such a schedule would have to be completed by the researcher himself
who would thereby also have the opportunity of being a participant
observer at hearings. Any analysis of the data collected could then
be improved under the influence of more qualitative information.
A list of factors which might possibly be taken into consider¬
ation in the course of a hearing was drawn up, much along the lines
of the list of factors in the Case Reports. In the original Interaction
Schedule, there were 39 factors included, again relating to the four
categories employed in the Case Reports, viz. Report, Welfare,
Dudicial and Residual categories. Since the list was in no way
considered to be exhaustive, the schedule was designed so that
information which was discussed but did not appear on the schedule
could accordingly be included in the appropriate category. Alongside
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this list of factors, in order to complete the grid, three columns
were outlined, one for each of the panel members or magistrates
presiding at a hearing. The fact that there were on occasion only
two magistrates on the bench in juvenile court made no material
difference. The middle column was reserved for the chairman. Thus,









Had the intention been only to analyse what panel members or
magistrates discussed in hearing a case, then it would have been a
straightforward process of indicating by a tick or some other symbol
what factor had been discussed by which subject. For example, if
'child's relationship with father1 had been factor 1, and subject B
had discussed this, then it could be indicated by an appropriate
symbol in box B 1. But the analysis was not just to be of what panel
members and magistrates discussed but rather of the nature of the
discussion as a whole. That is, the analysis was to include the
contribution, both in form and content, of the other participants in
the hearing. '
To achieve this, a system of coding was constructed using both
capital and small letters, by which the other main participants could
be identified. The symbols employed for the respective participants
were as follows:
1. What the grid does not record is any interaction which
does not involve either a panel member or a magistrate.
The exclusion is not because this would be of little
interest but rather because such interaction e.g. between
parents and child occurred only rarely in both the pilot
and main studies.
1
Father: F and f Police prosecutor: P and p
Mother: M and m Clerk of Court: CC and cc
Youth: Y and y Reporter: R and r
Social Worker: SW and su
The reason for the use of both capital and small letters was that it
provided a means by which we could identify whether that individual
made a statement about a particular factor or whether a statement
had been addressed _to_ him. Where capitals were employed, this
signified that the individual made a statement and where small
letters were used, this meant that the individual had been
addressed about a particular factor. Depending on the position
of the symbol on the grid, that is, depending on which column and
opposite which factor it was located, what had been discussed and
between whom could be readily identified. For example, as in Fig. b
if the 'child's relationship with its mother1 had been factor 5, and
the social worker had addressed the chairman about this, then in
box B5 would have been noted 'SW'. Had the chairman, however,
addressed the social worker about this then in the same position










The schedule was also devised to cater for discussion between panel
members or between magistrates who were coded simply according to
the column in which their name was noted. For example, if the
chairman addressed the person named at the head of column C about
the same factor, in B5 would now appear ' c'. If the person named at
the head of column C addressed the chairman about the same factor,
then in C5 would appear ®b'.
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By repeating this everytime a statement was made, a matrix
could be constructed which therefore provided, albeit in coded form,
a description of both the form and content of the hearing. However
as far as possible, it was decided to record verbatim the concluding
remarks of the chairman of Children's and Court Hearings. Though
the description of the coding here presented may appear rather
cumbersome, it did in fact turn out to be, with some modification,
a relatively simple but workable means of providing information
which could then be analysed for the purpose of examining the
major hypotheses of the study.
(iv) Interviews
Given the time constraints in conducting the fieldwork and
the number of different approaches adopted in the empirical research,
it was impossible to interview all the panel members and magistrates
involved in the study. Nevertheless, we thought it important to
supplement the material collected in other ways with at least a
number of interviews. Thus, the intention in the main study was to
interview twelve panel members and magistrates about topics and
issues relating to their roles in the respective systems of juvenile
justice. The material collected was used as a means of supple¬
menting the findings based on the case studies, case reports and
the interaction schedules.
The Pilot Study
Ten panel members and five juvenile magistrates, drawn
completely at random from two areas where permission had been
given, but not the main study areas, co-operated in the pilot study.
This was undertaken with several objectives in mind. Firstly, the
researcher wanted to ensure that the instruments to be completed by
the subjects, the Case Studies and the Case Report Form, were compre¬
hensible. Secondly, that the case studies presented might be
realistic portrayals of the types of cases that the subjects might
encounter, it was intended to allow them an opportunity of commenting
on their validity. Further, it was intended to modify the state¬
ments presented after the case studies where the subjects'
responses of the importance of any particular statement were over
consistent. Thirdly, the pilot study offered the researcher the
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opportunity of both familiarising himself further with the coding
grid associated with the Interaction Schedule and at the same time
testing its feasibility. Lastly, the lists of factors included in
the Case Report and the Interaction Schedule were to be modified
where necessary to include more relevant, and conversely exclude
less relevant, factors.
Ide have seen that in its original form the Role Construct
Repertory Test was designed primarily to elicit constructs from
subjects, but that in later versions constructs, or their word
labels, were actually provided by the researcher. Similarly,
whereas the original test required that judgments be made of known
people, developments of Kelly's original concept employed 'pictured
situations' as the elements to be judged. In our study, where the
elements were in the form of case studies and where the statements
were provided by the researcher, it had been determined from the
outset that it should be possible at some stage in the design of
the instruments that panel members and magistrates would never¬
theless be able to make some comment on their design. For this
purpose, the case studies were administered in two ways in the
pilot study.
Though fifteen people in the pilot study received the case
studies, only ten of these received them in the form intended for
the main study, i.e. with the ten statements provided after each
case study. The remaining five also received the case studies but
without the list of statements, and instead of being required to rate
ten statements in terms of their importance, this small group were
required to do two things. They were asked to list in order of
priority, those factors in the case studies which they considered to
be important for the purpose of decision-making. Also, they were
asked to indicate what information had not appeared in the case
study which they would have wished to allow them to make a more
informed decision. In this way by presenting case studies without
the lists of statements a comparison could be made of the type of
statements chosen by the subjects involved in the pilot study and
those presented by the researcher. And by asking for an indication
of what further information was required the case studies themselves
could be accordingly changed to accommodate the subjects' comments
so as to make them a more realistic portrayal of the types of
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information generally encountered by panel members and magistrates.
There were, however, obvious limits to the changes that could be
made because of the specific purpose for which the case studies had
been devised, and because they were not designed to examine all
aspects of decision-making.
Since the Case Reports were to be completed by individual
panel members and juvenile magistrates after the hearing of a case,
one important consideration was that they should be capable of being
completed as quickly as possible. Though permission had been given
to collect information for the research in this way, concern was
nevertheless expressed that the organisation and administration of
the Children's Hearings and the Court Hearings should not be dis¬
rupted by such an exercise. Since Children's Hearings also took
place in the evenings, it was imperative that the Case Report Form
should not be too time-consuming. As the list of factors was not
considered to be in any way exhaustive, the pilot study offered the
means whereby its comprehensiveness and validity could be assessed.
Moreover, an overall methodological objective was that the data should
be collected from the subjects as far as possible, and, initially, it
was intended that the researcher would interview subjects, after the
Case Reports had been completed, specifically about the decision just
reached. But even before the pilot study, the researcher had his
own doubts as to whether this was realistic and accordingly accommodated
the questions into a self-administered questionnaire which could be
incorporated into the Case Report if interviewing was out of the
question.
Problems associated with the Interaction Schedule were anti¬
cipated as being more straightforward. Again, the pilot study would
allow for modifications to the list of factors to be made but it
was also intended to afford the researcher the opportunity of
familiarising himself further with the coding system devised for
this part of the research.
In all stages of the preliminary development of the instruments
and the pilot study itself, comment was requested on all aspects of
the research not only from panel members and juvenile magistrates but




All the case studies were returned from those who had received
them for the purpose of the pilot study. There had been no major
problems experienced in their completion and reaction from both
magistrates and panel members indicated that they did in fact
depict cases and present information in a realistic and acceptable
manner. It should be noted however that several of the subjects
commented on the fact that in a genuine case, their impression of
the child himself would play a major role in determining their
decision. Whereas this is of course a valid point in that the case
study method, as we have discussed, is not subject to the many
!situated aspects' of decision-making, the case studies were neither
designed not conceived for this purpose.
The factors chosen from each case study as being important
for those subjects who had received case studies without the lists
of statements were encouragingly similar to those presented by the
researcher. It was therefore felt that on these grounds alone,
only minor modifications to the statements would be required.
However, some statements were changed for other reasons. Where the
statements had been given after the case studies, one of the ,
statements in Case A had been scored consistently by both panel
members and magistrates as being of least importance. Though
consistent scoring such as this was not impossible, it was not
expected that it would occur. On examining the statement, it was
found to be qualitatively different from the others in that it did
not simply refer to a factor relating either to the child's background
or to the offence committed, but rather made an explicit statement as
to why a decision should be made. It was not the purpose of the case
studies to examine the reasons for decisions but to consider what
kinds of factors would be chosen on which to base a decision. The
statement 'An example should be made of this boy' was therefore
deleted on the grounds that not only was it qualitatively different
from the other statements but also because it disrupted the logic
underlying the design of the case studies. A similar statement in
one of the other case studies was deleted likewise.
Some other statements were modified simply because they were
much longer in comparison to others and it was felt that this was
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imposing an undue influence. In view of the comments made by the
subjects as to what further information they would have required
to allow them to make a more informed decision, modifications were
made to the case studies themselves though the information incor¬
porated only meant minor alternations. Overall, it was felt that
the case study method posed no real problems and that reaction to it
had been such that it could be satisfactorily employed in the main
study. Copies of the final version complete with the lists of
statements are included in the Appendices.
Changes required in the Case Reports were however of a less
minor nature and the need for compromise between the methodologically
ideal and practical necessity became rather obvious. Prior to under¬
taking the pilot study proper, the researcher attended some hearings
in the pilot area in Scotland to assess the nature of the demands
completion of the Case Reports and being interviewed about cases would
impose on the subjects. As we have discussed, one reason for this
concern was that Children's Hearings take place in the evenings.
Even from these preliminary examinations it was apparent that
interviewing subjects after they had been involved in making a
decision and after they had completed the Case Report, would have
been far too time-consuming. It was felt therefore that the inform¬
ation to have been collected in the small interviews would more
appropriately be collected bytthe addition of a further self-
administered section to the Case Report. This was the format that
was then employed throughout the case study. To further reduce the
demands imposed on the subjects, the researcher also decided to
read out the instructions governing the Case Reports.
A total of twenty-four Case Reports relating to eight cases were
completed in the pilot study proper. The small number of cases
involved, reflected in the number of cases in the main study,
indicates the difficulty experienced in obtaining appropriate cases.
The peculiar nature of the hearings in England and Scotland did not
make for easy or quick collection of samples of suitable cases for
the study. Because of the heavy volume of cases dealt with by
magistrates at one sitting, up to as many as forty cases listed
for one day, they could not be justifiably be asked to complete Case
Reports for more than one case. The problem in Scotland was slightly
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different but with the similar effect of reducing the number of Case
Reports that could be completed at any one hearing. The volume of
cases dealt with at a Children's Hearing differed markedly in that
on most occasions, no more than five or six cases uere heard.
Since at the majority of hearings there uere not only offence
referral cases heard but also cases referred on other grounds, or
even for revieu, the availability of appropriate cases was thereby
limited.
The time taken to complete the case reports (uhich vindicated
the decision not to intervieu as uell) varied from 10 to 25 minutes.
The fact that some took as long as 25 minutes to complete uas in part
due to a major difficulty confronted in the design of the Case
Reports. In an attempt to have the subjects indicate both uhich
factors uere important for decision-making and to have some judgment
made of them, they uere asked to state uhether factors uere 'positive'
or 'negative'. Positive factors uere defined as those factors uhich
uere taken into consideration and uhich seemed to be favourable
factors in a case; negative factors uere defined as those uhich had
also been taken into consideration but uhich had been seen to be un¬
favourable. For example, uhere a panel member thought that the
child's use of leisure had been for instance constructive, this
uould then be indicated as being a positive factor. Where on the
other hand 'child's home conditions' uere seen as being unfavourable
or poor, then it uould be indicated as being a negative factor.
Whereas some of the subjects apparently experienced little
difficulty uith this, some of the more astute and discerning
subjects discovered that such a dichotomous category contained a
considerable measure of ambiguity. This uas mainly because
'poaiive' and 'negative' could be construed in a number of uays.
A factor such as 'good home conditions' could certainly be called a
positive factor, but a factor such as 'bad home conditions' uas also
capable of being conceived as being a 'positive' factor in the sense
that it had contributed to the child's offending and general
behavioural problems. It had also been remarked that a factor could
be a positive influence on a decision uhether it uas a favourable or
unfavourable factor. Thus, 'bad home conditions' might be considered
negative in the sense of a negative judgment but positive in the
influence it had on the decision.
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Whereas the intention had been to allow the subjects to make
judgments of actors selected as being important for decision-making,
the ambiguity inherent in the positive-negative category, rightly
pointed out in the pilot study, suggested that it would not be
acceptable for the main study, at least presented in that manner.
The important-unimportant category though comprehensible did
in fact prove to be too restrictive and several subjects commented
that factors they would take into consideration were not simply
important or unimportant. It was argued that some fectors were
more important than others. Though they all completed the Case
Reports, concern was expressed that, because of the restrictive
nature of the category, inaccurate responses were being given. After
some deliberation, the importance category was changed to the three
categories 'Uery Important?, 'Important' and 'Not Important' with a
residual 'Irrelevant' category for those factors which were not
taken into consideration. Where factors appeared to the subjects
as being irrelevant, this could be indicated by not putting a tick
opposite the factor in question. The reason for there being a
'Not Important' and an 'Irrelevant' category was that in some
instances it was felt that there might be factors which were not
important as such for decision-making but which on the other hand
were not completely irrelevant.
As for the list of factors offered in the case reports in the
pilot study, comment was made that not all factors would be taken
into consideration in a case and that indeed on occasion very few
factors would be needed to provide an adequate basis for a decision.
However, since the list was to be comprehensive to cover as many of
the different factors influencing decisions over a number of cases
and not just for particular cases, little change was made to the
list itself. The order in which the factors appeared was however
modified slightly, mainly for the purpose of analysing the responses,
and simply involved grouping the factors together in their respective
categories, viz. Reports, Welfare, Judicial and Residual Categories.
In the main study, the Case Reports were completed by panel members
and juvenile magistrates after they had made a decision in the
researcher's presence. By being involved in the administration of
the Case Report, the researcher was able to read the instructions to
the subjects and to be available should any difficulty have arisen.
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But he was also able to ensure that the case reports were completed
by each subject individually and not after consultation with his
colleagues. In the pilot study, though asked to complete the
case reports on the basis of their own impressions of a case, it
was obvious from some of the returned forms that there had been a
considerable degree of consultation by the subjects in completing
them. Since the object was to gain access to the interpretation of
cases by individuals and as a group, the presence of the author
when they were being administered was necessary to guarantee that
the case reports were completed individually.
Fourteen Interaction Schedules were completed by the researcher,
eight of which were for the cases for which the case reports had been
completed and six of which were for other cases heard whilst he was
in attendance at hearings. In the course of the pilot study, as a
result of having to attend on a number of occasions to obtain even a
small sample of appropriate cases, the researcher benefited by being
present at a large number of hearings. Even for the pilot study, he
attended as many as 30 hearings from which only eight cases could be
used as the pilot sample. This was to be a feature of the research
that was repeated in the main study where he was present at as many
as 100 Children's Hearings and even more Ouvenile Court Hearings.
The advantage was that despite the small number of cases in the
samples, he was able to familiarise himself with the nature of the
different types of hearings and the roles played by the various
participants. Though the Interaction Schedule was designed to
obtain information about a number of specific cases, his experience
in the respective systems of juvenile justice was supplemented
therefore by observation at a considerable number of hearings and
by discussion with many of the significant personnel.
kJhereas the Interaction Schedule did prove to be a very
workable instrument and extremely valuable in the absence of any
other means of gathering information about the form and content of
hearings, it was nevertheless not without a number of limitations.
One of the problems with not being able to tape record the hearings
was that of not having as full a transcript of the discussion as
possible. Since many different areas would be featured in the
discussion, it would have been impossible to merely record verbatim
absolutely everything. In this respect, the list of factors in the
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Interaction Schedule which it was thought might be discussed in a
hearing proved invaluable. Since the factors were already on a
form, the only recording that had to be done by the researcher was
effectively of who was actually in the discussion, the topic of
discussion being noted by the location of the coding on the grid.
A fairly accurate picture of the form and the content of the hearing
could then be obtained, in which the overall nature of the discussion
and the relative contributions made by some of the participants
could also be noted.
It had been proposed initially that each 'statement1 about a
particular factor should be noted with the appropriate symbols.
Though this had initially seemed a fairly straightforward under¬
taking, in practice it soon became rather obvious that it was by no
means clear what actually constituted a 'statement'. In some
instances two or three different references to the same factor could
be made in a single sentence and a number of references to different
factors could also be made within one sentence. To accommodate the
administration of the Interaction Schedule to this contingency, an
operational definition was adopted whereby a 'statement' was deemed
to be each particular reference made about any factor whatsoever.
In this way, it was hoped to add to the data by providing information
on the volume of discussion about each factor. Though a crude device
in that it could not record the richness of actual discussions leading
up to a decision, the interaction schedule did serve as a basis for
comparison of two different types of hearing where the means of
information collection was otherwise restricted.
After the addition of relevant factors and the reorganisation
of the presentation of all the factors, the Interaction Schedule was
adopted for the main study. It is to a discussion of the findings




For comparative purposes, two complete administrative areas,
one in Scotland and one in England, were chosen for the research.
The restriction to one panel and one court area then means that no
claims can be made as to the representativeness of the areas or of
the subjects therein. Indeed, it is questionable whether any area
or sample, however chosen or stratified, could ever be what might
be called 'representative'. Because the desire is that panel
members and juvenile magistrates should be representative of the
community which they serve, any attempt to obtain samples
representative on a national basis would inhibit the collection
of information about the workings of the system in particular
areas. Since each area, both panel and court, is characterised by
the peculiar administrative and organisational arrangements of
social and related services, as well as being serviced by a
restricted number of panel members and magistrates respectively,
additional variables would have been introduced to an analysis
of decision-making. Indeed, the danger of seeking to obtain
large samples that are representative of the national scene is
that as much information is lost because of the attempt to be
comprehensive.
Since we were concerned with the process of decision-making
the danger of trying to be too comprehensive would have been to have
ignored the peculiarities that exist within different administrative
areas. Because the practice of juvenile justice is dependent upon
local resources and expertise, and may also be a function of the
nature of the delinquency problem, regional differences make it
unlikely that a statement about juvenile justice on a national basis
could meaningfully be made. Since one objective of the research was
to examine situational and collective features of the decision¬
making process, to have crossed geographical and administrative
boundaries would have restricted the kinds of comments that could
be made. In simply practical terms, concentrating on particular
areas for the purposes of comparative research was also determined
by the fact that only one researcher was involved.
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However, this is not to suggest that the conclusions drawn
from such a small-scale exercise are without significance for the
Scottish and English systems as a whole or for the very concept of
juvenile justice. The translation of social policy into action is
a process whereby the redefinition and interpretation of the formal
ideology and philosophy by those responsible for its imple¬
mentation will be made within the framework of their 'working
frames of relevance'. In terms of the present thesis, the
empirical section of the study follows on logically from the
earlier chapters. UJe have already examined what we have termed the
'available ideologies' underlying punishment and treatment and have
suggested that the relationship between the two is more complex than
other researchers have allowed for. The discussion of 'available
ideologies' was then used to examine the historical and conceptual
development of juvenile justice in both Scotland and England. In
the empirical study, we set out to examine how an ostensibly
similar philosophy, of treatment or welfare, was realised within
different administrative and organisational frameworks, arguing that,
though formally the orienting philosophy was one of welfare, this
did not preclude the possibility that those working within the
respective systems adhered to frames of relevance derived from
differing available ideologies. It is from this that the comparative
element of our research derives.
To this end, two areas were chosen, one from Scotland and
England respectively, to be referred to simply as the panel and
court area. The choice was governed by a number of considerations.
Firstly, since the intention was to examine decision-making within
complete administrative boundaries, given the limited resources
available to the researcher these areas had to have a relatively
small number of magistrates and panel members respectively.
Secondly, since we were to examine the form and content of the
hearing process itself, it was again important to have a relatively
low number of magistrates and panel members. This was because of the
number of permutations possible of panel members at any particular
hearing and magistrates at any court hearing. Since we wished to
comment, as far as possible, on the collective nature of decision¬
making we had to be able to relate the data collected from the Case
Studies and Case Reports to actual cases.
A brief description of the respective areas now follows.
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(i) Scotland: the Panel Area
Early in 1974 approaches were made directly to the Reporter to
the Children's Hearings for the panel area mho gave his approval, at
least in principle, for the research. At his suggestion, a meeting
was arranged with the panel members who were to be involved in the
research to allow them the opportunity of discussing with the
researcher the nature and objectives of the research, as well as
the level of involvement that would be required of them. The
meeting in fact served the dual function of allowing particular
queries to be met by the researcher and, more importantly, of laying
a sound basis for the continued co-operation and enthusiasm of the
panel members throughout all stages of the research. The part of
the research which involved observing hearings and interviewing the
panel members was carried out from January until May of 1975, although
the case studies had of course been completed by the panel members
before that time.
The panel area itself, south of Glasgow, is a blend of heavy
industrial towns (the main industry being steel works) in the
north-most sector, with a number of rural areas in the southern
reaches.
One important difference in the administrative arrangements
between the panel and court area was that UJhereL.all the court
I
hearings were held in the same magistrates court, during the day, the
panel hearings met at different locations and mainly in the evenings
and afternoons. There were in fact four different meeting places
for the panels, though any panel member might be required to attend
hearings at any of the four venues.
Another important difference between the two groups, i.e.
panel members and magistrates, is that because the new system of
juvenile justice in Scotland had only recently been introduced
(1971) the panel members were all first-time appointments. There had,
at the time of the research, been no turnover of membership, though a
number of the panel members were in fact about to have their member¬
ship reviewed as their three-year period of service (after which
membership has to be reviewed) was almost completed. In general,
however, and in comparison with the juvenile court system, panel
members had less experience and were being offered training programmes
which themselves were only in the early stages of their evolution.
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From Table 1 it can be seen that there were a number of
differences in the patterns of cases referred over time to the











Whereas in 1972 and 1973, as well as later in 1974, the number
of reports per 1,000 children at a national leuel was always greater
than for the panel area itself, both sets of figures showed an upward
increase in the rates of reports to Reporters. The majority of all
reports were for boys. Moreouer, the number of offence referrals
each year increased both at national leuel and in the Panel Area,
as Table 2 indicates.
Table b
Offence Referrals
Scotland To Reporter To Hearing % to Hearing
1972 33,107 19,260 58
1973 44,713 25,697 57
1974 47,933 26,473 55
Panel Area
1972 1,519 ■ 971 63
1973 2,119 1,420 67
1974 2,457 1,523 61
The majority of referrals to the Reporter in any one year for
Scotland as a whole are for offence grounds. In 1972, for example,
the 33,107 offence referrals constituted 92% of the total number of
referrals. But whereas in that year, 5B% of all referrals to the
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Reporter actually reached a Hearing, in the panel area, the corres¬
ponding figure was 63%. The greater proportion of offence referrals
sent by the Reporter in the panel area to Hearings was repeated for
1973 and 1974, as can be seen. As for other grounds of referral, the
proportions of cases referred to a hearing for Scotland and for the
panel area were similar at 74%.
However, as a proportion of all cases dealt with on offence
grounds by the hearings, marginally more residential supervision
orders were made for the panel area than for Scotland as a whole.
Of all disposals made in the panel are in 1972, 16.7% involved a
residential supervision requirement, whereas the national figure
was 15%. In 1973 and 1974, the figures for the proportion of
residential supervision requirements in the panel area decreased to
12.5% and 9% respectively. What was particularly interesting about
this was that the decrease occurred at a time when the numbers of
residential orders being made also decreased nationally, but when
the proportion of residential orders on offence grounds actually
increased. What these figures suggest is that some significance may
well be attached to offence behaviour in deciding upon residential
care.
The variation between the national figures and those for the
panel area was indicative of the wide degree of variation in referral
and disposal patterns between the different administrative areas of
Scotland, as has already been noted. It is precisely because of such
variation and because of the Kilbrandon argument that panels should
be community based that, for the purposes of this research at least,
to have ignored administrative and organisational boundaries would
have been to distort any conclusions that may be drawn about
decision-making.
An important factor placing further constraints on the
research was that with local government reorganisation in 1975, the
administrative boundaries for the Reporters department and the
composition of the panels were to change. It was decided therefore
to conclude the empirical part of the study in Scotland before
flay, 1975.
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(ii) England: the Juvenile Court
After initial discussions late in 1973, with the Clerk to the
Justices in the court area, permission was given in principle for
the research to go ahead. And though the Chairman of the Magistrates
expressed some initial concern, after the proposal was discussed with
her in more detail, final approval was granted for the research to
begin in 1974. As it turned out, the Chairman proved to be very
helpful in accommodating the project and in maintaining the co¬
operation of her colleagues.
As we have already observed, the arrangements for court
hearings were very different from those for panel hearings. All cases
coming before the juvenile magistrates were heard in the same court
buildings and in the mornings of the same three days each week. The
complex which housed the Magistrates' Courts also housed the police
headquarters for the area. Thus even in terms of the physical
location (primarily the proximity of police offices) and the arrange¬
ments for convening juvenile courts, there was a marked difference
from the Children's Hearings. Though the juvenile court in the
pilot study was held in a less formal atmosphere, relatively
speaking, the court room in the study area was structured architect¬
urally in the traditional manner, with obvious implications for
social relationships.
On occasion, 'extra' juvenile courts were convened ex tempore
when it appeared that the work of the day would not be completed by
the main juvenile court. Since, as a consequence of the selection
process, all juvenile magistrates must also be magistrates in the
adult courts, where the adult magistrates' court had completed its
business, those juvenile magistrates present could be called upon
to preside over a juvenile court. What made this easier was the
fact that, though three magistrates generally presided, on occasion
only two did so.
Just as importantly in terms of the organisational differences
between panel and court areas, whereas panel hearings dealt with very
rarely more than six cases in any one session during the period of
the research, as many as forty were arranged for court hearings. As
a result, the court hearings tended to be somewhat shorter. (See
below)
207.
The area within the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Court in
the study included the town itself and also the outlying districts.
Whereas the statistics relating to the children dealt with by
the Children's Hearings in the panel area were readily available,
it proved exceedingly difficult to obtain conpanatwe information
in respect of the study area in England. The researcher contacted
the Home Office, D.H.S.S. and even the Institute of Criminology at
Cambridge, but with little success. As a final resort, contact was
made with the police in the court area, who were able to provide
figures which, however, were not collated in the same manner as
the Crime Statistics for England and Wales. Even then it was only
after permission had been obtained from County Headquarters that
they were made available.
What is apparent from them is that, like the panel area, and
perhaps not surprisingly, the majority of children appearing in
juvenile court were there on accusations of having committed
criminal offences. This holds true for both years prior to the
research.




Thus in both years, more than 90% of all charges were for offences.
Similarly, the majority of children appearing in court were boys with
82% and 80% in 1972 and 1973 respectively. (The national figure for
1972 was rather higher, at 91%.)
Obviously one of the more significant differences between the
Scottish and English systems lies in the measures available for
dealing with children, since the English courts do have punitive
measures available. It was for this reason, particularly with a
view to providing a base line for comparability, that the Case Study
method had been adopted in the attempt to examine the relative merits
of types of information. The significance of such measures can be
seen in terms of the decisions made in the court area.
Table d. Court Area: Decisions Reached 208.
1972 > 1973 */•
Fine 155 39.4 158 36.15
Care Order 44 11.2 62 14.2
Supervision Order 97 24.68 93 21.28
Attendance Centre 37 9.41 24 5.49
Committed to
Crown Court
9 2.29 6 1.37
Absolute Discharge 7 1.78 8 1.83
Conditional Discharge 40 10.17 73 16.7
Detention 4 1.01 8 1.83
Binding over - - 5 1.44
Total 393 437
In both years the fine was extensively used, though below the
national figure of 50% in 1972 for all persons under 17. But what
is obvious, even from a cursory examination of the figures, is that
despite the emphasis in the official reports on supervision and
care orders, and despite the introduction of care proceedings, more
than 60% of all decisions were other than care or supervision orders.
(iii) The Samples
At the time of undertaking the research, there were 35 people
registered as panel members in the Scottish study area and 33 people
on the juvenile bench in the English one. Of the 35 panel members
only two failed to participate in the research, one on the grounds
that he was opposed to the research in principle; the other, it was
later discovered, had in fact had no objection to the study but had
not received the appropriate material relating to the case studies.
In the court area, of the 33 magistrates who were juvenile
magistrates, two also did not participate in the research. Of these,
one was at the time in a position of some civil responsibility which
did not allow him to discharge his judicial duties on a regular
basis; the other refused to take part in the case-study stage of the
research, although she expressed her willingness to participate in
other stages.
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The final figures were then 33 panel members and 31 juvenile
magistrates. Because the samples are small as a consequence of
the dictates of a research design which sought to examine certain
aspects of collective decision-making and the organisational
characteristics of complete areas, it is obviously unrealistic to
relate the figures to national statistics. But as we have argued,
it is the peculiarities of decision—making within complete areas with
which we are concerned, not with the degree of representativeness
between national and local profiles.
In the following section, we examine the comparability of the
two samples prior to discussing the findings based on the first stage
of the research employing the Case Study method.
Sex
Of the 33 panel members, 16 were male and 17 female; of the
31 magistrates, 17 were male. The difference between the two samples
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in terms of sex was not significant (X = .2583, p .7,1 df)
flqe
Whereas the mean age for panel members included in the study
was 44.5, for juvenile magistrates it was 52.9 years. Sixteen panel
members, but only two magistrates, were under 40 years old; six panel
members and seven magistrates were aged 40-50; and finally 11 panel
members were older than 50, though as many as 22 of the juvenile
magistrates were so. The difference in terms of age was highly
significant (t = 4.008 p .001) The very different ages of the
magistrates and panel members may well be a reflection of the
selection processes within the different administrative structures.
Panel members are selected only after they have applied for member¬
ship. Anyone may apply, but is required to go through a selection
process usually involving members of social work departments,
childrents panel advisory groups and serving panel members. Since
the panel is supposedly representative of the community, it was
expected that a high proportion of younger people would apply. Though
there is again variation between regions, the national figures reveal
that in 1976, almost 44^ of all panel members were under 40, two-
thirds of whom were in the 30-40 age group. (Woody 1976)
1. Though the sample sizes are small we have adopted the
convention for this thesis that p levels equal to or less
than .05 will be considered significant. The analysis of
the data from the empirical study was conducted employing
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The selection process for magistrates, however, is very
different. Though the bench for a particular area is also meant
to be representative (Magistrates' Association 1975), there is one
important factor that bears on this. Only those magistrates who
are adult magistrates are eligible for juvenile court membership.
Thus, although personal qualities are also important, juvenile
magistrates are chosen from the ranks of the bench as a whole and
invited to sit on the juvenile bench. And since the only
restriction on service in juvenile court is that the retiring age is
65, a high proportion of juvenile magistrates have long periods of
service behind them.
Thus, whereas at the time of the study, the longest serving
panel members had been on the panels for 3-j years, individual
magistrates had served for as long as 18 years in the juvenile
court and 21 years in the adult court.
Youth experience
The rather vague guidelines that refer to the criteria for
selection to panel membership and juvenile bench membership suggest
that dealing with children would be a distinct advantage. Neverthe¬
less, in terms of their experience in youth work (e.g. youth club
work, voluntary work etc.) there were significant differences between
panel members and juvenile magistrates. Whereas 24 of the 33 panel
members had some experience in working with youth, only 12 of the
2
magistrates did so. (X = 7.5162, p - .01)
Marital status
Of the 33 panel members, 28 were married and of the magistrates
27. Two panel members and two magistrates were widowed, with the
remaining in each group being single. There was then no significant
difference in the marital status of the two groups of subjects.
(X2 = .1558, p .7, 2df)
Full-time education
Both groups were asked for the date of completion of full-
time education. As the table below shows, there was no significant
difference between the panel members and juvenile magistrates.
mainly formulae with built-in corrections for the vagaries
of small sample statistics. We therefore feel justified
in adopting the usual convention of .05 as the level at
which the results of this thesis can be considered significant.
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16 and under 17-19 20 and over N
Scotland 11 11 11 33
England 16 9 6 31
X2 = 2.5364, p = .3, 2 df)
Caring Profession
In both countries personal qualities and expertise at dealing
with children were considered important criteria for either panel or
bench membership. Yet when we examine the occupations of the two
groups, ue find a significant difference in terms of whether
individuals were members of a caring profession or not. 'Caring
profession' is a rather arbitrary category but ue mean by it those
occupations or professions where the individual is concerned with
the health, welfare or education of children or of adults. In
Moody's analysis of panel members in 1976 it was found, for
example, that of all panel members in Scotland, 25% were teachers
and almost 10% involved in medicine. (Moody 1976) Twenty two
panel members but only nine of the magistrates were members of what
we have called 'caring professions'. The difference was significant
at the .05 level. (X2 = 4.392, 1 df)
Once again, because small samples are involved, a number of
caveats have to be borne in mind in respect of interpretation and
analysis. This is especially true in respect of the Case Studies.
We wanted to have a baseline of comparison and therefore panel
members and magistrates completed the case studies individually with
the result that we had only just over thirty for each group. This
was necessary, however, since we were also later to examine the
extent to which the beliefs held by panel members and magistrates
in general influenced the process of collective decision-making in
the actual hearing situation. Whether the beliefs and assumptions
held by individual subjects outwith the context of a court or a
panel hearing did influence the actual decision-making process was
something we wished to test empirically. And since we have already
criticized Mannheim et al,(l957) and Hood (1972) for their lack of
rigorous observation in their research on sentencing, the significance
of the results derived from the Case Studies can only be appreciated
in relating them to later stages of our own study. By adopting an
approach based on 'methodological triangulation' (Denzin 1978) no
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stage of the research should be assessed entirely independently from
the others.
(iv) Case Studies: Panel and Court Scores
(a) Welfare Factors
Because of the comparative nature of this study, information
will be presented firstly relating to the major hypotheses but will
also be supplemented by information about panel members and
magistrates, respectively. That is, as well as presenting inform¬
ation about differences between the two groups, it is also
possible to discuss some of the findings relating to differences
within groups. This chapter will only contain information as to
the findings from the case studies and their relationship to the
major hypotheses of the research. All 33 panel members and all 31
magistrates completed the case studies.
Hypothesis I that for the purpose of decision-making, panel members
will treat welfare cpnsiderations as more impprtant
than will juvenile magistrates
Earlier in this thesis, we examined different theories of
punishment and crime as providing 'available ideologies'. We also
argued that the trend in juvenile justice had been increasingly
towards a more welfare-oriented approach and not based on the conceptual
framework of free-will and responsibility. Though criminology has
never really reconciled the competing paradigms of determinism and
free-will, what is more salient for our purposes is an examination
of how these paradigms are incorporated into the frames of relevance
of individuals responsible for making decisions about children. This
is especially so given that the administrative frameworks in
Scotland and England are themselves founded upon a different
conceptual basis. That is, though the panel hearings are concerned
exclusively with the needs and welfare of the child, court hearings
are institutionally committed to questions of guilt or innocense
(or in more contemporary language, 'whether he did it or not').
As can be seen from Table I, over all cases taken together to
provide an aggregate welfare score for both groups of subjects,
panel members scored significantly differently from juvenile
magistrates. (The lower the score, the greater the emphasis.)
213.
Table I. Case Study Scores: Welfare Factors




43.36 9.67 7.91 8.64 8.09 9.03
(4.49) (1 .708) (1.284) (1.979) (1.234) (1.527)
52.26 10.61 9.74 10.41 9.58 10.93
(6.676) (1.599) (2.063) (1 .879) (2.501) (1.74)
5.49 2.307 4.05 4.2 4.32 4.59
P4J301 p£05 p<001 p<;001 p£001 P<1001
(Figures in brackets are standard deviations)
(* In this and in all other calculations, the
small-sample t test was employed.)
Panel members, with a mean score of 43.36,would appear to
place more emphasis on welfare factors than do juvenile magistrates
(x = 52.26), the difference being significant at the .001 level.
Thus, Hypothesis I would appear to receive strong support, at least
in respect of the case studies. This is perhaps the least surprising
of the differences between the two groups of subjects since the very
nature of juvenile justice court philosophy and proceedings, a
modified version of the ordinary courts of criminal law with summary
jurisdiction, would suggest that welfare factors might be considered
less important by magistrates because of their judicial role.
In terms of the training offered to both panel members and
magistrates, both receive lectures and talks from members of the
different professions servicing the Hearings and the Court systems
respectively. Yet, we have also seen that juvenile magistrates must
acquire some familiarity with the law and its application (see above,
Chapter V ). Moreover, the training offered to panel members, far
from being related to specific problems of the law, more often than
not is aimed at increasing the individual's diagnostic and assess¬
ment skills. (See Martin and Murray 1976.) Thus, panel members
may well be trained, and even selected, on the basis of their
ability to understand the factors in a child's background in order
thereby to decide upon a more appropriate 'compulsory measure of care'.
The concemof magistrates, in both the adult and the juvenile court,
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with the issue of intent and the availability of measures (again
in both jurisdictions) of a more overtly punitive nature suggest
that they will be less inclined to view welfare considerations in
isolation. We are not suggesting that juvenile magistrates do not
take welfare factors into consideration but that, by virtue of their
training and the ethos of the court system, they do so to a lesser
extent than panel members. Indeed, as we shall later argue, panel
members themselves do not, prima facie, ignore more judicial
considerations and may even on occasion employ care measures as
disguised forms of punishment. This is not to argue that welfare
always provides no more than a rhetoric of treatment which
legitimates in reality a more punitive form of juvenile justice
(see May 1977); that needs more careful argument.
But for present purposes, the fact that juvenile magistrates
appear to ascribe more importance to what we have referred to as
'judicial' factors is perhaps not surprising from members of a system
where the legal protection offered to the rights of the individual is
underpinned by a conceptual framework on which considerations of
punishment can be justified. (See MacCormick 1974.) And the fact
that panel members are in more of a position to take preventive
action would imply that welfare factors would in practice as well as
in theory be extremely important.
Even when different variables are controlled for, the
differences in the scores generally remain highly significant.
(See Table (g) in Appendix II) The general conclusion that can be
drawn from this stage of the analysis then is that the different
degree to which panel members or juvenile magistrates treat welfare
factors as important may be attributed more to differences between the
respective court or panel systems rather than to considerations such
as age, etc. There are however two exceptions that ought to be
noted at this juncture.
For those with experience in youth work, the difference
between the average scores of panel members and magistrates was not
significant, (p = .1). On the other hand, the difference in the
scores between those who had no experience in youth work was
significant at the .001 level (1 df). But whereas magistrates with
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youth experience attached greater emphasis to welfare factors
(x = 53.89, t = 3.0835, p.01, 1 df), the converse tended to hold
for the panel members where the mean score of 44.12 for those with
youth experience was somewhat greater than those without (x = 41,
t = 1.733, n.s.)
Similarly, the scores attained by those who were members of
a caring profession, as for those who were not, were significantly
different. For those in the two groups who were members of a
caring profession the difference was significant at the 0.05
level; for those who were not members of a caring profession,
the significance of the difference was even greater at the .001
level. In neither country, however, was there a significant
difference between those who were and those who were not members
of the relevant professions.
From the fact that the overall welfare scores between the
panel members and juvenile magistrates were significantly different
(p .001), Hypothesis l(a) would appear to have been given strong
confirmation, at least from the data collected by the case study
method.
But though the differences between the two groups of subjects
were significant, some indication was sought of the extent to which
the members of the respective groups were in agreement as to the
importance of welfare. For this purpose, a coefficient of variation
was computed to allow for comparison to be made of the degree of
concordance reflected in the two sets of scores. Not only was the
overall welfare score for panel members lower than that for
magistrates (indicating greater emphasis), but there was also less
variation in the panel members' scores than in the juvenile
magistrates. Whereas the coefficient of variation for panel members'
scores was 10.373, the corresponding figure for juvenile magistrates
was 12.774. As we shall see later, the greater degree of variation
in the magistrates' scores could be accounted for by their reluctance
to ignore more judicially oriented factors such as intention and
awareness of right and wrong. The separation of the adjudication of
the allegation issue from final disposal in the Scottish system means
1 . See Appendix I for a discussion of the Coefficient of
Variation V.
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that the panel member2s role is not so circumscribed by such judicial
concerns, and hence there may be more agreement that welfare factors
are important. But as we shall also see, even though panel members
view welfare factors as more relevant this does not preclude the
possibility of their being influenced by other considerations.
Theories of Delinquency: Panel Members and Magistrates
Hypothesis 1(a): of the different theories of delinquency, more
importance will be ascribed to welfare factors
in the case based on the psychoanalytic pers-
ective than in any other case
The overall score, that is, the score obtained over all cases,
was broken down into a welfare score for each case study, and by impli¬
cation for each of the different theoretical perspectives on which they
were based.
As we saw in Table 1, for each of the respective case studies,
and reflecting the difference in the overall welfare scores, panel
members scored consistently lower than did juvenile magistrates. The
significance of the difference was in all but one of the cases at the
.001 level (62 df); in respect of Case A the difference, though still
significant, was at the .05 level. But with particular reference to
Hypothesis 1(a) the mean score of 7.91 attained by panel members for
Case Study B (the psychoanalytic case) was in fact the lowest mean
score, of all the case studies, for welfare factors. That is, of all
the different perspectives depicted, more importance was ascribed to
welfare factors in this case than in any of the others. Table 2 shows
the respective panel and court scores for the individual cases in order
of importance attached to welfare factors within the individual cases.
Table 2
Panel Court
Case B x = 7.91 Case D x = 9.58
Case D x = 8.09 Case B x = 9.74
Case C x = 8.64 Case C x = 10.41
Case E x = 9.03 Case A x = 10.61
Case A x = 9.67 Case E x = 10.93
However, as can be seen from Table 2, the mean score of 7.91 for the
psychoanalytic case study was itself not significantly different from
the mean of 8.09 attained in respect of Case D, based on behaviourist
theories. The importance of this is that juvenile magistrates did in
fact ascribe more importance to the welfare statements in Case D, with
a mean score of 9.58 than in any of the other case studies but that this
showed no significant difference from the mean of 9.74 in respect of
psychoanalytic factors.
Hypothesis 1(a) can then be said only to have partial
confirmation in that whereas the difference in the scores between the
two groups of subjects is significant, only for panel members is Case B,
based on the psychoanalytic perspective, the one in which welfare
factors are most important.
At this juncture, we can speculate about the significance of
such findings in relation to the perceptions maintained by panel
members and magistrates as to the importance of particular kinds of
information. Later, however, we discuss a major caveat which presents
the possibility that any interpretation of these findings has to be
located within a critique of the case-study method itself. But for
present purposes, even in relation to panel members1 scores, the
behaviourist case study received a welfare score which was not signi¬
ficantly different from that for psychoanalytic factors though it was
certainly greater. What is of extreme interest is the fact that the two
case studies whose statements receive the lowest welfare scores (and
therefore the greater emphasis) from both panel members and juvenile
magistrates are both based on theoretical frameworks in which
delinquency aetiology and, by implication, its treatment can be said
to relate to individuals. The lack of any substantial difference
between the perspectives within each group may well be accounted
for by the feet that both emphasise the importance of the home and
parental telationships in the development and growth of the normal
child. Delinquency, in terms of both psychoanalysis and behaviourism
can in part be attributed to a breakdown in the normal processes of
socialisation. Conversely, in terms of these perspectives, the object
of treatment or welfare measures can be fairly readily identified,
focusing either on the parents, children or both. Indeed, policy
changes in the care of children were premised in the sixties upon the
importance of the family in delinqquency aetiology.
Some weight is given to this speculation by the observation
that a feature arising from this stage of the research is that for
x\l
panel members the case depicting sociological dterminism (i.e. Case A)
is the one in which the welfare score is higher (indicating less emphasis)
than in any other case.
There could be a number of reasons which explain the apparent
lack of importance attached to welfare factors in the case based on
sociological determinism, not least the fact that panel members and
magistrates, even if they wished, are not in a position to effect any
radical change in the environment of the child. That is, within the
institutional setting of the hearing and court system, the information
presented by the different experts within the social control network
is primarily related to the child and his immediate environment.
However, outwith the institutional context, this does not preclude
the possibility that action can be taken. It is perhaps no coin¬
cidence that during the time of the research, a number of panels in
different regions of Scotland were forming pressure groups in an
attempt to have better provisions for the hearing system itself, but
also to voice concern about the more social and political consequences
of dealing with children from so-called deprived areas. (This was
discussed by a number of panel members in interviews.)
But what must also be remembered is that the ideological
basis of social work and probation work, both important influences
within the respective systems is located within a conceptual frame¬
work of a citerminism in which delinquency can be explained in terms
of individual pathology. This is reflected in the importance of the
role of social work in providing the respective systems with inform¬
ation about children and in the involvement of the profession in
training and selection (particularly in Scotland).
However, there is a caveat that has to be borne in mind in making
such an interpretation. Earlier (p.182) we suggested that the case
studies were varied in respect of type of offence and the serious or
harmful nature of the offence. What we have to recognise is the
possibility that welfare scores may not simply reflect the importance
ascribed to particular welfare factors or sets of factors by panel
members but that they may reflect the relative unimportance (as per¬
ceived by the subjects) of other factors, lile mean here specifically
those associated with the dher two variables that were varied, type of
offence and seriousness of the offence. Low welfare scores
(indicating more emphasis) may then simply be the product of a
perception by the subjects of the relative unimportance of more
judicially-oriented considerations and not be indicative of any
particular attachment to welfare considerations. The possibility
exists that the respective scores are products of the methods
employed in the research rather than a measure of the importance
attached to particular factors.
For example, whereas Case E and Case A were the cases in
which the welfare factors were given a high score (indicating low
importance) they were also the cases in which a low score (indicating
high importance) was recorded by panel members in respect of the
Harmful or Serious nature of the offence. And in respect of Case A
on its own, it is also the case in which Awareness and Intention-
ality, constituent elements of Child Involvement, are perceived of
as very important. Precisely the same relationship was recorded in
the magistrates8 scores. Any interpretation of the welfare, as of
other, scores has therefore to be qualified in the light of the
possible influence of the other variables manipulated in the case
studies.
(a) Dudicial Considerations
As a direct result of the means adopted for computing the
case study scores, we have already noted that a 'judicial* score
is a function of the welfare score. Thus where a mean score of
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45.5 is attained for welfare factors the mean judicial score must
logically be 54.5. Consequently, the fact that there has been
strong confirmation of Hypothesis I regarding the extent to which
welfare factors are more important for panel members than
magistrates mathematically entails that judicial factors are more
important for magistrates than for panel members. However, the
design of the case studies made it possible to examine the extent
to which the respective groups of subjects treat particular
judicial factors as important. Whereas it is fairly obvious from
the substantiation of Hypothesis I that juvenile magistrates will
perceive judicial factors as more important than welfare factors,
it was by no means certain that the differences indicated between
panel members and magistrates would be maintained in respect of
the different elements that made up the judicial dimension, as we
shall now see.
Hypothesis 11(a): for the purpose of decision-making, juvenile
magistrates will place greater importance on





All Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E
11.3 2.24 2.33 2.39 2.48 1.85
(2.158) (.7796) (.681) (.648) (.656) (.7015)
9.06 1.87 1.77 2. 1.99 1.52
(2.42) (.6595) (.606) (.718) (.734) (.5605)
3.851 3.407 2.02 2.27 3.26 2.05
p.001 p.01 p. 05 p. 05 p.01 p. 05
(Figures in brackets are standard deviations)
Again, the mean overall score for social protection of 11.3
for panel members was significantly different (p.001) from the juvenile
magistrate score of 9.06. Because of the direction of the scores, one
may therefore conclude that panel members attach significantly less
importance to the notion of protecting society.than do juvenile
magistrates, most of whom stated this to be a prime consideration in
the fulfilment of their judicial role.
What was particularly interesting as revealed by the coefficient
of variation, was that there was a greater degree of concordance
between panel members (V = 19.09) as to the relative unimportance
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of social protection. Though magistrates overall attached
significantly more importance to social protection, they were much
less in agreement as to its importance. (V = 26.72)
In every individual case, panel members and juvenile
magistrates differed in the extent to which importance was attached
to judicial factors. This difference was reflected in such a way
as to reflect the greater importance in respect of each case attached
to this factor by juvenile magistrates than by panel members. In
view of the small sample sizes, it is perhaps worth pointing out
that in three of the cases (B, C and E) the difference was
significant only at the .05 level.
Whereas the differences between the actual scores are signi¬
ficant, both groups of subjects treated social protection in Case E
as being more important than in any other case. This was also the
case in which welfare factors were considered as relatively un¬
important. The offence depicted in Case E, unlike the other cases,
was one involving assault on the person, and it would appear that
for both groups of subjects this constitutes behaviour against which
it is relatively important that society be given protection.
However, as can be seen in Table 4 below, the scores in
respect of the Harm or Seriousness of the offence were not signifi¬
cantly different for Case E, though magistrates were apparently more
concerned at this than the panel members. In relation to Harm and
Social Protection in Case E, panel members treated these factors
both as less important in their deliberations than did the
magistrates. It would seem reasonable to suggest that the relation¬
ship between Social Protection and Harm or Seriousness is understand¬
able since it could be argued that the greater the Harm, the greater
the need for social protection. The fact that in Case E panel
members ascribed more importance to these two factors than in the
other cases is particularly interesting since, in terms of the formal
philosophy of the 1968 Act, they are less committed to questions of
Harm and Social Protection. Nevertheless, in terms of a utilitarian
philosophy there is no logical distinction between meeting the needs
of children who offend and at the same time offering society
protection. One panel member suggested that he -
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"would be concerned about the seriousness and dangerous-
ness of offences like taking and driving away a car or
else assault with a booted foot."
There would appear to be prima facie support at this early
stage of the analysis, for claims made by researchers such as
Morris and Mclsaac (1978) who suggest that decisions made by panel
members may well be made in accordance with some type of modified
tariff principle. That is, decisions are made on the basis of the
nature of the offence, the seriousness of the offence, the need for
adequate social protection and other such considerations. On such an
argument there would then appear to be little difference between the
position of the panel member quoted above and the magistrate who
states, in an explicitly punitive vein, that one must
"measure your punishment by the nature of the offence,
the harm that results and how this affects others.
Our main purpose is protection".
However, though both magistrates and panel members appear to
agree as to the importance of Social Protection and Harm, these
factors may well be important for different reasons. Whereas it did
seem that both groups shared similar views about Social Protection and
Harm, particularly in Case E, further analysis suggested that this
might simply not be the case. When the individual Social Protection
and Harm scores for Case E were correlated, we find an interesting
difference between the two groups of subjects. Social Protection
and Harm were significantly but inversely correlated in respect of
the Panel members8 scores (r = .360, p = .05). For magistrates, the
correlation was positive but did not even approach significance
(r = .022). It would be too naive to suggest that the nature of the
offence and its consequences were not associated, at least in the
minds of panel members, with the need to protect society. Panel members
in general will argue that in general the Hearings system does in
effect offer some protection to society though not in as explicit a
manner as the juvenile court. But in particular cases, their decision
is usually not influenced by the nature of the offence and its
consequences except in so far as it is indicative of the need for
case. Thus
"
.... sometimes the nature of the offence can display the
extent of disturbance in a child or the child's background.
But I certainly don't think that the decision should be
weighted by the seriousness." (panel member)
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The decision then ought not to be linked to the offence in
terms of the Harm that results nor in terms of the need to protect
society. What this does not do, however, is to explain the strength
of the negative correlation between Social Protection and Harm as
indicated by the panel members' scores. What this perhaps raises
in rather more general terms is the question of the reliability and
validity of the case studies as instruments. We have argued that
we adopted a number of strategies in the research in order to widen
the scope of the data on which to draw'in making conclusions. What
we hoped to achieve at this stage of the research was a baseline
of comparison between the two groups of subjects as a source of
pointers that could be pursued in further stages of the research
and the analysis. We merely reiterate at this juncture our belief
in the necessity of supplementing the case study method, which we
accept as an abstraction of the actual decision-making process, by
other strategies more intimately involved in court and panel hearings.
With specific reference to Social Protection it does seem to be
the case that it is indeed considered as more important for
juvenile magistrates than panel members. In that respect, 11(b)
could be said to be confirmed. However, its relationship with other
considerations will need to be examined more fully in later stages of
the research as we develop our analysis of the influence of frames
of relevance in the assessment of information for the purpose of
decision-making. As we shall see, the magistrates and panel members
are not so dissimilar in their treatment of other 'judicial factors'.
Harm/Seriousness
Hypothesis II(b): for the purpose of decision-making, magistrates
will attach more importance to the Harm or
Seriousness of the offence than will panel members
Table 4 1




11.48 2.21 2.3 2.57 2.82 1.57
(1 .679) (.651) (.6269) (.494) (.385) (.49)
10.33 1.81 1.93 2.19 2.61 1.48
(1.853) (.5913) (.6188) (.5339) (.487) (.6658)
2.532 2.32 3.37 2.93 1.13 .623
p.02 .05 .001 .01 .3 .7
(Figures in brackets are standard deviations)
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The difference in the means for the overall score was signifi¬
cant at the .02 level. However, not only are the scores of the two
groups similar in their rank order, but an important feature of the
scoring in relation to this factor is that there are cases in which
the differences between the panel members and the juvenile magistrates
are not significant. In particular, as can be seen in Table 4 above,
the difference between the scores for Case D and Case E is not
significant and in relation to Case A the difference is only
r
significant at the :05 level.
The statements in Case E referring to the consequences of the
offence, depicting the assault on the personand rsulting in injuries
are obviously treated as important by both groups of subjects.
Whereas this is not an unexpected finding in relation to the
juvenile magistrates, it is particularly interesting with regard to
the panel members. The difference between the score given to 'welfare®
factors in this case between the two groups of subjects was highly
significant; the difference in the social protection scores was also
significant (p.05); and, as we shall see later, there was a highly
significant difference between the groups on the dimension of
personal responsibility. The other case in which there is no
significant difference in the Harm score is Case D where panel
members returned a mean score of 2.82 as compared with a mean
magistrate score of 2.61. But these scores for both groups of
tV\at
subjects reflected the fact|_Harm was less important in this case than
in the others. Thus the cases in which magistrates and panel members
do not significantly differ are those with the highest and lowest
Harm scores. Case D was in fact the case involving an unsuccessful
attempt at shoplifting.
In Case E though in terms of Social Protection and Welfare,
panel members and magistrates differed significantly as to the
importance of these factors, this was not so with respect to Harm.
The question that we have already raised is whether in fact this
factor is important to bath groups for the same reasons. Is, for
example, assault on the person more important because of the Harm
that results and the Seriousness of such an offence, or because such
an offence is indicative of more serious levels of disturbance and
so a greater need for intervention in terms of the needs of the
child. We have already seen that for panel members the relationship
between Social Protection and Harm or Seriousness is not positively
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correlated and that for magistrates, though positive the correlation
was not significant. One means of explaining what seems a surprising
finding may well relate to the design of the instruments rather than
to the way in which individuals conceive of such factors. Whereas
'Harmful' offences may also be 'Serious', it is not necessarily the
case that those which are 'Serious' are always Harmful. The
seriousness of an offence may well involve considerations of the
actual involvement of the child, in particular the extent of
deliberation, premeditation or planning displayed in the execution
of the offence. One magistrate suggests
"
.... you have to take everything into consideration
e.g. if it's a very bad offence, or damage or cruelty ....
you have to do this with every case. You have to take
in everything they have done. If they planned to do it -
watch it carefully .... then it's more serious, more
despicable."
and
"But some cases where a boy breaks a street light are
trivial - it's not deliberate. Serious offences, for
me, are deliberate or mischievous offences."
Although Hypothesis 11(b) receives confirmation from these
findings, a qualification has to be added to the effect that in two
instances, the difference in the Harm score was not significant. In
that sense, the confirmation can only be said to be partial. Further,
the relationship between this and other factors is as yet not clear.
Given that we have suggested that the actual nature of the child's
involvement in the offence, we shall return to this when we
discuss Personal Responsibility.
Personal Responsibility
Hypothesis 11(c): for the purpose of decision-making, .juvenile
magistrates will treat the notion of personal
responsibility as more important than will
magistrates
Given the different conceptual frameworks underlying the
administrative structure of the panel and court systems of juvenile
justice, it was hypothesised that juvenile magistrates would treat
questions of personal responsibility as more important than would the
panel members. In a system of justice based on a treatment-non-
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punishment approach questions of responsibility would theoretically
not arise. The position adopted, for example, by Uootton (see
Chapters II and III) is that the concept of responsibility could
and should be eliminated from a system of criminal justice, since
intervention ought to be justified in terms of the causes of
criminal behaviour. The concept of responsibility was in her view
a theological and metaphysical abstraction. Children's Hearings,
unlike the Duvenile Courts, are no courts of law. The functions
of adjudication and of making decisions as to how to deal with
children were separated in Scotland by Kilbrandon, and panel
members, at least in terms of the formal philosophy, only decide
upon the need for care. Thus,<E. waio ejcmce<-,\ ^ the welfare of the
child and his best interests and not with punishment, we argued
that the issue of responsibility for an offence would be less
important for the panel member than for the magistrate working
within a system in which children can be punished and in which the
issue of responsibility for an offence is important. This is,
however, not to argue that panel members will, in terms of their own
working frames of relevance, ignore considerations of responsibility.
liJe argued above, in discussing 'responsibility in general and
the notion of mens rea in particular that important considerations
for the ascription of responsibility were whether the individual
had intentionally committed the offence, whether he knew what he
was doing and that it was wrong and whether he was aware of the
consequences of his actions. Such considerations are significant in
ordinary moral discourse in deciding on moral responsibility and in
allocating or exempting someone from blame or punishment. For the
purpose of this thesis, one of the main objectives was to examine
the extent to which panel members and magistrates agreed as to the
importance of the concept of responsibility and the implications of
this for the assessment and interpretation of information in the
practical accomplishment of juvenile justice.
In terms of the formal philosophy underlying a social policy
ultimately concerned with the welfare of children, deterministic
assumptions are paramount. But in terms of the working ideologies
or frames of relevance of individuals working within the spirit of
that philosophy and responsible for its implementation there may well
be what we have referred to as shifts in the frame of relevance
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(Asquith 1977) with important implications for the translation of
social policy into practice. The findings in relation to 'personal
responsibility' itself will be presented first and then some consider¬
ation will be given to each of the constituent elements.
Panel members and juvenile magistrates again differed in their
scores for Personal Responsibility overall and in respect of each
case study. The difference in the overall score was significant at
the .001 level; and the difference in the scores for each respective
case study was also significant, albeit that the level of significance
attained in Cases A and D was at the .05 level only, with 62 df.
Hypothesis Il(c) has therefore been given strong confirmation,
though as we shall see the overall difference in the scores for
personal responsibility between panel members and magistrates
conceals some interesting similarities when the constituent elements
of personal responsibility are themselves subjected to analysis.
But in relation to tie 'umbrella' concept of 'personal
responsibility', as can be seen in Table 5 , the lowest panel
score for personal responsibility (indicating greater emphasis) was
in respect of Case A (x = 5.88) which had also been the case con¬
sidered least important in terms of welfare factors (x = 9.67).
Table 5 Personal Responsibility



























t = 3.71 .5648 2.779 2.95 2.05 4.36
P = .001 n.s. n.s. .01 .05 .001
One thing that should perhaps be pointed out is that whereas, as we
have seen, 'judicial' (which includes Personal Responsibility, Harm
and Social Protection) scores are certainly a function of welfare
scores, the personal responsibility score is not. Thus, the fact that
Case A received a large welfare score and a low personal responsibility
score is not accounted for by simply suggesting that one is a
mathematical function of the other.
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The position with regard to the magistrates® scores, (there
was in fact no significant difference in the scores) though not
exactly the same, is somewhat similar in as much as Case A was
considered to be less important in terms of welfare factors
(x = 10.61) but more important in personal responsibility
(x = 5.71). In all cases, the personal responsibility scores are
lower for the magistrates, indicating that, for the purpose of
decision-making, they attach greater importance to this concept
than do panel members.
In terms of sociological theory one of the basic problems
has been the attempt to reconcile the competing claims of
voluntarism and determinism, the sociological analogue of the free¬
will/determinism debate in philosophy. In ordinary language and
moral discourse it may well be more difficult to construct an
argument based on environmental (symbolic and physical) consider¬
ations than on those relating to individual psychological make-up
in the attempt to excuse someone from responsibility. Thus, as we
have suggested earlier, panel members and magistrates may be less
inclined to take what we have called sociological factors into
account because they are relatively powerless at effecting any
change in the environmental and background characteristics of the
child. It is, however, more conceptually difficult to exempt an
individual from responsibility in this way.
What is perhaps most surprising is the fact that personal
responsibility in relation to Case E is treated as relatively less
important by both magistrates and panel members (x = 6.06 and 7.55
respectively) than for other cases. As can be seen in Table 5
above, in Case E, in which the offence was that of assault on the
person, personal responsibility was less important for the panel
members than in any other case; and for magistrates only one other
case, Case B, received a greater personal responsibility score.
What is surprising is the fact that juvenile magistrates and panel
members in this case attached importance to the need to protect
society and to consider the harm resultant from or associated with
an offence, whilst not attaching great importance to the degree of
responsibility of the offender. When we correlated the individual
scores for Social Protection, Harm and Personal Responsibility in
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Case E there is, however, perhaps an important difference between
panel members and magistrates. Earlier we suggested that our
elision of Harm and Seriousness may not reflect the fact that
seriousness may be as much determined by the nature of the child's
involvement in the offence as by the actual harm ensuing from it.
In Case E, for magistrates, the correlation between Harm and
Personal Responsibility (r = .245, 29 df) was positive though it
only approached significance. For panel members the corresponding
r was .065, and was no where near significance. It is, of course,
dangerous to make inferences upon figures that are not significant
but it presents the possibility that there is in fact a closer
relationship between Personal Responsibility and the nature of the
offence, at least as perceived by magistrates than by panel
members. kJe shall return to this in the course of our
analysis. Though the case study method has a number of limit¬
ations, the significance of such findings will only be realised
in reference to the analysis of decisions about actual cases where
we shall examine the extent to which different frames of relevance
may influence the use of information and the decision as to how to
deal with the child.
Though the personal responsibility data continue the trend of
significantly different scores between panel members and magistrates,
they nevertheless conceal some interesting features which emerge
when we examine the constituent elements individually. These are
Awareness of the consequences (abbreviated to 'Consequences');
awareness of the difference between right and wrong (abbreviated to
'Awareness'); and lastly, the notion of Intentionality.
Awareness
As can be seen in Table 6 , the significance of the difference
of the overall Awareness scores of panel members and magistrates was
at the .001 level and showed that panel members attached less








However, as can be seen, in respect of individual case studies, there
were particular instances when the difference in the scores was not
significant. There was no significant difference in the Awareness
scores ascribed by panel members and magistrates to Case A (that
based on the environmental perspective). Moreover, both panel
members and magistrates, as reflected in the respective mean Awareness
scores of 1.97 and 1.64 were agreed that the notion of the childJs
awareness of the Tightness and wrongness of his behaviour was more
important than for any other case. Though for Case D where the
mean panel member score was 2.3, and the corresponding magistrate
score was 1.97, the difference again failed to reach significance,
for cases B, C and E the trend of significant differences was
maintained.





(Figures in brackets are standard deviations)
11.64 1.97 2.3 2.52 2.3 2.54
(2.333) (.834) (.6735) (.7015) (.7171 ) (.7422)
9.48 1.64 1.87 2. 1.97 2.
(2.6745) (.784) (.7509) (.762) (.8224) (.5587)
3.38 1.36 2.39 2.79 1.67 3.03
.001 .2 .02 .01 .1 .002
(Figures in brackets are standard deviations)
All Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E
12.51 2.57 2.73 2.24 2.12 2.85
(1.3285) (.6045) (.4453) (.7796) (.769) (.3585)
11.84 2.71 2.48 2.06 2.03 2.55
(1.7057) (.4539) (.6154) (.7155) (.8224) (.5587)
1.75 .98 1.78 .93 .44 1.5
.1 n.s. .1 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
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Wore interesting, however, was that the overall score in
respect of 'consequences' showed no significant difference between
the mean panel score of 12.51 and that of 11.84 for magistrates.
And though the Awareness scores reflected the trend of juvenile
magistrates attaching more importance to so-called 'judicial'
factors, there were no significant differences in the individual
cases. What is equally interesting is that for Cases B and C,
there are only small differences in the degree of variation in
the respective scores. In Case C, for example, the coefficient
of variation for the panel members' scores was 34.803 and for the
magistrates 34.733; and for Case B, the corresponding figures were
23.908 and 24.814 respectively. (The overall coefficient of
variation of this factor was 10.516 and 14.40 for panel members and
magistrates respectively.) Thus, not only was there no significant
difference in the scoring on the 'consequences' factor for these
two cases but the two sets of scores showed similar levels of
internal concordance.
Moreover, the coefficient of variation for Case B (16.31)
for panel members is one of the lowest variation coefficients for
the case studies, though for Case E there is even less disagree¬
ment as to the importance of this for panel members (V = 12.57).
Thus, not only are the scores between the two groups of subjects
similar but they also indicate a considerable degree of concordance,






All Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E
9.7 1.38 2.41 1.61 2.18 2.15
(2.0814) (.5318) (.6527) (.6485) (.7158) (.87)
8.29 1 .32 2.19 1.32 1.9 1 .54
(2.082) (.532) (.8583) (.5895) (.7341) (.7111)
2.64 .08 1.19 1 .79 1.51 3.03
.01 n.s. n.s. .1 .1 .002
(Figures in brackets are standard deviations)
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Though the overall intentionality scores were significantly
different (x = 9.7 and 8.29 for panel members and magistrates
respectively) this is almost entirely accounted for by the very
significant difference between the scores for this factor in
relation to Case E. In no other case is there any significant
difference between the two. There is then generally little dis¬
agreement between panel members and magistrates as to the importance
of intentionality for the purpose of decision-making. Thus, in the
cases involving theft of a car (Case A), breaking into and
damaging a school (Case 8), breaking into a factory (Case C) and
V)
stealing from a departmental storey the issue of Intentionality was
as important for panel members as it was for the magistrates. For
all these cases, Awareness of the Consequences was also apparently
as important for the magistrates as for the panel members. Only
in Case E was there a significant difference with magistrates
ascribing much more importance to this factor. The only preliminary
interpretation that we can make of this is that, as we have seen,
the degree of involvement in the actual planning or execution of such
an offence would be important for those whose frame of relevance was
founded mainly upon a judicial framework. What this must alert us
to in our analysis is the possibility that apparent consensus between
the groups of subjects actually conceals significant and fundamental
reasons as to why certain factors are important. For example, though
there is a degree of agreement between panel members and magistrates
as to the importance of Intentionality, it is impossible to gauge in
what way Intentionality is deemed important without locating it in
the broader framework of the frames of relevance dominating
decision-making by the two groups.
(v) Case Studies: 8Within 1 Scores - Panel Area
Even when the influence of different variables was taken into
account, there was generally little difference between the case
1
study scores. Only in a few instances were there significant
differences. Those who had had experience in youth work returned a
mean score of 11.76 for Harm as compared to a mean of 12.5 for those
panel members who had had no such experience (t = 2.058, p .05 and
31 df). What this suggests, rather surprisingly, is that those who
1 . See Aopendix II.
232.
had some experience in youth work in fact gave greater consideration
to Harm than did the rest of their colleagues. (As we shall see
later, also surprising is the fact that in reference to the actual
cases, those panel members with youth experience treated welfare
factors as being less important than did the other panel members.)
Moreover, though the differences were not significant, those with
experience in youth work also attached more importance to each of
the constituent 'judicial* elements.
Again, though the differences are not significant, there is
an interesting trend in the scores for Harm and Social Protection
when we consider the length of experience of the panel members.
Thus, for both Harm and Social Protection, the pattern for the
three groups (those with 6 months, 2% years and 3-j years' experience)
was of increasing importance attached to these factors. That is,
those who had the longest experience as panel members (n = 19)
returned mean Harm and Social Protection scores (11.266 and 11.105
respectively) which were lower than the corresponding means for the
other two groups with less experience. And though the longest
serving panel members attached less importance to Awareness factors
(x = 12.263) than did the other two groups (x = 10.55 and 11.2 for
those with six months and 2\ years' experience) they did neverthe¬
less pay greater attention to the Intentionality factors
(x = 8.89). We shall return to this in a moment when we have
examined the relationships amongst the different factors included
in the case studies.













Welfare — -.405 -. 509 -.623 -.254 -.483 -.744
Social Prot. - .2772 -.0088 -.3881 -.1231 1.203
Harm - -.0956 .0104 .1219 .012
Awareness - .3146 .0958
Consequences - -.0531
* Significant correlations are underlined.
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There is no significant relationship between Intentionality
and the other constituent elements of personal responsibility,
Awareness (of the difference between right and wrong) and
(Awareness of the) Consequences, which are themselves correlated
significantly at the .05 level, life have already seen, immediately
above, that longer-serving panel members treated Intentionality as
more important than other factors and that the overall
difference between panel members and magistrates in terms of the
same factor was accounted for solely by one case. It would be
unwise to conjecture as to the reason for the difference in
importance attached to one constituent element of personal
responsibility and not to the other two. Nevertheless, in
discussion with panel members, what became obvious was that
Awareness of the difference between right and wrong and Awareness
of the consequences of behaviour were considered important
indications of the child's character. That is, they were more
important in terms of the way in which the child had been brought
up and of the principles by which his behaviour was governed,
rather than being specifically associated with the child's
involvement in the offence. The notion of Intentionality, however,
more readily locates attention on the child's actual involvement
in the offence itself. This may account for the lack of relationship
between Intentionality on the one hand and Awareness of consequences
on the other. (The same factors in the court sample were all
positively correlated.)
The greater importance attached to Intentionality may also be
accounted for by the fact that panel members with longer experience
did express concern that 'you become hard after a while'. The
frustration expressed by the more experienced panel members at the
lack of facilities, the continuing reappearance of a number of
children, and the apparent.increase in 'crime' might explain the
importance with which they treat the actual involvement of the
child in the offence. It was in expressing such concern that a
number of panel members also thought that the restrictions placed
on the length of membership of a panel was no bad thing. Certainly
the panel members with the longest experience treated Harm, Social
Protection and Intentianality all as more important than did those
with less experience.
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As was expected, the welfare score was negatively correlated
with all the other factors and in all but one instance (Consequences)
the correlations were significant. The only other significant
correlation was between Social Protection and Consequences
(r = - .3881, p.05), but there was no significant correlation
between Harm and Social Protection though it did approach
significance.
(vi) Case Studies 'Within Scores'; Court Area
The 'within8 scores for magistrates in respect of all the case
study factors show no real significant difference overall. The only
significant differences which emerged when controls were imposed
arose in relation to experience in youth work and length of court
experience as a magistrate in both the juvenile and the adult court.
The mean Welfare score for those with youth experience was
47.08, considerably lower than the mean of 53.89 of those without
such experience (t = 3.083, p.01, 29 df), indicating that those
with experience treated welfare factors as more important. (The
reverse held in the case of panel members.) Similarly, those with
experience in youth work had a mean Awareness score of 10.83,
whereas those without had a mean score of 8.63 for the same factor
(t = 2.357, p.05, 29 df). Though not statistically significant,
other scores on Social Protection, Harm, Consequences, Intention-
ality and Personal Responsibility, all tended to be greater for
those with experience in youth work than for those without such
experience. That is, those without such experience did in fact
attach greater importance to these other factors as well.
The difficulty of establishing comparable categories of the
'experience' of both groups of subjects in terms of their involve¬
ment in the two systems has already been noted. All of those who
were magistrates in the juvenile court were, of necessity, also
magistrates in the adult court, and their experience was thus two¬
fold. For the purpose of analysis, the length of experience in
juvenile court and in adult court were treated separately, though
this strategy still does not allow for meaningful comparison between
the two groups of subjects with regard to 'experience8.
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When juvenile court experience was held constant, there were
no significant differences in the scores, though there were some
particularly interesting trends. In particular, and though the
figures involved are again small, the scores for the Intention-
ality factor are actually smaller with increasing juvenile court
experience. The means were 10.25 for those with less than one
year's experience as a juvenile magistrate; 8.062 for those who had
been a juvenile magistrate for between 1 and 5 years; and 7.909 for
those with more than five years of such experience. The inference
that could be drawn at this stage of the analysis is that with
increasing experience in the juvenile court, magistrates more
readily ascribe importance to Intentionality as a factor to be
considered for the purpose of decision-making. We must stress
that the actual differences in the scores were not significant
but that the trends displayed paralleled the corresponding scores
for panel members.
This was repeated when we also took experience in the adult
court into consideration where the corresponding means were 8.66,
8.25 and 7.833. Thus, it would appear that with increasing length
of experience in both the juvenile and the adult court, the notion
of Intentionality came to be treated as more important. The
longest-serving panel members, who had obviously not had the
length (nor the kind) of experience enjoyed by magistrates, also
treated Intentionality as more important than their colleagues with
less experience.
However, where this was also true of Social Protection and
Harm for panel members, it was not so for magistrates, who revealed
no consistent pattern in the importance they attached to these two
factors. But for Personal Responsibility as a whole, though there
is again a lack of significant differences, the scores were smaller
the more experience a magistrate had. That is, personal respons¬
ibility would appear to tend to become more important as a factor
in the judgment of juvenile magistrates as they gain more experience
in court. At this juncture it is impossible to suggest that as
magistrates gain experience they attach more importance to the
notion of Personal Responsibility and therefore are more punitive.
That does not logically follow and nor were the Case studies
designed to examine that. But it is perhaps worth bearing in mind
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that Lemon (1974) established that the first year of training did
appear to inculcate punitive attitudes and instilled a necessary
'judicial attitude'. The training of magistrates does demand more
familiarity with complex legal issues than for panel members, and
the magistrate though working in a juvenile court is also a magis¬
trate in the adult court where considerations of liability and fault
are more explicitly significant. But institutionally whereas panel
members are not required to decide such matters, magistrates even in
the juvenile court have to determine 'whether he did it' and then
'what to do about it'. It is when we examine the correlations
between the magistrates' scores that more consistency is revealed.













Welfare — -.454 -.617 -.804 -.620 —. 6 57 -.866
Social Prot. - .2983 .1267 -.0371 -.0493 -.038
Harm - .2416 .1469 .3715 .299
Awareness - .6181 .4729
Consequences - .3220
* Significant correlations are underlined.
All three constituent elements of Personal Responsibility
(Awareness, Consequences and Intentionality) were correlated signifi¬
cantly. In particular, the correlations (both positive) between the
Awareness and Consequences factors (r = .6181), and the Awareness and
Intentionality factors (r = .4729) were both highly significant
(p = .001 and .01 respectively). Moreover, not unlike the Scottish
figures, the Welfare score attained by the juvenile magistrates was
negatively correlated with all other factors considered, and in all
cases significantly so. Though the caveats associated with small-
scale statistics have to be voiced once more, the strength of the
correlations for these factors could not by any means be ignored.
Of particular relevance is the close inter-correlation of
Awareness, Consequences and Intentionality. Whereas panel members
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had treated Intentionality differently from the other two factors,
magistrates would appear to be more concerned with all three factors,
and their importance for the purpose of decision—making. What
remains unanswered at this stage of the analysis is whether the two
factors of Awareness and Consequences are more obviously perceived
by the magistrates as indicating the level and nature of the involve¬
ment of the children in offence behaviour; or whether, as appears
to be the case for panel members, they are taken as indicative of
the moral development of the child. That is, they tell more about
the child generally than about the nature and degree of involvement
in the offence. It could be argued that as magistrates operate
within a framework of juvenile justice derived from criminal law
in its application to adults (they do also, in fact, operate in
adult courts) they will be more concerned with establishing the
nature of a child's involvement in an offence. Such concerns are
more obviously important in a system where amongst the measures
available for dealing with children there are more overtly punitive
options. The overall concern with personal responsibility and its
constituent elements may well be a function of the fact that
magistrates can and do punish but also of a system in which the
protections and safeguards associated with natural justice or due
process are more evident than in a welfare-oriented administrative
tribunal such as the Children's Hearing system.
Though it approaches significance, the correlation between
Harm and Social Protection (r = .298) as for the panel sample is
not statistically significant. It was expected that it would be.
Summary and Discussion
There is thus strong evidence to suggest that panel members,
at least as assessed by the case study method, do indeed treat what
we have referred to as 'welfare' factors as of more importance than
'judicial factors'. The apparent, reluctance of both magistrates and
panel members to tnaar io«APa.r«. factors in fce sociological, tioloycal o<~ processoql
cases as ir-oporto-nt contrasts tsi-th ttSe.tr treatment of Wnesc Paefcoos n-> the psychoanalytic.
and btVaaioonist cases. This is not unexpected as we had argued that
the involvement of the social work and related professions in the
provision of reports, in the hearing process itself, and also in the
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very selection process (in Scotland) meant that both panel members
and magistrates would readily accommodate social work typifications.
(See Asquith 1977, Smith 1977) The argument was only partially
confirmed as magistrates ascr-i\o«A more importance hs ^eiPare cons vie rah
m IU«. case. AepioV.n^ hie WhaoioonsV p*rspe.cV>«ie. as moCe. important (Kan in any of IV
cases. SoV ft*. Vac* of AiWarenae. behaeeo IM ^e\fare on Vhvs and tke
fiycboanalyhoaUy based case cooU oeV\ indicate WxaJr Ifc* importance of Welfare
factors m these cases b>aV tbe>j Vu^Sli^Wr Wrea<dc,tSn in -H,t normal socialisation process
as a caose of delinquency. in keeping with the underlying assumptions
of a welfare philosophy it may well be that the ideological
attractiveness of construing delinquency in such a way is that the
objects of treatment or welfare measures are more readily identified.
For that reason alone, sociological and biological factors may not
be considered as relevant in as much as they are outwith the sphere
of competence and effective action of control agents. It is
precisely for this reason that the liberalism of the rehabilitative
model has been criticised as being conservative and in the develop¬
ment of 'psycho-social' experts. (Bean 1976)
Magistrates, again not unexpectedly, treat Social Protection
as of more importance than do panel members though both are agreed
that the case in which it is important is that involving assault on
the person. Similarly, panel members do generally treat Harm as
being less important than do magistrates, this is subject to some
qualification. In two cases (interestingly again Case E involving
assault on the person) there is no real disagreement between both
groups of subjects. Both treat Harm as important in Case E, the
case in which Social Protection was most important. Thus, even
panel members do appear to recognise the importance of such factors
as Social Protection and Harm given certain circumstances.
Paradoxically in terms of 'personal responsibility', it is in
Case E that the most significant difference in the scores is attained,
with panel members treating this factor as relatively less important
than in other cases. Thus, even though Harm and Social Protection
are both considered important this does mean prima facie that they
are as concerned about the nature of the child's involvement in the
offence. Ue say prima facie because when the constituent elements of
personal responsibility are analysed individually, though panel
members and magistrates disagree as to the importance of such factors
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as Awareness of the difference between right and wrong and
Intentionality, they do not differ materially in terms of the
importance they attach to Awareness of the Consequences. Of the
three factors, they are in agreement as to the relative importance
of this factor and that of all the three factors in question; it
is seen as less important than the others. What is important for
our purposes is that Intentionality is not only treated as most
important of the three by the magistrates but that it is also
most important for the panel members. And though the intention¬
ality score is significantly different overall, it is so only
because of the very significant differences in relation to the
assault case.
The importance of the notion of intent, of deliberateness
of choice, is obvious in a system of delinquency control derived
from the criminal law in its application to adults. But in a less
judicial and more administrative form of tribunal, the signifi¬
cance of intentionality would seem to be diminished by the
philosophical assumptions of a deterministic account of delinquency.
Yet, nevertheless, what we find here is that there is little dis¬
agreement between panel members and magistrates as to the importance
of the notion. The limitations of the case study method, though it
does attempt to gauge individuals1 perceptions of the importance of
different kinds of factors, is that we are unable to relate our
findings thus far to the actual decision-making process. In
particular, the conceptual frameworks of determinism and free-will
respectively are not readily reconcilable unless some form of
compatibility thesis is adopted. It is in the assessment of
information and in the making of decisions about how to deal with
children that shifts in frames of relevance will be better
appreciated. This is not to argue that the material presented
by the case method is not valid. Rather it is a part and means of
examining the different frames of relevance in operation in the
practical accomplishment of juvenile justice. What we have found in
the case studies suggests that those who diametrically oppose welfare
and punishment, or law enforcement and welfare ideologies, ignore the
complexity of conceptual schemata as employed by the individuals who
implement the philosophy underlying social policy. In particular,
the importance of 'intentionality' for both panel members and
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magistrates is that even within a system based on a deterministic
philosophy, it does not preclude the possibility that panel members
will on occasion operate within a frame of relevance incorporating
the concepts of excuse, mitigation and leniency, as well as being
overtly punitive. The fact that magistrates treat personal
responsibility overall as more important, however, suggests that
we should be very wary of arguing that Intentionality and
related factors are perceived by both groups of subjects as being
important for the same reasons. We have already argued that the
different perceptions of Awareness and Consequences are important
for different reasons.
What we turn to now is an examination of the implications of
the principal findings from this stage of the research for the
making of decisions about actual cases. The conceptual ambiguity
inherent in the welfare or treatment approach to dealing with
children who commit offences means that any neat distinctions
between different frames of relevance may be difficult to maintain.
The merit of the case study approach is that it has alerted us to
the conceptual complexity of delinquency control as mediated by the
assumptions and philosophies of two groups of individuals operating
within different control networks. We now wish to examine the
relevance of this in a comparison of decision-making processes which




DECISION WAKING BY PANEL MEMBERS AND
JUVENILE MAGISTRATES
It had been intended from the o'utset that the case studies
should be supplemented by other methods of inquiry. This was
particularly so because the case studies were highly decontextualised
in that they neither referred to real cases nor were subject to the
contingencies associated with the hearing of cases. Moreover, it
was important in a study which purported to examine decision¬
making that some means be developed whereby the nature of the
factors influencing actual decisions could be considered. The
1
Case Report forms were designed to this end. The following
chapter will also present material on the nature and content of
the Interaction at the hearings.
(i) Samples
The samples of actual cases used in the main study were again
small, with 30 cases in the panel and 35 cases in the court area.
But since each subject completed a Case Report form for each case
involved in the study, this meant that 90 Case Report forms were
completed by panel members, three for each case; 96 were completed
by the juvenile magistrates, nine of the cases in court having been
presided over by only two magistrates. The main reason for the
small number of cases was the intention to analyse the process of
decision-making in the respective systems in as much depth as
possible, given the restrictions imposed by the fact that only one
researcher was involved. Because a number of strategies were
being employed in the research, this had the effect of making the
collection of data a lengthy and time-consuming process. On most
occasions, the juvenile magistrates, given the number of cases
they were often required to hear at oneg\£ting, were only prepared
to cnmplete the appropriate forms for one case from each hearing.
And in the panel area, the researcher attended many different
hearings at which no suitable cases were presented or proceeded
1. A copy is included in the Appendices.
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with. There were a number of criteria governing the selection of
cases for the study. Since we wished to examine the relative
importance of 'welfare1 or 'judicial' factors as judged by panel
members or magistrates, only those cases where an offence had been
committed and where the offender was male were considered suitable.
To have included girls would have been to have added additional
complexity to the analysis by introducing a further category of
variables. Moreover, the cases had to involve 'fresh' charges.
This was particularly important in the panel area where, under the
terms of the 1968 Act, decisions made about children are subject to
review by a panel before but no later than a year after the hearing.
Review cases were thus not considered suitable because of the
I
peculiar circumstances of such hearings. At each court or panel
hearing, the first suitable case was chosen for the purposes of
the study. Because of the criteria governing selection, this
meant that in the panel area where there were as few as four cases
at each hearing there were a number of occasions when no suitable
cases were available. It also meant that in both the panel and
court area, the researcher attended a considerable number of
hearings.
The difficulty of obtaining a sufficient number of suitable
cases was further compounded by the fact that the researcher wanted
to include in this stage of the research as many as possible of
those panel members and magistrates who had completed the case
studies. Since we intended to examine aspects of collective
decision-making and not simply study the beliefs and working
ideologies of those individuals involved, it was therefore important
that those who had been involved in the first stage of the research
should also be included in the study of actual cases. This was to
allow us to consider the relative influence of the importance
subjects attached to certain factors in the case studies on the
practical accomplishment of juvenile justice within a collective
decision-making process.
A further complicating factor was that the fieldwork for the
research had to be completed, at least in Scotland, before May 1975.
This additional constraint on the collection of a suitable number of
cases was due to the fact that Scottish Local Government reorganisation
was scheduled to take place on 15th May. This would have considerably
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altered the composition of panel membership, in line with new local-
government administrative boundaries.
There now follows a description of the court and panel
samples.
Age: The difference in the ages of the boys involved in the cases
2
included in the research was not significant. (X = 6.9399, P = .5,
7 df)
Age 9 10. 11 11 13 14 15 11
Panel 1 1 3 4 6 7 8 -
Court _ 5 4 3 5 4 7 7
None of the Scottish sample was in the 16-year old category whereas
there were seven cases in the court sample who were. The mean ages
for the two samples were similar, the mean Scottish age 13.2 (Sd =
1.6206) and the mean age for court boys 13.3 (Sd = 2.1).
Number of Charges: Seventeen of the panel cases had only one charge
stated in the ground of referral, and 19 of the court cases
similarly had only one offence recorded in the charge. The
remaining cases in the respective samples had more than one charge
stated. It is only for convenience that we use the term 'charges*
since strictly speaking children who appear before a panel in
Scotland and who have committed an offence appear on offence referral.
The reason for appearance is referred to as the ground of referral
whether it be for offence behaviour or for any other reason. The
difference between the samples was completely insignificant.
(X2 = .037, p = .9, 1 df)
Previous Offences: There was, however, a significant difference
(X = 7.8996, p = .001, 1 df) between the samples in terms of
whether the offender had any previous known offences. Whereas 19
of the 30 panel cases did, only 10 of the 35 court cases had previous
known offences. The danger of trying to account for this, is that
any interpretation of such small samples is based on inference and
pure conjecture. Morevover, given what we have referred to as the
conceptual ambiguity of dealing with offenders in a welfare-oriented
system, the significance of a child's past offence history in the
practical accomplishment of juvenile justice is not immediately
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obv/ious. Any attempt to infer how a panel member or magistrate
construes past record by analysing what factors were apparently
important must be theoretically suspect where no attempt has been
made to involve the individual's own interpretation in the
analysis. Even in relation to the national statistics pertaining
to Scotland the same ambivalence impedes meaningful interpretation
of the increasing number of children who appear at a children's
hearing on offence grounds, or at the very least those who are
referred to the Reporter for those reasons. Is this because more
children in 'need' are being picked up by the new system? Or is it
because the new system is 'too soft', a factor which in itself
accounts for increasing crime figures? It is in the meaning given
to such statistics that we more readily appreciate the convergence
of penal and political ideology. (See Scotsman 1978)
Nature of Charge; As regards the nature of the main charge, 14
panel cases and 13 court cases involved theft; 10 and 16
respectively involved theft by housebreaking or burglary.
Theft Theft x H.B./ Assault Other
Burglary
Panel 14 10 51
Court 13 16 06
(The difference overall was significant
at the .05 level. X2 = 9.665, 3 df.)
Length of Hearing; The average length of a panel hearing was 25.4
minutes, the length of hearings ranging between 10 and 37 minutes.
It was more difficult to get such a figure for the court samples,
for a number of reasons. Firstly, where a number of boys had been
involved in an offence all the co-accused were usually heard in the
same hearing, and were present either for the whole hearing or part
of it. This in itself hinted at important difference in conceptions
of and the accomplishment of justice for children. Secondly, and
this provided a major obstacle, the magistrates on occasion could
and did retire to an adjourning room either to read reports or to
discuss some aspects of the case. No other persons — including the
researcher — were allowed to be present when the Bench adjourned and
in consequence, it was not possible to include this part of the
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decision-making process in the research. The average length of a
court hearing was 30.8 minutes ( ranging from 14 to
50 minutes), although great caution should be exercised in gauging
the significance of this statistic, since a number of children may
appear together in one hearing and the bench may retire, as often
happened, for as long as twenty minutes.
One of the objectives in the research uas to compare the
nature of decision-making in the two systems and in particular, to
examine the relative contributions of parents and children. For
that purpose, in the following chapter on the Interaction in a
hearing, a slightly different measure for length of hearing is
adopted. The difference between the means of the overall length
of panel and court hearings was not significant. (t = 12.418, n.s.,
62 df)
(ii) Decision-making in Court and Panel Hearings
In analysing the data provided by the case reports, two scores
could be computed. In keeping with the logic of the research, the
overall aim was to assess the relative influence of 'welfare1 and
'judicial' factors in decision-making within different forms of
juvenile justice. A 'welfare' score was computed firstly for each
subject, which was assumed to reflect the emphasis placed on welfere
or judicial factors by individual subjects. This was done in the
following manner. Each case report, as discussed in Chapter VI
was organised into four main sections, two of which were composed of
'welfare' and 'judicial' factors respectively. The other two referred
to (i) discussions specifically about the decision and (ii) the
different reports available to the two types of hearing. The subjects
had been asked to indicate how important particular factors were by
reference to the categories Very Important, Important, and Not
Important, with the residual category of Irrelevant. Where subjects
considered that certain factors were not on the list but should have
been, they were asked to include them and treat them in the same way.
In the analysis, factors seen as Very Important were given a
weighted score of 3; those seen as Important a weighted score of 2;
and those Not Important, a weighted score of 1. The weighted scores
for 'welfare' and 'judicial' factors respectively were then totalled.
To obtain a 'welfare' score, the weighted welfare figures were then
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computed as a percentage of the total welfare and judicial
weightings. Thus, where the total 'welfare1 weighting was 28 and
the total judicial weighting was 22, the welfare score would be 56.
For ease of discussion the welfare score obtained in relation to
Case Reports will from now on be referred to as the C.R. score.
There are a number of difficulties with this method of
scoring though it did allow for an examination of the factors that
were considered important by the panel members and juvenile magi¬
strates for the purpose of decision-making. In particular, such
a method does not readily allow us to appreciate the logic-in-use
in the making of decisions, in that it is a rather artificial
means of analysing the process of decision-making. Moreover, such
a method assumes that the resultant aggregate score is a true
indicator of the influence of the relative contributions of the
individual participants in that process. But the analysis will
later include a discussion of the content and form of the decision¬
making process and as such will hopefully lessen the significance
of the Case Report method. However, the merit of the case report
method is that it allows the subjects to indicate which factors
they considered to be important and in that respect, some progress
has been made from that orientation to studying decision-making,
which effectively ignored what information subjects considered
important and how it influenced their decision. (See discussion
of sentencing research in Chapter V.)
With regard to 'how' information affected decisions, as has
been argued, much of the logic of decision-making revolves around
the reasons given by the subjects themselves for a decision. Though
it is obviously important to appreciate which factors are used in
decision-making, to ignore the reasons for a decision would be to
ignore, as has been earlier suggested, the relationship between
information, decision, and frame of relevance. Merely to analyse
decision-making by requesting the subjects to indicate which
factors were important would be to expose oneself, albeit with
minor modifications, to the very criticisms that have been made
above of 'black box' sentencing research. Hence, in the Case Report
forms the subjects were also asked to indicate the reasons for their
decisions.
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(iii) Case Report Analysis
Earlier in this thesis, we argued that there are three basic
elements to a decision:
(a) Information;
(b) Objectives and Goals;
(c) Knowledge and Assumptions about delinquency.
Our discussion in the preceding Chapter related to the analysis of the
case studies in which we examined the extent to which individual panel
members and juvenile magistrates subscribed to the different1avail¬
able ideologies1. In the analysis of the case reports, we shall be
more concerned with a consideration of (a) the factors deemed
relevant by individuals in reaching decisions about children and
(b) the reasons for such decisions. In that respect, we shall
mainly be concerned with (a) information and its use and (b) the
objectives and goals panel members and magistrates sought to achieve
with reference to the actual cases included in the study.
Our concern with information and its use is twofold. Firstly,
in a system of individualised justice where decisions are based on
the characteristics of individuals and not simply through the appli¬
cation of some general principle, decision-makers require a wealth
of information. Secondly, how individuals interpret information can
only be understood by appreciating the frames of relevance within
which they operate, and its use is in part determined by the
objectives and goals which individuals seek to achieve. A danger
of trying to analyse how decisions are made without examining the
frames of relevance espoused by decision—makers is that relatively
little can be discovered of the process of decision-making. The
inadequacy of black-box sentencing research was precisely that it
ignored the interpretive and selective activity of those persons with
whom rested the responsibility for sentencing.
The information available to both panel members and magistrates
is mainly verbal and written though there is another information
source which we have elsewhere labelled 1paralinguistic' information
(Asquith 1976). In the next Chapter, we are to examine the nature
of the discussion in the respective settings, but we are here
primarily concerned with what information both groups of subjects
considered relevant for the purposes of reaching a decision about a
child who has committed an offence.
Case Report Scores: Panel Members and Juvenile Magistrates
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Hypothesis I Panel members will ascribe more importance to welfare
factors than will .juvenile magistrates
With a mean of 69.92 (sd = 15.76) panel members had a signifi¬
cantly higher C.R. score than did juvenile magistrates with a
corresponding mean of 51.76 (sd = 19.9) (t = 6.8301, p = .001).
Thus panel members, as the figures based on the 90 case report forms
indicate, placed much more emphasis on what we have called 'welfare'
factors than did the juvenile magistrates. We shall later examine
the importance ascribed to individual factors but for the present
we shall concentrate on the overall C.R. scores.
As can be seen in Appendix III, the significant difference
between the C.R. scores of panel members and magistrates remained
when certain factors were held constant. Thus, an adequate summary
of the table would be that in only two instances were the differences
in the C.R. scores between the court and panel sample not significant.
These were for the (41-50) age category and for those who had
completed full-time education by the age of 16. But even in
these cases the differences approached significance. (p = .1 and
. 1 in Vsofn )
An interesting feature of the figures in the table, however,
is that, in both groups of samples, those who are members of what
we have called the caring professions actually have a lower mean
C.R. score than those who do not belong to these professions. That
is, though there is no statistical significance in the finding,
those who are members of the 'caring professions' in both samples
appear to attach less importance to welfare factors than do those who
are not. It might have been expected that the reverse would have
been the case. The lack of significant difference in the C.R. scores
for those who were and those were not members of the caring professions
within each sample is repeated in respect of all those tests where
other factors are held constant. That is, the generally different
C.R. scores between the samples have to be appreciated in the
absence of any material differences within the samples.
Even when controlling for the number of charges relating to the
offence, the difference between the scores for the two groups of




1 Charge 1+ Charges
Panel 72.455 (n = 51) 65.494 (n = 39) n.s.
Court 52.4307 (n = 52) 51.011 (n = 44) n. s.
t = 4.2405 t = 3.0698
p = .001 p= .01
Though the means of 72.455 and 52.4307 for cases with one charge for
panel members and juvenile magistrates respectively were signifi¬
cantly different at the .001 level; and though the corresponding
means of 65.494 and 51.011 for cases with more than one charge was
significantly different at the .01 level, there was no significant
difference between the scores within each group of subjects. That
is, there was no significant difference between the average scores
attributed by panel members to those cases with only one charge and
those which had more than one charge. This was also the case for
England.
Nevertheless, in both cases the C.R. score for cases with
only one charge was greater than that for cases which had more than
one charge. The difference in the panel scores is, of course, quite
small and too much should not be made of it. But for the magistrates
the difference is greater though it does not reach significance. In
relation to the magistrates' scores, a tentative explanation could
be that with the greater number of charges, more concern is expressed
and reflected in the choice of a greater number of judicial factors
underlying the decision. Small samples and the lack of statistical
significance mean that any such interpretation must be treated with
caution. But the fact that there is_ a significant difference
between panel members and juvenile magistrates for both categories
of case offers additional support to the major hypothesis.
There is, however, little evidence thus far to suggest panel
members do in fact subscribe to a type of 'Tariff sentencing. Others
(Morris et al.1973 ) have certainly made the claim that the conceptual
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ambiguity underlying the control of children who commit offences
within a welfare framework is reflected in the fact that the panel
members operate within a retributive or more explicit punishment-
non-treatment orientation than intended by the legislation.
However, we have argued earlier that such claims were made on the
basis of an inadequate methodological framework in which the frame of
relevance revealed in such studies was determined by the researcher's
objectives and goals rather than those of the subjects. What we are
concerned with and what we have attempted consistently to examine is
the use made of and the relevance of information as seen by the
subject. When we come to examine the reasons given for the
decisions actually made, we shall find that there is much more
evidence that juvenile magistrates subscribe to the more classical
philosophies of punishment than do panel members.
Moreover, when the number of previous offences was held









68.3617 (n = 57)
53.961 (n = 33)
t = 3.692
p = .001
72.6326 (n = 25) n.s.
51.1069 (n = 71) n.s.
t = 5.296
p = .001
There were again significant differences between panel and
court C.R. scores and an absence of significant differences within
the respective samples. But whereas the scores reveal a slightly
smaller mean (51.1069) for cases in which the child had previous
offences recorded than for those without (x = 53.961), the opposite
held for the panel members. That is, with a mean of 72.6326 for
cases in which children had previous offences the panel members
recorded the greater importance they attached to welfare factors
than judicial factors in such cases. We have to emphasise again
however that we are discussing trends and not significant differences.
In relation to our discussion in the last paragraph a propos more
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punitive considerations, the fact that when controls are maintained
for known previous offences more importance is attached to welfare
factors in cases with one or more previous offences suggests at least
that the importance of this category is not simply that it provides
the basis for a more punitive orientation. For panel members
operating within a more overtly welfare-oriented system of
juvenile justice, such trends may well indicate a greater need for
intervention, rather than provide the basis for some form of penal
calculus. Morris (1976) has also acknowledged that the more serious
the offence committed by a child, the more serious might be his
needs. What this highlights once again is the necessity of
appreciating for what reasons and with what objectives in mind,
individuals reach decisions about children who commit offences.
This is because the conceptual complexity of separating 'needs1
from 'deeds' is reflected in the semantics of delinquency control,
which are riven with ambiguity. The danger of ignoring the inter¬
pretive activity of the control agent is that possible shifts in
the frames of relevance (Asquith 1977) are ignored in the analysis.
Once again, when controls were maintained for the nature of
the offence, the C.R. scores between panel members and juvenile






Panel 67.003 (n = 30) 70.5122 (n = 42) 74.5728 (n = 15) n.s.
Court 53.896 (n = 38) 53.828 (n = 58) n.s.
t = 2.488 t = 2.801
p = .01 p = ,01
Panel members, though they did attach less importance to
welfare factors for cases with more than one charge, nevertheless
ascribed more importance to such considerations for cases with one
or more recorded previous offences. One of the differences between
the panel and court samples of cases was that there were a number of
cases in the panel sample involving assault, whereas there were
none in the court sample. The panel C.R. score of 70.5122 for
cases of Theft by Housebreaking was greater than that for cases
of simple theft (x = 67.003); similarly, the C.R. score for
Assault cases (x = 74.572) was greater than for both Theft and
Theft by Housebreaking cases. Even here the differences are not
significant and any interpretation of the trends must be treated
as little more than an exercise in speculation as a preliminary
to examining the Case Report Data in more detail. But one inter¬
esting feature cannot pass without comment. In the Case Study
analysis we found that the panel scores for Case E, involving the
assault, were rather puzzling. What we find here is that of the
different types of cases in which we asked the panel members to
provide information, actual assault cases received a higher welfare
score. That is, more importance was attached to welfare considerations
in these cases. Again, we return to the suggestion made by Morris & Mclsaac
(1978 ) that, given the concept ambiguity in social welfare for
offenders, the seriousness of offence behaviour might be taken
only as an indication of the seriousness of a child's needs.
Albeit the differences in the C.R. scores within the samples are
not significantly different, the trend in the magistrates' scores
(in which they ascribe less importance to welfare factors in cases
involving more than one charge, more previous offences and to
offences ostensibly more serious in nature), implies that the
conceptual framework underlying their use of imformation is derived
from a greater concern with more punitive objectives.
In the case studies, magistrates did attach much more importance
to more judicially-oriented considerations than the panel members
and it begins to appear that this might also be the case with actual
cases. The juvenile magistrates operate within an organisational
and structural context derived ultimately from a court of criminal
law, whereas panel members operate within a system more exclusively
concerned with the identification and meeting of needs. The legal
ideology that characterises the juvenile court is epitomised by the
fact that magistrates must not only decide on how best to deal with
a child but also on whether the child did in fact commit the offence
or not. Panel members have no such jurisdiction.
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Though the juvenile court has been modified in a number of
ways - more recently with the introduction of the distinction between
care and criminal proceedings - unlike the panels in Scotland, they
are still essentially concerned with the question of whether the
child committed the offence or not. Moreover, where children are
under 14, they may be held criminally and legally responsible
though this presumption, as we have seen, is rebuttable. (Sanders
1973) Conversely, and given the fact that children under that age
may commit 'heinous' or 'premeditated' offences, this, more than any
test of the child's capacity for intentional behaviour, may be taken
as evidence of malice aforethought (Sanders 1973); they may in this
way be considered criminally responsible. The separation of the
two functions of adjudication and disposal in the Scottish system
means that panel members are not, at least in terms of the formal
ideology of the hearing system, required to have regard to the
specific questions of culpability or responsibility. A paradoxical
feature of the Scottish system of juvenile justice, however, is that
though the Children's Hearing system rests upon a conceptual framework
of determinism, in which offence behaviour is seen to be symptom¬
atic or pathological, children may still be prosecuted within a
system of justice in which the age of criminal responsibility is in
fact lower than in England. Children may still in Scotland be
dealt with in a judicial setting in which the conceptual framework
of legal ideology is reflected in a concern with intent and
criminal responsibility. (See Chapter IV) Even in Scotland the
importance of responsibility receives institutional expression.
The relevance of all this is apparent when we examine the
influence of the age of the child on the respective sets of scores.
Age and Responsibility
As we have noted above, there was no significant difference
between the ages of the children in the panel and the court samples.
But when the age of the child involved in the case was correlated
with the juvenile magistrates' C.R. score, the coefficient of
correlation was -.3876 (n = 96; p = .001). Moreover, the correlation
was negative. Thus, the older the child, the smaller was the C.R.
score. In other words, juvenile magistrates attached more importance
to judicial factors than to welfare factors in the case of older
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children. And since the child's age correlated significantly and
positively (r = .3281) with Length of Court Hearing, this suggests
not only that magistrates hold longer hearings with the older
children but also that the criteria on which a decision was based
were ultimately more judicial in nature.
In a system in which legal responsibility is still an
important concern it is perhaps not surprising that the older
children are, the less will welfare considerations be regarded as
important. The corresponding correlation between age of child and
the panel C.R. score was also negative (r = -.0114, n = 90) but
came nowhere near significance. What also has to be remebered is
that whereas panel members cannot, in theory at least, avail
themselves of explicitly punitive measures, juvenile magistrates
can. Ouvenile magistrates in fact are required to make what Thomas
refers to a primary and secondary decisions (1970). That is, they
have to decide first of all whether a case is to be dealt with
mainly by welfare or treatment measures on the one hand, or punitive
and more judicially-oriented considerations on the other. Only then
can they decide on the actual nature of the measure. In some cases,
e.g. road traffic offences, their choice as to how to deal with a
case is statutorily prescribed, leaving them with little choice over
the primary decision. No such limitations are imposed on the
decisions made by panel members who in formal terms are mainly
concerned with the nature of the compulsory measures of care required,
if any, by a child.
What we must now do is to consider the relative importance of
specific factors in the decision-making process.
(iu) Importance of Specific Factors
(a) Welfare Factors
Over the 30 panel and 35 magistrates' cases, there is actually
little difference in the number of factors treated as having some
degree of importance for the making of decisions. The panel members
had based their decisions for the 30 cases on a choice of no less
than 1152 choices (see Wilkins et al,1973,for a discussion of the
selection of factors in decision-making); the magistrates for their
35 cases had treated 1180 factors as having some degree of importance.
These figures are unweighted and simply indicate in a crude fashion
the total number of factors considered in some way to be important. It
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is only in weighting the figures in accordance with the degree of
importance attached to individual factors that they become more
meaningful. Table 4 presents the mean weighted scores on the
welfare factors. (See following page.)
There are in fact very few signficant differences in the
importance ascribed to the specific factors by panel members and
magistrates. The only significant differences are in relation to
the importance attached to the Family as a whole, with the panel
members treating this factor as much more important (x = 1.7333)
— 2
than the magistrates (x = 1.1075; X = 13.686; p = .005); the
child's character which panel members (x = 1.6555) considered
much more important than did the magistrates (x = 1.1505;
X = 9.9399; p = .02); and the child's Associates which panel
members again considered more important than the magistrates (the
means respectively are 1.188 and .6021, X = 16.4543, p = .001).
With reference to the child's use of leisure time the difference,
with a higher panel mean, did approach significance.
What is particularly interesting about these differences is
that they refer either to the child or to his family. The re¬
organisation of social work in both countries had been based on a
reconceptualisation of the ideological foundation of social-work
practice as much as the need for greater access to social services
for the community. The notion of generic social work had relocated
the focus on the family as a unit rather than on individuals. What
is perhaps surprising about these significant differences is that it
would appear that juvenile magistrates attach less importance to the
social and personal characteristics of the child and his family than
do panel members.
However, this could be countered by the fact that panel
members and juvenile magistrates agree on the importance of such
factors as the child's relationship with his father, mother and
siblings, and also home conditions and parental discipline, all of
which have relatively high means. What we also have to remember is
that both panel members and juvenile magistrates attached most
importance (though there were significant differences between the
groups) to the information in the case studies which referred to














































































Panel members and magistrates also differed significantly
in the importance they ascribed to the Social Worker's relation¬
ship with the family. The mean panel score of .8222 was much
greater than the corresponding court mean of .3655 (X = 11.816;
p = .001). A reason for the existence of a significant difference
of this magnitude may well be that in the Scottish system of
juvenile justice, and as was the case in the panel area, social
workers who are either known to the family or who have prepared
the social work report are encouraged to attend the hearing.
Panel members can therefore more readily appreciate for themselves
the relationship of the social worker with the family. In the
court area, the function of social work representation to the
court was fulfilled by a social worker seconded full-time for that
purpose. Only occasionally were those who wrote the reports
actually present in court. The presence at a hearing of a social
worker with knowledge of a family is a feature of Scottish juvenile
justice which one might expect to have implications for what
actually takes place during a hearing. But as we shall see later,
this did not appear to be the case.
Significantly, both panel members and juvenile magistrates
agree on the relative unimportance of Area of Residence (x = .4555
and .5376 respectively), though in most instances the children of
both samples of cases came from the more deprived of the areas within
the panel and court jurisidctions. Thus, in the situation of making
a decision about a real-life case, the operational philosophies of
magistrates and panel members received expression. As we had argued
earlier (see Chapter VII), it may well not be the case that panel
members, or for that matter magistrates, do not consider such circum¬
stances as Area of Residence as altogether irrelevant or unimportant.
Rather, within the institutional setting of systems of juvenile
justice which adhere to a welfare or treatment philosophy to a greater
of lesser degree, the nature and extent of intervention required to
deal with such broad social problems as the deprived area is outwith
their sphere of influence.
(b) Social Work and School Reports
In all the panel cases some form of social work and school
report was available to the panel members, but in England neither
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school nor social work reports were available in two cases. As can
be seen from the table, there was no significant difference in the
importance ascribed by panel members or magistrates to such reports,
Table 5
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When we look at how informative the two groups thought the
social work reports were, there is in fact a very significant
difference (X = 22.652; p = .001). Whereas 54 magistrates considered
the reports to be very informative only 39 panel members did so.
Magistrates therefore consider social work reports just as important
but more informative than do the panel members. One obvious
explanation could be that the quality of the reports south of the
border is better than in Scotland. However, the very different
administrative and structural characteristics of the two systems
may be more important contributory factors. Panel members, unlike
juvenile magistrates, may, and in most cases do, have all reports for
a case a number of days before the actual hearing. They are therefore
able to assimilate the information contained therein and to employ it
as the basis for discussion or exploring certain aspects of a child's
background during the actual hearing. The magistrates only receive
the reports after a finding of guilt has been made and after the
pertinent facts of the offence and the case have been discussed in
court. Panel members are therefore more directly involved at a
personal level in the diagnosis and identification of needs than are
juvenile magistrates, many of whom expressed concern at the delegation
of real discretionary power away from the courts to the local social
services department. Panel members may themselves therefore be
more willing to disagree with basic information contained in reports
but also have the opportunity of exploring particular concerns
further in the actual hearing. For that reason, they may find
social work reports less informative and less important than
magistrates.
Others have noted (Morris 1976) that panel members rarely dis
agree with the recommendations made by social workers. Certainly,
in our study, on only 11 occasions did panel members disagree with
the social worker's recommendation. However, since only three
broad decisions can be made, discharge, supervision at home, or
residential supervision, there is rather little room for dis¬
agreement anyway. What may be more important for panel members
is not agreement with the decision but agreement as to the reasons
for the decision. We have argued elsewhere that the danger of
analysing decision-making from statistical information about out¬
come is that prima facie similar decisions may be founded upon
very different assessments of information and very different
objectives. (Asquith 1976) Certainly where there is a greater
range of measures available, we would expect more disagreement
between individuals, and in our study magistrates disagreed with th
social work recommendation on no less than 30 occasions.
There was no disagreement of any significance either in
relation to the importance or the informativeness of the school
reports. It became obvious from discussions with the panel members
and magistrates that they felt that school reports were extremely
important but that the quality of report provided was generally of
little use. In both the study areas, dissatisfaction centred
around the fact that school reports were written on stereotyped
questionnaire-type forms. On only 29 occasions did panel members
and on 28 occasions did juvenile magistrates, think that school
reports were very informative. In the majority of cases, both
groups considered the reports to be only fairly informative.
(c) Parents and Children in the Hearing
Panel members and magistrates were asked to indicate how
important, if at all, they considered to be the attitudes of the
key individuals in the actual hearing. The marked differences are
shown in Table
Table 6
Panel x Court x X P
Father's attitude in Hearing 1.2777 .978 10.211 .02
Mother's ?! ?! ?! 1.1777 .462 16.874 .001
Child's ?! !? I! 1 .58 .946 23.207 .001
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It would certainly appear that the attitudes of mother, father
and child in the hearing are a more influential determinant in the
panel than in the court setting. Open and informal discussion was
seen as being one of the benefits of an administrative style system
of juvenile justice (Kilbrandon 1966), as well as the possibility
of parental participation in the decision-making process. It
certainly appears to be the case that panel members do in fact
ascribe more importance to the role and contribution of parents and
children in the children's hearings. Ule shall later see, in
conjunction with this, that the nature of the contributions made by
parents and children in the hearing is very different from that of
parents and children in court. But for the present, it is perhaps
worth speculating as to possible reasons for the difference in
importance ascribed by the panel members and the magistrates to
the presentation of the parents and children. Magistrates in
interview suggested that appearance at court should be something
that had !a salutary effect' on the parents and children. Moreover,
they were concerned that proper respect be shown by them to the
bench. Now whereas one or two panel members felt that their
colleagues were not formal enough in the panel hearing, most of
them felt that the atmosphere was more conducive to discussion than
the court type of hearing. Two comments can be made. Firstly,
panel members may consider the participation of the parents and
children in the actual discussion of the case as a crucial source
of information.
Secondlys for this very reason, and given that the structure
of the Hearings system in Scotland allows the panel member to
participate more fully in the diagnosis and assessment of a case,
the way in which the parents and children present themselves may
be taken to reflect wider considerations, e.g. how the parents
relate to the child or to each other and so on. But it certainly
appears to be the case, on the basis of the number of court and
panel hearings attended by the researcher, that parents and children
are given a greater opportunity to be involved in a discussion with
panel members than with magistrates.
261.
(d) Judicial Factors
A comprehensive list of the judicial factors can be found in
the Case Report form. Only the more significant factors are to
be considered here, tie have seen in the case studies that panel
members appeared to treat social protection, seriousness/harm, and
Awareness of Wrong as less important than do juvenile magistrates.
Moreover, though the overall Intentionality score was significantly
different, this was accounted for by a highly significant difference
on that factor in respect of one case study. In terms of Awareness
of the Consequences, there was no significant difference. Table 7
shows the relative importance of these factors for both groups of
subjects when deciding about actual cases.
Table 7
Panel (n = 90) Court (n = 94) t P
Social Protection .3333 .75 6.21 .01
Harm .1 .304 2.14 .05
Seriousness . 4333 .8586 2.506 .02
Awareness of Wrong .9333 1.152 2.0008 .05
Awareness of
Consequences
.5222 .7282 1.307 ns
Intentionality .4777 1.0108 2.904 .01
In the case study analysis we found that there were no
significant differences between the two groups in their treatment
of the Consequences factor. What is striking about Table 7 is
that this factor again is not treated differently by the magistrates
or the panel members. All the other factors appear to be ascribed
very different degrees of importance by panel members and magistrates
respectively. For the purpose of our thesis perhaps the most
important, and certainly one of the most significant, differences is
in respect of Intentionality (p = .01). In the preceding chapter, we
argued that the lack of difference between the two groups in terms of
Awareness of the Consequences in conjunction with very different
treatment of Intentionality might reflect differing frames of
relevance. That is, whereas there appeared to be a relationship
between the Consequences, Awareness and Intentionality scores of the
magistrates, among panel members, there was a significant correlation
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only between Awareness and Consequences. Our argument had been that
Awareness and Consequences may have a different significance/meaning
for panel members from that which it has for magistrates. In
particular, it seemed reasonable to conclude that panel members were
more concerned with the child's moral development than the
magistrates, who seemed more concerned with the degree and nature
of involvement in specific offences.
In the case report analysis, the difference in the Awareness
score is significant, but only at the .05 level. But panel members
again consider social protection, harm, seriousness and interytion-
ality to be less important than do magistrates. It will be
interesting to speculate how the influence of such factors is
reflected in the reasons given by the members of the two groups for
the actual decisions made. This will be the focus of concern in the
last section of this chapter.
But for the present, the concentration by magistrates on the
specific circumstances of the offence is also reflected in a much
higher weighted mean for the nature of the offence than panel mean
(x = .6555, t = 4.89, p = .001). And when we examine the differences
in terms of the child's involvement in criminal behaviour and with
the formal agencies of social control, the differences are again
very significant (at the .05 level).
Table 8
Panel Court
Child's first offence .522 .763
Previous Offences .433 1.0652
These factors are all much more important for magistrates than
for panel members. It would therefore appear at this stage of the
analysis that juvenile magistrates may operate to a far greater extent
than do panel members, within frames of relevance derived from more
traditional punishment ideologies. More particularly, in view of
certain claims that have been made (Morris 1976), panel members may
not in fact make decisions in reference to some kind of tariff
system. We therefore maintained a number of controls with these
considerations in mind in comparing the between samples scores.














1+ charges n.s. n.s. .05 n.s. n.s. .1
1 charge .01 .001 n.s. .01 .02 n.s.
Theft n.s. .05 n.s. n.s. .02 .05
Theft x H.B. n.s n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
No previous
offences




.05 .01 n.s. n.s. n.s. .05
What is remarkable about Table 9 is the distinct lack of
significant differences between the scores when the factors
specified in the left-hand column are held constant. Moreover,
what is unexpected is that with reference to Social Protection,
Seriousness, Awareness, Consequences and Intentionality, the mean
panel scores are greater for those cases which have more than one
charge stated than those with only one charge. Thus, whereas the
mean panel scores for cases with 1+ charges are .6667 for Social
Protection, .8205 for Seriousness, .1794 for Harm, 1.0769 for Aware¬
ness, .564 for Intentionality, the corresponding means for cases with
only 1 charge stated are .0784, .1372, .0392, .764 and .411
respectively. And in the case of Social Protection and Seriousness
these differences within the panel scores are in fact significant at
the .001 level. The others are not significantly different and with
respect to Intentionality, the difference between panel and court
scores for cases with more than 1 charge is only just short of
significance. Within the court and panel, however, there are
generally very few significant differences.
How, then, might this be best explained; Is it indicative of
some kind of tariff decision-making? The danger of such premature
conjecture is that it lends itself to the same criticism of super¬
ficiality as those claims about the punitive orientations of panel
members founded on analyses of the statistics produced annually or
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for particular periods in special regions. Similarly, as our
philosophical and historical discussion displayed, there is no
simple dichotomy between punishment and treatment, or free-will
and determinism. Rather, the development of juvenile justice has
been characterised by continual attempts to reconcile welfare and
punitive objectives. And as we have argued earlier, in terms of the
available ideologies, it is perfectly feasible for an individual to
be concerned about the serious nature of offending and the need to
offer society protection without being committed to punishment.
Put in another way, it seems perfectly reasonable for someone to
have a concern for societal protection and the nature of the offence,
but nevertheless to adopt a working frame of relevance in which
children do not conceptually belong to those categories of individuals
who may rightly be punished. When we come to consider the reasons
given for decisions we shall argue that there is considerable
evidence to support this claim.
From our analysis it therefore appears that generally
speaking there is relatively little disagreement between panel
members and magistrates over the importance of the number of
offences, the nature of the offence and whether the child had
previous offences. What matters however is the way in which these
are considered to be important. It is in appreciating the over¬
arching frame of relevance espoused by individuals and derived from
competing available ideologies that the reasons for the importance
of particular sets of information can best be acknowledged. We
contended that an important element in decision-making is the
objective and goal of the decision-maker. It is to this that we
now turn.
(v ) Reasons for Decisions
After each Case Report was completed in which panel members
and magistrates indicated the importance of specific factors, they
were then asked to indicate what the main reasons were for the
decision. An interesting feature of this exercise was that since
we asked individual panel members to indicate their reason for the
decision, it was obvious that apparently similar decisions were made
on the basis of very different reasons and considerations amongst the
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individuals at a panel or court hearing. We shall return to this at
the end of the chapter, but meantime ue now present a list of the
main categories of reason stated by panel members and magistrates
in support of the decisions made in actual cases. (See Appendix III,
Table C.)
Table 10










A number of inferences can be made from these figures. Firstly,
juvenile magistrates would appear to justify decisions in terms of
punitive objectives more often than the panel members and would
likewise appear to be less concerned about welfare objectives.
Nevertheless, panel members do also seem to have considered the nature
of the offence and the child's involvement in it more than did their
court counterparts. Secondly, magistrates have stated in a number
of cases that the reports and information contained therein were
important determinants of and reasons for the decisions made whereas
the panel members did not justify their decisions in this way at all.
We are to consider the latter point first because it seems to us
that it is related to the former which raises much more important
questions related to the main thrust of this thesis.
Panel members would appear to take welfare objectives into
consideration much more than the magistrates, since they made much
more frequent reference to welfare and family-oriented factors than
did the magistrates. It is significant in view of our earlier
discussions that though the overall figures are different, magistrates
and panel members both stated parental control as an important


















the low priority given to area conditions is also reminiscent of the
fact that the case study which was indicated as providing the least
important welfare factors was that in which environmental causes
were presented. A possible explanation of the apparent lack of
emphasis on welfare objectives in the reasons magistrates gave for
their decisions may well relate to the different sources of inform¬
ation in the respective systems. We shall see later the very
different interactional processes at work within the court and
panel hearings. But we have already seen that the various forms of
report are available to the panel members over a much longer period
than to the magistrates. This may explain the lesser emphasis
placed on welfare objectives by juvenile magistrates, as well as
the importance they attach to reports as a whole. However, what
we also have to take into consideration is that unlike panel members,
the juvenile magistrates can avail themselves of more explicitly
punitive measures. UJe shall now return to consider the fact that
panel members make no specific reference to punitive objectives,
whereas magistrates do, for different reasons, on no less than
23 occasions.
Of the reasons given by panel members for their decisions,
there were more than 40 references to the nature of the offence and
the child's involvement in it, the child's past record and any
measures the child may have previously experienced. There were,
however, no explicit references to punishment in any of the forms
discussed earlier in this thesis. All decisions by panel members
appeared therefore to have been reached with the child's interest
and welfare in mind. But of the 61 references made by juvenile
magistrates to those same factors (nature of the offence, etc.) there
were 23 reasons given which contained some reference to punitive
considerations. Since magistrates can, and do, punish, we
distinguished between those cases in which the final outcome was
either a supervision or a care order and those in which it was a
fine, discharge, attendance or detention centre.
Table 11
Final Outcome C.R. Score
Care/Supervision Order
Other
(n = 41) 61.6169
(n = 52) 43.2423
t = 4.9557
p = .001
What we found was that where the decisions made were more concerned
with the welfare of the child, as in care or supervision orders, the
2
mean C.R. score was 61.6169. This was significantly different from
the mean of 43.2423 for those other cases. An inference that could
be made is that there is then, at least for the juvenile magistrates,
a clear relationship between the actual decision and the factors
taken into consideration. That is, where the final outcome is a
care or supervision order there is a much greater emphasis on
welfare factors; whilst where the outcome is more explicitly punitive
there is greater emphasis on what we have termed 'judicial factors'.
It would then appear that there are two conceptually different
frames of relevance in operation: in one, children are construed as
legally, if not morally, responsible for their behaviour and as
therefore being eligible for punishment; in the other, the relevance
of information about a child's social and personal circumstances is
inextricably linked to a decision to commit a child to the care of
the local social services. However, as we suggested at the beginning
of this thesis, such frames of relevance are ideal-typical in that th
difficulty of separating them conceptually may be reflected in the
reasons given for a decision. It is also reflected in the fact that
there is no clear dichotomy between punishment and treatment in the
first place.
There did appear to be evidence of conceptual ambiguity in the
magistrates' reasons for decisions. The most clear-cut reasons were
those which did in fact refer to a care or supervision order. In all
cases, the reasons were primarily to benefit the child or the family
2. This refers, of course, to the Case Report score as discussed
earlier in the chapter.
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by offering them social work and related services. The only evidence
of possible conceptual ambiguity was displayed in a number of cases
where reasons given revealed a mixture of punitive and welfare
considerations. That is, the child was to be punished but only as
a means of promoting his welfare or serving his best interests.
Certainly the 'available ideology' of the compatibility thesis
would support utilitarian justifications of punishment-treatment.
Amongst the reasons given by juvenile magistrates (see Appendix III)
utilitarian justifications are prevalent and include the deterrence
of the offender, the prevention of crime, and protection of the
public. liJe expected that more explicit reference would be made to
social protection, but its omission may be due to the fact that
juvenile magistrates, as revealed in discussion generally, accept
social protection as an overriding objective in any case.' There
are few explicit references to retribution; but the greater concern
of juvenile magistrates with those judicial factors of intention-
ality and the nature of the offence, as well as the simple fact
that they decide not simply whether but also to what extent
punishment should be invoked, mean that in those cases in which
punitive sanctions are invoked their decisions are a blend of
retributive and utilitarian justifications. As Gordon states,
the criminal law is a blend of the utilitarian and the deonto-
logical. (1967)
Perhaps the most important points to draw from this section
are that juvenile magistrates seem capable of maintaining fairly
discrete frames of relevance depending on whether punitive (either
punishment-non-treatment or punishment-treatment) or welfare
objectives are to be invoked. In addition, and unlike the panel
members, they may legitimately avail themselves of punitive
sanctions. What, then, of the apparent emphasis by panel members on
'judicial factors'?
What is particularly interesting about the reasons given by
panel members is that all of the references made to the judicial
or allied factors by them related specifically to information about
the offence and the child's involvement in it. Yet there were no
overt references made to punitive objectives in the reasons for the
decisions. That is, though judicial and allied factors did appear
to form the basis for decision-making in some instances, the
1. This finding, however, by its very nature raises serious
doubt about the validity of the research instruments employed
in their inability to elicit what was after all stated by the
magistrates to be an overriding objective.
'
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objectives which panel members sought to achieve did not include any
overt reference to punishment, though there were references made to
information such as the seriousness of the offence, the triviality
of the offence and so on. The magistrates, on the other hand,
stated as important objectives in those cases involving punitive
sanctions, the wish to give a short, sharp shock; to deter the
offender; to prevent crime; and to protect the public.
The mean C.R. score for cases in which some reference had been
made to the judicial factors mentioned was 63.62 (n = 21) and was
lower than for those in which no such reference had been made with
a mean of 71.83 • But the mean of 63.62 for cases where the
decision had been justified by panel members with some reference to
judicial factors was still significantly different from the corres¬
ponding court mean of 43.24 (p = .001).
Discussion
We have argued in this thesis, on the basis of the case
studies and case reports, that panel members and magistrates do not
appear to attach the.same importance to the notion of Intentionality.
Where children are not held morally responsible, they may not
justifiably be subjected to punishment. This has been one of the
arguments that has underpinned the development of criminal law away
from a purely retributive system of justice. In the juvenile court,
magistrates do appear to operate within a retributive framework to
the extent that they reach their decisions bearing in mind the
principles of consistency and proportionality - at least in reference
to those cases which either on account of statutorily prescribed
guidelines, or because of seriousness, are the subject of punitive
sanctions. They are thereby able to separate conceptually the
different frames of relevance underpinning punishment and treatment,
in part because the structural and constitutional arrangements of
juvenile justice in England allow them to do so. The crucial and
central category accommodated within these different frames of
relevance is that of moral responsibility, whereby those who may be
punished can be distinguished from those who may not.
In Scotland, the organisational and structural arrangement is
such that the notion of criminal responsibility does still apply
with appropriate standards of evidence and proof. This however
I
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applies only within the court structure, since children in Scotland
may still be prosecuted - but only in court. (Approximately 3,000
children each year are prosecuted in Scotland.) Similarly, where
children deny the facts of the charge, their case is referred to the
Sheriff for adjudication. The separation of the functions of
adjudication and disposal neatly epitomises the supposed
incompatibility of a legal with a welfare ideology.
The fact that, in 90 reasons given for decisions by panel
members, there are no explicit references to punishment whether of
the punishment-treatment or punishmant-non-treatment kind is
perhaps then not unexpected within a e/stem which is based upon a
deterministic conception of delinquency. On the basis of the case
study and case report analysis we conclude that this is because of
the very different way in which panel members and juvenile magistrates
accommodate the crucial concept of Intentionality. Since panel
members appear to treat this notion as less important than do
magistrates it is not surprising that there are fewer explicit
references to the differing ideologies of punishment.
Consequently, this will have important implications for the
interpretation of information about the child's background and his
actual involvement in the offence. Magistrates are more concerned
to establish responsibility or fault for specific offences - indeed
that is one of their functions. They are also required on occasion
to operate some form of tariff system to determine the extent to
which children should be subjected to punishment whether for
punishment-treatment considerations or for non-treatment punishment
considerations. Pan.eL members, however, though not concerned to the
same extent as magistrates with responsibility and fault for
specific offences appear to be more concerned with whether the child
is able generally to appreciate the difference between right and
wrong, or to acknowledge what consequences impinge on untoward
behaviour. The child's past record (see above) may thus well be
important for panel members, operating within a conceptual framework
of need, in the attempt to construct as meaningful an assessment as
possible of whether and to what degree a child is in need of
compulsory measures of care. Morris argues (1976 ) that offence
behaviour has an important bearing on decisions reached by panel
members in that there is a relationship between such factors as the
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seriousness of the offence and the disposal reached. We agree with
her in part. But it is methodologically naive to infer from the
identification of a relationship between certain factors in a case
and the final outcome how people interpret those factors or with
what frame of relevance. It tells us more about the ways in which
the researcher, not the subject, treats information as relevant.
The reasons given by panel members themselves are more significant
in the assessment of the relevance of information.
Nevertheless, despite the lack of concern with responsibility
in the sense of moral responsibility, it would be naive on our part
to suggest that panel members operated only within a frame of
relevance underpinned by the conceptual framework of need. In
everyday life, for the purpose of ascribing blame or responsibility
it makes a difference whether or not an act had to occur and the
designation of conformity or deviance depends on this commonsense
consideration. The very language of treatment and the technical
language of need is not necessarily accommodated within ordinary
everyday language in which the notion of fault, right or wrong, is
important. Panel members obviously do make a distinction between
those cases in which the referral involves an offence and those
cases which would formerly have been called care and protection
cases. They appear to do so in a number of ways.
Information and its use
When offence criteria became relevant determinants of
decisions, then information about the personal, social and environ¬
mental background of children may assume a different significance.
Information may then be used not for 'explanation' as such but in
terms of 'mitigation'. Thus, decisions to put on supervision in the
community may be determined not simply by the need for care but
because 'it would be unfair to send him to a List D school,
especially after what he has been through at home'. Similarly,
panel members confess that there are cases when leniency is called
for, a concept which it is difficult to accommodate within a process
of decision-making theoretically designed to meet need.
Interestingly enough, a similar confusion in frames of
relevance also occurs in the juvenile court though not necessarily
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by the magistrates. liJe shall have more to say later about the contri¬
bution of the lawyer to the actual hearing of a case but for the
present we wish to note that in the cases where lawyers were
involved, the mean C.R. score was lower (x = 43.3) than for children
not legally represented (x = 50.6, t = 1.0102, n.s.). Lawyers, in
presenting information to the court about a child (see below) spend
a considerable deal of time discussing the nature and circumstances
of the offence and the child's involvement in it. Moreover, it
appears that information about the child's social, personal and
environmental characteristics are used by way of mitigation. That
is, the information is employed as a means of asking for leniency
and as an explanation of the child's appearance in court. The
concentration by lawyers in presenting their case on such factors
as the offence, the nature of the child's involvement and the nature
of the offence may well be reflected in the fact that the mean C.R.
score for such cases was 43.3 compared with 50.6 for those without
legal representation.
In the juvenile court, the magistrates do have the opportunity
to decide upon measures which are based upon overt punitive consider¬
ations. The panel members do not and we wish to argue that the fact
that they may on occasion accept the validity of notions such as
leniency and mitigation reflects an inability to operate entirely
within a frame of relevance based purely on assumptions about the
causes of delinquency and the needs of children. On occasion
".... you have to be lenient - some offence referrals
are just trivial." (panel member)
That panel members do differentiate between those who commit offences
and those who appear at a panel hearing for other reasons is also
indicated in another way.
Use of Resources
One of the implications of the development of the treatment
model in juvenile justice was that the distinction between offender
and child in need of care for other reasons should be eroded.
Consequently, the resources, especially the residential establishments,
were to provide facilities to meet the needs of children who have been
referred to the panel system on both offence and other grounds.
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However, not all panel members are able to maintain the lack of
distinction between offenders and other children simply because the
offender is a child who has broken a law. As a result, some panel
members are dissatisfied - mainly because of the 'contamination®
theory - that they have to commit children in need of care to the
same establishment as that to which they send offenders. In this
respect, there is then agreement between some panel members and
magistrates who wish to keep delinquents and other children
separate because, as the following quotations suggest,
"One is on the slippery path to crime and the
other is in need of care and protection." (magistrate)
"
.... it's the good ones who would be corrupted.
Especially those who are in need of care and
protection are likely to be most vulnerable." (magistrate)
One panel member in fact argued that -
"I'd like to be able to select the List D school -
according to degrees of badness i.e. make schools
graded according to degrees of badness of the
offender. Then allow the child to come up through
them in different stages."
Panel members, however, are more intimately involved in the
decision-making process than magistrates and the fact that there does
seem to be confusion in frames of relevance due to the conceptual
ambiguity raises a further intriging question. Hogarth (1973)
criticised earlier sentencing research for ignoring the penal
philosophy of the judge. What we in turn suggested earlier was that
sentencing, or at least decision-making in juvenile court and panel
hearing, is in fact a collective process. The issue that this
presents then is the possibility that prima facie similar decisions
in fact rest on different interpretations of information, are made
with different objectives in mind and with different conceptions of
what available resources are for. Where there is ambiguity or
ambivalence in the working ideologies of the decision-makers, then
the decision to send to a List D school can be made by those panel
members on the basis of very different considerations. The conflict
we traced earlier in this thesis between different models of delinquency
or crime control based on differing assumptions about delinquency
causation may then be reflected in lay assumptions about what use is
to be made of supervision, List D schools, Care Orders, etc. Despite
'
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the change of name, for example, in Scotland, a number of residential
establishments still have the reputation (at least in the eyes of
some panel members) of dealing with particularly tough boys.
Though we accept the importance of revealing the tacit
assumptions of those responsible for implementing systems of social
control (see Piatt 1975), what must surely be of importance is how
individuals collectively reach a decision. As we shall argue in
the next chapter, one of the crucial differences between a panel
and a court hearing is the way the search for information is
conducted. This will also require a discussion of the degree to
which individuals, who presumably do not completely share the same
frame of relevance, work together in the task of decision-making.
Punishment
As we have seen, amongst the reasons given by panel members
for their decisions made there were over 40 references to the nature
of the offence, the child's involvement in it, the past record of the
child and the previous measures experienced by the child. There
were, however, no explicit references made to punishment of any kind.
That is, children were not seen as appropriate objects on whom could
be inflicted either retributive (punishment-non-treatment) or
punishment-treatment measures. This is at least the inference we
make in the analysis thus far, though we do argue that the signifi¬
cance for panel members of Awareness, Consequences and Intention-
ality may suggest that they are more concerned with the moral
development of the child. We might then have expected some allusions
to the fact that punishment measures could be influential in the
fostering of the appropriate moral and intellectual development in
children. As suggested by a panel member in interview -
"Punishment after all can be an effective means
of treatment."
But the fact that formally panel members ought not to seek punitive
objectives may inhibit explicit reference being made to them in a
statement of the reasons.
It would, however, be more than foolish to deny that panel
members may on occasion, for what they determine to be serious
offences, seek punitive objectives. This is particularly so with
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reference to those youths whom they describe as the 'thugs';
'hooligan element' or 'young crooks'. One panel member, for example,
when asked to consider whether the panels ought to have more
punitive sanctions amongst the options available graphically
expressed his feelings thus -
"flake no mistake about it, there will require to be
very sterm measures introduced involving the police if
the present Hearing system is to be really effective in
dealing with the group of adolescents who can aptly be
described as apprentice terrorists." (Glasgow Herald 1976)
Similarly, panel members may wish to deter other children from
delinquent behaviour. There is here, of course, no incompatibility
between belief in welfare or treatment on the one hand, and the need
to deter on the other, though even this may be expressed rather
ambiguously.
"Deterrence comes into it in the overall pattern of the
Children's Hearings. We try to deter the child as a
means to an end. - Not simply deterrence for its own
sake."
Again we must return to this in the next chapter since we will be
concerned not simply with what information is sought and used in a
children's hearing, but also how. In particular, we will discuss the
symbolic use of the hearing itself as one means to inculcating
appropriate attitudes in children who have committed offences.
As we argued above, how individuals conceive of the resources
available and the use to which they may be put has to be taken into
consideration in analysing decisions. Thus, in many cases panel
members and magistrates agree that those who have committed offences
should not be put in the same residential establishment as children
who have experienced other problems. And though not as explicitly
as magistrates, panel members will confess their decision to send to
a List D school has been influenced by what the child has done; or
that the decision to put on supervision at home, rather than sending
him to a List D school, has been determined by considerations of
leniency and mitigation rather than being directly related to any
objective assessment of the child's needs. In that respect, the
'trivial' nature of much offence behaviour may be underpinned by
the same logic by which offences are considered serious. That is,
just as some panel members may feel that certain offences are too
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serious to be dealt with by them (e.g. Rape), so they complain that
many offences are really trivial and do not warrant an appearance at
a Children's Hearing.
All in all, the mosaic we are beginning to build, particularly
of the practical accomplishment of justice by panel members is
becoming very complicated. Suffice to say for the present that we
believe that as there is no easy dichotomy between punishment and
treatment any simplistic comparison of panel members and magistrates
ignores the complexity of the available ideologies and the frames of
relevance derived from them. It is for such reasons that we preferred
firstly to focus on what we termed 'welfare' and 'judicial' factors
before examining the practical accomplishment of juvenile justice in
two systems which administratively are founded upon different
conceptual frameworks. The main difficulty, as we see it, for panel
members is that any attempt to resolve the conceptual ambiguity in
delinquency control has to be within a system theoretically located,
at least formally, within a conceptual framework of determinism.
UJe now turn to examine the relevance of the thesis thus far
for the suggestion we have made that the nature of the panel or
court hearing is an important determinant of what information is
sought and how it is used.
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CHAPTER IX
COURT AND PANEL HEARINGS:
'FORM8 AND 'CONTENT'
I. Court and Panel: Basic Differences
Because of the differences in the organisational and admini¬
strative structure of juvenile justice in both countries it uas
expected that the nature of interaction and communication in the
panel and court hearings would be very different. Kilbrandon had
in fact argued that, because of its formality, the juvenile court
was an inappropriate setting for making decisions about the disposal
of young offenders. As well as testing the major hypotheses of the
study which we have considered in the analysis of the case studies
and case reports, we therefore also set out to examine the nature
of the decision-making process within the hearing in a court or
panel. As we have discussed earlier, we wished to examine the
'content8 of the respective hearings (what was actually discussed)
and the 'form' of such hearings (what were the major patterns of
communication). The hypotheses to be tested were:
Hypothesis III: there would be more open and informal
discussion in the panel than in the
court hearings
Hypothesis I; panel members would pay more attention
in the discussion of cases to welfare
factors than would magistrates
The difficulties in gauging the content of the interaction in
the hearing situation were compounded in England by the fact that the
court hearing^ by its very nature, did not allow for communication of
a kind comparable to that in the hearings. There were a number of
factors which therefore influenced the collection of information in
the court and in this respect the analysis of court hearings could
not be developed to the same extent as for the panels. The main
difficulties were the formality of the court, the practice of
adjournment, and the role of the police in prosecution. Let us
consider these in turn.
(i) Formality of Court
One of the intentions in the 1969 Children and Young Persons Act
was to promote a system of court procedure that was more informal in
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nature than had hitherto existed. But in comparison with the
Children's Hearings, it was obvious that juvenile court hearings
would be more formal than the administrative type of tribunal that
was instituted in Scotland. One of the trends that can in fact be
traced in the history of juvenile justice in Britain is the con¬
tinuing attempt to make juvenile court procedure less formal and
more easily understood by the child.
Not only was the physical structure of the English court in
the study such that informal communication was well-nigh impossible,
but the formalflSBSfC nature of the hearing process also meant that
different participants had their roles rigorously circumscribed by
the demands of court procedure. In particular, the parents and
children were only allowed to speak at certain points in the
proceedings, and only then at the instance or with the permission
of the chairman of the bench for the day. The prosecutors, the
lawyers, social workers and probation officers only rarely failed
to follow the pattern of speaking at the times appropriate to
their roles in the court process. If they did so, this would again
be at the instance of the bench; and in this respect, the bench, and
in particular the chairman, was obviously a crucial determinant of
court interaction. What interested us in this connection was
whether the actual form of the panel and court hearings actually
influenced the content of what was actually discussed.
One thing that must be remembered is that this study makes
no claims as to the 'representativeness' of the two areas studies.
The court chosen for the study area, for example, was very different
from that in which the pilot was conducted. Architecturally and
technologically, the court was so structured as to make informal
communication impossible. Architecturally, the courtroom was laid
out traditionally with a raised dais for the bench, seating for the
clerk and specific arrangements for social work, probation and
other personnel. Technologically, there were a number of micro¬
phones at important locations in the courtroom, not simply for the
purposes of acoustics but in fact to record every word spoken. The
court, in fact, was only one of two in England and Wales where every¬
thing said was actually recorded on tape.
Even the manner of questioning by the bench was different as
between the courts used in the pilot and the main study.
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Whereas in the court area in the pilot study each member of
the bench was allowed to conduct his own questioning, in the main
study area only the chairman directed questions at the participants
in the hearing. Consequently, the other juvenile magistrates had to
convey to the chairman the nature of the question they wished to ask.
Moreover, the replies of the parents and of the children had to be
directed 'to the bench', even though the question may not have been
broached by any of the individual magistrates. It is perhaps worth
noting that the rather more 'liberal1 approach of the pilot study
bench was exercised in the setting of a court which had waived the
physical structure and lay-out associated with a court of law, in
favour of a less formidable one. Unlike the court in the study
area, there was no raised dais for the bench, the parents and
children were therefore not separated physically from the bench,
but were all seated at the same table as the magistrates. A
practice that was, however, common to the courts used in the pilot
and in the main study was that social workers and probation officers
were not located near their clients - a feature of the hearing which
further added to the importance of the bench in determining both the
'content' and the 'form' of the hearing.
(ii) Adjournment
Unfortunately, on a number of occasions the bench actually
adjourned, a practice that is common in the court area and not
restricted to the period of this study. This was mainly for the
purpose of reading reports, or for considering a final decision; and
in all instances, the clerk of the court was invited to accompany the
magistrates to the adjournment room. The researcher was not allowed
to attend with the magistrates in adjournment because this could
have been interpreted as 'interfering in the course of justice'.
Consequently, this part of the decision-making process was not
open to examination. This contributed greatly to what we shall
see to be a comparatively low level of interaction in the court
hearings.
(iii) The police prosecutor
In the main study area in England, the prosecutor, a uniformed
police inspector, had considerable influence on the nature of the
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interaction in the court room. In all cases the greater part of the
prosecutors contribution to the discussion took place at the beginning
of the hearing when he presented information concerning the child and
the offence in question to the bench. Paradoxically, though the
prosecutor presented considerable information to the bench, the
bench rarely questioned him as regards this information and overall
there is in fact little communication from the bench to one who is a
key figure in the whole process. The ritualistic nature of the
processing of cases in the court allows different participants to
present information to the bench at appropriate times without them¬
selves necessarily being addressed to any great extent by the bench.
The police prosecutor in particular occupied an important role in
the hearing process which he was able to fulfil without there
being any continued ^Interaction' with the bench. What this indicates
is the extent to which the police, as prosecutors in particular,but
also more generally, are important agents in the administration of
juvenile justice in England and Wales. The dissatisfaction expressed
by a number of magistrates at the loss of some of their powers to the
social services is paralleled by their concern that the police, who
are 'real servants of their court* have numerous restrictions placed
on their activities as a result of the 1969 Children and Young Persons
Act. Similarly, the separation of probation and social work leads
magistrates to conclude that probation officers rightly show more
allegiance and loyalty to court than da social workers whose
loyalty often rests with the client irrespective of obligations to
the court.
The close working relationship between the magistracy and the
police may well reflect the fact that both groups share similar,
predominantly judicial ideologies. Thus, the apparent conceptual
ambiguity between what we refer to as judicial or welfare consider¬
ations is expressed institutionally in the form of a social control
network where the different bodies involved do not share similar
frames of relevance. This raises a number of important questions
that we shall later consider about the assimilation of information by
those who do not share similar working ideologies.
For these reasons, whereas the interaction schedule was designed
to examine the 'content' and 'form* of the discussion in the Children's
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Hearings system and the Juvenile Court, the level of discussion and
interaction in the court made a comparative analysis in one sense
somewhat difficult. On the other hand, the lack of discussion in the
court setting was an important feature of the hearing of cases and
this was in itself a significant difference from the situation in
the panel hearings. It did, however, mean that with particular
reference to the contribution of individuals within the decision¬
making process, the analysis could be extended further in respect
of the panel members than the juvenile magistrates. It is, of course,
appreciated that the court could not necessarily be considered
representative of the courts throughout England but neither is
there any pressing reason to consider that it was atypical of many
of them. The point we wish to make is that the nature of the court
in the study area is itself an important variable in the decision¬
making process.
II. Interaction: Form '
England
Hypothesis: there would be more free and open discussion in
the children's hearings than in the .juvenile court
What actually constitutes 'free' and 'open1 discussion is
obviously difficult to define clearly but in view of the criticisms
made of the juvenile court in the Kilbrandon report we were parti¬
cularly interested in the contributions made to the decision¬
making process by various people, including the parents and
children.
Table I below presents the 'form2 of the discussion and the
contributions made To and By the various participants in the hearing
of court cases. The figures are percentages of the total amount of
discussion initiated By and addressed To the magistrates. A discussion
of the method employed in recording what actually happened in panel
and court hearings is included in Chapter VI above. For the actual
analysis of the data, the scores were constructed quite simply by
treating statements about specific factors separately and totalling
how many statements overall had been made about any single factor and
by whom. (A copy of the Interaction schedule is included in the Appendices.)
The information contained in Table I in fact refers to the overall
contribution and involvement of key figures in the court hearings.
Table 1 . (Figures are percentages of total discussion.)
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Two rather obvious conclusions can be drawn from this table.
Firstly, very little discussion takes place amongst the magistrates
in the hearing of a case. Secondly, in terms of the 'form' of the
hearings, much more of the discussion is directed to the bench than
is initiated by the bench. But equally important for our purposes
is the way in which the volume of discussion and levels of partici¬
pation are distributed amongst the various participants.
Whereas the bench directed a considerable proportion of its
statements, mainly in the form of questions, in all cases to the
youth (45.28), the youth's contribution To the bench only involved
5.68% of the discussion. Similarly, the parents who were in court
with their children were addressed more by the bench (22.64) than
they themselves addressed the bench (10.38). What this rather crude
means of measurement of the interaction in the court hearing suggests
is that there is very little opportunity for free discussion. This
seems especially so when one also considers the fact that, whereas
the statements to the child and his parents By the Bench involved the
greater part of the discussion, the statements to the Police involved
a much smaller part (3.77); conversely, whereas the contribution made
by the child and his parents to the Bench only accounted for about
16% of the total discussion to the Bench, that of the police
involved slightly more than 40%, and that of the solicitors, more
than 36%. The nature of solicitors5 involvement will be discussed
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later, when this will be assessed in relation only to those cases in
which children were legally represented.
Again, the ritualistic nature of the court hearing may account
for the form of the discussion in that though questions may have been
directed at the children and their parents, fuller replies or
descriptions of their involvement and backgrounds are actually given
by the police, or on occasion by the solicitor. Not unexpectedly, as
we shall see, the content of the police contribution to the Bench is
heavily 'judicial', which, when added to the low level of youth or
parental participation, offers little opportunity for discussing the
child's needs or interests. The police concern at establishing the
nature of the involvement of the child and the offence in which he
was involved means that the predominant frame of relevance is not
solely a welfare one.
What the table also shows is that the social worker or, as the
case may be in England, the probation officer, takes little part in
the actual discussion of a child's case. Of the total volume of
statements to the Bench, social work participation accounted for
only 3.6%. Two other factors make this low level of contribution
a matter for interest. Firstly, the social work interest in a case
or potential case is usually the responsibility of a representative
of the social services department, and not necessarily the social
worker who is or may be responsible for the case. In the court area
there was in fact a post of Court Duty Officer. Consequently, the
social worker in court would not usually have first-hand information
about the case. Secondly, and related to the first, because of the
derivation of juvenile court from an ordinary summary court, the
juvenile court fundamentally remains a court of law. Therefore, no
report or information about a child's background may be offered to
the court until the facts have been established or accepted. This
means that, in view of the lack of involvement of the social worker
in the discussion, the only opportunity for assimilating social work
information is by the reading of reports which can only be presented
after the facts of a case have been accepted or established. This
was done either in court or in adjournment and essentially meant
that little time was available, and it is perhaps not without
significance that the magistrates found social work reports generally
(see Chapter VIII) very informative and very important. The fact
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not only that the social worker's contribution was small but also that
the Bench addressed itself to the social worker in a very limited
manner (3.4$ only of all statements made by the Bench were to the
social worker) would mean a greater reliance on written information
in view of the lack of opportunity for questioning it.
Because of the erosion of magistrates' power in the decision¬
making process in England, the lower level of social work involve¬
ment may reflect a practice in which the nature of the treatment'
decision is the responsibility of the social services department and
not of the magistracy, who must only decide whether a child needs
compulsory measures of care. Magistrates do not have the respons¬
ibility of deciding what form these measures should take. But
perhaps the main point that could be made here is that in relation
to the contribution of the social worker, the magistrates rely mainly
on written social work information.
The greater involvement of the police has to be discussed in
connection with the nature of the part played by the police
prosecutor since the 'form' of his contribution can best be
analysed in relation to the 'content'.
One further comment that can be made is that the Clerk of the
Court appears to play only a small part in the proceedings. Yet the
low contribution made by him _to_ the bench must not be used as a
basis for arguing that his is not an important role. His role is
important in informing the magistrates of the statutory limits within
which they can operate and generally keeping them advised of the law.
What can be said is that much of his involvement with the magistrates
actually takes place in the adjourning room whereby what he had to
say was not available for inclusion in the research. More
importantly, however, this also meant that it was not available for
public hearing in the open court. Whereas it is possible for panel
members to adjourn or ask for a period of discussion in the absence
of the parents or children, this very rarely happens in practice.
Only in one panel area, in the North of Scotland, is the researcher
aware of the availability of an adjournment room, but even here
most of the panel members felt its use would be contrary to the
spirit of the Kilbrandon philosophy.
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Scotland
The more obvious difference in the nature of the hearing
between Scotland and England is the absence of a police prosecutor
and solicitor, and the role played by the Reporter to the Hearings
rather than by a Clerk of Court. But there were other more interesting
differences which were not accounted for simply by the absence of
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Youth Parents Reporter Social Worker
53.499 35.84 3.69 5.18
A striking feature of the differences in the interaction in the
court and panel hearings respectively (at least for the cases studied
in the research) was the far greater volume of statements To and By
panel members than To and By juvenile magistrates. Some consider¬
ations must, however, be given to the fact that the magistrates in
many cases, as in general practice, did in fact adjourn to discuss
certain cases. Since the researcher was not allowed, by law, to be
present at these discussions, they were completely lost from the
study. However, since the intention was to gauge courtroom and
hearing activity respectively, the fact that magistrates did on
occasion retire is not without significance for the discussion about
the difference in levels of interaction between Scotland and England.
Over all cases, the difference in the volume of interaction
was highly significant, (t = 13.353, p = .001). Moreover, the
distribution of the volume of interaction in Scotland was markedly
different from that in England. Like England's magistrates, a
considerable part of the comments and questions made _by_ panel
members to others in the hearing were directed to the youth and his
parents (64.27 and 27.48/0 respectively). But unlike the form of the
parallel type of discussion in England, the child and the parents
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together contributed as much as 89% of the interaction to_ the
panel members, children making the greater contribution of more
than 53%. Whilst the greater part of the discussion in the court
was accounted for by the participation of the police prosecutor and
legal representative, in the panel hearings it uias in fact the
children and parents who accounted for much of the interaction.
Whereas in court, the rather formal atmosphere and ritualised
process did not allow for open discussion involving the parents and
the children, in the panel hearings they did appear to take an
active part in the decision-making process. Moreover, all three
panel members in each hearing were involved more immediately in the
hearing, a fact reflected in the greater level of communication.
Since the social work report is available to panel members
some days before the actual hearing of a case, the search for
information is fundamentally different from that of the court hearing,
where only a short time is available for the assimilation of written
social work information. The social work report in Scotland may be
used by panel members as a basis for introduction to the discussion
which can then be used to explore more fully some of the issues and
implications raised in such reports. Because of the greater
opportunity for discussion, and the freedom of the child and
parents to enter into the proceedings of the hearing, social work
information can be challenged in a way that is not so possible in
the more adversarially oriented juvenile court structure.
Nevertheless, though reports were not seen to be so generally
informative in Scotland and despite the greater opportunity for
discussion at the actual hearing, social work participation in the
interaction was almost as low as it was in the juvenile court, with
almost 4% of the overall discussion. But when the separate scores
for !form<_to_ and by. panel members are considered, only 2.98 of all
the discussion by the panel members is directed to the social
worker, though the social worker in reply does contribute slightly
more, with 5.18 of the total interaction _to panel members. It
would be unfair then to suggest that the low level of social-work
participation is simply the fault of the social work representatives
since panel members seem to direct little of the discussion
specifically to them. In many respects this is unfortunate,
especially since in the majority of cases included in the research
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the social worker actually involved in the case or who had written
the report was usually in attendance at the hearing. In view of
the intentions of the 1968 Social Work (Scotland) Act, social workers
were generally expected to attend the hearings. Thus, unlike the
situation in England there was as much opportunity to discuss with
the social worker the contents of his report as to read the
reports themselves. But this opportunity was little used, with the
main question directed to the social worker being of the nature
'Have you anything to add to your report'? It is perhaps more
surprising that th's should be so in Scotland since the decision
as to the need for compulsory measures of care may well include
recognition of the qualities of the social worker, as we have seen,
and the nature of his report. Nevertheless, most of the responses
showed agreement with the recommendation of the social worker.
Despite their apparent lack of involvement in actual hearings,
social workers were nevertheless considered by many panel members to
be extremely important.
"
.... I wouldn't like to be without the Social Work
recommendation - also the social worker has to be
asked his opinion in the hearing. I don't like
hearings where a socialworker is not introduced to
the discussion." (panel member)
We might have expected, however, that social workers would have taken
more initiative in the actual discussion of the case and of their
social work report.
Our conclusion is nevertheless that the panel hearings did
allow for a more open form of discussion. In particular, the
parents and children were able to contribute more to the actual
discussion in what appeared to us to be a more informal and free
atmosphere than existed in the juvenile court in the study area.
But even this did not meet with approval by all panel members since -
"
.... some panel members make it too informal and
relaxed. They forget sometimes what these children
have done." (panel member)
What we shall see at the end of this chapter is that the
hearing can be used by panel members in much the same way as
magistrates conceive of the court - as a symbolic reminder of the
fact that the child has done wrong. The very hearing itself can
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then 'impress on the child the significance of what he has done®,
'have a salutary effect® or can be used to ®let the child knou he
can't get away with it®. It is in this way that the ®form® and
the content of the decision-making process can be seen to be
closely related.
III. Interaction: 'Content'
The content of the discussion refers to what factors were
actually discussed in the respective hearings. As with the case
report scores, the figures relating to the content of a discussion
were computed in such a way as to present welfare factors as a
proportion of all factors discussed. Thus, the greater the score,
the greater the emphasis on welfare considerations.
Hypothesis I: that for the purpose of decision-making panel members
will treat welfare considerations as more important
than will .juvenile magistrates
Our discussion in this section of the thesis will relate not only
to the question of what was discussed in the respective hearings but
also to the much broader issue of the extent to which the type of hearing
influences the search for, and use made of, information.
We have already seen the very great differences in the form of
the respective hearings in the panel and the court area. Table 3
shows similarly significant differences between the two groups in
terms of content.





The marked differences in the Case Study scores, Case Report scores
and the form scores would appear then to be repeated in respect of the
Content of the discussion in the hearings. That is, juvenile
magistrates in discussing a case do not refer to welfare factors as
often as do the panel members. What follows is a more detailed dis¬
cussion of the extent to which various individuals emphasised welfare
as opposed to judicial factors.
Panel
To Panel Members and
Magistrates




(a) Panel Members: Content Scores
An overall summary of the scores attained by the panel members
is presented in Table (a) in Appendix IV. Here, only the more salient
features of the figures will be discussed.
Panel members who were also chairmen in the hearing of cases
in the sample had lower mean content scores (63.22) than did their
colleagues who were not chairmen. (71.34, t = 1.2827, 88 df. n.s.)
Though this only approached significance, the difference may in part
be accounted for by the fact that the practice in the cases included
in the study, as in others attended by the researcher, was for the
chairman to begin the discussion by addressing the child about the
offence. The Content score would therefore be influenced by the
inclusion of 'judicial® factors as a result of the chairman's
role. For reasons that may also be associated with the role of
chairman, those panel members also took a greater part in discussion
of a case (47.58%) than did those who were not chairmen (25.53%).
That is, not only did chairmen comment more than their colleagues
on judicial factors such as the child's involvement in the offence but
they also, in view of their role, took a much greater part in the
discussion. The fact that those with most experience as panel
members (a mean of 38.9) took a greater part in the discussion may
well then also be partially due to the fact that the chairmen were
selected from the longest serving panel members.
Priestley et al, noted that
"Magistrates .... pursue the personal dimensions
of offence behaviour in two further ways. First by
asking for explanations. 'Why did you do this?' is
asked so frequently and receives so few replies that
its use seems at first sight to be merely rhetorical.
But there is a serious purpose to be discovered behind
it. The 'causes' of criminal behaviour are often dis¬
cussed in the reports submitted by probation officers
and social workers, but magistrates also appear to be
genuinely in search of explanations direct from the
horse's mouth." (1977, p.90)
What is particularly interesting about this quotation is that panel
members, in their capacity as chairmen, also often initiate proceedings
in the hearing by asking the child 'why he did it®. That is, the
child is also given the opportunity to present his reasons for his
behaviour and in this way much of the early part of the hearings
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for the cases in the study was focused on the child's reasons for
his involvement. This is, however, not to suggest that the relevance
of such considerations is the same for panel chairmen as for the
magistrates. Indeed, as we have argued on the basis of the analysis
of the case studies and Case Reports, the importance of the child's
involvement in the offence may be taken as being more indicative of
the child's moral development than of considerations of intent, and
responsibility. What makes this more problematic, however, is even
the possibility that panel members may consider that the child who
deliberately commits an offence, particularly if it is serious in its
consequences may be more in need than the child who is 'easily led'
or 'weak-willed'.
There is, moreover, further evidence to suggest that the
lower content scores attained by chairmen cannot be taken simpliciter
to suggest that chairmen are more judicially oriented than their
colleagues. When we examined the welfare scores attained by
chairmen in respect of the case reports, though on average greater
than for other panel members (the means were 72.6 and 68.6
respectively), we found that they were not significantly different.
Thus, though the role of chairman in a hearing may well determine the
nature of their contribution, such panel members do not appear to
have attached any more importance to judicial considerations than
their colleagues.
Perhaps the most intriguing difference in the content scores
was between those who were and those who were not members of what
we have called the caring professions. Those who were had a mean
score of 65.12 in respect of the case in which they were involved,
which was significantly different from those who were not members of
the caring professions, and for whom the mean content score was
76.33 (t = 1.8539, 88 df, p = .05). That is, members of the caring
professions actually discussed welfare factors less in the hearing
than did their colleagues who were not. We might have expected the
converse to have applied.
(b) Panel Cases: Content Scores
In cases where there had been no previous offences, the mean
panel member content score was 69.46 (n = 57 ), whereas in cases
where the child had one or more previous offences recorded, the
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corresponding mean uas 70.051 (n = 33 ).(n.s.) Nor was there any
statistical significance in the difference between those scores when
the number of charges in a case was held constant. For cases where
only one charge was recorded, the mean content score was 68.35
(n = 51), and for those with more than 1 charge, it was 69.41
(n = 39). It would, prima facie, appear therefore that the 'content'
of contributions to the discussions by the panel members individually
were not influenced notably by whether the boys had had previous
offences recorded nor by the number of charges in the referral.
Similarly, the age of the child did not correlate signifi¬
cantly with the panel members' content scores (r = -.0951, n = 90
n.s.). What this suggests is that the age of the child made no
significant difference to the nature of the discussion in the
panel cases where it would appear that issues related to the social,
personal and environmental characteristics of the child were given
equal consideration. This does, however, conceal the fact that the
child's age can be important in the decision-making process and
especially so when the child is approaching the age at which he can
legitimately be dealt with by the court. Panel members will confess
to being aware that the fifteen year-old will soon be under the
jurisdiction of the court and allowing this to influence the nature
of the decision ("we'll discharge the case because he'll soon go to
court anyway") or the presentation of the decision ("we'll discharge
the case this time but remember, it's the court for you next time
my lad"). However, when the length of the panel hearing of cases
was correlated with the content score, the relationship was in fact
both significant and positive (r = .4876, p = .01, 28 df). Thus,
the longer a case was discussed in a hearing, the more the
discussion tended to focus around 'welfare' as opposed to
In respect of cases of Theft and Theft ing, the
content scores were quite similar with means of 73.76 (n = 52) and
74.3 (n = 30), respectively, with no significant difference.
However, of particular interest is the fact that the mean content
score for cases in which assault was alleged was actually much
lower (x = 50.21, n = 15). This was significantly lower than the
other scores mentioned above. Thus, in cases such as assault, the
judicial factors are important aspects in the hearing of a case.
'judicial' factors.
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Paradoxically, however, the case report forms completed by the panel
members in respect of these cases of assault produced a mean Case
Report score of 74.57 which was in fact the highest welfare score
when we controlled for type of case. Though discussion in
assault cases was indicative of concern with 'judicial8 features
of a case, this did not preclude the possibility then that
'welfare8 factors would provide the basis for the making of a
decision about a child involved in that case. The significance
of this will be more apparent when we discuss the fact that though
a welfare philosophy appears to support the decisions made by panel
members, the actual hearing process nevertheless retains a 'symbolic'
element more akin to retributive or utilitarian ideas of punishment.
(c) Panel Cases: Major Factors Discussed
The content scores overall did indeed substantiate the hypo¬
thesis that panel members, to a greater extent than magistrates,
lay more emphasis in discussion on welfare factors. An examination
of the relative influence of the individual factors provides further
support for such a claim. On the basis of the Interaction schedules,
Table 4 outlines the major factors that were discussed and the
number of times they were discussed in the course of the hearings.
This exercise was designed simply to examine the importance of
particular factors in the discussion of cases. On its own, the
table would of course present no more than a crude total of the
frequency specific factors were discussed; its significance, we
suggest, is in the way in which it relates to other elements of
the analysis.






















What is particularly interesting about the list is that most
of items referred to relate specifically to the child either in terms
of his involvement in the offence or in terms of his personal
circumstances, e.g. schooling, leisure time etc. Earlier, in both
the Case Study and the Case Report analyses uie discovered that
both panel members and magistrates were reluctant to treat more
social and environmental considerations (E.g. the area where the
child lived) as important.
The fact that 'the circumstances of the offence' and the
child's reasons for the offence appear high in the set of factors
discussed by the panel members has to be analysed in the light of
the other factors that were considered important enough to be
discussed often. Magistrates for example discuss the same
'judicial' factors but very rarely discuss, at least in open
court, more 'welfare' oriented considerations. Thus, it is our
belief that panel members, who operate more than do magistrates
within a welfare frame of relevance, seek to interpret such factors
in such a way as to give a fuller picture of the child's presenting
problems. They do not concern themselves so much with the specific
act or offence in abstraction from the child's general behavioural
problems.
It is perhaps no surprise that the most often discussed
factor, in view of its importance in the Case Reports, was
'Schooling'. In discussion with the researcher and in presenting
reasons for their decisions, panel members identified truancy and
school difficulties with delinquency and other behavioural problems
generally. Indeed some of the magistrates even conceived of
'truancy' as 'delinquency'.
An important aspect of the list of factors actually discussed
is that considerable discussion took place with reference to the
actual decision itself. For example, the 'Possibility of Discharge'
is one of the most frequently discussed factors of all, with
'Possibility of Home Supervision' or 'residential supervision' also
being prominent. It would therefore appear that a panel hearing,
by its very nature, allows parents and children to have the opport¬
unity of at least being aware of, it not completely involved in
the discussion, the kind of decision being contemplated by the
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panel members. In commenting on the merits of the Children's
Hearings system, one panel member felt —
"
.... we are lay people who have to endure the same
stresses as people we're trying to help .... I can
speak the same language that the child and parents
speak. The informality must help in reducing the
strain and allow parents and children to be involved
in all aspects of the case";
and another remarked -
"
.... what happens in the hearing is as important
as the decision we reach .... if parents can leave
the room feeling less aggrieved, less hostile and
with some dignity, we've achieved something. UJe at
least try to win them over to see what we are doing -
this must surely be better than the court."
What panel members then appear to seek to achieve is an
atmosphere which allows the parents and children to participate
even to the extent of involving them in discussion about the
most appropriate means of disposal. When we examine the findings
for the court hearings we shall see that not only does less
discussion take place but that it also covers a smaller range
of topics.
Court Cases: Major Factors Discussed
Table 5 presents a list of the major topics discussed in
the court hearings.
Table 5 England
Circs, of offence 82
Reasons/Motives 16
Seriousness of offence 5
As we can see this is a much more limited list than the
corresponding one for panel hearings. Any other factors were
referred to only minimally by the magistrates reflecting both the
concentration of magistrates on more judicially oriented factors
and also the much lower level of discussion in the hearing of a case
in the court area. The obvious difference with the panel hearings
is that there is in fact little discussion by the magistrates, and
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that usually means the chairman of the day, of factors other than
judicial ones. This is not to say that other factors are not
discussed. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the research
was bedevilled by the fact that the magistrates often adjourned,
which meant that that stage in the hearing was not available for
analysis.
Secondly, what these figures represent are the factors mentioned
in the statements made by panel members and juvenile magistrates
respectively. They do not contain any reference to statements
made by others. Indeed, the differences in the content and form
of the discussion of cases by panel members and magistrates point
to more fundamental issues relating to the nature, the source and
the use made of information available to those responsible for
making decisions in the two systems. In particular, the more
formalised and ritualistic nature of the juvenile court allows
personnel other than magistrates themselves to determine the
nature of the information provided.
We suggested above that panel hearings did allow for more open
discussion involving both parents and child. What is equally
important, however, is the nature of the participation by these
key figures and it is to a consideration of this that we now turn.
Parents and children
We have seen that the overall content scores were significantly
different as between the panel and the court samples. The greater
emphasis placed on welfare factors by panel members appears to be
reflected in the content of the children's and parents' contri¬
butions to the discussion, as in the comments directed to them by
the panel members. For panel members, the Content scores were
62.47 to the child and 83.49 to the parents. (N = 90 in both
cases) In other words, the greater part of the discussion with
the child and his parents focused more on the child's social,
personal and environmental circumstances than on more judicial
aspects of the case. That the panel content scores are lower for
children than for their parents is not unexpected since it was
1. What the content score referred to was the extent to which
welfare factors rather than judicial factors were discussed
in a hearing.
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usually the case in discussion that questions were initially
directed to the child concerning the offence.
But just as important was the fact that the Content of the
actual contributions to the discussions by parents and children
was also high. They too were prepared to discuss the child's
background and not just concentrate on the offence. The mean
content score for parents was 82.91, and for children it was




Child To Panel 60.46 53.49
To Child by Panel 62.47 64.27
Parents To Panel 82.91 35.84
To Parents by Panel 83.49 27.84
What we can see then is that parents and children in panel
hearings are active participants in that they contribute a lot to a
panel discussion (form) but that they also focus more exclusively on
welfare factors in their discussion. This does not necessarily
mean that they themselves are committed to welfare frames of
relevance. As we have argued earlier in this thesis, the language
of therapy or treatment is not readily compatible with ordinary,
commonsense moral discourse. Similarly, though the aim was to
achieve a panel membership that was both suitable and representative,
Mapstone (1972) argues that if membership uere truly representative
then the attitudes and beliefs expressed by panel members would be
more reactionary, conservative and punitive. For Mapstone, the
attitudes to crime and delinquency expressed by the general
Scottish public are not those which would necessarily lead to the
successful selection of particular individuals. But the main point
to be made here is that no a priori assumptions about parents and
children's assumptions about justice and delinquency control can
be made; empirical research is necessary to establish the tacit
assumptions commonly held by different sections of the community.
(Petch 1977; Morris & Giller 1977.) The influence of the Calvinist
ethic on Scottish morality suggests that any inference as to the
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extent to which the parents and children in this study are committed
to a welfare ideology has to be treated with caution. (Asquith
1977.)
In all probability the greater concentration of parents and
children on welfare factors may be attributable to a variety of
reasons, not least that their contributions are determined by what
panel members wish to discuss. But whatever the reasons, the
greater part of the discussion in panel hearings was accounted
for by the children and parents whereas in the court hearings
discussion was dominated by the police prosecutor and the legal
representative.
Legal Representation
The importance of including this in the analysis is that (i)
the question of legal representation epitomises much of the conflict
we have attempted to identify between what we called judicial and
welfare modes of thought and has implications for claims that
children in the hearings system should be legally represented;
(ii) it also has implications for the confused state of the right
of appeal against a decision made by a children's hearing in
Scotland (Grant 1976; Gordon 1976) where the right of appeal
against a decision made by lay persons actually rests with the
judiciary.
It was difficult to make meaningful interpretations of most
of the content scores because of the simple fact that so little
discussion actually took place in the court areas. Nevertheless,
some comment can be made on those cases where children were legally
represented. It is important to point out that these were not cases
which in Scotland would have involved referral to the Sheriff. That
is, they are not cases in which children had denied facts but are
those in which the lawyer's task was to represent the child and
present the case.
Of the 34 cases in the English sample, children were legally




Statements to the Bench by:
N.. Youth Parents Magistrates Clerk
Social
Work Police Lauyer
56 0 0 0 0 0 21 .43 78.57
55 0 0 3.64 0 0 40 54.55
41 0 0 2.44 0 0 43.9 53.66
38 0 0 □ 0 0 15.79 84.21
32 0 0 0 0 0 18.75 81.25
51 0 1 .96 0 0 1.96 19.61 76.47
45 0 D 0 0 0 37.78 62.22
43 0 0 0 0 2.33 11.63 86.05
18 0 0 0 0 0 33.33 66.67
45 0 0 0 0 0 28.89 71.11
36 0 0 0 2.78 5.76 25 66.67
13 0 0 0 0 0 69.23 30.77
14 0 0 00 0 0 71 .43 28.57
The most interesting feature of the representation of children
in the feu cases in this study is the significance of the lauyer's
contribution in the hearing of a case. In all the cases uhere a
child uas represented legally, the child himself made no actual
contribution to the discussion, the greater part of uhich, in all
but one of the cases, uas accounted for by the participation of the
lauyer. Moreover, the overall mean contribution of solicitors in
the study cases uas as much as 64.48%, reflected in the fact that
in such cases, police interaction in addressing the bench uas only
33.59%. The situation as regards cases uhere there uas no legal
representation uas that the police contribution overall uas 56.06%,
a significantly different proportion.
But uhereas the greater part of the discussion to the Bench is
made by the legal representative of the child, it uas important to
consider not only the 'form® of the solicitor's contribution but
also the 'content*. That is, though the level of his contribution
uas acknouledged, it had yet to be assessed uhere the focus of the
solicitor's contribution rested.
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Over all the 13 cases where legal representatives were
involved, the mean content score was 38.21, indicating a rather
greater emphasis on 'judicial' factors than on 'welfare' ones.
What is equally interesting is that these 13 cases involved a
greater volume of interaction directed jto_ the bench than in the
cases where there had been no legal representation. The
'represented' cases had had a mean of 37.4 units of information,
whereas the others had only 19.57 units of information. Thus,
where there was legal representation, there was overall a greater
volume of discussion directed to the bench, the greater part of
which was offered by the solicitor. This discussion however
focused more on the offence information than on the child's
welfare. Their main concern was with clarifying the nature of
the child's involvement in the offence. What observation at the
hearing of the cases afforded was the opportunity to appreciate the
use of the information made by the solicitor and though it would be
more than unfair to suggest that the solicitor did not take the
child's welfare into consideration, some comment can be made at
this juncture on his presentation of information.
On occasions where the child's background characteristics were
revealed to the court by the solicitor, this was used not to
construct an argument relating to the child's needs or interests in
arguing for an appropriate disposal of the case. Rather, it was
used within the court predominantly as the basis for an argument for
the modification of any sentence intended by the magistrates. The
'modification' usually took the form of asking the court to show
leniency or to accept the mitigating circumstances of the child's
background, such as coming from a deprived area, poor family etc.
That is, though background and 'need' information was being used,
its use was determined more by a conceptual framework espousing
legal and judicial values with its greater emphasis on notions of
responsibility and culpability. The concepts of mitigation,
excuse and leniency are more readily located within a frame of
relevance based on responsibility and punishment rather than on
one of need. But with the shift in frames of relevance from
'need' to 'offence' criteria, there will also occur a subtle
shift in the interpretation of the personal, social and environ¬
mental characteristics of children who commit offences. Legal and
judicial ideology highlights notions of intent.
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Since there remains a right of appeal to a Sheriff in
Scotland, it is important to consider the extent to which judicial
and welfare modes of thought are compatible within the same system
of juvenile justice. Elsewhere we have argued that judicial review
of welfare decisions about children is problematic, a claim
supported by the fact that the judiciary themselves are in dis¬
agreement over when to allow an appeal. (Asquith 1978) The point
we make is that in the juvenile court system, the presentation of
information by a lawyer about a child, though it may make reference
to prima facie welfare considerations, is founded upon a predominantly
judicially oriented frame of relevance. Accordingly, the inter¬
pretation of information about the child's social and background
characteristics is made within a judicial frame of relevance in
which leniency and mitigation form part of the conceptual con¬
figuration. Interestingly enough, as we have seen, a number of panel
members also operated with such concepts indicating that they did
not subscribe completely to welfare considerations. But one
wonders whether the involvement of the legal profession within the
framework of the Children's Hearing system, albeit in the interests
of the child, would alter the practical accomplishment of juvenile
justice.
But on a wider level, this has as much significance for the
acceptance of a system of juvenile justice based on welfare by the
community. Criticisms of softness and unfairness, as with leniency,
may be made by those who, for their part, view delinquency control
in terms of punishment and justice.
As regards legal representation, an important feature of the
13 cases in England, without exception, was that the contribution
made to the Bench by children was absolutely nil, whilst parents
only made a contribution in one of the cases. And yet, as can be
seen from Table 7 the bench initiates little interaction with the
solicitor, whose role in the structure of the court proceedings was
fairly rigidly determined by convention. Consequently, there was an
allotted time at which it was appropriate for him to present his
information before the court, and as such he did not even require
to be invited by the bench to speak. But more importantly, the
presence of the lawyer, who may have only seen the child just before
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the hearing, would appear to obviate the need for the child and
his parents, if present, to speak and present their own case. As
can be seen, children and parents contributed very little to the
discussion.
Police
Where there was no legal representation, the greater volume of
statements to the bench was, not surprisingly, made by the police
prosecutor whose duty it was not only to present information about
the childJs involvement in the offence but also about his background.
Although the police make a large contribution to the discussion _to_
the bench in all the 34 cases (x = 40.33), only 3.1^Sof the discussion
from the bench was directed to the police prosecutor. Similarly, the
statements directed _to_ the solicitor (in the cases where one was
involved) by the magistrates was almost negligible. Neither the
prosecution nor the defence required to be introduced into the
discussion by the bench since, despite the hopes of the 1969
Children and Young Persons Act, it was expected that they knew when
was the appropriate time to speak. That is, the 1969 Children and
Young Persons Act had not removed the air of ritualism associated
with the adversarial nature of criminal justice. Certainly,
informality would be difficult to achieve in a system where
uniformed police operated; where the bench was physically removed
from the body of the court and where children and parents could
only speak when requested or with permission from the bench.
Clerk of the Court and Reporter to the Children's Hearings
What is obvious again, even restricting the analysis to those
cases in which lawyers were involved, was that the clerk of the court
actually played little part in the proceedings in open court (see
Table 7 ). But again we would not underestimate the role played
by the clerk because of the fact that much of his involvement in a
case took place in the adjournment room with the magistrates. The
magistrates themselves acknowledged the debt they owed to the clerk
because of his guidance in legal matters.
Interestingly enough, the Reporter in the panel hearings also
played little part in the proceedings apart from on occasion reading,
and even interpreting, the grounds of referral to the child. This,
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however, was not typical of the role played by the Reporter in
different areas in Scotland. In some areas, the chairmen of the
hearings were expected to put the referrals to the child, whereas
in others the Reoorter fulfilled this function. But
whatever practices were adopted have arisen by convention and are
not statutorily prescribed. Indeed, an examination of the 1968
Social Work (Scotland) Act will reveal that the actual duties and
responsibilities of the Reporter are vaguely defined. In at least
one respect, the role of Reporter epitomises the conceptual
ambiguity between the judicial and welfare frames of relevance
in as much as it is his job on the one hand to decide whether there
might be need for compulsory measures of care and therefore an
appearance at a hearing, and on the other to ensure that the
statutory requirements relating to the actual hearing have been
met.
Panel flembers and Magistrates
As all questions from the bench were directed through the
chairman for the day, there was little interaction in court
amongst magistrates. There may obviously have been more in the
confines of the petiral room, but in the courtrooom itself it was
negligible. Of the interaction that did take place between the
magistrates, the physical separation of the bench from the body of
the court made it difficult for the researcher, and undoubtedly
the child and his family, to hear what was actually said. But
more surprising is that within the more informal structure of the
children's hearing, though panel members did discuss features of
a case with the child and the parents, there was little actual
communication between panel members during a hearing. This does
not mean, of course, that individual panel members ignored the
interaction of other panel members, but that there was little
attempt to test each other more precisely about impressions of
what were considered relevant pieces of information and why.
This raises an intriguing possibility. In both systems,
individual panel members and magistrates do, of course, on occasion
disagree with the actual decision reached about a child; the
decision need not be unanimous since a majority is sufficient.
There is then explicit disagreement expressed about the decision.
However, just because a decision is prima facie unanimous, this
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does not necessarily mean that the decision has been reached on the
basis of the same information, on a similar interpretation of the
information available, nor with the same objectives in mind. We
have already seen that between the two groups there is considerable
disagreement as to the importance of a welfare frame of relevance and
sufficient evidence to suggest that within groups, especially the
panel members, the welfare orientation is qualified in a number of
respects, e.g. by considerations of leniency, mitigation etc. We
have also argued that information is only relevant in so far as it
is assessed within a particular frame of relevance. Yet we have
seen that in the actual hearings and the process of decision¬
making there is very little communication amongst panel members and
magistrates prior to the reaching of the decision. Operating then
with possibly different assumptions about the causes of delinquency,
the most appropriate measures of delinquency control and ebout the
functions of the available resources, apparent consensus and
unanimity may well conceal greater disagreements than actual
agreement. The process of decision-making in both the court and
the panel hearings is theoretically a collective enterprise. What
earlier research into 'penal philosophies' and 'the human element
in sentencing' (see Chapter V ) ignored was that decision-making,
especially in the lower courts was a collective process and that
the making of a decision was a complex social accomplishment
involving a number of people.
The interesting question that this raises, but which we can
not go into in detail here is whether in fact parents and children
themselves, who may well operate within more judicially oriented
frames of relevance (i.e. more concerned with intentionality,
responsibility, fairness etc.) actually truly become involved in
the decision-making process. We have already seen that at least
one panel member felt that a merit of the Scottish system of
juvenile justice was that parents and children could become fully
involved in the decision-making process. Thus, parents may
ostensibly agree with the decision, but for reasons little to do
with welfare consideration. An example would be where a child was
sent to a List D school by panel members ("because he needs a
structured environment") and where the parents agreed with the
decision ("because it's no more than he deserves").
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Nevertheless, by comparison with the court hearing, we would
argue that, on the basis of the evidence available to us thus far,
there does appear to be more scope for the involvement of the children
and parents in the discussion in a panel hearing. In terms of the
form' of the discussion in the panel hearings and the court hearings,
Hypothesis III receives confirmation inasmuch as the Scottish
system allows for greater involvement of the parents and children.
And in terms of the 'content2 scores, panel members pay more
attention in the discussion of a case to welfare factors, lending
support to Hypothesis I and in keeping with the conclusions in
the last two chapters.
Symbolic character of Hearings
Before we end this section on the actual hearings themselves,
it is perhaps worth commenting on how appearance before a court or
a panel may be used as a symbolic reminder to the child that he has
done wrong. We argued earlier in this thesis that symbolic denun¬
ciation of offence behaviour was associated more with traditional
theories of punishment, in its pure form, than with treatment or
welfare considerations. Indeed, one of the arguments made by early
advocates of the Scottish system was that it would allow for the
eradication of the stigma associated with court appearance.
In the court area, we have already seen that the participation
of key personnel in the hearing is circumscribed by a fairly
sterotypical protocol for court hearings. Much of what Carlen
(1976) has had to say about magistrates' justice could be seen in
the study court where formalism and the 'majesty' of the court
served to prevent normal social intercourse. The magistrates them¬
selves also argued that the very appearance of a child before a
court should be sufficient to 'bring home to him just what he has
done'; or 'have a salutary effect on the child'; or should 'deter
others'. That is not to be completely unexpected in a system of
justice where punishment of children is still a recognised,
legitimate objective.
But what was interesting was that panel members have also
evolved their own informal strategies for conducting hearings of
offence cases. We have noted the ambivalence of panel members
over the difficulty they experience in separating the relevance of
L
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'offence1 and 'need8 information. This is perhaps easier for
magistrates in a system which recognises that punishment is a
legitimate aim. Panel members do confess to differentiating
between children who appear for offence reasons and those who
appear for other grounds, in that those who offend have broken
the law. It would appear to be such an approach to delinquency
control which underlies the demands that panel members make for
the provision of separate establishments for offenders and non¬
offenders and for more powers to deal with 'hard cases'.
(See above p.xiS)
Even where the use of punishment is not explicitly stated,
the shift in the frame of relevance to one which attaches more
emphasis to offence criteria also has implications for the way in
which the hearing iteelf is conducted. The fact that delinquents
have committed an offence and have broken the law also determines
the posture adopted towards offenders by panel members. Bean
(1976) has noted the fallacy of moral neutrality claimed by the
proponents of the treatment approach and has suggested how moral
evaluations mediate the diagnostic terminology. The commonsense
distinction between delinquents and other children who appear before
a hearing is also reflected in the adoption of a moral posture by
panel members. This is not only in reference to those children who
are the 'real delinquents' or the 'serious offenders', but occurs
regularly in any instance where an offence has been committed. The
hearing is used as a symbolic reminder to the child that he has done
wrong and serves the function of delineating the parameters of
delinquency and conformity. In an attempt to bring home to the
child 'the seriousness of what he has done', panel members may
deliberately take steps to endow the hearing with an air of
formality, despite the promise of the Act. Indeed, some panel
members feel that hearings ought generally to be more formal
affairs so that not only children who appear before the hearings but
also the wider public may acknowledge the seriousness of an
appearance on offence grounds. Tactics adopted in an attempt to
make the decision more formal vary between panel members and
different panels, but include such strategies as lecturing and
evoking a sense of shame. Despite the formal intention of the
legislation, there are elements in children's hearings more generally
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associated with forms of degradation ceremonies1. What is parti¬
cularly interesting about such tactics is that they may even be
employed where considerations of need are paramount or even where
a decision has been made to discharge a case, and are not reserved
for cases which are conceived as being more serious in terms of
offence behaviour. Even where punishment is not an explicitly
stated aim, this does not rule out the use of shame, its moral and
social analogue.
Ue have already seen that amongst the reasons given by panel
members for decisions there was no explicit reference to punishment
whether it be in terms of pure punishment or punishment-treatment.
However, in the summing up by the chairman, children are warned
about their behaviour, lectured about the seriousness of appearance
before a panel, and even on occasion threatened with possible
committal to a List D school. Thus the public announcement of a
decision to the child and to his parents, even, it would appear,
where children are to be discharged, is often accompanied by
warnings about the possible consequences of further offence
behaviour.
It has not been possible, given the scope and limitations of
this thesis, to subject the hearing process, whether it be in a court
or a panel system, to a complete analysis. However, the significance
of the present analysis has been to identify important features of
the process of juvenile justice within a structure and setting
derived from a court of summary jurisdiction and one which is best
described as a form of administrative tribunal. By examining
important aspects of the actual hearings, we have been able to
make some comment on the practical accomplishment of a welfare
philosophy within different administrative structures. It was in
terms of the absence of such information that we criticised
earlier approaches to sentencing research.
Case Studies, Case Reports and Content Scores
An important consideration in this research was that the
methodological strategies should allow for some examination of
different aspects of decision-making within two different systems
of juvenile justice. Our main concern at this stage is to consider
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the extent to which the different types of hearing, court and panel,
influenced the nature of the decision-making process as a whole. To
allow us to develop our argument we shall first discuss the relation¬
ship beteeen the findings derived from the various stages of the
research. In particular, we shall focus on the relationships
between the Case Studies, Case Reports and the Content scores.
The adoption of a number of different strategies was an
attempt to progress from that approach employed in sentencing
research which can most appropriately be referred to as the ®black
box® model of research. Thus, the simple guiding factor was, as
far as possible, to allow the subjects themselves to provide
information as to which factors influenced their decision. Once
again, due to the characteristics of the court hearings, the
analysis for magistrates cannot be developed as fully.
The 90 Case Report and 90 Content scores in respect of the
30 cases in the Scottish sample were correlated with the panel
members® Case Study scores. The resultant matrix is presented in
Table 8.




























We have already noted that the panel Case Study scores and the
Case Report scores were both significantly different from the
respective court figures. That is, with a welfare mean of 43.36
for the Case Studies and a Case Report mean of 69.92, panel members
indicated the greater importance they attached to welfare factors and
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considerations than did juvenile magistrates. Yet when we examine
Table above, we find that there was no significant correlation
between the Case Study welfare score and both the Case Report and
Content scores (r = .079 and .028 respectively). This was both
unexpected and disappointing. In all three stages of the research,
the panel members had treated welfare considerations as much more
important than did the magistrates and we had expected that the
findings based on the Case Studies would bear some relationship to
the criteria upon which actual cases were dealt with and on the
nature of the case hearing itself. But although the welfare scores
in the case studies were also significantly different between the
two groups, the only significant relationship as regards welfare
considerations is between the Case Report and the Content score
(r = .224, p = .05 with 88 df). Thus, the high welfare score in the
Case Reports is reflected in and correlated with the high content
score, indicating that the criteria upon which a decision appears
to be based in an actual case is closely related to the nature of
the discussion. Reflecting the overall lack of correlation between
the Case Study welfare scores and the other scores, even when such
factors as sex, age, experience etc. of the panel members were
controlled for, there were in the main no significant correlations,
apart from those that existed between Case Report and Content scores.
What is interesting about all this is that the lack of
correlation is between the scores for the constructed cases on the one
hand and the scores for actual cases on the other. The reason for the
lack of association between the three types of score may well then be
related to either the construction of the Case Studies or to the
process of their completion. UJe shall return to this after briefly
discussing the juvenile magistrates' scores.
Because there was little actual discussion in the court
hearings, it was only possible to examine the relationship of the
juvenile magistrates' Case Study and Case Report scores. In brief,
the lack of significant correlation between these scores for panel
members was repeated in relation to the magistrates. The relation¬
ship between the magistrates' Case Study welfare and the Case Report
2
scores was not significant at all (r = -.052 n.s. 92 df). Thus,
although there were significant differences between the two groups,
there was a similar lack of association between the Case Study and
Case Report scores.
2. See Appendix IV(d).
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All along in this thesis we have argued that the assessment of
information as relevant for the prupose of decision-making will
ultimately be determined by the predominant frame of relevance
espoused by individuals such as panel members and juvenile
magistrates. We thought that the assumptions and beliefs main¬
tained by individuals about delinquency causation and delinquency
control would find expression in the actual decisions made, for the
purposes of this study at least, by panel members and magistrates.
Though welfare considerations are important in the Case Studies,
and though we do find these expressed in the case Report and Content
scores, there seems to be no relationship between them, apart from
the fact that the importance of welfare is common to all three scores.
A number of the panel members and the magistrates commented, however,
that the case studies, though they resembled the kinds of information
presented to them, were very different from the actual hearing of a
case. The case studies were considered 2abstractions1 from the real
life situation and 'would give the wrong impression1 of how decisions
were made. Certainly, there were a number of ways in which the
case studies could be considered 'abstractions', e.g. there were no
parents, children or social worker to question, only a limited choice
of information was presented for assessment as to its importance,
there were no other reports available, and the individuals did not
have to reach a decision. Thus, although in terms of the general
commitment to welfare considerations, the case studies revealed
significant differences between the two groups (as was intended),
they are not necessarily a good indicator of how individuals will
act in a real-life situation. On the basis of the Case Studies, we
had expected that welfare considerations in general would underpin
the discussion at a panel hearing and also inform the criteria on
which decisions were made. This, in fact, happened but with no
connection between the Case Studies and the actual cases, at least
as far as related to individual's scores. A conclusion that can be
drawn then is that, methodologically and theoretically, the weakness
of the case study method is its inadequacy to give anything but
general indications as to how and for what reasons people make
decisions about actual cases. Even where simulated cases have been
employed in as authentic a manner as possible, their use has been
recognised as having serious limitations (Lemon 1974, p.37). The
situated aspect of decision-making makes the hearing of cases in a
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panel or a court a very different enterprise from the assessment of
constructed cases in isolation from the demands and restrictions of
actual hearings.
At the time of the research there had, in fact, been eleven
people who had just been appointed as panel members and who had had
no experience of actual hearings at all. These eleven were asked
to complete the Case Study stage of the research. A number of
interesting findings mere made and it is perhaps pertinent to discuss
them at this stage of the analysis when we are considering the
importance of the experience of actual hearings.
Over all the Case Studies, new panel members did in fact
indicate by their scores that they attached even greater importance
to welfare factors (x = 39.14) than did those who had gone through
the training programme and who also had experience of actual
hearings (x = 43.36)(n.s. ). The difference was, however, not significant.
What is interesting, however, is that the 'new' panel members
treated the sociological factors of Case A as more important than
did the experienced panel members for whom it was the Case in which
welfare factors were considered less important than for any other
case. Again this may well raise some questions about the impact
of the training programme as of the experience of decision-making
in hearings, both of which may contribute to a change in individual
perception of the status of certain information. Dust as the hearing
situation confronts panel members with the reality of offence
committal, so are panel members presented with the reality of having
to deal with behaviour which is perceived to be the result of
environmental causes. Only when confronted with this reality may
panel members alter their views as to the relevance of certain types
of information.
Even the training programme offered to panel members was one
in which those professions with an individualistic or case-work
orientation were heavily involved with consideration given to wider
sociological factors only in so far as it could impinge on
individual behaviour. It is particularly interesting in this respect
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that the book now (at the time of writing) widely used by panel
members in their training (Martin and Murray 1976) is one in which
there is no sociological contribution and in which much of the
material is provided by psychologists and social workers.
In terms of other factors such as Social Protection, Harm
and Personal Responsibility, we found that 'new1 panel members were
less concerned about the importance of these than were their
experienced colleagues. However, in Case E the case referring to
the assault, they were more concerned about Social Protection.
But, in general, perception of these factors as less important
than indicated by their colleagues may well suggest that there is
some truth to the belief maintained by a number of panel members
that -
"
.... it's a good thing that you can't serve any
longer than three years without being reconsidered.
You can too easily become 'hard' with these
children when you think what they've done."
Discussion
What we wish to return to now is a discussion of our suggestion
that the search for information in the panel and court hearings is
influenced as much by how information is sought as it is by what
information is available. Decisions are theoretically the outcome
of the organisation and assessment of information based on the
individual's knowledge about resources, treatment and behavioural
problems, and on the objectives he hopes to attain. However, the
search for relevant information in a hearing is not an individual
enterprise, but a collective process circumscribed by the more
social and symbolic features of different types of hearings.
In the juvenile court hearings we attended, the Bench did not
have much opportunity for open discussion in court, the search for
information being more overtly circumscribed by the formality and
ritualistic nature of the decision-making process. Reports from
various agencies had to be read either in open court or in adjourn¬
ment with the result that magistrates only had a limited time to
familiarise themselves with the material contained in them. Panel
members, however, have reports available a number of days before a
hearing and therefore have the opportunity to assimilate the material
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and to employ this as a 'spring board5 for further discussion. One
of the consequences of this was that there appeared to be different
types of decision-making by panel members, which we can crudely
label 'backward5 and 'forward5 decision-making.
In keeping with the feet that the juvenile court in England in
some senses remains a modified court of criminal law, the reports
are only available after the acceptance of or finding of guilt. In
Scotland, social work and other reports can be, and usually are,
prepared before the child has even appeared at a hearing. This
obviously gives rise to further considerations of the legal
protection available to children. But as regards the decision¬
making process, with the availability of reports prior to the
hearing of a case, panel members may reach some tentative con¬
clusion as to what the decision should be in a particular case.
Perhaps this is particularly so when the panel member adopts a more
offence-oriented frame of relevance since the bulk of the
'relevant5 information will already be available to him (e.g.
police charge sheets, grounds of referrals etc.). This may not
only apply to individual panel members but to a panel as a whole
where prior discussion of a case allows panel members as a group
to reach some tacit agreement as to what should be done and how
the hearing should be constructed. What we refer to as 'backward'
decision-making is that approach in which decisions are tentatively
reached in advance of a hearing and where the hearing is used to
obtain information that will serve to justify that decision. It
is 'backward' since the search for information is dictated by a
decision already reached. As we have argued above, panel members,
where offence or judicial considerations are important, may also
decide prior to a hearing to adopt particular approaches such as
lecturing, inducing shame, or employing the 'sword of Damocles'
with veiled threats. The hearing then takes on a more symbolic
role than perhaps might be expected in an administrative tribunal.
'Forward' decision-making is, we suggest, an approach to
decision-making that is more logical inasmuch as it is characterised
by the attempt to assess all information prior to the reaching of a
decision which is then the conclusion to a widely-based search for
information. It is then justified by reference to specific sets of
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'relevant' information, leading to specific conclusions about a
child's needs and the most appropriate1 measure. The contribution
of parents and children in this form of decision-making is important
because the greater level of communication within a panel hearing
may well mean that they can influence the decision itself or at
least be involved in the whole process. But the general point to
be made is that within a system of juvenile justice based upon a
welfare philosophy, the availability of information prior to the >
actual hearing influences the decision-making process, though
doubts may be raised about the justice of social work and other
reports being prepared before acceptance of the grounds of referral.
In the court system, where reports are only available after the
finding of guilt, and where the finality of the court setting
i
inhibits open discussion, the search for information is a very
different enterprise with most reliance being placed on written
reports and the statements of the prosecutor and lawyer.
Perhaps just as significant a characteristic of the actual
hearing process is the role played by the chairmen in the hearing.
We have already discussed the difference in the Content scores of
those who were and those who were not panel chairmen. As a result
of discussion with the panel members in the study and also of his
involvement in seminar groups with those training to be panel
members, the significance of the chairman in directing a hearing
3
became rather obvious to the researcher. Not only does he have
formal responsibilities and duties (e.g. in the Scottish study area
the reading of the grounds of referral), but since only experienced
panel members can be chairmen at hearings, their less-experienced
colleagues may 'expect some guidance and support1. Nevertheless,
some panel members felt that the role of the chairman was too
influential since certain individuals 'often abused their position
and dominated the proceedings by exerting undue influence or
pressure on their colleagues'.
The methodological significance of all this is that it may
well point to the inadequacy of the case study method in so far as
it fails to cater for the restrictions and peculiarities of the real
3. The researcher attended and was involved in a seminar employing
a videotape of a hearing which was used to analyse the role and
responsibilities of the chairman.
life situation. The hearing of offence cases at actual hearings
may well force more into the open the conceptual ambiguity between
welfare and judicial considerations as indicated by subtle shifts in
the frames of relevance adopted by individuals and the nature of the
hearing process. Dealing with offence cases in actual hearings
where the situated aspects of decision-making are important may
well account for in part the lack of association between the Case
Study and other scores.
The theoretical significance, we argue, is that at the very
least it is unwise to divorce the nature of the hearing, whether
it be court or panel type of hearing, from the decision-making
process as a whole. This is particularly so because the making of
decisions in panel and court hearings involves more than one person
and because the very hearing itself can become imbued with symbolic




It is not new to suggest that there may well be a clash
between what we have termed a welfare ideology and a judicial
ideology. As we discussed in fact in Chapter IV the historical
development of juvenile justice reflects the continued attempt to
reconcile the competing claims of the two approaches within a single
system of juvenile justice. However what we suggested early in
this thesis is that responses to delinquency are determined in part
by the manner in which delinquency is conceived. Hence, we argued
that an important consideration in dealing with delinquents was the
extent to which they could be held to be responsible for their
actions. Thus, our examination of the free-will/determinism
debate in philosophy was an important preliminary to a consideration
of the causal accounts of delinquency offered within the approach best
characterised as criminological positivism. What we sought to do
was to identify 'available ideologies' which might be the source of
frames of relevance employed by those responsible for making decisions
about delinquents. A number of points have to be made here.
Firstly, we were not concerned in the earlier part of this thesis
simply to point out the salient differences between punishment and
treatment. That, as we hope was clear, is too simplistic a
dichotomy to be made. Secondly, though we were more concerned with
whether human action could be explained in terms of some conception
of responsibility or rationality on the one hand and causal accounts
of behaviour on the other, our purpose was not purely philosophical.
Rather it was to provide the means for analysis of the conceptual
frameworks underlying two very different systems of juvenile justice -
one in which the judicial, legalistic court structure was maintained
and the other in which a social agency or administrative tribunal was
seen to be the more appropriate medium of intervention. Thus
though the trend has been away from conceiving of the delinquent as
a responsible individual and towards deterministic and causal
accounts of delinquent action, systems of juvenile justice more often
than not reflect a compromise between these competing assumptions.
In England the retention of the juvenile court structure and
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the retention of more punitive sanctions was in recognition of
the fact that at least some of the children dealt with could be held
to be responsible and thereby liable to punishment. The importance
of the issue of 'responsibility' is that it allows blame or fault
to be ascribed prior to the imposition of either punitive sanctions
or welfare measures.
In Scotland, despite the fact that the Children's Hearings were
based upon a more overtly welfare ideology, they do not have the
monopoly over delinquency control. (Asquith 1979). In Scotland,
children can still be prosecuted in a system where the age of
criminal responsibility is still eight; children can still go to
court to have the facts established if they deny the grounds of
referral to a children's hearing; and, surely neatly reflecting the
ambiguity and compromise between a welfare and judicial ideology,
the right of appeal against a decision by a children's hearing is
heard by a sheriff in the first instance.
Our concern then was to examine the extent to which decisions
about delinquents reached by those operating within the two systems
reflected the competing judicial and welfare ideologies. In one
respect then the empirical study has been an examination of the
translation of social policy into., practice in the context of two
very different organisational structures. We were interested then
in the extent to which the frames of relevance adopted by lay panel
members and lay magistrates in the decision-making process reflected
elements of the different ideologies, the implications that this had
for the use and assessment of information as well as what was revealed
about the different organisational structures in question. The
rather simple orienting assumption was that in ordinary moral
discourse the question of responsibility is crucial for the ascription
of blame and punishment. Our interest was in whether it was
important in the making of decisions about delinquents and what
implications would follow. In that respect we believe a number of
points were established in the course of the empirical study.
Methodologically we were committed to analysing the frames of
relevance by which individual panel members and juvenile magistrates
assessed and used information for the purpose of decision-making.
What we must argue here is that the lack of overall relationship
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between the welfare scores attained by the case study method and
the other strategies adopted suggests that the situated aspect of
collective decision-making in an actual hearing is very different
from a simulated exercise. Actual decision-making in a court or
panel hearing is a collective process involving other magistrates
or other panel members, parents, children and other appropriate
personnel. It involves exchanges of information both written and
verbal in a rather formal setting. And with particular reference to
the panel members, the symbolic use made of the hearing itself
suggested that they did in fact ascribe more importance to the fact
that the child had done wrong than was expected on the basis of
the case studies. In terms of the analysis of the situated
aspect of decision-making and the logic-in-use (Cicourel 1968)
of the decision-makers our approach may even then not have been
sufficiently sensitive for what is a socially constructed event.
There is more to a hearing, whether it be a court or a panel hearing,
than simply the sum of the different perspectives employed.
In general terms it would appear that the panel members in our
study ascribed more importance to welfare considerations than did
the more judicially orientated magistrates. The frames of relevance
espoused by the panel members were predominantly concerned with
the social environmental and personal characteristics of the children.
Nevertheless, in terms of the 'available ideologies' of delinquent
explanation, both panel members and magistrates^taPi*^ m tHe c.au«.at cWuissed
aVnttCpXtgY "nor1#. vmpoc Vro.nct. Vo vAeiPace. Pac>or,s n tv,0ie Casts dk«.p^cV-,n^ i^\ dwidvuU.iV><_
a<\*| of vwosuggested
earlier that this may well be due to the fact that the welfare approach
to delinquency has developed generally within the context of the
development of social, and particularly social casework, services.
Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that individualistic types of
explanation will inform panel members' and juvenile magistrates'
decision-making. However, it may also be linked to the question of
responsibility or fault in another way. Individualistic explanations
as excusing from responsibility may be more acceptable than^Por «.*<*<»>pit,
sociological forms of explanation where the theoretical links between
cause and behaviour are less readily made.
i But though panel members were more concerned with welfare than
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judicial considerations, they did nevertheless indicate that
they agreed with magistrates on certain issues. In particular,
in the case study stage of the research we saw that Intentionality
was almost equally important for both groups of subjects, though
for juvenile magistrates this was also correlated significantly with
the other personal responsibility factors, Awareness and Consequences.
Moreover, where the offence was one of assault on the person there
was also less disagreemnet between the two groups.
In the Case Report section however we found that, despite the
earlier prima facie agreement about the importance of Intentionality,
panel members' decisions were based more on welfare criteria and
included no explicit reference to punishment. Magistrates however
did, and legitimately so given their role, state their desire to
punish amongst the reasons for their decision and were much more
concerned with judicial considerations. The implication that we make
from this is that the importance of specific considerations, such as
Intentionality, has to be gauged in the context of the frame of relevance
predominantly and generally employed. Thus, where the frame of
relevance is derived from welfare considerations, the concern may be
made with the moral development of the child rather than any desire
to establish fault or guilt. Similarly the importance for individuals
of such factors as previous offence involvement or the number of charges
cannotsimpliciter be taken to indicate that panel members or magistrates
are thereby committed to a punitive philosophy or a tariff approach
to decision-making. There is some ambiguity however amongst panel
members for whom leniency and mitigation seem to be pertinent concepts.
Institutionally, the welfare and judicial ideologies are more
neatly separated for the juvenile magistrates than panel members in
that they are legitimately concerned with the issue of guilt or
responsibility, are permitted to punish but they can also decide
whether a child is in need or not. There are thus stages in the
proceedings where 'offence' or 'need' considerations can be divorced.
For panel members, the position is more complex since theoretically
they are only concerned with the need for a compulsory measures of
care and their allusions to 'offence' considerations are more subtle
than is the case with magistrates. The ambiguity of 'judicial1 and
319.
'welfare' ideologies is perhaps more keenly experienced within an
administrative system of juvenile justice in which panel members are
not formally concerned with the issue of responsibility. Nevertheless,
it is an important concept in ordinary moral discourse and we suggest
that though not overtly 'judicial' in their orientation, panel
members nevertheless still distinguish between those who have committed
offences and those who have not. This is particularly so in the
hearing of actual cases, about which a number of points of comparison
can be made.
F.irstly, there is much more discussion in panel hearings than
in court hearings and this relates more to welfare than judicial
considerations.
Secondly, in panel hearings, parents and children themselves have
more opportunity to be involved and there is evidence to suggest that
their part in the discussion also focusses more on the social and
personal characteristics of the child.
Thirdly, the search for and use made of information in a panel
hearing is very different from the court hearing in that the reports
can be used as a springboard for discussion in which their contents
can be explored with the family and amongst the panel members.
But what is interesting is that despite the more informal
approach in the panel hearing, we do in fact find panel members adopting
moral tactics which serve to differentiate between offenders and
non-offenders. The symbolic use of the hearing and the adoption
of moral postures serve to impress on the child, without in any way
being overtly punitive, that he has done wrong.
A number of general points can be made. Firstly, we have
suggested that panel members and juvenile magistrates, on the basis
of this study, employ very different frames of relevance. Wore
concerned with welfare considerations, panel members will interpret
information and reports about offenders generally in terms of the
need for care rather than in terms of what he has done. Nevertheless,
they may well still make subtle distinctions between those who have
committed an offence and those who have not in keeping with ordinary
moral discourse. Given the lack of basic differences between the
two samples in terms of personal characteristics, we would argue that
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the greater emphasis in training given to judicial and legalistic
matters, and the fact that they also operate in adult courts of
criminal law, will make juvenile magistrates more inclined
to operate within a judicial frame of relevance in which responsibility
is important.
Secondly, there may well be implications for relationships
between different bodies within the organisational network of
different juvenile justice systems where different groups share,
or conversely do not, similar frames of relevance. Thus, in the
Juvenile Court in England, there is a closer working relationship
between the magistrates and the police than there is between panel
members and police in Scotland; in Scotland, on the other hand, there
appears to be some evidence that there is more of a shared approach
to delinquency control between panel members and social workers than
is the case with magistrates who have 'lost power to the social
services.1
Similarly, even where groups of individuals may agree on the
objectives of delinquency control, there may nevertheless still be
disagreement as to the causes of and best means of treatment of
delinquency. Thus a number ,of panel members and magistrates can
still refer to psychiatrists as 'trick cyclists' and argue that
'we need an interpreter for psychiatric reports.' Thus, individuals
have to work out for themselves what source of information and
recommendations is most relevant and this will usually be in keeping
with the preferred frame of relevance. A hierachy of relevance
as it were, has to be constructed.
The general point that we are making is that basic differences
in the ascription of relevance to prima facie similar information by
individuals might also reveal much about the social structure within
which they make decisions. Thus, the organisational network of
different agencies within any preferred system of juvenile justice
may be characterised by different philosophies of delinquency control
with implications for organisational co-operation.
Perhaps the last point that we would make is that any attempt
to assess or evaluate how a system of juvenile justice is 'working'
cannot simply be made on the basis of an examination of the official
statistical returns. These are also dependent upon the selective and
interpretative activity of the decision-makers and may be poor sources
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for evaluation. A further implication is that comparative
research on different systems of juvenile justice must recognise the
significance of the organisational structure and the conceptual
frameworks underpinning the system.
Social policy is translated into practice and implemented only
through the interpretative activity of key individuals operating
within very different structures. The appropriate source of
information about the practical accomplishment of juvenile justice
is neither the statute books nor the policy statements but the
actual context in which decisions about child offenders are made.
The significance of the phenomenological approach to research, though
we could not follow its dictates completely in this thesis, is that
the activity of individuals has to be analysed within a particular
context. The conceptual groundwork for this thesis should not
be taken to suggest that more philosophical or theoretical work per se
is demanded; rather it has to be assessed with reference to its
contribution to the empirical study. Analyses of social policy and
social policy research we believe can only benefit from the







Since we wished to compare the means of samples of less than
50 observations, the small sample t test was generally employed,
particularly in the case study analysis. The formula employed was
t = *1 " *2 N




Where X .was employed, the formula we used was
Y2 1 c ( . , 1 v2 ) . . 1X = S ) 1 - a n^J ( where a and a
n1 x n2 a + a '
represent any associated pair and where n^ and n^
were the total frequences
3. Coefficient of Variation
In the attempt to examine the extent to which scores, again
particularly in the case study analysis, were scattered about their
means, the coefficient of variation was calculated by expressing the








SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND Case studies
(a) All scores
Social Aware- Conse- Intention-








































































































(b) t values: 'between' scores
Personal
Social Aware- Conse- Intention- Respon-
Welfare Protection Harm ness quences ality sibility
All
Cases 5.49 3.851 2.532 3.38 1.75 2.64 3.71
Case A 2.307 3.407 2.32 1.36 .98 .08 .558
Case B 4.05 2.02 3.37 2.39 1.78 1.19 2.26
Case C 4.2 2.27 2.93 2.79 .93 1.79 2.95
Case D 4.32 3.26 1.13 1.67 .44 1.51 2.05
Case E 4.59 2.05 .623 3.03 1.5 3.03 4.36
Significant t's are underlined

















































































Awareness 11.12 12.12 11.44 12 11.73
Consequences 12.25 12.76 12.37 12.33 12.82
Intention- ality 9.94 9.47 9.94 10.17 9.09

































(d) t values 'within' scores
When controls uere maintained for certain variables, there
were in fact very few significant differences Within* Case Study
scores. The significant differences were all in relation to
Harm and were between those who did and those who did not have
experience of youth work (t = 2.0582 p = .05), and those who had
left school before they were 17, compared with their colleagues






















































































In general, there were very few instances of significant
differences in the scores when controls were maintained. Perhaps
the most interesting was that between the welfare scores for those
who had had experience in youth work (x = 47.08) and those who did not
(x = 53.89, t = 3.0835, p = .01). Similarly, still in relation to
experience in youth work, those with previous experience had a
significantly different Awareness score (x = 10.83) from those
who had not (x = 8.63, t = 2.3572, p = .05). What is noteworthy
about the other scores in relation to experience in youth work
is that, though they only approached signifiance, there was a
distinct trend indicating that those with experience in youth work
were generally more concerned with welfare considerations than with
any of the more judicially oriented factors.
In relation to Intentionality, what is particularly
interesting, though the differences fall short of significance,
is that the trend indicated that with increasing experience in
both Ouvenile and Adult courts, more importance was attached to
this factor. Again, though the difference was not significant,
those with most experience as panel members had returned the
lowest score for Intentionality, thereby indicating its greater
importance for them than their less experienced colleagues.
(g) /-
(g)CaseStudies:Pan ldCourtSc res:tv/ l ewithntrolm i tain d Social WelfareProtectionHarmAwareness Male(31df) Female(29df) Age 0-40(16df) 41-50(1df) 51+(31df) Completionf Education Under16(25df) 16-20( 8df) 20+(15df) Experiencein YouthWork Yes(35df) No(25df) MemberofCaring Profession Yes(29df) No(31df)3.1815 3.4736 1.1279 2.7812 3.3743 2.6057 5.116 2.3147 1.6908 5.4869 2.3073 4.09083.1998 2.2624 .8858 .5725 3.1016 2.4905 1.728 1.9336 1.2612 4.1757 1.9429 2.31143.117 1.5333 1.9338 1.749 1.62 1.4455 1.6817 2.2716 .8382 3.8926 1.8853 1.3975
1.9408 2.6835 .507 2.3265 2.5388 2.1956 2.5517 .3375 .7094 4.0281 .5278 4.1258
Conseguences 1.2557 1.1156 .125 .0985 2.0563 .4283 3.1815 .7734 .0358 1 .8633 .9829 2.0058
Intention- ality 2.7419 1.0822 .907 3.5619 .7266 .6329 1.8276 2.3144 .9652 1.8196 1.6992 1.4518







(a) Case Report Scores: Differences between Panel and Court
Panel (n) Court (n) t P
All scores 69.92 (90) 51.76 (96) 6.8301 .001
Male 69.33 (38) 55.33 (44) 3.5105 .001
Female 70.65 (52) 48.78 (52) 6.14 .001
Age 0-40 68.32 (44) 48.61 (8) 3.8606 .001
41-50 67.66 (10) 52.42 (26) 1.8958 .1
50+ 72.51 (36) 51.89 (62) 5.0637 .001
Completion of
Education
Under 15 66.57 (34) 58.95 (28) 1.7194 .1
16-20 72.94 (29) 43.08 (27) 6.8559 .001
20+ 70.92 (27) 44.49 (21) 5.9716 .001
Experience in
Youth Work
Yes 70.15 (64) 52.90 (28) 4.4798 .001
No 69.3911 (26) 51.26 (68) 4.0664 .001
Member of Caring
Pro fession
Yes 69.78 (58) 45.32 (26) 5.8294 .001
No 70.13 (32) 52.94 (68) 4.1594 .001
What this table indicates is that the overall difference
between the panel and court Case Report scores is repeated, with one
or two exceptions, when we controlled for specific variables.
Moreover, as we discussed in Chapter VIII, there were no significant
differences within the respective groups and therefore the generally
different Case Report scores between the samples have to be
appreciated in the absence of any material differences within the
samples.
When we examined the length of experience of panel members and
magistrates, though it was difficult to make meaningful comparison




Length of Experience n
6 months 68.77 (24)
2 years 6 months 61.95 (12)
3 years 6 months 70.86 (54)
Magistrates
Adult
Length of Experience Court n_
0-5 years 50.96 (24)





0-1 year 55.39 (3)
2-5 years 53.58 (49)
5+ years 48.374 (37)
(b) Oudicial factors treated as important for decision-making:
panel and court t-values
Social Serious Aware¬ Conse- Intention'
Protection ness Harm ness guences ality
1+ charges .891 1563 2.168 n.s. n.s. 1.915
1 charge 3.1464 4. 953 .712 2.716 2.57 1.286
Theft n.s. 2. 09 1.311 n.s. 2.434 2.2803
Theft x H.B. 1.407 1. 883 1.658 n.s. n.s. 1.165
No previous g22
offences




2.53^ 2.409 1.672 1.529 1.008 2.074






Parental control 28 21












Previous record 3 5
1st offence 4 12
Bring home nature/
offence ~
To punish - 1
To deter offender - 3
To give a short, sharp shock - 5
Prevent crime - 11
Protect public - 3
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When we examined for significant differences within the panel
scores we found that only in two cases were the t-values significant.
These were for the difference between the scores for Members of
Caring Professions and those who were not (t = 1.8539, p = .05),
also those who had left school before their seventeenth birthday had a
significantly different (and higher) mean than for those who
had pursued further education (t = 1.737, p = .05). The
difference, however, was only just significant.
(c) Panel Members: All Welfare Scores Correlated
Case Study: Case Study: Case Report
n_ Case Report Content Content
All (90) 90 .079 .028 .224
Male (38) 38 .16 -.022 .073
Female (52) 52 -.009 .105 .342
Panel
Experience
6 months (24) .293 -.29 .223
2 yrs 6 mths (12) -.467 .136 .42
3 yrs 6 mths (54) .166 .288 .143
Age
0-40 (44) .186 .117 .207
41 - 40 (10) .024 -.34 .535
51+ (36) -.144 -.145 .178
Completion of
Education
16 and under (34) .007 -.1 .241
17 - 20 (29) -.114 -.224 ♦ 428
21+ (27) .283 .211 .038
Member of Carinq
Profession
Yes (58) .060 .0873 .152
No (32) .136 -.075 .367
Youth Experience
Yes (64) .132 -.017 .193
No (26) .128 .2234 .308
Significant correlations are underlined
(d)
Because of the lack of comparable hearing analysis in the
court area, only the Case Study and Case Report welfare scores
could be correlated.








































































CASE STUDY 'A' j(r,,iuv<io*m£.f4TAw "bereetiiMisfi^
James Green, 99 Lowvale Road, Hightown Estate, Charington (Age -lit)
James lives with his parents and sisters in a council house in
Hightown Estate, where there is a high level of anti-social behaviour.
Many of the houses have been damaged as a result of vandalism and
James' own house has been without electricity for some months because
the family were unable to pay the bill. His father has been
unemployed for four months and this may also explain the recently
incurred rent arrears. As with many families in the area, the Greens
are receiving assistance from the social services department.
School reports indicate that James is not without ability, but
that he lacks the motivation to concentrate on his studies and eagerly
awaits the day, two years hence, when he can leave school to find a job.
According to the social worker, the financial and living
circumstances of the family have been creating strain in the
relationships between the different individuals in the household.
James may therefore not be receiving the guidance and control he needs.
Recreational facilities in the area are of a poor quality and
indeed most have been closed due to vandalism and gang fights. James
spends most of his time with his friends just walking about the streets
with no particular purpose in mind. The majority of his friends are
known to the police. He shares his father's and associates' distrust
of authority, especially the police, who are seen as patrolling the
Estate in order to 'pick up' youths like James at the slightest chance.
However, his association with local gang elements is giving rise to
concern, in that prior to the Green's move to the Estate, some three
years ago, he had never been in trouble with the police.
He states that the offence was committed by him in company with
his friends, all of whom wanted to go to Hopkirk to see their football
team, Armingham Thistle, play. Since none of them had sufficient money
to pay their fares to the game, James suggested that they 'arrange'
their own transport. He knew of a man whose family were on holiday and
that the man himself worked nightshift. When he was at work his car
was left unattended outside the house. On the night they wanted to
leave for the match, James organised two of his friends to keep watch
while he and another stole the car. He knew how to cross the ignition
wires with silver paper and so did not need the appropriate key. Entry
to the car was just as simple, since the quarterlight was easily forced
with a screwdriver. After the match and on their way home, they decided
that it would be best to abandon the car and in doing so, drove it through
a fence into an orchard. The car was considerably damaged and would cost
£lj.00 to repair.
Although they made off at the time, they were later apprehended by




1. He was well aware that what he was doing was against the law.
2. He comes from an area where there is a high level of anti-social
behaviour.
3. His family is in a bad financial position.
li. He should have anticipated the consequences of being caught.
3. living conditions generally are extremely poor in the estate.
6. Society has a right to protection.
7. James initiated and planned the whole affair.
8. His associates have been in trouble with the police previously.
9. This incident resulted in considerable damage to property.
10. There are no recreational facilities in the estate.
CASE STUDY 'B' 3>e.tee.«iNUiiO
William Black, Fotheringham Children's Home (Age -13)
Willie was removed from his parental home at the age of five on the
advice of the social worker who was involved with the family. His
father was a chronic alcoholic who was unable to give the necessary
emotional support to his wife who was virtually left to raise Willie
and his younger brothers on her own. Mr Black's alcoholism also
meant that he could not provide the material requisites for bringing up
his family. Due to financial and emotional pressures, Mrs Black had
a nervous breakdown when Willie was only about one year old. While
she was in hospital, all her children were looked after in separate
foster homes, and Willie apparently experienced his separation from his
mother as most traumatic. When Mrs Black returned from hospital, it
took Willie some time to settle down and he began behaving in an
extremely aggressive manner towards his mother. This situation
improved slightly with time but deteriorated again when Mrs Black left
home because she felt her husband's excessive drinking becoming too
much for her. The children were once more split up and sent to
Children's Homes temporarily.
Mrs Black returned after a period of one year but the social worker
decided that, because she was still showing signs of her nervous
condition, she was unable and apparently unwilling to care for her
children or to show them love and affection, the children should
therefore be removed from the parental home on a permanent basis.
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For different reasons, some administrative and some arising
from Willie's own personal problems, he has been taken care of in
various homes. In this way, and as a result of his enforced
separation from his mother, he has experienced rejection in many
different forms.
According to the report from the house in which Willie is at
present, he is something of a problem. He attaches himself to no
one in particular but forms shallow relationships with anyone who
happens to be available. Moreover, his behaviour shows various signs
of regression, including bedwetting. He does not seem to have
sufficient self control but rather acts on impulse and for immediate
gratification. Nor does he accept the most ordinary discipline, but
is easily frustrated if he does not get his own way. His school
report emphasises the disruptive effect his behaviour has on the rest
of the class.
Willie says that it was not his idea to break into the school but
that he was asked by some of his friends to go with them. This he
decided to do, although he did state to the social worker that he knew
-it was wrong to do so. Once inside the school, however, Willie took
an active part in the destruction that followed, and actually led the
others to what seemed to them to be a music room. In this class room
they hammered tape recorders and musical instruments with billiard
cues taken frcm the games room. Generally, they ran through the
school continuing to destroy property.
When they came to the science laboratories, they broke a
considerable amount of apparatus before they found a cupboard containing
methylated spirit. This they used to start a small fire with some
jotters, but when the fire got out of hand, they left the school
premises and stood at the perimeter fence, waiting until the fire
brigade came. Total cost of the damage to the school was £12,000.
CASE STUDY *B«
1. He was not forced to go with his friends but went through choice.
2. Extensive damage resulted from the fire.
3. In his formative years, his life was spent in an unstable home
environment.
li. He knows the difference between right and wrong.
5. Consideration must be given to the protection of public property.
6. Since he was five, he has been in the care of the local authority
in a Children's Home.
7. He well knew what would happen if he were caught.
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8. He is only able to form superficial relationships with others.
9. On several occasions, he has experienced rejection.
10. He acts on impulse and is easily frustrated.
CASE STUDY 1 C T
Jimmy James, b Provost Road, Lamington (Age -15>)
Last year Jimmy was placed under the supervision of the social
services department for his part in a fight between rival football
supporters in which a youth was stabbed quite seriously. The present
offence occurred while he was still under supervision.
Since he was dealt with for the last offence, far from benefitting
from his period of supervision, Jimmy's behaviour has deteriorated
considerably. His previous offence, up to which he had never been in
trouble before, came as quite a shock to his parents, who are both well
known in the area, his father being a prominent member of the church.
Apparently, since then they have used the name 'delinquent' in
addressing Jimmy any time he does not comply with their wishes. They
also require him to be in at nine o'clock although his sister is allowed
to stay out longer because she is more 'trustworthy'.
At school, where he was doing quite well before this first offence,
the teacher would refer to him as a young tearaway in front of the class
and repeatedly warns the other children that they will turn out like
Jimmy James if they do not keep out of trouble. Jimmy has reacted in a
way which he thinks shows his contempt - by living up to his delinquent
tag. He now bullies other young children at school and has started
associating with a crowd of boys who are constantly in trouble with the
police. Since then his former friends have been prohibited by their
parents from meeting him and as a result he has tended to seek
companionship amongst an anti-social element in the area. He has been
blamed at school, and in the neighbourhood for things of which he had no
knowledge, but which were readily attributed to him because of his
reputation.
The police are keeping a close watch on him and he is amongst the
first to be 'picked up' and question^ when an offence has occurred.
Perhaps as a result of this, he now frequents the adjacent housing estate
in which his new found friends live and in which anti-social behaviour is
readily entered upon. He has adopted their dress of denim jacket, jeans
and boots in preference to his school blazer and more casual clothes.
His parents now feel that he is incapable of spending money wisely on
clothes and so have reduced the amount he gets as an allowance.
He and his friend had made up their minds to break into a factory
which was quite near their home. Although the factory had closed down
some time ago, it was left standing intact until the new owners arrived.
Guard patrols make regular rounds in the property immediately
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surrounding the factory. Jimmy and his friend therefore had to
watch the factory for two or three weeks prior to the offence, in
order that they could work out the safest time to break into the
factory, without risk of being caught. Since the factory had been
engaged in the manufacture of plumbing equipment, lead was
extensively used and some deposits of it remained scattered about the
factory floor. It was the lead which Jimmy and his mate were after,
since they could sell it below market price to local scrap dealers
without too many questions being asked as to its origins. They were
both aware of the risks involved but felt sure that they could get
away with it.
They cut through the mesh fence surrounding the factory with wire
clippers and made their way to a side door where the friend used a
steel ruler to open a yale lock. Once inside, it was an easy matter
to collect the lead and put it into a sack but as they were doing this,
they heard the sound of a patrol, with a dog, making a tour of
inspection of the factory. Both made a dash for the fence and only
managed to scramble over it without being caught, but not before a
patrolman saw them and was later able to give their description to the
-police. Not only did they fail to get the lead off the premises, but
they were also apprehended by the police that very night.
CASE STUDY 'C'
1. He is old enough to know the difference between right and wrong.
2. He has been forced to seek companionship amongst the gang element.
3. Since his previous offence, he has been treated as if he were
untrustworthy in all respects.
iu A deliberate decision was made by him to break into the factory.
3. The offence involved damage to property.
6. He is always amongst the first to be questionned if an offence is
committed.
7. He was aware of the consequences of being caught.
8. Seen by others simply as a delinquent, he is forced to behave as one.
9. He takes the blame for many things of which he has no knowledge.
10. Protection of property has to be given due regard.
341.
CASE STUDY 1D' £.£>&Hfwi60(l&K)
Charlie White, Birdfield Avenue, Farnton (Age -15)
Charlie comes from an area of Farnton in which there is
considerable anti-social behaviour and frequent confrontation between
the police and the local criminal element. Charlie associates with
many of those who have been in trouble with the police and with one of
them committed the offence which constitutes the present ground for
referral.
Mike, Charlie's friend, had remarked that he was short of money
and needed some to buy new clothes. Charlie suggested that they could
'raise' the money by stealing some goods frcm the local Woolworth's
store, then selling them. To many of their friends, the department
stores offered many opportunities for theft with little risk of being
caught. They decided ihat they would take a tape recorder since it was
light enough to carry and was likely to be in demand by various
unscrupulous buyers. They then worked out a plan for executing the
theft.
According to the social worker who was given the account, Charlie
was to act as a decoy while Mike was to be the one who actually stole
the tape recorder. It was to be from Woolworth's because, unlike the
other larger stores, the arrangements for the protection of goods were
known by them to be very poor. They went into the store and while
Mike made his way to the appropriate counter, Charlie asked the attendant
if he could see the record players on the pretence that he wanted to buy
one. Meantime, Mike had begun tohandle the cassette tape recorders and
when he was sure that he was not being observed and that Charlie had
managed to distract the attendant's attention sufficiently, he slipped
one inside his denim jacket. He then walked out. When Charlie saw
this, he 'decided' that he did not like the record players shown to him
and also made his way out. However, both boys had in fact been watched
on a concealed closed circuit television and were caught at the door.
It seems that Charlie has acquired his distrust of authority from
his father, a building labourer, who has himself been in trouble with
the police. When Charlie was younger, his father used to live away from
home because his work at that time involved travelling. Mrs White was
left on her own to look after Charlie, but because she was also working,
there were many occasions when he was allowed to do simply as he pleased.
When his father was at home, he was more inclined to punish Charlie
physically than was Mrs White who used to bribe hers on with sweets or
extra pocket money. This pattern of inconsistency is reported in a
social work report as being general throughout Charlie's upbringing, as
a result of which he is inclined to act on impulse and from selfishness.
It was during his adolescence that he began to associate with the
delinquent element of the area in which he lived, and during which his
distrust of authority was strengthened.
Most of his participation in crime has been aimed at obtaining the
benefits of material possessions, as well as winning for him high esteem
in the eyes of his friends who see his flaunting of authority as something
to be admired. The fact that there exist law enforcing agencies does
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little to modify his belief that crime pays. Rather, he now views
his criminal activities as a source of material and personal reward.
He scorns the police and it is likely that his future will be one of
frequent contact with the law. If it is not impressed on him that,
in the long run, anti-social behaviour does not pay, he will be
tempted to participate in more serious behaviour in the belief that he
will for the most part escape the consequences.
CASE STUDY 'D»
1. Though aware of the consequences of being caught, he felt he could
escape them.
2. His parents were inconsistent in disciplining him in childhood.
3. He was well aware that what he was doing was against the law.
h' The area in which he lives has a high incidence of anti-social
behaviour.
.3- Charlie himself suggested that he be a decoy in the theft.
6. He has lacked the opportunity for learning socially acceptable
behaviour.
7. His attitude of hostility to authority is reinforced by contact
with others of similar mind.
8. The item stolen was of some value.
9. The status he enjoys amongst his friends makes him participate even
more in crime.
10. Society needs protection from theft.
CASE STUDY 'E' CBIQUOCHCQU. "be-rtj'mivjisn')
Brian Brown, 6 London Road, Kirkhaven (Age -13)
On the night of the offence, Brian and his gang, of which he is
leader, were walking the streets of Kirkhaven at about 10 o'clock. At
this time, the pubs began to empty and a number of the patrons were
walking home. According to Brian, he and a few of his friends followed
two men, who appeared the worse for drink, oversome common ground where
there were few lights. Their aim was to rob the men whom they supposed
to be incapable of defending themselves. When the time seemed right,
they stopped the men and demanded money or else they would 'do them in'.
However, the men refused to hand over the money despite the threats and
started to hit out at the youths. Some of them ran away but Brian stood
his ground and, according to his own report, took out a steel comb which
was sharpened at one end, whilst the other was covered with insulating
tape to act as a handle. He then began to fight with one of the men,
343.
inflicting injuries on him which later required several stitches.
He was however, unable to use the makeshift knife, but injured the
man with his fists and feet.
The account of the fight given by the men included the statement
that, while one was chasing what remained of Brian's gang, Brian was
fighting with the other using heavily booted feet. According to them,
he seemed to have lost control of himself and even when he was being
restrained by both men till the police arrived, he began to struggle
violently. They did not recollect actually seeing the steel comb and
it can only be assumed that Brian, not having the opportunity to use it,
and well aware of the consequences of possessing it, had hidden it on
his person before the police arrived. However, it was found on him
during a search in the police station.
Brian's father had died when he was two and his mother had remarried
shortly after. Mr and Mrs Brown have three children by this marriage,
none of whom display the same aggressive tendencies as their half
brother, Brian.
Mrs Brown stated that her first husband, Brian's natural father, was
an extremely aggressive man whose temper got him into considerable
trouble. She feels that Brian is, in this respect at least, very
similar in nature to his father.
Brian had been an extremely demanding baby in that he had cried a
lot from his earliest days and needed continual attention from his mother.
When he was a toddler, frustration of his immediate desires brought on
particularly severe bouts of temper. In later childhood, discipline was
never readily accepted by Brian without resulting in expressions of anger
and temper tantrums. Mrs Brown feeis that she looked after him as well as
she could and is convinced that she provided him with sufficient
emotional warmth as well as having adequately met his material needs.
But she herself received little sign of affection from Brian.
When he was seven, Brian had a pet rabbit which he teased, for no
other reason apparently, that that he enjoyed doing so. Later he began
to treat it rather cruelly and actually brought about its death.
At school, his tendency to slip into violent behaviour without much
provocation is recorded as having a disruptive effect on the whole class
as well as hindering his own development. He has attended remedial
classes throughout his educational career. Outside school, his
inclination to hostility made him the natural leader of a gang of boys
amongst whom his fierce fighting ability was not only respected but feared.
According to the social worker who visited the family, Brian is
without shame or remorse for what he did to the victim of his attack and
has by all accounts never been known to have shown these emotions in
relation to any of his behaviour.
CASE STUDY SE*
1. The injuries he inflicted on the older man were quite serious.
2. By nature, Brian is extremely aggressive.
3. There is a history of aggression in Brian's childhood.
4. As leader of the gang, it was his decision to attack the man.
5. The public must be protected from such offences.
6. He has inherited his father's aggressive temperament.
7. He is well aware that it is illegal to carry an offensive weapon.
8. Frustration easily arouses his extremely aggressive temper.
9. He has never been known to show remorse or shame.
10. He knew fully the consequences of being caught.
(ii) In all cases, as can be seen from the statements following each
case study, all children took deliberate decisions to be
involved in the offence and all children were aware of the
wrongful nature of their action. However, the offences were
of different types and involved different consequences. In
summarised form these were:
Case A Theft involving considerable damage to the value
of £400.
Case B Malicious Damage involving considerable damage to
the value of £12,000.
Case C Theft by Opening Locked Premises involving minimal
damage.
Case D Shoplifting.





CASE (indicate by offender's initials)
1. Briefly, what were the main reasons for the decision?
2. Was the decision influenced by
(a) The availability of suitable resources
(b) Statutory restrictions
(in both cases delete as appropriate)
3. Did you agree with the actual decision reached?




5. Given ideal resources what would your decision have been?
6. For what reasons.
7. Indicate by placing a tick in the appropriate box whether you thought
that, for the purpose of reaching a decision in this case, the available
reports were Very informative, Fairly informative or Not informative
about the offender's background and circumstances.
Similarly, if any report available to you made a recommendation as to
the appropriate disposal of the case, indicate whether, on the whole,






















B Child's relationship with father
Child's relationship with mother
Child's relationship with siblings
Family unit as a whole
Financial position of family





Either/both parents in trouble
Child treated as delinquent since he
has been in trouble before.
Use of leisure time
The offence was committed in the
company of others
Parental discipline of child














Nature of this offence
Child aware of what he was doing
Child aware that it was wrong
Child aware of consequences of
being caught
His behaviour was intended
This was a serious offence
A lot of harm was done
Society needs to be protected
This offence is occurring too much
Father's attitude in the Hearing
Mother's attitude in the Hearing
Child's attitude in the Hearing
Sibling/s in trouble
Social worker's relationship with
family
Child denied the facts which were
established in court




Case: Start: Finish: Adjournments:
Present:






























Aware of his behaviour
Aware it was wrong
Aware of consequences




Serious/harmful nature of offence
Societal protection
Prevalence of offence ! !
Nature of offence j
No. of previous offences [
Previous disposals !
Points of law _J i_
1) SW rel. to offender/family 1 |
Modifying influences > I
Availability of resources \ |
Legal restrictions j I
Discharge i !_
Home supervision ! [
Residential
Other
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